On 'The evolution of morality'


I would like to develop the idea that the evolutionary perspective does not ground morality in a grand consilience, but instead has the potential to eliminate talk of morality. I think Hume was right that we cannot get "ought" from "is" -- or rather, we cannot get an objectively correct ought from is. However, the evolutionary perspective is the best way to shed light on the etiology of particular oughts that exist.

Thoughts on Andro Hsu's "The Evolution of Morality", at The Colossus.

The overarching theme of the essay is that "moral values" are those things that allow cooperation, survival and flourishing. Hsu sees moral values as increasing "group fitness"; they are selected and shaped on that basis. In the absence of further distinguishing factors, he would seem to be claiming that every behavior that enabled one group to succeed where another, lacking the same behavior, did not succeed, is a "moral value". If so, then the courtesy, forbearance, and love of neighbor that happened to enhance the fitness of one culture share the same status as the slavery, oppression, and preemptive war that at one time did the same in another culture. It is more likely, however, that a single culture, such as ours, will have all these behaviors popping up for consideration from time to time. What a study of morality is supposed to do is explain why some of these activities are right, and others are wrong. Hsu claims that the distinction is to be found in the particular effect on fitness or competitiveness the behavior has on the population at the time:

"Slavery, for example, was morally acceptable for thousands of years, but today's societies—the successful ones—have determined that slavery weakens their ability to compete."

Although the conclusion is valid (slavery does lead to the downfall of the society that enslaves), what we want from an explanation of slavery's immorality is a larger discussion that includes such elements as the infringement of human rights. There is more to the argument against slavery than that it leads to a lesser common good in the utilitarian sense. Although we can explain the willingness of otherwise rational people to engage in reprehensible acts such as slavery by demonstrating how they believed they were acting in their best interests at the time, we seek different criteria to condemn the same acts when they occur today.

Although Hsu invokes "group selection" at several points during the essay, it is not clear why group selection as opposed to individual or gene selection should be a firmer ground for morality. Further, the examples given can be seen to work, if they do work at all, at the individual level instead of the group level. At the first level of direct benefit, in the discussion of the kosher dietary laws, if you just replace "don't eat shellfish" with a more general "don't eat harmful things", you have unceremoniously arrived at the normal foraging behavior of any organism, which is an outcome of ("selfish") gene-level selection. How does a group's blanket law against all shellfish improve on this, and what makes that moral? Surely it would lead to even greater individual fitness to adopt a policy of weighing the benefits of eating a particular batch of shellfish against the possible risks, making the final decision based on all the information available at the time. A group law that prohibits optimal foraging behavior is an overall detriment, if maximization of fecundity is the aim.

At the second level, a universal "taboo" against murder does not prevent murder from being carried out in all human societies. The evolutionary rationale for murder is plain - it is the ultimate conflict resolution - as is the rationale for preventing it to one's self and allies. As Steven Pinker points out in "How the Mind Works", the complexities of human society, involving conflicts, temporary alliances, promises, betrayal, revenge, and peacemaking make sense at the level of genes and individuals. Game theory has also provided sound theoretical reasons why beneficial actions toward non-kin, as well as "altruistic punishment" of defectors, could also be selected for at the level of genes. One does not need to ascend to the level of group selection; the choices made by agents striving to maximize their genes' presence in a socially complex world take care of almost everything.

Hsu introduces a belief in deities as a "meta-rule" to bind other rules together, but I do not think it needs a level of its own. If one needs a third level to enforce the lower levels, wouldn't a fourth level be needed to ensure the third's operation, and so on? Hsu's divine third level can be compared to a sign posted on a wall that says "Observe all posted notices". If one does follow this sign (and those under it), it can only because of an a priori commitment to do so. That objection aside, if belief in deities per se confers an advantage on a person, it is surely by virtue of being accepted (i.e., not burned at the stake) by other believers, rather than through Freud's notion of staving off terminal existential despair. In any case both paths are cases of individual, rather than group, selection.

In the case of morality being grounded in belief in god there is a stronger opposing argument to be made. A belief in the supernatural is never guaranteed to produce good results. The critic of religion can produce innumerable examples of religion used to justify and facilitate terribly brutal acts. This exercise is usually followed by a countermove wherein the supporter of religion brings up examples of religion being employed to great humanitarian benefit. However, this countermove does not negate the original claim, but merely tries to redirect attention. Unfortunately for the religious person, the argument itself ends up supporting the critic's position. If religion can be used to justify what people would call both morally right and morally wrong ends, then clearly an appeal is being made to something outside of religion itself for the final arbitration.

We can conclude what no biologist should be surprised at: evolution has shaped the human brain, including those aspects of it that govern the activity of social interaction with other humans. As Hsu would no doubt agree, we should therefore be able to use evolutionary psychology to help predict and explain human intuitions and behavior that have traditionally been described as "moral".

I would argue that this is as far as we can go. As David Hume pointed out, there is a huge problem in getting from "described as moral" to "is moral". A classic formulation is found in book III, section I, of his Treatise of Human Nature:

"In every system of morality, which I have hitherto met with, I have always remark’d, that the author proceeds for some time in the ordinary ways of reasoning, and establishes the being of a God, or makes observations concerning human affairs; when of a sudden I am surpriz’d to find, that instead of the usual copulations of propositions, is, and is not, I meet with no proposition that is not connected with an ought, or an ought not. This change is imperceptible; but is however, of the last consequence. For as this ought, or ought not, expresses some new relation or affirmation, ’tis necessary that it shou’d be observ’d and explain’d; and at the same time that a reason should be given; for what seems altogether inconceivable, how this new relation can be a deduction from others, which are entirely different from it."

On what grounds, even allowing that it is the case that some degree of altruistic behavior causes "flourishing" of the society, can one state that this fact ought to influence a person's actions? Why should behaviors that enhance fitness, or indeed any other behaviors, warrant the term "moral value" in the first place?

The traditional expectations of a theory of morality is that it will tell us what sorts of actions are right and which are wrong. At best Hsu and Wilson's direction, based in evolutionary psychology, has the potential to shed light on why some actions feel right or wrong. But I do not believe other lines of reasoning could do any better - these traditional expectations cannot be fulfilled. The problem in the outset is taking morality to be a matter of fact, rather than opinion. I would argue that attempting to "ground" morality is akin to attempting to "ground" the grammar or lexicon of a language. There is no objective "ought" when it comes to language; no objective reason why in English, for example, a canine pet is called a "dog" and two or more instances of a child are collectively called "children". It is a matter of convention - but one must follow these conventions if one's goal is to be understood by other people using the same language. It is likewise with morality: if your goal is to live with other humans (and since humans are social by nature, this translates to: if you want to pass on your genes), then you can only do so by following the relevant moral conventions. Evolutionary psychology and game theory can help us understand why moral conventions take the form they do, as Hsu has pointed out, but these disciplines cannot say whether any actions are right or wrong. This is not a shortcoming, but rather the best solution presented thus far to the "problem of morality": to eliminate talk of morals in favor of talk of evolved social behavior. Hume's objection to the rational derivation of moral truth has not been overturned by Darwinian thinking. If this is consilience, it is consilience by replacement.

Posted: Mon - January 17, 2005 at 12:49 AM | | | |

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