Draft

Vr - Februari 6, 2004

Yogis and Children - Rough Draft

Yogis and Children

Rob Hogendoorn

My doctrine has two modes,

Advice and tenets.

To children I speak advice

And to yogis, tenets.

Lankavatarasutra

In 1989, at the request of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama, one of the foremost Western translators of Tibetan Buddhism, Alexander Berzin, visited the Ganden, Drepung and Sera monasteries re-established in exile in the south of India. Berzin addressed the monastic community there, explaining that he had been asked by the Dalai Lama "to come to the three main monasteries of Sera, Drepung and Ganden to speak about the situation of Buddhism and Buddhist centers in foreign countries."

[note: A full transcript of Berzin's remarkable "Address to the Monks of Ganden, Drepung, and Sera about Buddhism in Foreign Countries", held in Mundgod and Bylakuppe, India, January 22-26, 1989, can be found at: http://www.berzinarchives.com/modern_adaptation_buddhism/address_monks_buddhism_west.htm. Ganden, Drepung and Sera are the three largest monasteries belonging to the ge-luk order of Tibetan Buddhism. Together they house ???? monks. Other, less omvangrijk, monastic orders are the nyingma, sakya and kagyü.]

Although I find it hard to judge how Berzin's advice weighed with his ge-luk audience, I'd expect that after such an introduction he must at least have had the rapt attention of the "Venerable Abbots, Lamas, Geshes and monks" he addressed.

[note: Contrary to what is often assumed, the Dalai Lama is not the formal head of the ge-luk monastic order. In fact, historically, the Dalai Lamas' relations with ge-luk monastic authorities have been somewhat strained. 13th Dalai Lama reform, 14th Dalai Lama ban Shuk-den. A recent controversy surrounding the practice of the Dalai Lama by no means is in a position to give orders . Still, both as a "simple Buddhist monk" and as the temporal leader of a informally the Fourteenth Dalai Lama commands deep respect. Berzin, who as a lay person is no part of the monastic community, has been translator to the highly respected, .... a former debate partner of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama. ]

First, I shall briefly summarize the prologue of Berzin's address, as a prelude to my discussion of one remark made by Berzin that, at least to me, is emblematic of a certain philosophical myopia that plagues many Western students of ge-luk scholasticism. inhibiting its reception in mainstream Western culture. Given Daniel Cozort's observation, surveying the state of ge-luk buddhism in the West, that there's only one barrier that currently holds up a further expansion of Tibetan Buddhism, namely "the emergence of a cadre of Western-born teachers" [note:"The Making of the Western Lama], I ask myself whether this stagnancy [stagnation] is merely a temporary, practical problem, or, indicative of a rampant philosophical 'idling' [stagnation, complacency]. From where I'm at, I see the continuous arrival of eager, open-minded students of ge-luk buddhism, and a steady departure of tired, hardened students too. I wonder: are these the contingencies of hype and lack, or perhaps the predictabilities of dilettantism and wishful thinking? Why is the interest in Tibetan Buddhism for some so easy to arouse, and for others so hard to keep? In recent years, much has been made of the lure of Shangri-la and the dark side of Tibet. I do believe these approaches are valid, but my own tack is mainly philosophical: can one advance spiritually by distancing oneself from one's past?

The address is fairly straightforward. Having briefly reviewed the rise of Buddhist centres in the West, Berzin assesses the nature of the Western interest in Tibetan Buddhism along with a few distortions that Westerners tend to project, and proceeds by discussing some of the difficulties involved in properly translating Tibetan Buddhism in Western languages. This prefigures, as a matter of course, his discussion of the cultural divide that Tibetan teachers meet when visiting or staying in the West. At this point, Berzin impresses on his audience the religious and cultural variety of the world outside Tibet and India, concluding that "although there are some general characteristics that most modern foreign countries share in common, it is important for those who are going to teach and translate there to take an interest in and learn about not only these common features, but also about the culture of the specific country they are going to. This will help them to understand better the people they are teaching, and enable them to help them more."

So far, so good. I do feel that speaking about Westerners Berzin sounds somewhat condescending here and there, but perhaps this is merely to placate his Tibetan hosts to the prospect that there's real merit in developing the Wild Wild West. [note: To be fair, Berzin does explicitly mention that ..... His argument is valid and brave, I think, ] Having thus set the stage for the next topic, 'Advice for Teaching Westerners', Berzin stresses that "teaching foreigners is quite different from teaching Tibetans." He reprises the varieties of modern culture and catalogues a few of its general features, such as an inquisitiveness paired with skepticism, and a prevalent lack of faith in Buddhism, pointing out to his Tibetan hosts that therefore "it is necessary to be patient with them and when they question something, not just think they are disrespectful or have wrong views."

But then follows a casual yet telling remark, that, at least to me, is emblematic of a very common yet often unstated a-philosophical stance. Berzin advises his Tibetan hosts: "It is very helpful to learn something about foreign religions, like Christianity and Judaism, and about psychology. Western philosophy is not so important to learn, since most foreigners do not study it. However, psychology is something everyone knows about, and is very important for being able to explain the Buddhist teachings on the mind to them. Also, Judeo-Christian and psychological ways of thinking shape very much the types of questions that foreigners ask. If the Geshes and translators can understand the cultural and religious backgrounds of the foreigners, they will understand their questions better."

[note: I do not know for a fact that Berzin's advice still stands, but given the fact that his address at the time of writing this is the longest of four papers he makes publicly available via the internet on his "Berzin Archives" website. on the internet website under the heading 'Modern Adaptation of Buddhism"...

First of all, leaving aside any posited 'yogic' or psychic powers of Tibetan teachers, I simply can't see how they could even begin to learn to understand the cultural and religious backgrounds of their foreign students without appreciating their philosophy too. Further, it may be very true that, in general, Western audiences have only a very rudimentary understanding of philosophy, "since most foreigners do not study it", but the same goes for their comprehension of religion, psychology, science, or any other topic Berzin says prospective teachers in the West should study. Indeed, measured by ge-luk scholastic standards, even highly educated Westerners probably "know about" hardly anything at all.

[note: superiority complex]

To begin with then, it seems as if Berzin gives his Tibetan audience a good excuse for not studying Western philosophy for the wrong reason.

Moreover, just as the Western mind continuously and unreflexively avails itself of 'folk psychology', 'folk physics' and 'folk religion', it routinely parses reality using the beliefs and projections of 'folk philosophy' as well.

[note: Here, I take my lead here from a conception of "folk psychology", introduced by Daniel Dennett in 1978 and since then put to use in developing his notion of the self as a "center of narrative gravity" and of free will as . [note: "The Intentional Stance", "Consciousness Explained", "Brainchildren". Specifically, the qualifier 'folk' refers to people's everyday, deeply intuitive, understanding of themselves and each other in psychological, scientific, religious or philosophical terms, abstractions which may or may not be corroborated by the respective academic disciplines themselves.]

The past decade, Charles Taylor, in "Sources Of The Self" and "The Malaise Of Modernity", convincingly argues how popular philosophical intuitions, and Stephen Toulmin in "Cosmopolis" and "The Return Of Reason" how concomitant philosophical assumptions about reason prefigure throughout popular discourse on the crises that self, authority and reason.

[note: Although, ever since his participation in the Mind and Life meeting of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama with Western scientists (documented in Sleeping, Dreaming and Dying), various Buddhist scholars have cited Taylor's "Sources Of The Self" as being relevant to Western notions of the self, I suspect that many do not quite appreciate how deadly his arguments on epistemology are for the naive presuppositions that currently govern popular reception of ge-luk madhyamaka.] the Expectations, Fenner "spiritual accounting"

Now, fortunately, within the context of ge-luk scholasticism the issue is not whether or not this spontaneous 'philosophizing' is a singularly good or bad thing. If anything, our philosophizing gives us a window of opportunity to improve our lot. Thupten Jinpa characterizes Tsongkhapa's reading of madhyamaka reasoning as a form of 'self-criticism', aimed at liberating our minds from a "deap-seated tendency for reification", specifically "designed to prevent the virtuoso Madhyamika from succumbing to any of the possible metaphysical havens the he may otherwise seek" [note: "Self, Reality and Reason in Tibetan Philosophy: Tsongkhapa's Quest for the Middle Way", p. 62]. Jinpa continues: "That many of these standpoints represent tenets of actual historical schools is, as far as Tsongkhapa is concerned, an interesting coincidence. In fact, it strenghtens his point that these are possible routes one might quite naturally take to seek refuge if one is not vigilant through a critical approach." Much could, or perhaps should, be said about the epistemological presuppositions and consequences that attend Tsongkhapa's view, but I hope that for present purposes the following will suffice.

starting point

If Cozort and Preston [note: "Buddhist Philosophy", SnowLion 2003, p. 8] are right in paraphrasing Tsongkhapa that, to be able to subject our (unconsciously held) beliefs to rigorous analysis it is crucial that we first correctly identify what they are, it may well be inevitable that Westerners with a ge-luk bent focus on their own 'indigenous' beliefs first. I very much doubt that the Western students' metaphysical safe havens are instantly recognizable as identical to those of their Tibetan teachers, or the putative beliefs of Indian vaibashika's, sautrantika's etc etc. Any such correspondence to ancient Tibetan doxographies – however interesting – is coincidental anyway, according to Tsongkhapa. Therefore, maybe, from a ge-luk madhyamaka perspective, the proper study of Western philosophy is the only way out of the maze of our own beliefs.

To effectively take stock of our preoccupations and hang-ups then – as did our Indian and Tibetan madhyamaka predecessors in their day and age – we'd therefore better study Western philosophy and the history of ideas hard, retrieving and delineating the actual – not putative – safe havens and escape routes we ourselves might "quite naturally take" seeking refuge from madhyamaka reasoning. [note: Welwood "spiritual bypassing"]

After all, didn't the Buddha say that we should diligence

Most of this work has yet to start, I fear. Too many Western converts to ge-luk buddhism seem to think that they're exceptions to the rule and that, quite contrary to common sense, their philosophical slates are spontaneously cleansed as soon as they start studying and practicing with a Tibetan teacher. Moreover, the articulate generation of Western Buddhists that converted in the 60s and 70s, Berzin included, seems to be particularly prone to thinking that the only proper use one could make of Western philosophy is to either critique or laud Buddhism. It simply doesn't occur to them that Western philosophy could help them make sense of Buddhism too. Remember, many members of these pioneers were barely twenty years old when they left their homelands to study and practice Tibetan Buddhism abroad, and they may have been naively antagonistic towards Western culture and philosophy at the time. Indeed, there seems to be a pervasive pattern within Western Buddhist circles, as observed by Lewis Richmond, of a "clinging to counterculture roots" paired with a strident anti-intellectualism, that goes a long way in explaining why even the suggestion is met with weerstand oproept

[note: Richmond, in his perceptive "Ten Reasons Why Western Dharma May Fail", notes that "Western Dharma's leaders and core adherents are still predominantly aging alumnae of the counterculture (although this is definitely changing), many of whom still retain an aversion to mainstream American culture. In other times and places, Dharma entered the culture at the top, through the king and ruling class. Western Dharma's lingering association with counterculture values (distaste for business, government, and mainstream institutions of local and national community) limits its accessibility to those who never shared those values, as well as a younger generation who had no experience of it." On the anti-intellectual stance, Richmond remarks, "The last two decades has produced a new generation of rigorously trained academicians specializing in the study of Buddhist texts and commentaries, but many Dharma centers display little interest in what they have learned. Anti- intellectualism – another artifact of counterculture values – is common in Dharma circles." Deploring the resultant lack of critical examination and intellectual dialogue, Richmond observes, wryly, "Buddhists are not supposed to believe in God, but it often seems that we subject our faith and beliefs to far less intellectual scrutiny than those who do."

Batchelor

Having participated in a Tibetan Buddhist study program loosely modeled upon the ge-luk monastic curriculum for some years myself, I've encountered an awkward, disconcerting disparity of means.

Soon upon their first acquaintance with ge-luk scholasticism, many Western students fervently throw themselves into studying translations of their teachers' Tibetan presentation of rather arcane tenets of madhyamaka soteriology. For uninitiates the intricacies of ge-luk madhyamaka thought can be intellectually very challenging. It requires constant, strenuous effort from both the Tibetan teacher, near-simultaneous interpreter and senior students to give novices a partial command of the myriad philosophical complexities and about-faces that ge-luk masters appear to take in their stride.

Hoping to ever be able to enhance their understanding in proper dialectical debates, the more ambitious students attempt to supplement what they learn directly from their Tibetan teacher, consulting on their own miscellaneous translations, commentaries and expositions that contemporary scholars have made available in English over the past three decades. Adopting a Western Buddhist vocabulary of choice, they adroitly transpose Tibetan 'maps of the profound' onto charts, categories, outlines, glossaries and other mnemonic devices, ever striving at "getting straight" the verbal presentation.

Often, they tentatively start learning colloquial or classical Tibetan, soon discovering that ouside academia. [note: Lopzez, Hopkins] Some even become monk or nun, to

get it right, not distorting Hopkins

discussion, examination

[Lopez 12-year old]

Still, as Paul Williams

Others, out of an 'inverted conservatism', attempt to preserve what they do not yet own. Truly committed to the 'preservation of the pure teachings', they preempt their teachers' culturally induced trepidation vis-à-vis modern scholarship – often referred to with the term 'buddhologists', the use of which has definite pejorative overtones – by eschewing contemporary literature altogether, hardly reading anything other than the prescribed course materials.

[note: Institutionalized, NKT]

Indeed, I found that after some time, and especially after students have taken on tantric commitments, for many 'protecting the practice' by the screening of heterodox perspectives became almost intuitive, a natural reflex. The tantric practice of 'guru devotion' raises the stakes dramatically, of course. In my own case, when two (semi-)resident teachers had become the tantric guru of a large group of students, soon after the initial euphoria had subsided and the demanding practice of tantra had begun in earnest, the relation between peers became strained. Novice practitioners of tantra, myself included, can manifest a grave spiritual anxiety, which all too easily leads them to misconstrue innocent, open-minded remarks or questions as the much dreaded criticism of the guru, the guru's guru, and so forth, ending with the Buddha himself. This way, I found, a very oppressive intellectual climate can take hold among students, which has discourse among peers falter through intermediate stages of self-censorship and censure, to a point of utter meaninglessness.

practice in its own right, almost institutionalized, often designated as 'cultivating the right view'. 'protecting the practice'

afzetten tegen wat eraan vooraf gegaan, denigrating it

tijdgebrek wegens tantra

just as they are presented, phonetically mouth Tibetan liturgies with no comprehension at all of their scope and intent. absorb

And yet, no matter how diligent and eager to learn these students appear to be, all but a few remain blatantly ignorant of their own philosophical and cultural presuppositions, unable to contextualize or question their newly acquired faith at all. Having prematurely lost sight of the intellectual horizons that could make their conversion meaningful - or at least intelligible - they unknowingly dwell in epistemological and moral vacuousness. Thus, their predicament is strangely reminiscent of

'Malaise of Modernity' "against this background of chaos and contradiction that the spiritual traditions of the East are able to shine out as bastions of wisdom and sanity." AWO, 19

Williams says, "Often part of the problem, it now seems to me, is that the knowledge of Christian thought and experience of Christian practices possesed by many Westerners is quite childish and elementary. It is what we learnt at school. It is no more sophisticated than that of an eleven year old. Very few people are sufficiently interested in Christianity to study Christian theology and philosophy in any depth during their teens. (...) [TUW, 9] Thus when we come to compare Christianity and Buddhism it is not surprising that Buddhism often seems so much more doctrinally and spiritually sophisticated. The Christian thought outside the New Testament that many people are familiar with is commonly the Christian 'mystics'. vervolg p. 10

having lost one's bearings, one's unable to explore the

Thus captivated by their own dilettantism, these students unwittingly evoke false expectations in themselves, their preceptors and peers, eventually leading to disillusionment and embarassment for all. Tibetans assume Western levels of intelligence to be very high, on average. Paul Williams (TUW, 9) explains this tendency thus: "When we come to Buddhism as adults we immediately start studying Buddhism at a level that traditionally would have been the preserve of an elite of highly talented and advanced practitioners, usually monks and nuns. We read the advanced stuff (even if we cannot practice it). This knowledge of really quite advanced Buddhist thought gained from the many books now available in the West, plus deference to a dominant culture and the level of Western education, is one reason why Tibetans tend to think Westerners are so very clever (if lacking in self-discipline and application)."]

But even after years, whenever a Tibetan teacher - often a learned Geshe, who can be very inquisitive - casually challenges his students on their 'own' ground, questioning them perhaps on science, psychology or philosophy, hardly an answer is forthcoming. Stranded in intellectual no man's land, having established no firm footing in either Buddhist or Western philosophy, their students apparently can't hold their own defending any view at all, whereas their teacher, who presumably can stand his ground debating within the parameters of ge-luk orthodoxy, is hardly ever challenged to do so from an heterodox perspective. This asymmetry is not unlike that of ge-luk debate itself, where the defender is held accountable for the truth of his assertions, whereas the truth content of the challenger's questions is irrelevant. [cf.

THC, 211 and DTB, 28]

In their introduction to the second part of "Cutting Through Appearances", a much used annotated translation of an eighteenth century Tibetan doxographical text, Jeffrey Hopkins and Geshe Lhundup Sopa explain that the genre called 'presentations of tenets' (grub mtha'i rnam bzhag, siddhantavyavasthapana) mainly refers to Tibetan delineations of Indian Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophical systems. [CTA, 111] In order to get a handle on the plethora of philosophies in Indian Buddhism, they say, Tibetan exegetes, over centuries of interpretation and interpolation, amalgated disparate views into coherent doctrines, as if they constituted a hierarchical scheme of four separate schools.

[note: Their doxographical format largely an artificial, retrospective creation, these Buddhist schools, in order of estimation, are known as the 'Lesser Vehicle' Vaibashika and Sautrantika schools, and the 'Great Vehicle' Cittamatra and Madhyamaka schools.]

In India, of course, the need to reconcile divergent opinions expressed in the Buddhist canon had already led to meta-scriptures such as the Samdhinirmocana, [cf. BL, 57] addressing and arbitrating doctrinal inconsistencies between early scriptures such as the sutras and abhidharma. [cf. Bl, 226, nt 14] Thus, José Cabezón makes clear, "by the time such questions had reached Tibetan exegetes like Tsong kha pa and mKhas grub rje the issues were at least third order (and sometimes fourth)." [BL, 57] Eventually, the tradition of Buddhist scholasticism that had begun aan het begin van onze jaartelling in India mondde uit in the works of the dGe lugs pa order founded by Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), whose

Strongly influenced by Indian Buddhist doxographical texts such as Bhavaviveka's "Blaze of Reasoning" and Shantaraksita's "Compendium of Principles", the Tibetan genre of 'presentations of tenets' became ever more systematized, evolving extant Indian interpretative strategies into a sophisticated (worldly-wise) hermeneutical program that allows for the comparative study of different Buddhist schools in order of ascendancy.

[note: Following Donald Lopez' introduction in "Buddhist Hermeneutics", I shall conceive of hermeutics as the principles governing the retrieval of meaning from texts. In his essay on the interpretation of the Mahayana sutras in India, Lopez himself contrasts the "hermeneutic of accomodation" with a concomitant "hermeneutic of control, whereby rival philosophies are subsumed." [BH, 6] For discussions of ge-luk hermeneutics: Buddhist (Vajra) Hermeneutics, Speech of Gold. Tibetan Literature, Buddhism and Language]

Tsong kha pa himself did not study this way, however

emulated Tsong kha pa's development of faith. Dreyfus

In Tibet, Hopkins and Sopa say, "students are taught this four-fold classification first, without mention of the the diversity of opinion that it does not include, but then over decades of study the structure of such presentations of schools of thought is gradually recognized by many students as a technique for gaining access to a vast store of opinion, a way to focus on topics crucial to authors within Indian Buddhism." [CTA, 119] On this view, ideally, students gradually climb the ladder that takes them from the so-called lower schools to ever higher levels of meaning. Meanwhile, on their ascent, they develop the critical accumen and skills needed to eventually penetrate the pinnacle of Buddhist thought, prasangika madhyamaka.

pragmatic,

rational, not elaborate account historical accuracy or authenticity, comes to the fore

eventually, the ladder will have to be discarded.

adaptation that determines the vitality of the ge-luk tradition, is primarily accomplished by the practice of exegesis or interpretation, which, of course, shields the tradition's constitutive texts themselves from challenges to their authenticity and validity, [cf BL, 70]

relation between folk psychology and academic psychology is an avenue to understand buddhism as a craft, not a theory, (...) "the craft needs to be adjusted to acknowledge the existence of perplexities and peculiarities and contrary predictions that the craft had never before made" [cf. BC, 83]

Ideally, students gradually ascent through the philosophies of the so-called lower schools to the pinnacle of Buddhist thought, Madhyamaka.

– allowed for a gradual approach that had students develop over decades of study both the faith and capacity that a true appreciation of the most profound view requires.

"Thus, the aim of studying schools of philosophy is to gain insight into the fact that many perspectives that are basic to ordinary life are devoid of a valid foundation and thereupon to replace these with well-founded perspectives."

To replace perspectives unfounded with These texts are primarily studied

"Furthermore, the etymology for 'tenet' (grub mtha', siddhanta) is as follows: a tenet [literally, and established conclusion] is a thesis decided upon and established in reliance upon scripture and / or reasoning and which from the perspective of one's mind, will not be foresaken for something else." [CTA, 150]

"'Tenet' [established conclusion] signifies one's own established [it.] asssertion within being demonstrated by reasoning and scripture. Because one will not pass beyond this assertion, it is a conclusion [it.]." [CTA, 150]

Assuming that contemporary Tibetan adepts appropriate Tsongkhapa's view in much the same way as his own disciples did, modern Western scholarship, adopting its own hermeneutical principles, frequently adds further layers of exegesis. [remains unexplored, cf. BH,9]

Another striking example is given by Georges Dreyfus, himself a former Tibetan Buddhist monk and the first Westerner to complete the ge-luk curriculum and achieve the title of geshe. Discussing the meaning that traditional Tibetan scholars find in studying the Abhisamayalamkara and similar texts, Dreyfus observes that, contrary to popular belief, "the study and reflection on the great texts is for the most part not experiential. The study of Madhyamaka can be a preparation to meditation, but most of the other topics – particularly the presentation of the path, the curricular area to which the greatest amount of attention is devoted – are not. These "impractical" studies are meant to bring about a strong faith in the validity of the Buddhist tradition, as they did for Dzong-ka-ba in Ngam-ring. The discussion of the path is central to Tibetan traditions because it habituates students to the universe in which these narratives make sense, and thus strengthens their religious commitment." [THC, 178] Although Dreyfus qualifies this assesment considerably by pointing out that (...) especially His Holiness further complicates reception a

Raising self-critical awareness considerably, Dreyfus' observations seriously inhibit Western students' ability to take their Tibetan teachers' presentations at face value. (...) Ironically, in recent years – due to popular demand for meditative practices and perhaps to counteract the impression of being overly intellectual – ge-luk teachers in the West have begun to stress precisely the experiential nature of studying of the 'great texts', stopping short of presenting them as meditation manuals.

"For the dGe lugs pas, therefore, in the end the critical spirit must triumph." In a note, Cabezón remarks that, "Interestingly, this is the same conclusion that Vasubandhu comes to in his Vyakhyayukti." [BL, 231]

skeptical, self-conscious times, devolved

conclusions are not established

tenet holders neither proponents of Outsiders' tenets, nor of Insiders

cf. BL, 211 nt 5

disoriented students

culturally alien presentation of Buddhism

locus of a lack of self-critical reflection that, I believe, seriously inhibits the current popular reception of ge-luk madhyamaka scholasticism in the West.

moral and epistemological ambiguities

Needless to say, when analyzed in terms of ge-luk scholasticism, a sense of disorientation falls far short of creating a Buddhist 'universe of meaning' cf. THC, 242

ironically, 'homeless'

yogis and children

Losing one's bearings in a meaningless universe cf. THC, 243

angst voor afwijzing

stood their ground

haribadra (cf THC, 179) faith - followers of faith/dharma abhisamaya

George Dreyfus often heard the Fourteenth Dalai Lama comment that, in his own words, there are "no self-evident (ldog ldog) paths existing out there."

So, perhaps Berzin rather should have given his Tibetan audience the following advise: "For you, Western philosophy is not so important to learn. Since most foreigners do not study it of their own initiative, however, oblige them to do so, or their faith shall not be based on genuine reason and they will be easily swayed." I believe this is also the intent of the Fourteenth Dalai Lama's own insistence, often misunderstood as an interreligious courtesy, that changing one's faith should not be taken lightly. Above all, Westerners need to appreciate the value of their native traditions, the Dalai Lama often says. When some do consider to adopt the Buddha's teachings, it is vital that they subject those teachings and that decision to profound intellectual scrutiny: "Only after thinking very deeply, examing very thoroughly, can one really determine that the Buddhist approach is, in one's own case, more suitable and effective." (EHS, 14)

sparring partners geluk study based, centrality study, peers niet zien, gurus wel, op voet van gelijkwaardigheid, Magee exams impresses upon the students how little they know,

empty toolbox, cf THC 11

strategy of retrieval/suspicion cf. THC, 193 BL, 83-85

By contrast, their Tibetan teachers, out of a culturally induced conservatism tend to ignore modern scholarship althogether, writingoriginal bound reluctance to writing that quite often is mimicked by their students , hardly ever study the self-same body of scholarly work,

As a result, no one seems to be able to

Tsongkhapa makes it abundantly clear that the Madhyamaka critique will serve its purpose,

Westerners are as foreign as their fellow Tibetans.

Some ten years ago, when I was 29, I spent a year in India, researching philosophy of law from a Tibetan Buddhist perspective. Soon after my arrival I met Samdhong Rinpoche, then Dean of the Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies in Sarnath, and Chairman of the Tibetan Parliament-in-exile, now the first elected chairman of the Kashag or Tibetan Government-in-exile. I would like to call him my teacher, but it takes two to tango and he doesn't accept students, so let's just say I learned a lot from him. Over those months I spent quite some time with him privately, and we frequentlty disagreed. On one occasion, following one of my demurrals he said, dryly, 'So, we should debate then', to which I retorted: 'That's easy for you to say!" And indeed, it was, for

wrong excuse for the right reason

My objection is not that Tibetan teacher

Moreover, Tibetan Geluk-teachers usually expect a hell of lot more from serious Western students, supposedly because they "do study philosophy" themselves.

I don't believe my this is a case of mere semantics, and that Berzin in fact does expect his Tibetan audience

Moreover, Tibetan teachers usually expect a hell of lot more from us, when we want to learn from them. studying their philosophy

semantics / bias

For instance, in Christianity and Judaism there is an emphasis on there being only one God and one truth. Because of this, Westerners cannot accept that one teaching of Buddha can have many different levels of understanding and meaning. They are always insisting and asking, "But what does it really mean." They want the one truth, like in their own religions. And if the Geshe explains that in one set of textbooks it is explained one way, and in another it is taken to mean something else, this is very difficult for the Westerner. However, if the Geshe can explain that their insistence on one truth is a Western idea, and that in Buddhism the way of thinking is different, then the Westerner's doubts and problems can be eliminated more skillfully. There are many other examples like this.

It is also very important to have some understanding of science, especially about the brain, about the universe, the earth being round, and so on. Otherwise, if the learned Geshes teach that the earth is flat, either people will laugh and have no faith in the Buddha's teachings, or only strange people will like the teachings. And this will not be because they have faith in them, but because they are attracted to what seems strange from a normal Western point of view because they have had some unhappy experience with people who assert the norm. As was mentioned at the fourth nonsectarian conference of the Tulkus and Abbots of all the Tibetan traditions, held in Sarnath in December 1988, the essence of the Buddha's teachings is the Four Noble Truths and the two levels of truth. However, with skillful means the scriptures teach a physical description of the universe that was in harmony with the currently held beliefs of ancient India. Therefore, the essence of the Buddha's teachings need to be presented in harmony with modern theories of science and geography, while bearing in mind that the currently held theories may change in the future. In any case, teachings on the hells and on the description of Mount Meru, etc., need to not be given at the very beginning to new people.

[See: Tulkus Conference on Nonsectarianism.]

When teaching about the physical description of the universe, one skillful method may be to mention that Buddha taught two descriptions: the Abhidharma and the Kalachakra ones. Because there are two, this means there is not just one definite description. Each description was given for a specific reason. The Abhidharma one is for developing wisdom. The Kalachakra one is for having a meditation practice that is in analogy with the situation of the external world. There is no contradiction, then, in accepting a third description, the one of the scientists, given for yet a different reason. The scientific description is for the purpose of sending a rocket to the moon or navigating a ship on the ocean, for instance. Buddha never claimed that a rocket could be sent to the moon on the basis of the Abhidharma or Kalachakra model. In this way, there is no contradiction in accepting both the Buddhist and scientific models, and Buddha's teachings are not harmed.

The same technique can be used for discussing Mount Meru. The shape of Mount Meru is described differently in the Abhidharma and Kalachakra systems. Therefore, it does not have one definitive shape. However, it is at the center of each universe. Modern science also accepts that the universe has a center. Although they do not call that center Mount Meru, it can perform the function of a Mount Meru. In this way, there can be a third assertion of the shape and location of Mount Meru with no contradictions.

Often the confusion between the Buddhist and the scientific explanations is due to the translation terms. One of the questions, for instance, foreigners ask most frequently is do plants, such as trees and flowers, have a mind and take rebirth. The confusion here is due to the translation of the word "sems-can." If it is translated as "sentient being," this word is not commonly used and does not mean much to most people. If, to make it easier to understand, it is translated as "living being," this is the source of the misunderstanding.

In science, one category of phenomena is phenomena with life. This includes both plants and animals since both take in nutrition, breathe, give off wastes and reproduce. The word "living being" refers, then, to both plants and animals. However, plants do not have a mind. As one scientist explained to His Holiness the Dalai Lama, the main difference between plants and animals is that plants do not have nerves. This is not exactly the same as the nerves that are part of the winds, channels and energy-drops described in Buddhism, but they are similar. Because plants have no nerves, they have no basis, then, for mind and, in particular, no basis for experiencing the feelings of happiness or suffering. If they have no such feelings, they cannot have the wish to be happy or the wish not to have suffering. If they have no such motivating wishes, they cannot build up karma from their actions. They cannot be liberated from suffering if they cannot experience suffering. Therefore, although plants are living beings, they are not "sentient beings" or "beings with limited awareness." And since Buddhism is speaking about liberating from suffering those who experience suffering, Buddhism presents animals and humans in a separate category of phenomena from plants. However, if the categories are defined differently, there is no contradiction in the scientists presenting a category of phenomena that includes animals and humans, as well as plants. Again, the confusion can become eliminated simply by giving clear definitions of the terms and categories, and the boundaries of which phenomena are included in each category. If a Geshe or Lama explains like this, the foreigners can understand and also will see there is no contradiction between Buddhism and science. This will increase their faith in Buddhism.

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