Relativistic Morality
This document describes my idea of relativistic
morality. Although others may have thought along these lines, to the best of my
knowledge and that of some very well read friends, I am the first to use this
phrase. I apologize that this is not a well constructed argument; I'm still
exploring the ideas and cannot yet write convincingly about them.
Most theories of morality try to either eliminate
morality or apply it universally. Relativistic morality, though, applies morals
within reference frames. For example, there might be rock morals. These morals
are good for rocks and make sense for rocks, but not for cows or humans. But,
since rocks don't appear to show goal oriented behavior, they cannot have morals
or, at least, cannot employ any morals they might
have.
There are cow morals, though. For
example, cow morality might forbid cows eating humans. Thus, cows won't eat
humans (except for mutant ones). Humans have more complex morals because they
are more intelligent and can support complex morals. But, cow morality is not a
subset of human morality, nor the reverse. A cow is not a simplified human;
that's not how evolution works.
But
there can be nested moral reference frames. What is moral for a mind in general
is moral for all minds, regardless of type, though what is moral for humans is
not necessarily moral for a mind in general. Thus, it would seem that there
could be universal morals, though I have no idea how large this set might be.
It's equally likely that it's empty.
I
define a moral reference
frame as a goal system. For example, there is
a panhuman aspect to the human goal system in every human mind that evolved over
millions of years. This is a moral reference frame which we can discuss. Humans
have other aspects to their goal system, including a cultural and personal
aspect, creating nesting of moral reference
frames.
This theory is still in
development and needs more examples and refinement, but the basic idea is
presented here.
Posted: Wed - July 30, 2003 at 05:12 PM