

Introduction: The Culture of Repetition

Is a sacrifice necessary? Hurry up with it, because—if we are still within earshot—the World, by repeating itself, is dissolving into Noise and Violence.

- Jacques Attali, *Noise: The Political Economy of Music* (1977)

I woke up this morning thinking that I might not want to listen to repetitive music ever again—the endless looping of images yesterday was enough for me for quite some time.

- message posted to the .microsound e-list on September 12, 2001

It is late on a Friday night in the industrial consumer society at the turn of the twenty-first century.

The culture of repetition is in full swing.

In a converted warehouse near the urban core, hundreds of dancers are moving in rhythm to highly repetitive electronic music; many of them are under the influence of controlled substances, most notably 3-4 methylenedioxymethamphetamine (MDMA), known to them as E, X, or Ecstasy. The DJ, who has been building erotic tension for 45 minutes by careful interweaving of current hard trance with classic disco tracks from the 1970s, pulls a prized 12-inch record from his crate: the sixteen-minute dance remix of Donna Summer and Giorgio Moroder's "Love to Love You Baby." He spins the record to the halfway point and begins to intercut Summers' elaborately structured moans into the driving groove that issues from his other turntable; as the crowd realizes what he is doing, they begin to scream and moan along with the record. Everyone reaches climax together as the bass drum kicks in...

A solitary late-night shopper wheels her cart down the soup aisle of a nearby supermarket; she finds the repeating pattern of the colored labels vaguely relaxing as she glides by. (Clinical monitoring of her eye-blink rate would show that she has entered the first stage of hypnoid trance.) She wonders, as she does every time she traverses this aisle, why there are so many different brands of

soup and who buys them all. She remembers, suddenly, that she has been wanting for a long time to try some chunky chicken noodle. The music drifting down from speakers embedded in the ceiling hardly registers on her consciousness...

A writer sits in his suburban study watching a videotape of network television. He has almost one hundred sets of tapes, twenty-four hours of every channel available from his local cable provider on a given day almost two months ago. He is watching them all, trying to make sense of the torrential flow of information pouring from the nation's TV sets. He has seen dozens of sitcoms, hundreds of reruns, literally *thousands* of commercials, and he has thousands more to go. He is exhausted—and a little terrified. Downtown, a junior advertising executive sits in a conference room with a computer printout. He is engaged in a strangely similar task, tallying against the agency's media plan the thousands of television and radio buys they executed last week for a major soft-drink account. The plan, carefully calibrated to maximize both audience reach and frequency, plots bursts of advertising in various mass-media vehicles (the vertical axis) against time (the horizontal axis); it looks rather like the output of a MIDI sequencer in piano-roll notation...

A college student sets out to read one hundred fifty pages of an overdue sociology assignment. Settling down at her desk with pencil, highlighter, and a one-liter bottle of Diet Coke, she decides the only thing lacking for her invariable study ritual is some sonic ambience. Leafing through her record collection, and passing over the many pop and rock CDs, she picks her favorite relaxing-and-study music, a bargain re-issue of a 1958 recording of Vivaldi violin concertos which includes the famous *Four Seasons*. She figures that if she mixes up the twenty-odd movements on the 65-minute CD with random and repeat play, she should have enough familiar music in the background to keep her focused for several hours. Absently tapping her pencil in time with the soft music, she begins to read...

Down the hall, the girl's mother silently enters the darkened bedroom of her six-year-old son. The headphones have slipped off, so she gently puts them back before flipping the cassette tape over. The music begins again (it is a Vivaldi concerto from the same set that her daughter is half-listening to next door), and she thinks, not for the first time, how strange it is that the Suzuki

teacher demands they listen to the same few tracks over and over, even when sleeping. Their first, equally strange, group lesson was the previous afternoon: she was amused and a little intimidated by the repetition and discipline, her little boy sawing away in a line of twelve other children at an exercise that sounded like “peanut-butter sandwich” over and over—his teacher said, laughing, let’s do it *ichi-man*, which she later found out meant, in Japanese, *ten thousand* repetitions!—and then bowing ceremonially at the end of the lesson. It’s not music, it’s just playing the same thing over and over; repetitious like factory work, she thinks, or like beginning meditation, like the idea of “just sitting” that cropped up in a little book her yoga teacher gave her, called *Zen Mind, Beginner’s Mind*. Turning out the light, she says a short mantra that it works. After all, taking up classical music can help improve performance in school, especially for boys, and it’s never too soon to start thinking about college for this last one...

In a university electronic music studio, a sophomore composition major is fiddling with a keyboard and computer sequencing software. She has been listening obsessively to Steve Reich’s 1976 *Music for Eighteen Musicians*, and, trying to get the same effect, has created several slow, overlapping analog-string melodies and some faster figures for a sampled marimba. (The dot-dash piano-roll notation she is staring at looks oddly like the ad executive’s media plan.) She clicks the mouse a few times, putting virtual repeat signs around all the loops, and starts playback. Cool. *Very* cool. Of course she’ll never show this to her composition teacher—he’d just frown and sentence her to ten more hours of Schoenberg. And, to tell the truth, if he asked her why anybody should care about two idiotic minimal loops repeating over and over and slowly going out of phase, she’d have no answer.

Except that it sounds like, *feels* like...

Her life.

* * * *

The fundamental claim of this book is that the single-minded focus on repetition and process that have come to define what we think of as “minimal music” can be interpreted as both the sonic analog and, at times, a sonorous constituent of a characteristic repetitive experience of self in mass-media consumer society. Repetition, regimentation, and process are of course basic to any form of human organization more complex than hunter-gatherer bands. But the rationalized technoworld that began to take final shape in industrialized societies during the long post-war boom of the 1950s and 1960s created for the first time the theoretical possibility of a strange feedback loop whose many paradoxical complexities I want to fold into the single notion of a “culture of repetition.” A culture of repetition arises when the extremely high level of repetitive structuring necessary to sustain capitalist modernity becomes salient in its own right, experienced directly as constituent of subjectivity; it is in this sense that we are constantly “repeating ourselves,” fashioning and regulating our lived selves through manifold experiences of repetition. “Pure” control of/by repetition has become a familiar yet unacknowledged aesthetic effect of late modernity, sometimes experienced as pleasurable and erotic, but more often as painfully excessive, alienating, and (thus) sublime.

Often very repetitive musical experiences literally structure a given culture—as at the discotheque, in the Suzuki violin class, on classic-FM radio, or at the experimental music concert—and thus analyzing the complicated way various kinds of repetitive musicking function within *very* broadly-construed cultural contexts will be one of the basic aims of my study.¹ (We’ll need to consider along the way such seemingly extra-musical issues as the precise number of orgasms simulated by Donna Summer in her 1975 hit “Love to Love You Baby”; the unintended consequences for listening practices of the 1948 “battle of the speeds” fought by Columbia and RCA-Victor; and the doctrinal debate between Rinzai and Soto Zen lineages on the most effective path to enlightenment.) But understanding repetitive music as a cultural practice must also include the possibility that repetitive minimal music itself, taken as an autonomous, not overtly representational cultural

¹ The term “musicking” was coined to fill the lack of a generic verb in English by critic Christopher Small; see *Musicking: The Meanings of Performing and Listening* (Hanover, NH and London: University Press of New England, 1998). Small’s term is particularly apropos here, since his broad definition of musicking covers listening—and even not-quite listening—as well as more traditionally “musical” activities like composing and performing.

practice, might have a hermeneutic aspect: a set of “hidden” meanings that might point at much larger contemporary cultures of repetition, might trope off them, even signify on them in some ambivalent and not easily reducible way.

Eros and Thanatos: music, subjectivity, and the culture(s) of repetition

The few critical studies to date that attempt a hermeneutic of minimalism have limited themselves, it seems to me, by a pair of reductive assumptions. First, following (at whatever critical distance) the later Freud, they assume that the tendency to repeat is essential to human psychology, a kind of built-in homeostatic mechanism for reducing tension. Freud, biological essentialist to the core, postulated that all organic life strove towards the inorganic, a tendency he identified with *Thanatos*, the phantasmagorical “death drive.” Critics of repetitive music have not forgotten that Freud invented the death instinct to explain a particular war neurosis, the *compulsion to repeat* traumatic events that seemed to seize shell-shocked veterans, in direct defiance of what had seemed an unvarying principle, that organisms always act to avoid unpleasure. With Freud, modern interpreters seek the cultural significance of musical repetition “beyond the pleasure principle”: repetition in music is thought to negate teleological desire, and thus repetitive music is allied with any and all psychic forces antithetical to *Eros*, to the goal-directed patterns of tension and release that define the ego-creating “life instinct.”

It follows, secondly, that many psychoanalytic readings simply assume repetition-structures in music are unequivocal markers of regression—if not all the way back to the inorganic, than certainly back before the human subject, back to the non-dialectical psychic states (infancy, schizophrenia) which precede ego-differentiation. Adorno set the tone in *Philosophy of Modern Music* when he attacked Stravinsky’s frozen ostinatos as musical “catatonia”; Wim Mertens, whose 1980 monograph still stands as the single extended culture-critical treatment of American minimalism, provides an explicit Frankfurt School echo, turning suddenly at the end of a long and detailed survey to denounce repetitive music as regressive and infantile. He himself appears in the grip of a repetition compulsion, reproducing a sonorous psychoanalytic diagnosis out of pre-war Adorno as if by rote:

In repetitive music, repetition in the service of the death instinct prevails. Repetition is not repetition of identical elements, so it is not reproduction, but the repetition of the identical in another guise. In traditional music, repetition is a device for creating recognizability, reproduction for the sake of the representing ego. In repetitive music, repetition does not refer to eros and the ego, but to the libido and to the death instinct.²

Mertens is of course aware that within experimental musical circles repetition is prized precisely for its ability to dissolve traditional formal dialectics, unleashing strange and unpredictable surges of intensity; as Fluxus composer Dick Higgins once noted, implicit within extreme boredom is extreme danger, and thus extreme excitement.³ Critics less politically worried by minimalism have followed Mertens in linking those non-dialectical fluctuations of intensity to Lacanian tendencies in French thought, turning for an interpretive matrix to the anti-teleological *jouissance* of French feminism and the anti-Oedipal “libidinal philosophy” practiced by Lyotard and Deleuze. Here repetitive music is valued precisely for its refusal to route musical pleasure through the symbolic order, for its self-negating regression to a pre-subjective space that Lacanian psychoanalysis calls “the Real.” In a memorable turn of phrase, David Schwarz has argued that the repetitions of John Adams’s *Nixon in China*, by cutting us off from memory and anticipation—i.e., from *Eros*—cut us off from the self, “trapping us in a narrow acoustic corridor of the Real.” By Naomi Cumming’s account, the motoric string ostinatos in Reich’s *Different Trains* are not just train sounds. They are sonorous pieces of

² “[Stravinsky’s] rhythmic procedures closely resemble the schema of catatonic conditions. In certain schizophrenics, the process by which the motor apparatus becomes independent leads to infinite repetition of gestures or words, following the decay of the ego.” Theodore Adorno, *The Philosophy of Modern Music*, trans. Anne G. Mitchell and Wesley V. Blomster (New York: Continuum, 1973), p. 178. Wim Mertens, *American Minimal Music*, trans. J. Hautekiet (New York: Broude, 1983), pp. 123-24. It is worth noting that Adorno’s later works, in particular “The Aging of the New Music (1955) and “*Vers une musique informelle*” (1961) show him as anything but a dogmatic partisan of high musical modernism. And yet... Adorno never engaged with minimal music directly, but it seems unlikely that he would have recognized the music of La Monte Young or Steve Reich as anything other than a sad, reactionary liquidation of the musical subject through complete reification of primitive musical material. Adorno’s early 1960s ideal of “informal music” sounds like a negation of pulse pattern minimalism *avant le lettre*: “—the spontaneous ear, conscious of itself, should resist not just tonal symmetry, but its most sublime derivatives – the predominance of an abstractly maintained pulse, the strong beat, and its negative retention in syn-copation.” (“*Vers une musique informelle*,” in *Quasi una Fantasia: Essays on Modern Music*, trans. Rodney Livingstone (London: Verso, 1998): 321-22. Though he did not live to read it, his dialectical reaction to Steve Reich’s 1970 “Some Optimistic Predictions about the Future of Music” (“The pulse and the concept of a clear tonal center will reemerge as basic sources of the new music”) can easily be imagined. See Steve Reich, *Writings About Music* (London: Oxford University Press, 2002), pp. 51-52.

³ Dick Higgins, “Boredom and Danger,” *The Something Else Newsletter* 1-9 (December 1968): 1-4, 6.

what Kristeva called the “pre-articulate,” of the Real as refuge from the Holocaust and its “horror of identification.”⁴

These psychoanalytical approaches can be elegant, suggestive, and highly ramified; they also demand attention because no one has, as yet, proposed a viable hermeneutic alternative. Lacanian theory has done a service—it has empowered at least a few scholars to “read” minimalist musical repetition as a cultural practice—but its assumptions can lock a critic into a rigid explanatory matrix where repetition is an abstract, purely psychic construct, and its singular meaning is always some form of self-annihilating regression unto death (or birth). One goal of this study is to wean the reader from attachment to such psychoanalytic rigor by linking repetitive music, flexibly and at multiple epistemological levels, to specific historical formations of material culture presented in their thickest, most irreducibly contingent aspects. It will neither be possible nor desirable to read musical repetition as the single aesthetic effect of any one cultural cause. “Culture of repetition” is a neat name for a deliberately shaggy portmanteau concept, useful precisely insofar as it refuses to assert a unitary psychological model or a single chain of cause and effect; rather than assume that one innate subjective drive to repeat always, everywhere, and in the same way weaves culture, why not explore the many different ways that our repetitive subjectivity is constituted, over and over, within the multiple, complex webs of material culture we weave? Reified categories handed down through the Frankfurt School and its epigones will be of little use here. For instance, it is simply not true, as Mertens claims, that teleological desire and subjectivity, the domain of *Eros*, are irrelevant to this new, supposedly “non-dialectical” musical style.⁵ In the pages that follow, we’ll trace the presence in minimalist music of both *Eros* and *Thanatos*, of dialectical entrainment to desire as well as libidinal liberation from it, never forgetting that these lofty psychoanalytic terms are just metaphors for the bodily effects of material social constructions.

⁴ David Schwarz, “Postmodernism, the Subject, and the Real in John Adams’s *Nixon in China*,” *Indiana Theory Review* 13-2 (Fall 1992): 134; Naomi Cumming, “The Horrors of Identification: Reich’s *Different Trains*,” *Perspectives of New Music* 35-1 (Winter 1997): 129-152.

⁵ See Mertens, *American Minimal Music*, pp. 87-92.

The nearest precedent in methodology and scope for the current study is undoubtedly the fourth chapter, “Repeating,” of *Noise*, Jacques Attali’s influential 1977 treatise on the political economy of music. An alert reader will have recalled that Attali used transformations in the production and consumption of music to predict the advent of “repetitive society,” a radical and general transformation of lived experience in post-industrial capitalism:

Repetition is established through the supplanting, by mass production, of every present-day mode of commodity production. Mass production, a final form, signifies the repetition of all consumption, individual or collective, the replacement of the restaurant by precooked meals, of custom-made clothes by ready-to-wear, of the individual house built from personal designs by tract houses based on stereotyped designs, of the politician by the anonymous bureaucrat, of skilled labor by standardized tasks, of the spectacle by recordings of it.⁶

Clearly, Attali is not trapped in psychoanalytic categories; his interpretive field takes in the key twentieth-century material developments in media, technology, and the consumer society. But psychoanalytic obsession with repetition as Thanatos, as drive to death, provides his analysis with its grim subtext. The sound object, infinitely reproducible as commodity and endlessly repeatable as experience, is nothing less, it turns out, than a harbinger of mass cultural suicide. Stamped *en masse* from a model at basically no cost, pumped up with ersatz exchange-value by crude manipulation of demand, stockpiled uselessly by consumers who thereby mortgage the very time they would need to consume them, mass-produced musical recordings enact the collapse of all systems of value and the cancerous proliferation of meaningless, pleasure-less sign exchange. “Death,” intones Attali, “is present in the very structure of the repetitive economy: *the stockpiling of use-time in the commodity object is fundamentally a herald of death.*”⁷

Attali deals with repetitive music *per se* only once in his dark meditation on the repetitive society: minimalism, as it gives rise to the autonomy-negating relationships inside the Philip Glass Ensemble, makes a brief cameo appearance as pseudo-democratic “background noise for a repetitive and perfectly mastered anonymity.”⁸ In her afterword, Susan McClary tries to revise *Noise* so that

⁶ Jacques Attali, *Noise: the Political Economy of Music*, trans. Brian Massumi (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1985), p. 128.

⁷ Attali, *Noise*, p. 126. Emphasis in original.

⁸ Attali, *Noise*, pp. 114-15.

Downtown minimalist composers like Laurie Anderson and Philip Glass, both linked by noisy immediacy and outsider status to the punk and New Wave explosions just over Attali's critical horizon, can participate in the "collective play" that he awaited under the utopian rubric Composing.⁹ But I suspect that Attali would likely disagree with his musicological interlocutor, preferring to read the pervasive repetition of minimalism as a nightmarish simulacrum of the fully-repetitive society, the non-stop refrain of an all-embracing round dance of death. *Noise* is intentionally (and problematically) vague about what styles might ensue once the musical means of production are liberated, but a fully-notated, high-tech, non-improvisatory music performed by professionals, disseminated on recordings, even (in recent years) stockpiled in bulky and expensive box sets, is certainly *not* on the menu.¹⁰

Itinerary: among the cultures of repetition

Attali's broad grasp of socio-economic realities is unmatched, as is his materialist understanding of how technological advances in production and reproduction engender pervasive repetition in consumer society—but he is too in love with Thanatos to see how complex and multivariate our experience of that repetition might be. The absolute dystopia of Attali's repetitive society is a powerful polemical construct, but an inflexible hermeneutic tool. Accordingly, in the interpretive excursions that follow I will take up in turn various cultures of repetition, seeking flexible, ad hoc contexts for diverse moments of musical repetition. Some of these will indeed have little to recommend them; but we'll also visit repetition cultures of liberation, self-gratification, even subliminal resistance to authority.

Repeating Ourselves breaks down, on the largest scale, into two not-quite balanced halves, correlated loosely with the two ways that repetition and subjectivity have traditionally been understood to interact, giving rise to formations that I will refer to, in metaphoric Freudian shorthand, as the *culture of Eros* and the *culture of Thanatos*. In the culture of Eros, repetition is a technique of *de-*

⁹ Attali, *Noise*, pp. 141; 156-58.

¹⁰ "Use-time and exchange-time destroy one another. This explains the valorization of very short works, the only ones it is possible to use, and of complete sets, the only ones worth the effort of stockpiling." Attali, *Noise*, p. 101.

sire-creation, a more-or-less-elaborately-structured repetitive entrainment of human subjects toward culturally adaptive goals and behaviors. In Chapter 1, we confront repetition as desire-creation in its most unabashed form, the genre of popular music that the Reverend Jesse Jackson once denounced from the pulpit as “disco sex rock.” Under the rubric “Do it (‘til You’re Satisfied),” we’ll uncover through close musical analysis the presence of a complex syntax of goal-direction in disco, taking as our text one of the most famously urgent dance-floor meditations on sexual desire and, in early 1976, the occasion for one of the first extended dance mixes ever released, Donna Summer and Giorgio Moroder’s notorious 16-minute version of “Love to Love You Baby.” Moving from disco to what critics of the time liked to call “the higher disco,” a correlate analysis of similar linear-harmonic structures in Steve Reich’s exactly contemporaneous *Music for Eighteen Musicians* will uncover a similar syntax. Disco and minimalism appear as two linked instances of a new theoretical possibility in late-twentieth-century Western music: not the absence of desire, but the recombination of new experiences of desire and new experiments in musical form across a bewildering spectrum of teleological mutation. Process music’s *recombinant teleology* supports a revisionist (and perhaps transgressive) interpretive conclusion: its repetition is not the negation of desire, but a powerful and totalizing metastasis. Minimalism is no more celibate than disco; processed desire turns out to be the biggest thrill of all.

The two chapters that follow make an attempt to excavate the material cultural framework for these new musical thrills. It was clear to most observers that 1970s disco was equal parts sexual desire and consumer display, perhaps even sexual desire *as* consumer display; chapters 2 and 3 will move back to the 1950s to uncover the mercantile roots of repetitive desire-creation in the higher disco. We’ll be tracking down the most elusive species of hermeneutic game imaginable, attempting to argue that the pulse-pattern minimalism of Riley, Reich, and Glass uses the incessant pulsed repetition of mass-media advertising campaigns as what Lawrence Kramer would call a *structural trope*, a musical “procedure, capable of various practical realizations, that also functions as a typical expres-

sive act within a certain cultural/historical framework.”¹¹ It may be disconcerting to realize that within the cultural-historical framework of post-industrial consumer society, executing a media plan to deploy the thousands of advertising messages deemed necessary to sell automobiles and underarm deodorant qualifies as a “typical expressive act.” It will no doubt be just as deeply dispiriting for partisans of musical minimalism to see the structural tropes of advertising used as a plate-glass hermeneutic window into the “blank” music they have consistently portrayed as resistant to commercialization by virtue of its very opacity.

Though the first wave of 1960s repetitive music has always been positioned as a particularly countercultural kind of non-commercial music (thus the pervasive anxiety of early partisans in the face of its subsequent success), it actually has more in common with Thomas Frank’s mordantly expressed alternate view of the 1960s counterculture as “a colorful installment in the twentieth-century drama of consumer subjectivity.”¹² Chapter 2 will link minimalism’s recombinations of teleology to the post-war debates over formations of subjectivity and desire in what was being understood for the first time as a newly “affluent” consumer society. Economists and sociologists outlined what appears in retrospect as a crisis of consumption: as rising productivity threatened to flood industrialized economies with a glut of goods, attention shifted to theories of desire, and desire *creation*, that could rationalize a society dependent for the first time on the systematic mass-production of desire for objects—in other words, a society dependent on advertising. Advertising executives, proclaiming that “what makes this country great is the creation of wants and desires,”¹³ began to harness repetitive marketing strategies to transform the rather incoherent field of people’s lived desire for objects into a fully-rationalized system—a system that, as sociologist Jean Baudrillard reminds us, only at this post-war moment achieved the discipline and functionality of the pre-existing system of mass-produced consumer objects. The subjective experience of desire within this system of objects was radically transformed through repetitive process. Consumer *telos* thus underwent in the

¹¹ Lawrence Kramer, *Music as Cultural Practice, 1800-1900* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1990), p. 10.

¹² Thomas Frank, *The Conquest of Cool: Business Culture, Counterculture, and the Rise of Hip Consumerism* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1997), p. 29.

¹³ See Vance Packard, *The Hidden Persuaders* (New York: David Mackay, 1957), pp. 23-24.

1960s the same recombination as did tonal desire in repetitive music. The isomorphism will become clear when we compare the representation of this experience within contemporary literature with the unmarked yet identical phenomenology of minimalist process music. (We'll read closely, for structural tropes, in George Perec's remarkable experimental novel-of-consumption, *Things: A Story of the Sixties*.) Thus forearmed, we can trace the phenomenology of consumer desire deep into the rhythmic and tonal structures of a pivotal text of musical minimalism, Steve Reich's 1973 *Music for Mallet Instruments, Voices, and Organ*.

As Chapter 3 will make clear, the point is *not* to trash an influential compositional style, but to use close reading of its characteristic forms to illuminate both the music and a revisionist claim of materialist historical causality. Whatever their ideological relation to Fluxus experimentalism, Hindu mysticism, Ghanaian drumming, or any other counter-cultural scene you care to name, the repetition-structures of American minimal music broke into the Western cultural mainstream around 1965, the precise moment that the complete transformation of American network television by commercial advertising established the medium's distinctively atomized, repetitive programming sequence. Minimalism, whatever judgment of taste one might pronounce upon it, whatever local cultures of repetition it might abet, thus takes on a unique cultural significance: it is the single instance within contemporary art music of what Raymond Williams called "flow," the most relentless, all-pervasive structural trope of twentieth-century global media culture. The sheer scope and intensity of this media torrent index an aesthetic effect we might call the *media sublime*. Minimal music turns out to structure its repetitious desiring-production in much the same polyphonic way as a spot advertising campaign spreads out across diversified media vehicles (we'll look quite carefully at just how such campaigns are conceptualized and realized); its effect on the listener is the sublime perception of all those campaigns and all that desire-creation perpetually coruscating across the huge expanse of mass-media flow. Once again, in an aesthetic effect absolutely characteristic of consumer society, the sheer excess of processed desire turns out to be the biggest thrill of all.

The painful thrill of the media sublime has more than a little self-abnegating death drive in it; but the second large section of this study is devoted to the recuperation of Thanatos, to a sympa-

thetic look at the use within industrial culture of ambient repetition as a form of homeostatic *mood-regulation*. If the major issue in the first half of the book was the repetitive disciplining of desire—and thus the major focus socio-economic—the overriding concern of the final two chapters is the use of repetition to discipline and control attention. Here technology comes to the fore, specifically as it facilitated a post-war culture of *repetitive listening*. The fortuitous combination of two technologies that had been invented to fight it out—Columbia’s microgroove LP and RCA Victor’s super-fast 45rpm record changer—created by about 1950 an entirely new and unintended possibility for repetitive musicking. One might place a single disc of “Music for Relaxation” on the changer and listen to it over and over; or, better yet, stack a half-dozen records, sit back, relax, and let it homogenize them for you into a home-made evening of musical flow. Like TV—and actually a little before the broadcasting world caught on to its power—long-playing records could provide controlled ambience, dispensing hours of what the industry was happy to market (discreetly) as a seductive flow of “continuous and uninterrupted pleasure.” (The technical language of repetitive listening echoes that of television; as instructional booklets continue to inform us, digital audio devices that hold more than one disc are designed to allow the “programming” of multiple recordings into a smooth “sequence.”)

One of the most popular types of recording to pile on the spindle featured instrumental music of the eighteenth century. Baroque music had, until this time, been a rather esoteric taste, but the advent of the LP and the record changer ushered in a revival, not so much of the Baroque per se, but of the kind of brisk, impersonal, generally upbeat concerto movements produced in large numbers by composers like Albinoni, Geminiani, Locatelli, and, of course, Antonio Vivaldi—a style of music so perfect for repetitive listening that it was quickly disparaged by musicological critics with the generic label *Barococo*. Chapter 4 is built around one of the most powerful denunciations of the Baroque Revival ever to see print, H. C. Robbins Landon’s calling down of “A Pox on Manfredini” in the June 1961 issue of *High Fidelity*. Attacking in the harshest possible terms, he fashioned a sweeping indictment of Barococo as corrosive solvent of traditional musical, cultural, class, and even sex-role distinctions. His hysterical over-reaction betrays a profound unease at the effect on musical

traditions of Attali's "repetitive society": the technologically-mediated modernity exemplified by mass-produced box sets of *concerti grossi* consumed repetitively and subliminally on the record changer.

Robbins Landon denounced the new use of eighteenth-century concerted music as sonic "wallpaper," a term that prefigures 1980s attacks on minimalism; in both cases, the real danger is a *soi-disant* classical music that submits to inarticulate flow, that allows its structures to dissolve under the anti-structural bath of repetitive listening. It will be simple to uncover the socio-journalistic trope that casts minimalism as the "new Baroque," the repetitively patterned wallpaper music of its day; what may be less obvious is how the critical portrayal of composers like Vivaldi *during* the Barococo revival had already cast them as unwitting purveyors of minimalist process music, an overdose of which on the record changer would make for a strikingly reductive, even hypnotic experience. (Adjectives like *stripped-down*, *flat*, and *minimal* start showing up in 1950s record liner notes—in descriptions of interchangeably motoric concertos by Telemann and Vivaldi—well before they crop up in art-magazine reviews of gallery events featuring Young, Reich, and Glass.)

Musicologists professed not to be surprised—just a little depressed—that the obscure eighteenth-century suites and concerti they had gone to such trouble to exhume sometimes ended up providing ambience at fashionable cocktail parties; after all, most of this music was in fact originally designed to function as background music. But barococo on the 1960s record changer was hardly just the technologically-enhanced return of *Tafelmusik*. The most characteristic venue for Vivaldi was not the party where he was ignored, but the study or office, where he was indeed listened to, but in a new way. Barococo minimalism is music not for pleasure (Eros), but music for mental discipline, for mood-regulation, for the homeostatic equalization of tension encapsulated in the very idea of "easy listening." The repetitive listening habits of the barococo revival were early harbingers of the way most music is consumed now, which in turn is a constituent of the way most people *are* now.

Annahid Kassabian has hypothesized that we live in a world of ubiquitous music, of repetitive, slowly changing tints and ambiances of sound used to regulate mood and construct loose nodal associations of subjectivities. Minimalism pioneered the deliberate creation of this kind of musical

ambience in the 1960s, but it was not the first music to address itself successfully to the ubiquitous subject—in other words, like television, to influence everyone and be fully attended to by no one. Barococo concerto sets on the living-room record changer hold that controversial distinction. Satie’s infamous *musique d’ameublement* was no more than a visionary failed attempt at “easy listening,” as the composer, prodding his too-respectful audience to talk over his deliberately banal and repetitive musical wallpaper, must quickly have realized. What was needed, it turns out, was not furniture music, but just the right piece—from Philco, Decca, or RCA—of musical furniture.

Baroque concerto movements were not only fodder for repetitive listening; they also formed the raw material out of which Shin’ichi Suzuki, inventor of the *Saino-Kyoiku*, or Talent Education method of violin instruction, constructed perhaps the most systematic exercise in repetitive performance as cultural mood-regulation ever attempted. In the final chapter of *Repeating Ourselves*, we’ll investigate the way this gentle, unworldly pedagogue set out quite literally to repeat the world’s children into better, more compassionate versions of their young selves. One of the most seductive cultural hypotheses about minimalism is that it is the revivifying result of the direct encounter of post-Cage experimental composers like Young, Riley, Reich, and Glass, under the sign of 1960s counterculture, with Eastern philosophies and cultures, followed by wholesale transfer of those philosophies into a dying Euro-centric musical discourse.¹⁴ Minimalism has certainly had a whiff of incense and patchouli about it from the beginning; nor is it useful to deny the obvious analogies between time-honored technologies of Vedic mood-regulation like drones and mantras and what Tom Johnson, trying to make the point nominatively, dubbed the “New York Hypnotic School.”¹⁵

¹⁴ See, for instance, Tom Johnson, “Music for Planet Earth,” *The Village Voice*, 4 January 1973; Kyle Gann, *American Music in the Twentieth Century* (New York: G. Schirmer, 1997), p. 353.

¹⁵ Johnson coined the name in *The Village Voice*, 7 September 1972. By 1974, he had anointed the “hypnotic form” as one of six “new forms for new music”: “Hypnotic pieces may be written for almost any instrumental ensemble, but they must always be rather long, extremely persistent, and highly repetitious. The tempo must be rather fast and must remain exactly the same throughout. The main concern is to lull the listener into a sequence of melodic or rhythmic patterns that shift very gradually as the music progresses. The form sprang up rather suddenly in America in the late ‘60s, when Terry Riley’s ‘In C’ became widely known, and several composers launched successful careers writing hypnotic pieces.” See Tom Johnson, *The Voice of New Music (New York City 1972-82)* (Eindhoven: Apollohuis, 1989), pp. 44-45; 333-34.

But most such accounts are suffused with a gentle Orientalist longing, as Eastern culture quiets the vain striving of the modern Western compositional soul through its repetition-drenched otherness. Typically, whether the framework is Zen, Confucianism, or the Rig-Veda, non-Western musics are characterized—with little regard to the complexities even superficial ethnographic research would uncover—as pure, unspoiled cultures of Thanatos, traditions of disciplined mood-regulation as unitary and unchanging as their various musical forms are imagined to be. Even though minimalist composers rightly reject the “exotic” borrowing of musical instruments and textures, goes the argument, they have enriched Western musical culture through their openness to the radical structural difference of Eastern music, its use of “static non-developmental forms,” and their willingness to imagine those forms as the basis of a new, Western musical *Thanatopia*.¹⁶ My suspicion of this self-congratulatory historiographic trope should be obvious, but I have chosen to recoil from it in what might seem an idiosyncratic direction. Rather than attempt to attack the existence, accuracy or motivation of Western appropriations of Eastern music, I hope to let the oriental subaltern speak. We’ll consider, and identify as an unsung minimalist art music, the Suzuki Method, one of the most singular and successful appropriations of Western art music into Eastern culture and philosophy ever attempted.

This intense, cross-cultural culture of musical repetition was formed when a young Japanese violin teacher, steeped both in the formal study of Zen and a pedagogical method derived from Buddhist techniques of character formation, attempted to teach his young pupils to play the Mozart he had grown to love on recordings as naturally as they learned their mother tongue at home. Suzuki’s Method fused distinctly Japanese repetitive mood-regulation techniques from Zen Buddhist philosophy (teaching as repetitive drill; *katachi de hairu*, or “entering in through basic forms”) with the American-style industrial repetition of his father’s violin factory and the new technological possibili-

¹⁶ For a general discussion in this vein, see David Nicholls, “Transethnicism and the American Experimental Tradition,” *Musical Quarterly* 80/4 (winter 1996): 569–594. Nicholls’s concept of “transethnicism”—an attempt to absolve, on purely technical grounds, American experimental composers like Cowell, Cage, Harrison, and (presumably) Riley, Reich, and Glass of “orientalism”—has been comprehensively critiqued by Cecilia Sun, whose study of the performing history of Terry Riley’s *In C* provides a useful antidote to occidental self-congratulation. See “Minimalism’s Myths of Origin: Performing Terry Riley’s *In C*,” in Cecilia Sun, “Performing Experimentalism,” Ph.D. thesis, University of California, Los Angeles, 2004.

ties for immersive repetitive listening provided by long-playing records and cassette tapes. The pedagogical spectacle that ensued took 1960s America by storm: the parents who had gotten into the habit of piling Vivaldi concertos on the home stereo were now watching, slack-jawed, as those same concertos were played in brisk, inhuman unison by platoons of perfectly turned-out children, some no more than four-years old, in military formation on gymnasium floors.

We'll consider Suzuki's pedagogical method as a unique hermeneutic window into the possible relation of Eastern philosophy and 1960s musical culture—can we really talk about “Zen-like minimalism” in music, and what happens when it crops up within Western musical practices? Contemporary American accounts of Suzuki and his Method show the traces of profound cultural anxiety; evidently the Western subject did not recognize itself—or the musical practices long thought to underpin that self—when mirrored back through the *ongaku-do*, Suzuki's explicitly spiritual “way of music.” The material metaphors Western journalists reached for—machines, robots, factories, mass-production—show Americans misreading Suzuki's Zen-inspired repetition according to their own deep-seated ambivalence over the fate of individual subjectivity in a repetitive and industrialized society.

Suzuki explicitly denied any desire to manufacture musical automatons, returning time and again to a fundamental Buddhist truth: that repetition leads not to the abnegation of the minimal self, but to an expansive mental state where, to quote the title of one of his most famous books, “love is deep.” The road to deep compassion passes through the powerful cross-cultural idea of repetitive performance as “practice.” In Western musical culture, repetitive practice is indeed an industrial concept, a legacy of the nineteenth-century need to rationalize and systematize the mass-production of musicality. But in the Soto Zen tradition from which Suzuki's *Saino-Kyoiku* sprung, repetitive practice was valued for its own sake; the endless repetition of what Soto practitioners called “just sitting” (*shikan-tazu*) was not a means to some other end, but the goal itself: “These forms are not the means of obtaining the right state of mind. To take this posture is itself to have the right state of mind.”¹⁷ Thus Suzuki's method transmuted one of the least inspiring aspects of

¹⁷ Shunryu Suzuki, *Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind* (New York: Weatherhill, 1970), p. 25.

Western musical culture, its use of repetitive practice in soul-destroying industrial models of pedagogy and performance, into an avant-garde redemption of musical repetition as a self-justifying act.

Suzuki himself, a lover of Kreisler's Beethoven and Mischa Elman's recording of the "Ave Maria," would undoubtedly have been confused by minimalist process music; but his tonalization exercises, short minimalist musical fragments designed to be repeated tens, even hundreds of thousands of times, epitomize "Zen-like minimalism" in music. As an experiment, Suzuki himself once decided to repeat the most basic of his tonalizations, a single long tone, 100,000 times. (The year was 1957, and it took him 25 days.) Had he done this in a Soho loft, he would now be hailed as an avant-garde originator of musical minimalism; since hundreds of thousands of Suzuki students now do less strenuous versions of that experiment across the world every day, it seems that, taken as a form of musical minimalism, the Suzuki Method is the most powerful culture of repetition, and the most pervasive and successful form of experimental musical practice, ever to come out of the fusion of Occident and Orient.

We in the West would do well to remember that the fusion was not on our terms, but theirs.

Minimalism rescued from its devotees

I would like to finish this introductory chapter by acknowledging that my investigation into musical minimalism as a cultural practice is bound to appear extremely idiosyncratic in several fundamental ways to those familiar with the extant literature. Some of the motivation for these idiosyncrasies is doubtless to be found in the personality of the author, and its justification found in the overall success or failure of his work as it proceeds from here; but there are a few important methodological choices that, to avoid confusion, I feel it necessary to justify with some degree of formality before we begin.

First, the very act of interpreting minimalist process music as a cultural practice contravenes musicological and critical orthodoxy. This is not simply a matter of twentieth-century musicology's

built-in bias towards formalism. Minimalism sits squarely within the “New Sensibility” of the mid-1960s, and Susan Sontag was speaking for many when she observed that the key aesthetic stance tying together the diverse cultural productions—avant-garde Happenings, process art, pop music, New Wave cinema, etc.—which outlined that sensibility was an unremitting hostility towards the interpretation of art. In her 1965 manifesto “Against Interpretation,” Sontag imagined cultural hermeneutics (the task of the present study, alas) as subjecting the pristine works of New Sensibility to a kind of environmental degradation, “like the fumes of the automobile and of heavy industry which befoul the urban atmosphere.”¹⁸ Some quite extreme contemporary art strategies were understandable as part of an ongoing rear-guard action against interpretive pollution: art could flee into pure decoration, into parody, even into non-art. The defensive posture Sontag most admired has more than a tang of the minimalist aesthetic: “Ideally, it is possible to elude the interpreters in another way, by making works of art whose surface is so unified and clean, whose momentum is so rapid, whose address is so direct that the work can be...just what it is.”¹⁹

If the minimal work of art is to be “just what it is,” there is little profit in worrying about what it might mean. Minimalist composers, like their compatriots in the visual arts, have tended to take extreme anti-interpretive stances for granted. Steve Reich, who studied analytic philosophy in college, was particularly fond, at least in early years, of pronouncements that echo the prohibition encoded in the magnificent final axiom—*Whereof one cannot speak thereof one must be silent*—of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*: “Music Dance Theatre Video and Film are arts in time. Artists in those fields who keep this in mind seem to go further than those mainly concerned with psychology or personality.”²⁰ Most twentieth-century compositional theory has tended to this stern formalism; what is striking about the discourse around minimalist music is how many supposedly independent critical voices are also silent on that about which they assume they cannot speak.

¹⁸ Susan Sontag, “Against Interpretation” (1965), in *Against Interpretation and Other Essays* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 1966), p. 7. A previous essay of the present author’s devoted quite a bit of space to Sontag as guide to some related meta music-theoretical issues; see Robert Fink, “Elvis Everywhere: Musicology and Popular Music Studies at the Twilight of the Canon,” *American Music* 16-2 (Summer 1998): 159-67.

¹⁹ Sontag, “Against Interpretation,” p. 11 [ellipsis in original].

²⁰ Steve Reich, *Writings on Music 1965-2000* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 82.

One reason, of course, is that much of the critical discourse around a experimental genre like minimalism has been that of insiders: overwhelmingly until the 1980s, and still significantly thereafter, those who wrote about minimalism also wrote minimalism, and the result has been criticism of a quite remarkable deadpan literalism:

[Music for a Large Ensemble] is a very colorful work, bright in its opening, a little darker in the second section, brighter again as it moves into the third. The first section's timbral blending of women's voices with cellos and basses is very effective within the texture. The mallet instruments, clear and solid at the beginning, gradually blend into the background as trumpets and soprano saxophones surge forward. One could watch and feel the rhythmic patterns lock into place as the players relaxed into the performance. It is a bright, joyous, and exciting work.²¹

Joan La Barbara clearly felt it her duty to report that Reich's work was...just what it was, in as much blankly descriptive detail as her editors would allow; clearly she is a supporter of minimalism, as her final simulacrum of a critical judgment attests. But it is not clear why we should care. Self-consciously "minimalist" criticism of minimalism—and examples could be multiplied from the pens of Tom Johnson, Kyle Gann, William Duckworth, K. Robert Schwarz and others—limits itself to careful, systematic description of the surface details of musical structures followed by testimony as to their sensuous effects on the critic. Sontag argues—and I would agree—that there is immense cultural value in providing "a really accurate, sharp, loving description" of an artwork; and minimalist insiders have excelled at the kind of "transparent" criticism she championed: "*Transparence* is the highest, most liberating value in art—and in criticism—today. Transparence means experiencing the luminousness of the thing in itself, of things being what they are."²² Especially in the early days of experimental minimalism, providing a transparent critical reflection of this strange, exotic luminosity was a worthy, even heroic task: given the complete disregard of repetitive music by the critical and academic establishment, the gleam of that reflection was often the only light anyone outside a small coterie could see.

But a generation has passed, and there is less need to carry a torch for minimalism. The critical landscape around this music has become cluttered with aging technical descriptions and restate-

²¹ Joan La Barbara, "Three by Reich," *High Fidelity/Musical America* 29-6 (June 1980): MA 12.

²² Sontag, "Against Interpretation," pp. 12-13.

ments of compositional manifestos. At least in the neighborhood of contemporary music, the New Sensibility is growing old, and it may be time for Sontag's critical pendulum to swing back. Unfortunately, the belated intervention of academic music theory has only exacerbated matters: after decades of ignoring minimalism because it had so obviously upset their modernist compositional heroes, some music theorists began to realize in the 1980s that this music in fact resonated perfectly with the extreme formalism in musical analysis that held sway within their discipline. Pioneering studies by Richard Cohn and Paul Epstein were undertaken at no little risk of apostasy from the high modernist church; but in each case, the analytical methodologies that had served to parse Schubert and Schoenberg, tweaked somewhat so as to pay attention less to harmonic stasis and more to rhythmic complexities, seemed to work just as well on Steve Reich and Philip Glass.²³ Jonathan Bernard has been the only American theorist to push past "the music itself," seeking to analyze the structures of minimal music in the context of minimalist and process aesthetics in painting and sculpture. This is indeed a species of musical hermeneutics, but with a strangely tautological aspect: the ascetic formalism of minimalist music simply bounces back off the formalist asceticism of 1960s visual art, highly-polished mirrors reflecting each other's cultural emptiness in infinite analytical regress. Pure musical formalism is breached (for which we must be grateful), but the larger formalism, that of the autonomous work of art with no relation to material culture or history, remains inviolate.²⁴

A true cultural hermeneutic of minimal music must do more than describe or analyze minimalism: it must attempt to make its emptied-out formal language *signify*. Success will come, in all likelihood, against the collective will of its creators and partisans. In fact, the one reliable source of hermeneutic intuitions about minimalist music is the taunting and jeering of its myriad enemies within the critical community. Minimalism's attackers have tended to show little sympathy for the New Sensibility, and feel no compulsion towards a transparent, non-ideological criticism. They are

²³ See Paul Epstein, "Pattern and Process in Steve Reich's *Piano Phase*," *Musical Quarterly* 72-4, (1986): 494-502; Richard Cohn, "Transpositional Combination of Beat-Class Sets in Steve Reich's Phase-Shifting Music," *Perspectives of New Music* 30-2 (1992): 146-77. The analytical discussions in Potter's *Four Musical Minimalists*, it must be said, represent a significant advance on these tentative, if pioneering investigations.

²⁴ See Jonathan Bernard, "The Minimalist Aesthetic in the Plastic Arts and in Music," *Perspectives of New Music* 31-1 (1993): 86-132; and "Theory, Analysis, and the 'Problem' of Minimal Music," in Elisabeth Marvin and Richard Hermann, eds., *Concert Music, Rock and Jazz Since 1945* (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 1996): 259-284.

unimpressed by the way minimal music *is just what it is*—because they don't feel that *what it is* adds up to very much. Faced with the uncomfortable sociological truth that such a simple-minded music has been vastly more popular than, by their estimation, it should be, they are almost forced to hypothesize about its cultural significance. If minimalism makes no sense on its own terms, perhaps it can be understood as a kind of social pathology, as an aural sign that American audiences are primitive and uneducated (Pierre Boulez); that kids nowadays just want to get stoned (Donal Henahan and Harold Schonberg in the *New York Times*); that traditional Western cultural values have eroded in the liberal wake of the 1960s (Samuel Lipman); that minimalist repetition is dangerously seductive propaganda, akin to Hitler's speeches and advertising (Elliott Carter); even that the commodity-fetishism of modern capitalism has fatally trapped the autonomous self in minimalist narcissism (Christopher Lasch).

Rather than abuse these critics, I want to use them, to gather clues about minimalism as a powerful cultural practice from those who would prefer to see it as a pathological cultural symptom. A truly idiosyncratic feature of the following study is the way it takes such critical put-downs with a kind of inspired literalism, applying hermeneutic *jiu-jitsu* to flip and then open up dismissive analogies normally used to close off critical discourse. In the process, the implied value judgments are summarily suspended. Thus, a series of five disreputable diagnoses—metaphorical propositions of the form “*Minimalism is just...*”—provides the chapters of this book with an alternate structure, one I've tried in the table of contents to set as subliminal commentary in editorial brackets:

Minimalism is just...the higher disco. (Chapter 1)

Minimalism is just...like a soap commercial. (Chapter 2)

Minimalism is just...what television should be. (Chapter 3)

Minimalism is just...wallpaper music. (Chapter 4)

Minimalism is just...sitting. (Chapter 5)

The final idiosyncrasy follows, to some extent, from the decision to follow those who take minimalism as an illness, and that illness as a metaphor: I am going to define “minimal music,” the subject of inquiry, in a deliberately antinomian way. The idea that there is a coherent genre of music

called “minimalism” is a belated journalistic construction which I am not anxious to reify further.²⁵ It has become standard parlance because it is terminologically vague enough to encompass the quite different musical strategies followed by a loose coterie of musicians who, conveniently enough for the cultural historian, all knew each other and lived in close, if not always amicable proximity in downtown New York City during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Other names—drone music, hypnotic music, repetitive music, pulse music, modular music—would have cut deeper, and in different ways, through the historical record; in what follows I will not discard entirely the label “minimalist,” but the body of music I want to discuss hardly follows the conventional boundaries that term outlines.

In a study of minimal music and late twentieth-century cultures of repetition, we are primarily concerned, of course, with minimalism *as* repetition, particularly as repetition with a regular pulse, a pulse that underlies the complex evolution of musical patterns to alter listener perceptions of time and *telos* in systematic, culturally-influential ways. In terms of experimental music of the 1960s and beyond, this repertoire includes at its center what I will refer to as *pulse-pattern minimalism*: the music of Terry Riley in his post-*IN C* vein, Steve Reich, Philip Glass, and their immediate followers. It does *not* include most of the drone minimalism of La Monte Young, excepting early works like *arabic number (any integer) to Henry Flynt*, one of the rare Young works structured by rhythmically regular repetition; nor does it include any composers who followed Young down the reductive path of sustained microtonal drones. Thus I am not invested in the historical revisionism that animates Edward Strickland’s heavily-researched study on the origins of minimalism; I have no brief in this book to refocus critical attention away from the “famous” minimalists—the pulse-pattern composers—back to the unsullied avant-garde attitude of “original” drone minimalists like Young (the invidious terms are insider critic Tom Johnson’s).²⁶ If we are interested in minimalism as a cultural practice, we will be drawn not to its purest, most uncompromising instances, but precisely to where minimalism is most “famous,” where the cultural practice is widest and most significant.

²⁵ See Edward Strickland, *Minimalism: Origins* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indian University Press, 1993), pp. 241-53 for a cogent overview of how musical minimalism got its name.

²⁶ See Strickland, *Minimalism*, pp. 10; Tom Johnson, ‘The Original Minimalists,’ *The Village Voice*, 27 July 1982: 68-69.

(This is not to deny that microtonal drone music is also readable as cultural practice—but the practice would be a very different one.)

Having disentangled from minimalism its core of repetitive music, we can add to it some key instances of repetitive *musicking*. Latent in the structure of this study, but worth stating openly, is the assumption that certain ways of performing, recording, disseminating, and consuming music can be considered to be forms of musical minimalism—insofar as “minimalism” is the name we give to musicking implicated in contemporary cultures of repetition—even if the music involved has little to do with the experimental avant-garde. Disco and electronic dance music are “minimalist” in this way. It is not so much that any given dance track or record *itself* is like an autonomous, self-contained “piece” of minimalism; rather, it is the entire cultural matrix within which these tracks are chosen, combined, and listened to that defines a repetitive musical practice. Perhaps even more outlandish is my implicit claim in the final two chapters that, in post-war America, a certain subset of eighteenth-century instrumental music, epitomized by the concertos of Antonio Vivaldi, was transformed through advances in reproductive technology into the first widely available minimalist trance music. Obviously any given Manfredini concerto is not “really” minimalist or repetitive, except in a loose metaphorical sense when compared with, for instance, the dense complexities of the elder Bach. But stacking dozens of such workaday concertos on the record changer, turning down the volume, and half-following them in an atmosphere of studious concentration—that is *minimalism as a form of repetitive musicking*. (Remember that Small’s definition of musicking includes all types of listening to music.) And learning a Vivaldi concerto by playing through its melodic patterns 10,000 times and then submerging your musical ego by performing it in unison along with 500 other students is, conversely, *repetitive musicking as a form of minimalism*.

* * * *

One final thought: If the subject of this book is, at the most basic level, the implications within our culture of a widespread taste for repetitive musicking, then, as Christopher Small would

be quick to point out, what is really at stake is a taste for certain kinds of repetitive relationships. “Musicking,” he tells us, “is about relationships, not so much about those which actually exist in our lives as about those we desire to exist and long to experience.”²⁷ It is my belief that most commentators have shied away from a cultural reading of minimalist repetition because they cannot believe that we *really* desire the types of deadly, inhuman relationships (*I want my MTV?*) such musicking would seem to encode. To be sure, not all repetition cultures set up human relationships that are death-obsessed and oppressive, as the diametrically opposed, vigorously life-affirming examples of disco and Zen make clear. But perhaps the act of musicking is more complex than even Small gives it credit for; need every act of music making express the desire to actualize and idealize the often problematic relationships encoded in its structures? As will become clear in the explorations that follow, repetitive musicking rarely expresses a longing for authentic relationships that don’t exist, and in this way has at least the virtue of honesty that more traditionally avant-garde musicking often lacks. More often repetitive music provides an acknowledgment, a warning, a defense—or even just an aesthetic thrill—in the face of the myriad repetitive relationships that, in late-capitalist consumer society, we all must face over and over (and over and over...).

We repeated ourselves into this culture.

We may be able to repeat ourselves out.

²⁷ Small, *Musicking*, p. 183.