J. Gresham Machen & "True Science", by Paul K. Helseth

J. Gresham Machen & "True Science" Machen's Apologetical Continuity With Old Princeton's Right Use of Reason

by Paul K. Helseth

Dr. Helseth recieved his PhD from Marquette University. This essay is made available here at Reformation Ink by permission of the author.

Introduction
In an essay entitled "Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," the late apologist Dr. Greg Bahnsen addresses two questions that are of critical importance to the apologetical identity of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church. These questions, which flow from the perceived tension between the Old Princeton and the New Westminster approaches to apologetics, can be stated as follows. Is the apologetical approach of J. Gresham Machen (1881-1937) conceptually opposed to the presuppositionalism of Cornelius Van Til? And are there, therefore, two apologetical traditions in the Orthodox Presbyterian Church that are diametrically opposed to each other? While most interpreters either have or will conclude that Machen's apologetic was conceptually at odds with the presuppositional approach of Van Til, Bahnsen insists that no such conclusion is warranted. Indeed, while he concedes that the approaches of Machen and Van Til are not identical, he nonetheless argues that there is a "harmony of perspective" between the two because Machen "moved away from the old Princeton conception of apologetics in a presuppositional direction."¹ Whereas we might expect Machen "to have had the same old Princeton conception of, and goal for, his historical apologetic; namely, to reason his way to dominion . . . by using historical evidence which is compelling in itself to the unbeliever's neutral reasoning," he actually conceived of his work in historical apologetics, Bahnsen assures us, "as requiring and resting on Christian presuppositions, as Van Til taught."²

Although I, like Bahnsen, suspect that there might be more in common between the apologetical approaches of Machen and Van Til than partisans on both sides of the apologetical divide are likely to admit, I disagree with Bahnsen as to why compatibility is possible because I disagree with his assessment of Machen's relationship to Old Princeton in general and Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield in particular. Whereas Bahnsen insists that compatibility is likely because Machen viewed apologetics in the same way as did Van Til, namely as a defensive task that is directed, "quite contrary to Warfield, mainly to believers,"³ I am convinced that if the methods of Machen and Van Til are compatible they are compatible only because Machen viewed apologetics in the same way as did Warfield, namely as an offensive task that is directed mainly to unbelievers. While this essay leaves it to more qualified interpreters to determine if there is in fact a "harmony of perspective" running through the approaches of Machen and Van Til, it establishes via the examination of Machen's solution to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture that apologetics for Machen was an offensive rather than a defensive task. As such, it substantiates the claim that I made in the last issue of Premise namely that if there is a "harmony of perspective" between Machen and Van Til there is harmony only because Machen stood squarely in the tradition of Old Princeton and thereby lays the groundwork for conclusions that are relevant to the historiography of Old Princeton in general and to the ongoing debate within the Reformed camp over apologetical method in particular.

The Problem of the Relationship between Christianity and Culture: Two Anti-Intellectual Solutions
Machen was convinced that there was no greater problem facing the modern church than that which has to do with the relationship between Christianity and culture. "What," he asked, "is the relation between Christianity and modern culture; may Christianity be maintained in a scientific age?"⁴ Machen's answer to this question and hence his solution to the problem is clearly articulated in an address that was originally delivered to the Philadelphia Ministers' Association in the fall of 1912, an address that was originally intended to be "a defense of `scientific theological study.'"⁵ In this address, initially entitled "Scientific Preparation of the Minister" but published later under the heading "Christianity and Culture," Machen argued that the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture may be settled in one of three ways. It may be settled in the first place by stating Christian belief in modern terms through the accommodation of Christianity to modern culture and the conclusions of modern science. The religious needs of people in each successive generation will be satisfied, advocates of this solution insist, not by clinging to outmoded expressions of religious truth, but rather by blending "the old faith" and "the new knowledge" into "a new combination."⁶ This solution, which is based upon the presumption that the Christian religion is simply a mystical or moral rather than a supernatural historical phenomenon, was perhaps nowhere more clearly articulated than in the writings of Machen's contemporary Harry Emerson Fosdick.⁷ "We must be able to think our modern life clear through in Christian terms," Fosdick argued, "and to do that we also must be able to think our Christian life clear through in modern terms."⁸

The second solution to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture goes to the opposite extreme. While the "Worldly Solution" seeks to preserve the Christian religion by subordinating it to modern culture and the conclusions of modern science, the "Obscurantist Solution" seeks to save the Christian religion from the devastating conclusions of modern scholarship by "withdrawing into a sort of unhealthy, modernized, intellectual monastery."⁹ "Some men in the Church are inclined to choose a simple way out of the difficulty," Machen argued, "they are inclined to reject the whole of modern culture as either evil or worthless; this wisdom of the world, they maintain, must be deserted for the divine `foolishness' of the gospel."¹⁰ Since advocates of this solution recognize correctly that salvation is a gift that flows from the sovereign grace of God, they conclude wrongly that "the culture of this world must be a matter at least of indifference to the Christian."¹¹ Indeed, while they concede that the Christian must live in and be a part of human culture, they regard this participation "as a necessary evil a dangerous and unworthy task necessary to be gone through with under a stern sense of duty in order that thereby the higher ends of the gospel may be attained."¹²

While Machen was not without sympathy for these solutions to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture,¹³ he was nonetheless convinced that they pose a serious threat to the enduring relevance and viability of the Christian religion. This is due to the fact that they are based upon the explicit or implicit endorsement of philosophical assumptions that undermine the integrity of the gospel by encouraging the accommodation of Christianity to the "epistemological error" of the modern era, namely the notion that there is discontinuity, perhaps even antagonism, between the epistemological realms of religion and science.¹⁴ On the basis of their post-Kantian aversion to metaphysical speculation, and encouraged by their accommodation of a naturalistic view of the universe, advocates of these solutions insisted that the Christian religion can be preserved in the modern era only "by divorcing it from science."¹⁵ The Christian religion is not based, they argued, upon the rational appropriation of something that is considered to be objectively true.¹⁶ It is based, rather, upon an ineffable mystical or moral experience that is the natural manifestation of the universal human effort to "tap" into and thereby order life according to the vital moral force that pervades and actuates world processes.¹⁷ In light of the fact that religion according to these solutions is simply that individual or corporate effort to live in accord with those values of love and good will that the Ultimate Reality has woven into the processes of the cosmos, advocates concluded that the conflict between Christianity and culture will be settled as soon as it is realized that religion and science occupy autonomous epistemological realms. Religion, they maintained, "may hold to a realm of [religious and ethical] ideals; but science must be given the entire realm of facts."¹⁸ It is herein, then, i.e., in this abandonment to science of "the whole realm of objective truth,"¹⁹ that the threat posed by these solutions to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture is to be found.

The Task of Consecration: The "True Solution" to the Problem Of the Relationship between Christianity and Culture
Despite Machen's initial concession that these solutions seem at first to offer promising responses to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture, he insisted that they are unacceptable precisely because they are ultimately unable to satisfy the religious needs of fallen sinners.²⁰ Nothing but something that is objectively true can meet the supernatural needs of the sinful soul, Machen argued, and objective truth is abandoned by "the epistemological By-Path Meadow which is found in the separation of religion from science."²¹ Because he was convinced that all truth be it religious or scientific is ultimately one, Machen concluded that the conflict between Christianity and culture will be settled not by "destroying one or the other of the contending forces," but rather by "transforming the unwieldy, resisting mass of human thought until it becomes subservient to the gospel."²² "Instead of obliterating the distinction between the Kingdom and the world, or on the other hand withdrawing from the world into a sort of modernized intellectual monasticism," Machen insisted that Christians must "go forth joyfully, enthusiastically to make the world subject to God."²³

How, then, are Christian scholars to make the world subject to God? How are "the soldiers of the cross," in other words, to move the Church of God forward "to joyous conquest"?²⁴ Machen maintained that Christian scholars accomplish this end neither by cultivating the natural moral capacities of fallen sinners, nor by waging social and political culture wars against the perceived forces of cultural disintegration. Christians make modern culture subject to God, rather, by cultivating the arts and sciences "with all the enthusiasm of the veriest humanist, but at the same time consecrat[ing] them to the service of our God."²⁵ "Patient study should not be abandoned to the men of the world," Machen argued, but those "who have really received the blessed experience of the love of God in Christ must seek to bring that experience to bear upon the culture of the modern world, in order that Christ may rule, not only in all nations, but in every department of human life."²⁶ Elements of modern culture that are hostile to the gospel must be "refuted and destroyed," the rest must be "made subservient," but nothing can be "neglected."²⁷ It is in this fashion, then, i.e., by assimilating modern culture to Christianity, that Christians make modern culture a means to the service of God.²⁸This is how they set modern culture apart, in other words, for the service of the Kingdom.

But why did Machen insist that Christians must pursue the consecration rather than the destruction or accommodation of modern culture? Why did he argue, in other words, that the "true solution" to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture is to be found in the subjugation of modern culture to Christian truth?²⁹ He did so for two reasons, both of which will be clear after a brief consideration of the two factors that together make the consecration of modern culture necessary. The first factor has to do with his endorsement of the classical notion that saving faith is based upon the rational appropriation of objective truth rather than upon the ineffable religious experience of a fallen moral agent.³⁰ While Machen conceded that in the temporal order of faith the experience of regeneration is essential, he insisted that "what the Holy Spirit does in the new birth is not to make a man a Christian regardless of the evidence, but on the contrary to clear away the mists from his eyes and enable him to attend to the evidence."³¹ The Spirit enables the moral agent to attend, in other words, to the "thoroughly reasonable" foundations of the Christian religion.³² Since saving faith is "always a conscious condition of the soul"³³ that is logically based upon a movement of the mind, it follows that the need for consecration is related to the fact that "A man can believe only what he holds to be true."³⁴ "Obviously," Machen argued, "it is impossible to hold on with the heart to something that one has rejected with the head, and all the usefulness of Christianity can never lead us to be Christians unless the Christian religion is true."³⁵

While the first factor has to do with the logical priority of the intellect in faith, the second is closely related in that it has to do with what Machen considered to be the primary obstacle to the advancement of the Kingdom of God in his day, namely the hostility of the modern mind to the "gospel about Jesus," i.e., "the message upon which salvation depends."³⁶ Machen recognized that masses of people reject the gospel simply because their thinking is dominated by ideas that are "profoundly opposed to Christianity, or at least what is nearly as bad . . . out of all connection with Christianity."³⁷ But why is their thinking dominated by such ideas, and why do they stubbornly conclude that orthodox convictions are antiquated and absurd?³⁸ The answer to this question is to be found in the pervasive anti-supernaturalism of the modern era.³⁹Masses of people can no longer believe that the gospel is true, Machen argued, not because the gospel has been demonstrated to be false, but rather because their thinking is attuned to the naturalism of the age.⁴⁰ As such, they reject Christianity not because the Christian religion is in fact an absurdity, but rather because their thinking is controlled "by ideas which, by the resistless force of logic, prevent Christianity from being regarded as anything more than a harmless delusion."⁴¹

If it is indeed true, then, that faith is based upon a conviction of the objective truth or trustworthiness of what is rationally perceived, yet faith for many is impossible because their thinking is controlled by ideas that make acceptance of the gospel "logically impossible,"⁴² we must conclude that the consecration rather than the destruction or accommodation of modern culture is necessary for two reasons. It is necessary not only because the Christian religion "must justify its place, despite all that that may cost, in the world of facts,"⁴³ but more importantly because this justification i.e., this creation of "those favorable conditions for the reception of the gospel"⁴⁴ is really necessary for the "external advancement" of the Kingdom of God.⁴⁵ "Intellectual conquests are just as necessary for the progress of the gospel as are conquests in the external world,"⁴⁶ in short, because people can believe only what they know to be both true and trustworthy.

The Epistemological "Breadth" of "True Science": Christian Experience And the Moral Underpinnings of Cultural Consecration
To this point we have seen that of the three proposed solutions to the problem of the relationship between Christianity and culture, only Machen's solution repudiates the naturalism of the age by insisting that saving faith is grounded in the rational appropriation of objective truth rather than the ineffable religious experience of a fallen moral agent. It is undoubtedly at this point, however, that some will question the legitimacy of Machen's solution, for they will suggest that his preoccupation with the rational basis of faith and his apparent indifference to the subjective and experiential components of religious epistemology betrays an implicit endorsement of precisely those commitments that he allegedly rejects.⁴⁷ The effort to extend the Kingdom by consecrating modern culture to Christianity is ultimately informed, they might suggest, not by an endorsement of the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of the Reformed tradition, but rather by an accommodation of theology to the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of an essentially humanistic philosophy. Indeed, critics will perhaps conclude that the effort to extend the Kingdom by establishing the reasonableness of the Christian religion is ultimately based not upon an epistemology that acknowledges the supremacy of God in all things, but rather upon an epistemology that is covertly if not overtly rationalistic.

While it is beyond dispute that the ultimate objective of the task of consecration is the advancement of the Kingdom of God via the assimilation of modern learning to Christian truth, it is just as indisputable that the task of consecration is not a merely rationalistic enterprise, but rather an enterprise that recognizes the import of the subjective and the centrality of experience in religious epistemology. This recognition is perhaps nowhere more clearly manifest than in Machen's insistence that the task of consecration is based upon and appeals to "true science." Science ought not be defined, Machen insisted, in a manner that artificially limits or narrows the scope of what is regarded as "fact" to the conclusions of "those methods of research that operate merely with the doctrine of `physical causation.'"⁴⁸ It ought not be defined, in other words, in a manner that endorses the separation of the epistemological realms of religion and science. It ought to be defined, rather, in a manner that is "true" because it recognizes that the sphere in which science moves is broad enough to include even the knowledge of God that He has given of Himself "in nature and in His Word."⁴⁹

What, then, determines how broadly or narrowly science is defined? What determines, in other words, whether the science of the consecrating scholar "is really scientific or not"?⁵⁰ The answer to these questions will never be understood correctly if the interpreter fails to recognize that Machen endorsed the Christian anthropology of Charles Hodge and Benjamin B. Warfield.[51] Like Hodge and Warfield, Machen rejected the faculty psychology because he was convinced that the soul is a single unit whose unitary activity is certainly determined by that which "lies far deeper than individual actions," namely the moral character or personality of the "whole man."[52] There "is no such thing," Machen argued, "as the will, considered as a separate something-or-other inside of a man; but what we call the will is just the whole man willing, as what we call the intellect is the whole man thinking and what we call the feelings is the whole man feeling."[53] But did this rejection of the faculty psychology extend to the realm of scientific investigation? Did Machen regard science, in other words, as a form of human activity that is engaged in by the "whole man" and thus conditioned by the moral character of the "whole man"? He clearly did, for while he insisted that all science rests on presuppositions that are determined by the perception and conception of the intellect, he nonetheless recognized that the perception and conception of the intellect is itself conditioned by the moral character of the "whole man."[54] That this is the case, and that the breadth and quality of scientific investigation are ultimately determined by the moral character or personality of the investigating agent will be clear after a brief examination of the scientific capacity of moral agents in their fallen and regenerate states.

Following Hodge, Warfield, and the Westminster divines, Machen maintained that Adam was created in the image of God and thus "was like God not only in that he was a person but also in that he was good."[55] His likeness to God did not consist, in other words, merely in a capacity for personal freedom, but "it also means that there was a moral likeness between man and God."[56] It was this moral likeness, however, that Adam as the federal head of the human race lost for himself and for his posterity by his first act of disobedience, for it was in response to his violation of the covenant of works that "God withdrew His favour" and the souls of "all mankind became spiritually dead" and fell "into an estate of sin and misery."[57] As a consequence, Adam and all those descended from Adam not only lost communion with God, but they also forfeited the ability to be "truly scientific." But why does spiritual death prohibit a moral agent from having the ability to be "truly scientific"? The answer to this question gets to the heart of the relationship between moral character and the presuppositions that condition scientific investigation. The power of sin precludes the possibility of "true science," Machen argued, for the same reason that it precludes the possibility of "true religion." Namely, it corrupts the moral nature of the investigating agent and thus renders "a sound metaphysic" i.e., an apprehension of God that is the occasion of the presuppositions that inform "true religion" and condition "true science" impossible.[58]

If, then, it is the power of sin that renders "true science" impossible because it is the power of sin that precludes the possibility of "a sound metaphysic,"[59] how is the science of the fallen sinner to be made a truthful thing? The answer to this question explains the experiential foundation of the task of consecration. Because he recognized that the presuppositions that condition scientific investigation are themselves the manifestation of an intellectual operation that is conditioned by the moral character or personality of the "whole man," Machen insisted that the science of the fallen sinner can be made a truthful thing only through the "regenerating power of the Spirit of God."[60] It is the regenerating power of the Spirit of God that makes the intellect a "trustworthy instrument for apprehending truth," Machen argued, for it is the regenerating power of the Spirit of God that applies to the soul the saving benefits of the redeeming work of Christ and thereby raises the soul from spiritual death to spiritual life.[61] While the specific consequences of this supernatural act will be clear after the forthcoming consideration of the task of consecration's appeal to Christian experience as the means to the advancement of the Kingdom of God, interpreters must acknowledge that the experience of regeneration is at the very foundation of the task of consecration simply because it is that "moral awakening of a soul dead in sin"[62] that makes fallen sinners "better philosophers" and thereby better scientists by enabling them "to see clearly where formerly [their] eyes were darkened."[63] "What the new birth does," Machen argued, "is not to absolve men from being scientific in their defense of the faith, but rather to enable them to be truly scientific because a veil has been taken from their eyes."[64]

Before moving on to our consideration of the role of Christian experience in the advancement of the Kingdom of God, two observations are in order regarding the relationship between "better philosophy," better science, and the task of consecration. The first is that modern interpreters will never understand how "better philosophy" and better science are related in Machen's thought if they forget that the veil that lies before the eyes of the fallen sinner's mind is moral rather than merely rational.[65] In this section we have seen that the philosophical or metaphysical presuppositions that inform the breadth and quality of scientific investigation reflect the moral character of the "whole man" rather than the intellectual capacity of the rational faculty alone simply because it is the moral character of the "whole man" that conditions the perception and thereby the conception of the intellect. If we approach the relationship between philosophy and science with this in mind, it becomes clear that the unregenerate do not have the ability to be "truly scientific" not merely because of rational weakness, but rather because of moral weakness. That is to say, the unregenerate do not have the moral ability to see God for who he objectively is, and as a consequence they do not have the moral ability to take account of "all of the facts" that impinge upon the integrity of the gospel message.[66]

The second observation has to do with what the better science of the consecrating scholar will look like. Is the science of the consecrating scholar which is "true" different from the science of the non-Christian scholar which is not "true"? And if it is different, how is it different? Given Machen's insistence that the only difference between the Christian scholar and the non-Christian scholar is that the Christian scholar has the moral ability to take account of all, rather than merely some, of the facts, we may surmise that for Machen the science of those who are possessed of "a sound epistemology"[67] i.e., the regenerate is different from the science of those who are epistemologically challenged i.e., the unregenerate not because the science of the regenerate is a type of science that only the regenerate can practice. The science of the regenerate is different, rather, because it is more "comprehensive" and therefore more forceful than the science of those who because of spiritual blindness have yet to attain to "a sound metaphysic."[68] As Warfield would say, the science of the consecrating scholar is different from the science of the non-Christian scholar not because there is "a difference in kind" between the two, but rather because there is a difference in terms "of perfection of performance."[69]

The Task of Consecration and the External Advancement of The Kingdom of God: The Appeal to "True Science"
If the task of consecration is based on Christian experience because it demands that the consecrating scholar have the moral ability to take account of "all of the facts," it appeals to Christian experience because it includes an adjuration to "true science." It includes the attempt, in other words, to extend the Kingdom not by asking fallen sinners "to regard science and philosophy as without bearing upon religion, but on the contrary by asking them to become more scientific and more philosophic through attention to all, instead of to some, of the facts."[70] While modern interpreters might suggest that this sounds strangely enough like a wholehearted and certainly naÔve endorsement of an unflinching positivism, it is my contention that this appeal is neither positivistic nor naÔve because it is based upon the realization that the ability to attend to "all of the facts" i.e., the ability to respond to the adjuration of the consecrating scholar presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the "whole soul" of a moral agent. That this is the case, and that the external advancement of the Kingdom of God is totally dependent upon the regenerating grace of God, will be clear after a brief examination of the relationship between the intellectual labor of the consecrating scholar, the work of the Spirit, and the advent of saving faith.

Although Machen insisted that one of the primary responsibilities of the modern Church lies in the task of transforming modern culture until it becomes subservient to the gospel, he nonetheless recognized "that argument alone is quite insufficient to make a man a Christian. You may argue with him from now until the end of the world; you may bring forth the most magnificent arguments: but all will be in vain unless there be one other thing the mysterious, creative power of the Holy Spirit in the new birth."[71] But if the really decisive factor in the production of Christian conviction is the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit, does it follow "as is so often assumed" that the intellectual labor of the consecrating scholar is unnecessary?[72] The answer to this question must be understood within the context of Machen's contention that the insufficiency of the "external proofs" of the Christian religion to produce faith "is due not at all to any weakness of their own but only to a weakness in our minds."[73] While Machen maintained that the consecrating scholar can induce an "intellectual" or "theoretical" conviction of the truth of the Christian religion by presenting the historical and philosophical proofs for its trustworthiness, he insisted that a "full" or "moral" or "saving" conviction cannot be attained without the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit not because the arguments of the consecrating scholar lack objective sufficiency, but rather because the veil that lies before the eyes of the fallen sinner's mind prohibits the apprehension i.e., the "recognition" of that sufficiency.[74] If the arguments of the consecrating scholar are ultimately ineffectual, then, simply because the unregenerate do not have the moral ability to apprehend what is objectively presented to their consciousness, we must conclude that the work of the Spirit is of critical importance not because it makes fallen sinners Christians regardless of the evidence, but on the contrary because it removes the veil from the eyes of their minds and enables them to attend to the evidence. It enables them to see, in other words, that the "probable" conclusions of the consecrating scholar which are necessary precisely because they establish the integrity of the gospel and thereby "prepare" for the "gracious coming" of the Spirit are indeed true and therefore trustworthy.[75]

How, then, does the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit remove the veil from the eyes of the fallen sinner's mind, and how does the Spirit thereby confirm that the gospel message is both true and trustworthy? Machen insisted that the Spirit accomplishes both of these ends by bringing fallen sinners into contact with the law of God and thereby enabling them to take "a truly scientific attitude towards the evidence."[76] Through the law, which is grounded in the moral perfection of God, the Spirit enlightens the eyes of the fallen sinner's mind to the perfect righteousness of God and thereby convicts him of "the guilt and misery of man in his sin."[77] It is this illumination of the mind to "the facts of the inner life of man,"[78] then, that enables the fallen sinner to "really lay hold upon the central message in the Bible,"[79] fr it is the "sense of need"[80] occasioned by the revelation of the majesty of the transcendent God that suddenly makes "the words of Scripture glow with a heavenly light and burn in the hearts of men."[81] Indeed, "When a man has that experience, when a man comes under the conviction of sin, his whole attitude toward life is transformed; he wonders at his former blindness, and the message of the gospel, which formerly seemed to be an idle tale, becomes now instinct with light."[82]

Given the import of the subjective and the centrality of experience in Machen's religious epistemology, we must finally consider why the work of the Spirit fosters the external advancement of the Kingdom of God. We must consider, in other words, why the sinner who has been awakened to the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the gospel message not only clings to Jesus "like a drowning person [who] will snatch at a plank that may save him from the abyss,"[83] but also why he enlists in the campaign to conquer the world for Christ with "mighty enthusiasm."[84] The answer to these questions is to be found in Machen's Christian anthropology. While Machen did not analyze the nature of the relationship between moral character and moral activity with the same amount of precision that his predecessors at Old Princeton did, the following quotation clearly demonstrates that he endorsed the understanding of Christian anthropology known as Realistic Dualism.[85] "The will of man is not free," he argued,

in the sense that it operates independently of the feelings and the intellect. Indeed, if we regard the will as a sort of separate somewhat inside of a man, going about its business in its own way, capable of taking advice from other parts of man's nature but also capable of acting quite independently of such advice when the mood strikes it if we think of the will thus, we are getting very far away from reality indeed. We are really making of something that we call the will a little separate personality; we are doing away with the unity of the man's personality. As a matter of fact, there is really no such thing as the will out of relation to the other aspects of the person. What we call the will is just the whole person making choices.[86]

Since Machen recognized that the operation of the will is an operation of the "whole person" that is determined by the motives or ends that the intellect and feelings place before the mind of the acting agent,[87] it follows that the work of the Spirit fosters the external advancement of the Kingdom of God simply because the "sense of need" that enables the regenerate to "really lay hold upon the central message in the Bible" is the same sense that is the occasion of the affections that determine the activity of the will, broadly understood. Whereas the unregenerate are "repelled by the stupendous nature of the thing that we ask them to believe"[88] because they are without the consciousness of sin, the regenerate "rejoice"[89] i.e., they "glory"[90] in the message of the cross because they recognize that the gospel alone will meet their supernatural need. It is the joy of knowing that the gospel is true, then, that not only compels the regenerate to place their trust in the atoning merit of Christ's active and passive obedience, but it is also that which drives them onto the battlefield of truth for the purpose of bringing all branches of earnest human endeavor "into some relation to the gospel." [91] Indeed, the consecrating scholar enters into combat with joy not only because he knows that he has been rescued from the wrath of a righteous God, but also because he knows that he enters into combat "armed with certain facts to a knowledge of which [the unregenerate] have not attained."[92] We must conclude, therefore, that sinners who have been awakened to the truthfulness and trustworthiness of the gospel message cling to Jesus and enlist in the cause of Christ simply because "in humanity as it is actually constituted, an intellectual conviction of the truth of Christianity is always accompanied by a change of heart and a new direction for the will."[93]

The Offensive Nature of Machen's Apologetic: Machen's Continuity with Old Princeton
Having established that the task of consecration is an offensive task that is ultimately directed to the external advancement of the Kingdom of God, we must finally consider why Machen urged Christian scholars to leave their "comfortable winter quarters" to do apologetical battle on the battlefield of truth.[94] Did Machen urge Christians to do apologetics for the benefit of believers i.e., for the benefit of those who already have faith but are "troubled by hearing the scholarly objections against Christianity raised all around them"?[95] Or, did Machen urge Christians to do apologetics because he recognized that apologetics can perform "a kind of `debris-clearing' function in the unbeliever's thinking,"[96] and can as a consequence be used as a means to the external advancement of the Kingdom of God? Whereas I am convinced that Machen viewed apologetics in the same way as did Warfield, namely as an offensive task that is ultimately directed to the production of Christian conviction and the conversion of fallen sinners, scholars like Greg Bahnsen contend that Machen viewed apologetics in primarily a defensive fashion. Machen's apologetic was in line with the presuppositional approach of Van Til, Bahnsen insists, because he recognized that without "the enabling work of the Holy Spirit in their minds nothing like Warfield's `right reason'" is at the disposal of the unregenerate.[97] According to Bahnsen, Machen therefore did apologetics not because he believed that the Christian religion must reason its way to its dominion, but rather because he recognized that "Faith of a biblical sort . . . needs intelligent and detailed answers to the objections of modern critics, even when it already has the right presuppositions."[98]

What, then, are we to make of Bahnsen's conclusions? Did Machen really move "out of the Warfieldian camp and a long way toward Van Til's presuppositional conception of evidences"?[99] Did he really believe, in other words, that the primary task of the apologist is to provide "intellectual reassurance"[100] to those who already have faith but are "troubled by hearing the scholarly objections against Christianity raised all around them"? The answer to these questions is to be found in an aspect of Machen's thought that Bahnsen overlooks, namely the correspondence in Machen's thinking between the goal of the task of consecration and the goal of Christian apologetics.

In "Christianity and Culture" (1912), Machen's first published work on the problem of the relationship between knowledge and piety, or, culture and Christianity, Machen argues that the true solution to the problem is to be found in the consecration rather than the destruction or accommodation of modern culture. Christians must consecrate modern culture to Christianity, in short, because they must "mould the thought of the world in such a way as to make the acceptance of Christianity something more than a logical absurdity."[101] A remarkably similar statement can be found in an article entitled "Christian Scholarship and the Defence of the Faith" (1932), an article reflecting what Bahnsen suggests is Machen's "most mature thinking" on the nature of Christian apologetics.[102] Referring not to the goal of the task of consecration but rather to the goal of Christian apologetics, Machen asserts that apologetics is useful "most of all in producing an intellectual atmosphere in which the acceptance of the gospel will seem to be something other than an offence against truth."[103] But is it possible that this statement refers to a service that the Christian apologist must provide for those who already have faith, as Bahnsen would have us believe? Is it possible, in other words, that the production of an intellectual atmosphere in which the acceptance of the gospel will seem to be something other than an offense against truth is actually a defensive enterprise undertaken to bolster the faith of wavering believers? The following statement, which Bahnsen deals with only tangentially in a footnote, demonstrates that no such conclusion can be justified. Conceding that the work of the Spirit is necessary to the production of Christian conviction, Machen nonetheless argues that though

argument is insufficient, it does not follow that it is unnecessary. Sometimes it is used directly by the Holy Spirit to bring a man to Christ. But more frequently it is used indirectly. A man hears an answer to objections raised against the truth of the Christian religion; and at the time when he hears it he is not impressed. But afterwards, perhaps many years afterwards, his heart at last is touched: he is convicted of sin; he desires to be saved. Yet without that half-forgotten argument he could not believe; the gospel would not seem to him to be true, and he would remain in his sin. As it is, however, the thought of what he has heard long ago comes into his mind; Christian apologetics at last has its day; the way is open, and when he will believe he can believe because he has been made to see that believing is not an offense against truth.[104]

Given the fact that apologetics is directed in Machen's thinking to the same end as is the task of consecration, namely the creation of an intellectual atmosphere in which the acceptance of the gospel will seem to be something other than an offense against truth, it follows that apologetics for Machen was a decidedly offensive enterprise. That is to say, Machen did apologetics not because he was convinced that faith needs answers to the objections of modern critics, but rather because he recognized that "False ideas are the greatest obstacle to the reception of the gospel,"[105] and that answers to the objections of modern critics are consequently needed for "faith of a biblical sort." That this is the case and that any real or imagined harmony between the apologetical approaches of Machen and Van Til must acknowledge Machen's continuity with Old Princeton in general and B. B. Warfield in particular is confirmed by the quotation that I cited in the last issue of Premise. In his personal correspondence with a Dutch Calvinist by the name of Gerritt Hospers, Machen makes a statement that should put an end to all speculation about his relationship to Warfield and the basis upon which his agreement with Van Til should be sought. "You will not take it amiss," Machen writes,

that I still agree rather strongly with Dr. Warfield about the place of apologetics. It is quite true that the human reason because of the noetic effects of sin needs the Spirit of God in order to accept the truth of the reservation [sic] which God has given, but because the arguments for the truth of the Christian religion are insufficient to produce Christian conviction, it does not follow, I think, that they are unnecessary. On the contrary, it seems to me that they constitute one of the means which the Spirit of God uses in the production of Christian conviction and the conversion of the sinner.[106]

The Correlation between "Right Reason" and "True Science": Implications for the Evidentialist/Presuppositionalist Debate
If the foregoing analysis is correct and if Machen did indeed view apologetics in the same way as did Warfield, namely as an offensive task that is ultimately directed to the production of Christian conviction and the conversion of fallen sinners, then we must ask ourselves how a theologian as astute as Bahnsen could have missed the connection between Warfield and Machen, and how he consequently could have misinterpreted the relationship between Machen and Van Til. I would suggest that Bahnsen missed the connection between Warfield and Machen and misinterpreted the relationship between Machen and Van Til because he based his analysis upon an endorsement of Van Til's misunderstanding of Warfield's notion of "right reason." According to Van Til, "right reason" for Warfield "is not the reason of the Christian. It is the reason that is confronted with Christianity and possesses some criterion apart from Christianity with which to judge of the truth of Christianity."[107] Given the fact that such a notion of "right reason" compromises the distinctives of Reformed epistemology by capitulating to "the non-Christian principle of the rational autonomy of man,"[108] Van Til concludes that Warfield's approach to apologetics must be rejected because it seeks to operate in "neutral territory" by appealing to the natural man's "right reason" to judge of the truth of Christianity.[109] That is to say, it explicitly endorses "the correctness of the natural man's problematics," and thereby renders the unbeliever's rejection of the truth virtually certain because it cannot "remind" the unbeliever "that Christianity alone is reasonable for men to hold."[110]

That Bahnsen endorses Van Til's misunderstanding of "right reason" is clear from his insistence that Machen's apologetic was in line with the presuppositional approach of Van Til simply because Machen recognized that nothing like Warfield's notion of "right reason" is at the disposal of the unregenerate. The unregenerate for Machen "must have their eyes changed," Bahnsen reminds us, "so that they can, at last, `attend to the evidence' properly."[111] But how is this different from what Warfield believed? Did Warfield really believe that the unregenerate have the ability to reason "rightly"? Did he really believe, in other words, that "right reason" is "not the reason of the Christian," but rather the reason of the natural man?

In a previous article I argued that no such conclusion can be justified when Warfield's "intellectualism" is interpreted within a context that is moral rather than merely rational. When Warfield's emphasis upon "right reason" is interpreted within a context that rejects the faculty psychology and insists instead that the soul is a single unit that acts in all of its functions as a single substance, it becomes clear that for Warfield the ability to reason "rightly" presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the "whole soul" of a moral agent. Whereas Warfield certainly affirmed that a saving i.e., a "right" apprehension of revealed truth rests upon the rational appropriation of objective evidence, he nonetheless recognized that the "rightness" of this apprehension is determined neither by the intellectual prowess of the perceiving mind nor by the objective sufficiency of the evidence presented to consciousness, but rather by the moral or "ethical state" of the knowing soul. It is the renewed soul, Warfield insisted, that has the ability to reason "rightly," for it is the renewed soul that has the moral capacity to see revealed truth for what it objectively is, namely glorious. Given the fact that the ability to reason "rightly" is for Warfield a characteristic manifestation of regeneration, it follows that his apologetical appeal to "right reason" is not primarily an appeal to the unbeliever's neutral reasoning to judge of the truth of Christianity, but rather a call to "the men of the palingenesis" to establish the integrity of "the Christian view of the world" by urging their "`stronger and purer thought' continuously, and in all its details, upon the attention of men."[112] Just as the soldier in combat appeals to his sword as the means to advancing the objectives of the Commander in Chief, so too the Christian apologist appeals to his "right reason" as the means to moving the Church of God forward to joyous conquest.[113]

Since "right reason" for Warfield is the offensive weapon of the Christian apologist rather than the "self-established intellectual tool" of the autonomous natural man,[114] we must conclude that Bahnsen misinterpreted the relationship between Machen and Van Til because he based his analysis upon an endorsement of Van Til's misunderstanding of Warfield's notion of "right reason." Had Bahnsen recognized that Warfield's "intellectualism" is moral rather than merely rational, he would have noticed that what is "true science" for Machen is "right reason" for Warfield, and he would have realized that "what [he] puts forth as Machen's views are in line with the Old Princeton tradition as a whole."[115] While Bahnsen is to be commended for recognizing that subjective and experiential concerns play a critical role in the religious epistemology that underlies Machen's apologetic, he is to be critiqued for failing to see that these same concerns play a critical role in the epistemology of Old Princeton as well. In response to those who would have us believe that there is a "harmony of perspective" between Machen and Van Til because Machen moved away from the Old Princeton conception of apologetics in a presuppositional direction, I would therefore suggest that interpreters allow the clear continuity between Warfield and Machen to serve as the catalyst for a reexamination of the epistemological orthodoxy of Old Princeton. Those who undertake such a reexamination will likely conclude that Old Princeton's apologetic was "not as far from presuppositionalism as Van Til believed,"[116] for they will discover that many of the alleged epistemological distinctives of the presuppositional approach were actually incorporated into Old Princeton's conception of "right reason." Although this discovery will likely give rise to a considerable amount of angst in some quarters of the presuppositionalist camp, it will bring much-needed clarity to the debate between evidentialists and presuppositionalists because it will encourage committed Van Tillians to articulate the distinctives of their approach in a manner that takes full account of the epistemological orthodoxy of the Old Princetonians.[117]

Old Princeton and the Right Use of Reason: Historical Significance
While this essay has challenged Professor Bahnsen's analysis of the relationship between Machen and Van Til by demonstrating that Machen viewed apologetics in the same way as did Warfield, namely as an offensive task that is ultimately directed to the production of Christian conviction and the conversion of fallen sinners, our more comprehensive consideration of the right use of reason in the Princeton tradition has established that a reexamination of the epistemological orthodoxy of Old Princeton is long overdue. We have shifted the focus of interpretation for Old Princeton's "intellectualism" from a perspective that locates it within the context of Scottish Common Sense Realism to a perspective that locates it within a context that is moral rather than merely rational, and we have demonstrated thereby that Old Princeton's "intellectualism" sprang from an endorsement of the classical Reformed distinction between a merely speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel rather than from accommodation to the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of Enlightenment thought.[118] As such, we have determined that the Princeton theologians were not the naÔve rationalists that the consensus of critical opinion would have us believe they were. They were, rather, Reformed scholars whose employment of Scottish Common Sense Realism and Baconian inductivism was qualified and conditioned by their Reformed commitments.

This is historically significant for two reasons. To begin with, it is significant because it demonstrates that the employment of induction is not ipso facto evidence of latent Arminian tendencies.[119] Whereas defenders of Old Princeton must concede that Scottish Common Sense Realism and Baconian inductivism had a marked impact upon the theological method of the Princeton theologians, they need not concede that this impact was so profound that it altered anything more than the "framework" of the Princetonians' theology.[120] Indeed, as scholars like Mark Noll and David Wells have carefully noted, the Scottish Philosophy moved New England theologians like Nathaniel Taylor much further from Reformed orthodoxy than it did Old Princeton simply because New England theologians like Nathaniel Taylor endorsed "the estimate made of human nature by Scottish Common Sense Realism."[121] They endorsed, in other words, the latent humanism of the Common Sense tradition, and as a consequence they passed on to their descendents a liberalized version of Calvinism that was, as Joseph Haroutunian has incisively noted, "not Calvinism. It was the faith of the fathers ruined by their children."[122] To seriously suggest that the Princeton theologians were guilty of the same anthropological indiscretions as were their New School brethren is to do a terrible disservice to the Princeton Theology. It is to ignore, moreover, the historiographical key to understanding the tensions between the Old and New Schools throughout most of the nineteenth century.[123]

Shifting the focus of interpretation for Old Princeton's "intellectualism" from a perspective that locates it within the context of Scottish Common Sense Realism to a perspective that locates it within a context that is moral rather than merely rational is also significant because it undermines the assumption that is implicit in commentary that is critical of the "intellectualism" of Old Princeton. Commentary that is critical of the "intellectualism" of Old Princeton be it the contention that the Princeton theologians "held an almost Pelagian confidence that the mind was essentially undisturbed by sin's influence,"[124] or the ancillary assertion that the Princetonians were indifferent to the subjective and experiential components of religious epistemology[125] is based upon the unspoken assumption that the theologians at Old Princeton Seminary fell prey to the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of Enlightenment thought simply because they endorsed a faculty psychology.[126] The Princeton theologians sacrificed anthropological and epistemological integrity to the assumptions of an essentially humanistic philosophy, it is tacitly assumed, because they failed to recognize that "our intellect, will and emotions are inseparably connected with our whole personality," and as such cannot operate independently one from the other.[127] Whereas this assumption and the ancillary critiques that spring from it would be valid if the Princeton theologians in fact failed to recognize that the soul is a single unit that acts in all of its functions as a single substance, that it is not is clear from their insistence that the operation of the intellect involves the "whole soul" mind, will and emotions rather than the rational faculty alone. Interpreters ought not conclude, therefore, that Old Princeton's emphasis upon "right reason" and "true science" is evidence of what B. B. Warfield once referred to as the "habit of `concession,'"[128] i.e., of the heretical proclivity "to state modern thought in terms of Christian belief."[129] They ought to regard it as evidence, rather, of Old Princeton's uncompromising attempt to remain faithful to the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of the Reformed tradition in an increasingly subjectivistic age.

Given the plausibility of the claim that the "intellectualism" of Old Princeton was moral rather than merely rational, I conclude our consideration of Old Princeton and the right use of reason by suggesting that we have arrived at an answer to one of the most vexing questions in the historiography of the Princeton Theology. The primary question that confronts modern interpreters of the Princeton Theology is that which has to do with the role of the subjective in that theology. "The real question regarding the Princetonians," historian Terry Chrisope writes, "is not whether this element was present in their thought, but how it fit in with their other philosophical commitments."[130] Shifting the focus of interpretation for Old Princeton's "intellectualism" from a perspective that locates it within the context of Scottish Common Sense Realism to a perspective that locates it within a context that is moral rather than merely rational suggests, in short, that the Princeton Theology was driven by subjective rather than objective, theological rather than philosophical concerns. It suggests, in other words, that the Princeton theologians were neither indifferent to the subjective and experiential components of religious epistemology, nor overly sanguine about the cognitive powers of the fallen mind, but rather acutely aware of the fact that the unitary operation of the soul is determined by the character of the acting agent. The Princeton theologians ought not to be regarded, therefore, as theological hacks who molded their theology to meet their apologetical needs. They ought to be regarded, rather, as Reformed scholars who responded to the modern era's relocation of the divine-human nexus by insisting that the Christian religion is based upon the rational appropriation of objective truth rather than upon the ineffable religious experience of a fallen moral agent, and by reminding the Christian community that the ability to see this truth for what it objectively is presupposes the regenerating activity of the Holy Spirit on the "whole soul" of a moral agent.[131]

Notes
[1]Greg Bahnsen, "Machen, Van Til, and the Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," in Pressing Toward the Mark: Essays Commemorating Fifty Years of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, edited by Charles Dennison and Richard Gamble (Philadelphia: The Committee for the Historian of the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, 1986), 263, 262-263.
[2]Ibid., 278, 277-278.
[3]Ibid., 280.
[4]J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (New York: Macmillan, 1923; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990), 6. Also cf. J. Gresham Machen, "Christianity and Culture," in What is Christianity? And Other Addresses, edited by Ned Stonehouse (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1951), 158. In this essay the word "culture" refers generally to everything in human civilization that is remotely related to the sphere of the intellect, i.e., to the life of the mind, and specifically to those "intellectual forces which are rampant in the world [that] are grievously perplexing the Church." J. Gresham Machen, The New Testament: An Introduction to its Literature and History, edited by W. John Cook (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1990), 377. In this regard, see Harry Emerson Fosdick, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" The Christian Century 39 (June 8, 1922): 713-714.
[5]D. G. Hart, "`Doctor Fundamentalis': An Intellectual Biography of J. Gresham Machen, 1881-1937" (Ph.D. Johns Hopkins University, 1988), 63. Cf. J. Gresham Machen to Minnie Gresham Machen, 3 March 1912, Machen Archives, Montgomery Memorial Library, Westminster Theological Seminary, Philadelphia.
[6]Fosdick, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" 713-714.
[7]Cf. J. Gresham Machen, "The Modern Use of the Bible," in What is Christianity? 199. See also Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 158.
[8]Fosdick, "Shall the Fundamentalists Win?" 713-714.
[9]J. Gresham Machen, The Literature and History of New Testament Times, Teachers Manual, The Westminster Departmental Graded Series, edited by John T. Faris (Philadelphia: The Presbyterian Board of Publication and Sabbath School Work, 1916), 277, 278.
[10]Ibid., 277.
[11]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 159.
[12]Ibid.
[13]For example, cf. J. Gresham Machen, "Christianity in Conflict," in Contemporary American Theology, vol. 1, edited by Vergilius Ferm (New York: Round Table Press, 1932), 255-257; J. Gresham Machen, "Christianity and Liberty: A Challenge to the `Modern Mind,'" The Forum (March 1931): 165.
[14]J. Gresham Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," Princeton Theological Review 24 (1926): 62. Cf. Michael Horton, Beyond Culture Wars: Is America a Mission Field or a Battlefield? (Chicago: Moody Press, 1994), 77.
[15]J. Gresham Machen, "Religion and Fact," The Real Issue 1 (April 15, 1924): 3.
[16]J. Gresham Machen, "The Gospel and Modern Substitutes," in God Transcendent, edited by Ned Stonehouse (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1949; reprint, Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1982), 102.
[17]On the mystical and moral ways of tapping into this force, cf. J. Gresham Machen, "Faith and Knowledge," Fourth Biennial Meeting of the Conference of Theological Seminaries and Colleges in the United States and Canada: Bulletin 4 (August 1924): 14-15. At this point we must note that it is in this effort to "tap" into what is considered to be divine that the defining characteristic of theological liberalism "naturalism" is to be found. Machen defines "naturalism" as "the denial of any entrance of the creative power of God, as sharply distinguished from his works in nature, at the beginnings of Christianity." J. Gresham Machen, "Christianity vs. Modern Liberalism," Moody Bible Institute Monthly 13 (April 1923): 349.
[18]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 46.
[19]J. Gresham Machen, What is Faith? (New York: Macmillan, 1925; reprint, Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1991), 242.
[20]Machen, "Christianity and Liberty," 165.
[21]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 66; see also J. Gresham Machen, "Isaiah's Scorn of Idolatry," in God Transcendent, 27. Machen repudiated the "fatal" anti-intellectualism of the aforementioned solutions, J. Gresham Machen, "What is the Gospel?" Union Seminary Review 38 (1927): 170, because he recognized that human beings who are dead in sin and "totally unable to please God," J. Gresham Machen, The Christian View of Man (New York: Macmillan, 1937; reprint, Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1984), 241, need salvation "from the awful wrath of a righteous God" rather than an ineffable experience, Machen, What is Faith? 58. They need access, in other words, to an object outside of themselves that is capable of providing salvation from sin.
[22]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 160, 163-164. On the unity of truth, see J. Gresham Machen, The Virgin Birth of Christ (New York: Harper, 1930; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1967), 219.
[23]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 160.
[24]J. Gresham Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," Unpublished Sermon, Machen Archives, 2.
[25]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 160.
[26]Machen, The Literature and History of New Testament Times, Teachers Manual, 278.
[27]Ibid.
[28]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 164; cf. Machen, The Literature and History of New Testament Times, Teachers Manual, 278.
[29]Ibid.
[30]For example, see Machen, The New Testament, 375; Machen, What is Faith? 174, 197-198, 202-204.
[31]J. Gresham Machen, The Christian Faith in the Modern World (New York: Macmillan, 1936; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978), 63.
[32]J. Gresham Machen, review of Apology and Polemic in the New Testament, by Andrew D. Heffern, Presbyterian 93 (Sept. 13, 1923): 10. On the logical vs. temporal order of faith, see Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 43, 59; Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 56; Darryl Hart, "The Princeton Mind in the Modern World and the Common Sense of J. Gresham Machen," Westminster Theological Journal 46 (1984): 23.
[33]Machen, What is Faith? 197.
[34]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 160; cf. Machen, What is Faith? 94.
[35]Machen, "Christianity in Conflict," 261.
[36]J. Gresham Machen, "Christian Scholarship and Evangelism," in What is Christianity? 123. See also Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 165; Machen, The Literature and History of New Testament Times, Teachers Manual, 278.
[37]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 162-163.
[38]Cf. J. Gresham Machen, "Christian Scholarship and the Defence of the Faith," in What is Christianity? 129; Machen, "Christianity in Conflict," 245.
[39]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 165-166.
[40]Machen, "Christian Scholarship and the Defence of the Faith," 126; cf. 136.
[41]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 162.
[42]Machen, The New Testament, 378; cf. Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 142.
[43]Machen, "Faith and Knowledge," 20.
[44]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 162.
[45]Machen, The New Testament, 378.
[46]Ibid., 376. Cf. Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 174.
[47]Anyone who endorses the notion that the Princeton Theology in general and the Princeton apologetic in particular were based upon an accommodation of theology to the anthropological and epistemological assumptions of Enlightenment thought will likely draw such a conclusion. For example, see George Marsden, "J. Gresham Machen, History, and Truth," Westminster Theological Journal 42 (1979-1980): 157-175; Idem., "Understanding J. Gresham Machen," Princeton Seminary Bulletin XI (1990): 46-60; Mark Noll, "The Princeton Theology," in The Princeton Theology, Reformed Theology in America, edited by David Wells, no. 1 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1989), 29.
[48]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 51.
[49]Ibid., 52.
[50]Machen, What is Faith? 130.
[51]Machen's indebtedness to the anthropological commitments of Hodge and Warfield is explicitly stated on page 228 of The Christian View of Man. On the Christian anthropology of Charles Hodge and B. B. Warfield, see my dissertation, "Moral Character and Moral Certainty: The Subjective State of the Soul and J. G. Machen's Critique of Theological Liberalism" (Ph.D. Marquette University, 1996), chapter two; and my article "B. B. Warfield and the Princeton Apologetic: The Appeal to `Right Reason,'" Premise 4, 4 (December 1997): 5.
[52]Machen, The Christian View of Man, 146. On the certain relationship between moral character and the activity of the "whole man," also see 26-29, 125, 138, and 234-239.
[53]Ibid., 236.
[54]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 53. On the relationship between presuppositions and science, cf. Machen, The Virgin Birth of Christ, 219.
[55]Machen, The Christian View of Man, 149.
[56]Ibid.
[57]Ibid., 218, 214, 215.
[58]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 60. My justification for contending that the fall into sin entails the loss of communion with God as well as the loss of the ability to be "truly scientific" is to be found in the correlation between the origin of the presuppositions that condition "true science" and the origin of the convictions that foster "real" communion with God, i.e., "true religion." The presuppositions that condition "true science" and the convictions that foster "true religion" are: (1) a genuine theism, and (2) a genuine awareness of the ontological as well as moral gulf that separates fallen sinners from the Creator. On how the regenerate alone can endorse either of these presuppositions, cf. Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," 1-11; Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 54-68.
[59]Cf. Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 55.
[60]Machen, The Christian View of Man, 144.
[61]Machen, What is Faith? 135. On the benefits of Christ's redeeming death, cf. J. Gresham Machen, "The Active Obedience of Christ," in God Transcendent, 187-196. On the miraculous nature of the work of the Spirit, cf. Machen, The Christian View of Man, 102-104.
[62]Machen, What is Faith? 144.
[63]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 59.
[64]Ibid., 63.
[65]See, for example, Machen, The Christian View of Man, 83.
[66]We must note that while Machen insisted that the regenerating activity of the Spirit enables fallen sinners to see God more clearly, he never maintained that it enables them to see God perfectly. He never maintained, in other words, that fallen sinners can have a perfect philosophy. Indeed, perfect philosophy is impossible for two reasons: (1) mere mortals cannot see the face of God and live "We are but finite creatures, and God has not destroyed us by showing us the full splendors of His being," Machen, "Isaiah's Scorn of Idolatry," 25; and (2) no matter how good our apprehension of God is, God is still shrouded in "mystery," Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," 10-11.
[67]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 64-66.
[68]Ibid. It goes without saying that "a sound metaphysic" and "a sound epistemology" are related in Machen's thought.
[69]B. B. Warfield, "Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics," Selected Shorter Writings of Benjamin B. Warfield, edited by John E. Meeter, 2 vols. (Nutley, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1970 and 1973), II: 100-103; see also B. B. Warfield, "A Review of De Zekerheid Des Geloofs," Shorter Writings, II: 117-120.
[70]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 64.
[71]Machen, "Christian Scholarship and the Defence of the Faith," 127; cf. Machen, The New Testament, 378.
[72]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 166; cf. Machen, The Literature and History of the New Testament, Teacher's Manual, 279; Machen, What is Faith? 248-250.
[73]Ibid., 248, 249.
[74]Machen's point will be lost if we forget that the veil that lies before the eyes of the fallen sinner's mind is moral rather than merely rational. For Machen's endorsement of the classical Reformed distinction between a merely speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel, see Machen, The New Testament, 375; Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 63-64; Machen, What is Faith? 135, 202-204; Machen, The Christian View of Man, 150-151.
[75]J. Gresham Machen, "History and Faith," in What is Christianity? 182-183; Machen, The New Testament, 378. At this point, two important observations are in order. The first is that the historical and philosophical proofs for the trustworthiness of the Christian religion point not to themselves, but rather to the gospel. As such, the faith of the believer does not reside in rational arguments about Scripture or about the gospel, but rather in Scripture itself. See Helseth, "Moral Character and Moral Certainty," Appendix One. Second, if Machen did not endorse the classical Reformed distinction between a merely speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel, then statements like the following which presume the distinction would be the kiss of death to the argument I am making. "Thus even in order to exhibit the truth of Christianity at the bar of reason, it is necessary to learn the lesson of the law. It is impossible to prove first that Christianity is true, and then proceed on the basis of its truth to become conscious of one's sin, for the fact of sin is itself one of the chief foundations upon which the proof is based." Machen, What is Faith? 134.
[76]Ibid., 135.
[77]J. Gresham Machen, "Christian Scholarship and the Building up of the Church," in What is Christianity? 144. See also J. Gresham Machen, Address at the Second Annual Symposium on Religion at Columbia University, 2 April 1930, Machen Archives, 12; Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 56; Machen, The Christian View of Man, 188.
[78]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 64. The unregenerate can take account of all of the facts except the fact that reveals the glory of the gospel, namely the fact of sin.
[79]Machen, The Christian View of Man, 33. The central message in the Bible is the gospel, or that which has to do with "the redeeming work of Christ." J. Gresham Machen, "What Fundamentalism Stands for Now," in What is Christianity? 259.
[80]Machen, What is Faith? 248.
[81]J. Gresham Machen, "Prophets False and True," in God Transcendent, 121.
[82]Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 67. Because he recognized that the conviction of sin "cannot be obtained by ordinary methods of research," Machen conceded that there is an "element of truth" to the notion that "religion possesses its own credentials and should be judged as religion and not as something else." This concession notwithstanding, Machen still insisted that because these convictions are based upon facts e.g., the "fact of sin" the "attainment even of these convictions is not really to be separated from philosophy or from science. A man cannot be truly scientific if he neglects relevant facts; he cannot be truly scientific if he neglects the fact of sin." Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 63-64.
[83]Machen, What is Faith? 249.
[84]Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," 2.
[85]For a brief discussion of Realistic Dualism, see Helseth, "B. B. Warfield and the Princeton Apologetic," note 6. For a more extensive analysis, see Helseth, "Moral Character and Moral Certainty," chapters One and Two.
[86]Machen, The Christian View of Man, 29.
[87]For an understanding of how the Holy Spirit "determines the will" without dealing with moral agents as if they were "sticks or stones," see ibid., 44, 46-48, 62, 100. On the determining influence of motives, see 26-29.
[88]Machen, What is Faith? 248.
[89]Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," 10-11.
[90]Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 105-106.
[91]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 161; cf. Machen, "Rejoice with Trembling," 1-2.
[92]Machen, "The Relation of Religion to Science and Philosophy," 64.
[93]Machen, What is Faith? 249, 135. Because Machen recognized that the soul is a single unit that acts in all of its functions as a single substance, and because he insisted that believing in Christ is the "immediate" sign of the Spirit's single act of salvation (which includes regeneration and justification), see Machen, The Christian View of Man, 77; Machen, Christianity and Liberalism, 140, we must conclude that he rejected what Charles Hodge earlier referred to as the "light system." While Hodge clearly affirmed the primacy of the intellect in faith, he was unyielding in his insistence that the whole soul is the subject of the Spirit's influence. As such, he rejected "what has been called the `light system,' which teaches that men are regenerated by light or knowledge, and that all that is needed is that the eyes of the understanding should be opened. As the whole soul is the subject of original sin the whole soul is the subject of regeneration. A blind man cannot possible rejoice in the beauties of nature or art until his sight is restored. But, if uncultivated, the mere restoration of sight will not give him the perception of beauty. His whole nature must be refined and elevated. So also the whole nature of apostate man must be renewed by the Holy Ghost; then his eyes being opened to the glory of God in Christ, he will rejoice in Him with joy unspeakable and full of glory. But the illumination of the mind is indispensable to holy feelings, and is their proximate cause." Charles Hodge, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1872-1873; reprint, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1982), II: 263.
[94]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 163.
[95]Bahnsen, "The Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," 280.
[96]Ibid., 293.
[97]Ibid., 281.
[98]Ibid., 280.
[99]Ibid., 278-279.
[100]Ibid., 280.
[101]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 162.
[102]Bahnsen, "The Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," 279.
[103]Machen, "Christian Scholarship and the Defence of the Faith," 129.
[104]Ibid., 128. For Bahnsen's treatment of this passage, see "The Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," 293, note 109. Interestingly, this statement immediately precedes and thus supplies the context for much of the evidence that Bahnsen cites in support of his thesis.
[105]Machen, "Christianity and Culture," 162.
[106]Machen to Rev. Gerrit H. Hospers, Ontario, New York, 27 December 1924, Machen Archives. See also Machen to Hospers, 11 December 1924.
[107]Cornelius Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, third ed. (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1972), 264.
[108]Cornelius Van Til, "My Credo," in Jerusalem and Athens: Critical Discussions on the Philosophy and Apologetics of Cornelius Van Til, edited by E. R. Geehan (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1980), 21.
[109]Van Til, The Defense of the Faith, 264-265. Cf. Jack Rogers, "Van Til and Warfield on Scripture in the Westminster Confession," in Jerusalem and Athens, 154.
[110]Van Til, "My Credo," 11, 21.
[111]Bahnsen, "The Apologetical Tradition of the OPC," 281.
[112]Warfield, "Introduction to Francis R. Beattie's Apologetics," Shorter Writings, II: 102-103.
[113]Ibid., II: 99-100. To interpret Warfield's appeal to "right reason" as an appeal to a capacity that is possessed even by the unregenerate is to fundamentally misconstrue the word picture being painted in this "remarkable" passage, cf. George Marsden, Fundamentalism and American Culture: The Shaping of Twentieth-Century Evangelicalism, 1870-1925 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1980), 115. It is to make Warfield guilty, moreover, of reducing the Christian religion to a natural phenomenon, and of endorsing what he elsewhere describes as "autosoterism." Cf. B. B. Warfield, "How to Get Rid of Christianity," Shorter Writings, I: 60.
[114]Van Til, "My Credo," 11.
[115]David B. Calhoun, The Majestic Testimony, 1869-1929. Vol. 2, The History of Princeton Seminary (Edinburgh: Banner of Truth, 1996), 529.
[116]This phrase is lifted from a question originally posed by Professor John Frame in his brief analysis of Bahnsen's "very interesting essay." Frame's question reads as follows: Is it possible, he asks, "that Old Princeton's apologetic was not as far from presuppositionalism as Van Til believed?" John Frame, Cornelius Van Til: An Analysis of His Thought (Phillipsburg, NJ: Presbyterian and Reformed, 1995), 450.
[117]By focusing in this last sentence on committed Van Tillians I am not suggesting that committed evidentialists need clarify nothing about their approach. Indeed, it is entirely possible that committed evidentialists particularly those of the Arminian persuasion would benefit just as much from a reexamination of the epistemological orthodoxy of Old Princeton as would committed Van Tillians. On this point, see Kim Riddlebarger's excellent dissertation, "The Lion of Princeton: Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield on Apologetics, Theological Method and Polemics" (Ph.D. Fuller Theological Seminary, 1997), chapter four. What I am suggesting, however, is that the differences between an evidentialist and a presuppositionalist approach to apologetics cannot be attributed to Old Princeton's alleged endorsement of an epistemology that somehow is less than truly Reformed because it fails to acknowledge "the epistemic Lordship of Christ." On this point, see Michael R. Butler, "A Truly Reformed Epistemology," Penpoint 8, 5 (May 1997).
[118]On the distinction between a speculative and a spiritual understanding of the gospel, see my previous Premise contribution, "B. B. Warfield and the Princeton Apologetic," note 6.
[119]Cf. Riddlebarger, "The Lion of Princeton," chapter seven.
[120]Mark Noll, "Jonathan Edwards and Nineteenth-Century Theology," in Jonathan Edwards and the American Experience, edited by Nathan O. Hatch and Harry S. Stout (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 268.
[121]David Wells, "Charles Hodge," in The Princeton Theology, 43; Mark Noll, "New Haven Theology," in Evangelical Dictionary of Theology, edited by Walter Elwell (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), 763.
[122]Joseph Haroutunian, Piety Versus Moralism: The Passing of the New England Theology (New York: Holt, 1932), 281. For another excellent analysis of New School Presbyterianism, see George Marsden, The Evangelical Mind and the New School Presbyterian Experience (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970).
[123]The source of the tension between the Old and New Schools can be traced to the differing starting points of each school. Whereas the Old School was theocentric, i.e., it had for its object "the vindication of the Divine supremacy and sovereignty in the salvation of men," the New School was anthropocentric. The New School had for its "characteristic aim," in other words, "the assertion of the rights of human nature. It is specially solicitous that nothing should be held to be true, which cannot be philosophically reconciled with the liberty and ability of man." On the difference between these starting points and the implications for the historiography of the nineteenth century, see Charles Hodge, "Remarks on the Princeton Review," The Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review 23 (1851): 309; Wells, "Charles Hodge," 44ff.
[124]Jack Rogers and Donald McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1979), 290.
[125]For example, Ernest Sandeen, "The Princeton Theology: One Source of Biblical Literalism in American Protestantism," Church History 31 (1962): 307-321.
[126]See, for example, Lefferts Loetscher, Facing the Enlightenment and Pietism: Archibald Alexander and the Founding of Princeton Theological Seminary (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1983), 168.
[127]William Masselink, "Professor J. Gresham Machen: His Life and Defense of the Bible" (Th.D. Free University of Amsterdam, 1938), 153-155; see also Rogers and McKim, The Authority and Interpretation of the Bible, 290.
[128]B. B. Warfield, "Heresy and Concession," Shorter Writings, II: 675.
[129]B. B. Warfield, review of Foundations: A Statement of Christian Belief in Terms of Modern Thought, by Seven Oxford Men, in Critical Reviews, vol. X, The Works of Benjamin Breckinridge Warfield (New York: Oxford University Press, 1932; reprint, Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 322.
[130]Terry Chrisope, "The Bible and Historical Scholarship in the Early life and Thought of J. Gresham Machen, 1881-1915" (Ph.D. Kansas State University, 1988), 99.
[131]I would like to thank Dr. Darryl Hart, the late Dr. Greg Bahnsen, and Rev. Ian Hewitson for their helpful comments on significant portions of this essay, a less comprehensive version of which will appear in a forthcoming issue of The Westminster Theological Journal under the title "The Apologetical Tradition of the OPC: A Reconsideration."

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