Somalia Is Still A Problem 


Although the number of people facing starvation has fallen in Somalia and international business is returning in a limited fashion, the country still lacks an effective central government and still poses the threat of being a haven for international terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda. 

It has been eleven years since the downing of two American Blackhawk helicopters by Somali militiamen over the slums of Mogadishu. But since the horrific events and the (short-lived) media spotlight on Somalia that followed, things have not improved by much in the beleaguered country. While the number of people facing starvation has declined and international business is returning in a limited fashion, Somalia still lacks an effective central government and continues to pose the threat of being a haven for international terrorist groups, including al-Qaeda.  
 
After the 9/11 attacks on the US, Western governments placed renewed pressure on the authorities in Somalia and closed banks in the country in an effort to stem the amount of funding to terrorists that transited through that state’s borders. Although there has been limited success in these endeavors, the closing of banks has neither solved the problems for the US nor for the Somali people. Aside from the desired outcome of potentially restricting access to funds by terrorists, ordinary and expatriated Somalis have also been restricted from their own assets, something that has not done well in creating any more pro-American spirit and may actually foster an even greater animosity.  
 
Another reason for the limited success of this tactic is that the so-called Somali authorities with whom diplomatic relations are conducted are mostly impotent. Somalia’s true authorities are the powerful warlords who control wide swaths of the country and who owe no allegiance to any regime in the fragmented capital, Mogadishu. In late January, however, after nearly twenty months of talks, the warlords managed to strike a deal between them that, although predictably fragile, led the way to last week’s inaugural meeting of the new Somali Parliament. The renewed attempts at peace are also endorsed and supported by Somalia’s neighboring countries, something that had been lacking in previous attempts to re-empower Mogadishu. 
 
Although the formation of a national parliament has the honorable intention of recreating a viable national government, it is a faulty arrangement and one that may do little to reunite the country and reduce the prevalence of terrorist activities. The MPs are nominated by the various warlords and are approved by a group of tribal elders, a sort of senate. The problem is that, in all likelihood, the elders will be chosen by those same warlords, wholly discounting the apparent attempt at some form of checks-and-balances. 
 
Public opinion on the new government is also vitally important. The widespread knowledge of Western insistence for its formation as well as the exclusion of other non- violent groups—the recovering business community, among others, complain about not being included in the process—does not bode well for creating a national consensus. Without a consensus, factional interests will still be sought, including those provided by groups such as al-Qaeda. 
 
As it relates to America, the question may be whether or not, by attempting to put a tight stranglehold on terrorism in Somalia, its policies are tuned well enough so that they do not beget an even larger national security problem. Somalis see Americans dealing with various warlords, such as Hussein Aideed—son of Mohamed Farah Aideed, the warlord who led the fight to expel the US-led force from the country in 1993—who are being paid to surrender their weaponry in an attempt to keep it out of terrorists’ hands. Somalis also see many of these same warlords at odds with their own interests as civilians are often caught in the inter-clan crossfire.  With this perceivable misunderstanding as to America’s intentions in their country, the Somali people must not be left out of the anti-terrorism equation. More may need to be done to strengthen a true central government so that anti-terrorism policies may more precisely target the terrorists and their financiers and not the civilians who still have a lot yet with which to deal. 

Posted: Mon - September 6, 2004 at 07:04 PM          

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