イラク:ジェームズ・ファローズの名論文を断固無断転載するぞ!
アトランティック・マンスリー誌はオンラインでただでは読めない(有料)。でも今回のジェームズ・ファローズの記事はニューヨークタイムズ紙に2004年の名論文の一つとして紹介されたことで、今のところ例外的に「期間限定で」ネット公開されている。いつネットから消滅するかわからないので散人はそれを勝手に全文転載することとした。明白な著作権法違反だが、彼らが文句を言ってきたら「ごめんなさい」をすることとして、まず読んで頂きたい。一読に値しますぞ! ブッシュの取り巻きの傲慢さとアホさ加減が良くわかる。
The Atlantic Monthly | January/February
2004
ハ
Blind Into Baghdad
The U.S. occupation of Iraq is a
debacle not because the government did no planning but because a vast amount of
expert planning was willfully ignored by the people in charge. The inside story
of a historic failure
by James
Fallows
.....
Special Feature: For a
limited time only, we've made James Fallows's fascinating "Blind Into
Baghdad"ムjust picked by David Brooks of The New York Times as one of the
most important essays of 2004ムavailable to all visitors to The Atlantic
Online. Complete and exclusive access to The Atlantic Online is normally
available only to Atlantic
subscribers.
To save $25 today,
click here to subscribe to The Atlantic.
n a Friday afternoon last
November, I met Douglas Feith in his office at the Pentagon to discuss what has
happened in Iraq. Feith's title is undersecretary of defense for policy, which
places him, along with several other undersecretaries, just below Secretary of
Defense Donald Rumsfeld and Deputy Secretary Paul Wolfowitz in the Pentagon's
hierarchy. Informally he is seen in Washington as "Wolfowitz's
Wolfowitz"ムthat is, as a deputy who has a wide range of responsibilities
but is clearly identified with one particular policy. That policy is bringing
regime change to Iraqムa goal that both Wolfowitz and Feith strongly
advocated through the 1990s. To opponents of the war in Iraq, Feith is one of
several shadowy, Rasputinlike figures who are shaping U.S. policy. He is seen
much the way enemies of the Clinton Administration saw Hillary Clinton. Others
associated with the Bush Administration who are seen this way include the
consultant Richard Perle; Lewis "Scooter" Libby, the chief of staff for Vice
President Dick Cheney; and the Vice President himself. What these officials have
in common is their presumably great private influence andムeven in the
case of the Vice Presidentムtheir limited public visibility and
accountability.
In person Douglas
Feith is nothing like Rasputin. Between a Reagan-era stint in the Pentagon and
his current job he was a Washington lawyer for fifteen years, and he answered my
questions with a lawyer's affability in the face of presumed disagreement. I
could be biased in Feith's favor, because he was the most senior Administration
official who granted my request for an interview about postwar Iraq. Like Donald
Rumsfeld, Feith acts and sounds younger than many others of his age (fifty). But
distinctly unlike Rumsfeld at a press conference, Feith in this interview did
not seem at all arrogant or testy. His replies were relatively candid and
unforced, in contrast to the angry or relentlessly on-message responses that
have become standard from senior Administration officials. He acknowledged what
was "becoming the conventional wisdom" about the Administration's failure to
plan adequately for events after the fall of Baghdad, and then
explainedムwith animation, dramatic pauses, and gesturesムwhy he
thought it was wrong.
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Feith offered
a number of specific illustrations of what he considered underappreciated
successes. Some were familiar ムthe oil wells weren't on fire, Iraqis
didn't starve or fleeムbut others were less so. For instance, he described
the Administration's careful effort to replace old Iraqi dinars, which carried
Saddam Hussein's image ("It's interesting how important that is, and it ties
into the whole issue of whether people think that Saddam might be coming back"),
with a new form of currency, without causing a run on the
currency.
But mainly he challenged
the premise of most critics: that the Administration could have done a better
job of preparing for the consequences of victory. When I asked what had gone
better than expected, and what had gone worse, he said, "We don't exactly deal
in 'expectations.' Expectations are too close to 'predictions.' We're not
comfortable with predictions. It is one of the big strategic premises of the
work that we do."
The limits of
future knowledge, Feith said, were of special importance to Rumsfeld, "who is
death to predictions." "His big strategic theme is uncertainty," Feith said.
"The need to deal strategically with uncertainty. The inability to predict the
future. The limits on our knowledge and the limits on our
intelligence."
In practice, Feith
said, this meant being ready for whatever proved to be the situation in postwar
Iraq. "You will not find a single piece of paper ... If anybody ever went
through all of our recordsムand someday some people will,
presumablyムnobody will find a single piece of paper that says, 'Mr.
Secretary or Mr. President, let us tell you what postwar Iraq is going to look
like, and here is what we need plans for.' If you tried that, you would get
thrown out of Rumsfeld's office so fastムif you ever went in there and
said, 'Let me tell you what something's going to look like in the future,' you
wouldn't get to your next
sentence!"
"This is an important
point," he said, "because of this issue of What did we believe? ... The common
line is, nobody planned for security because Ahmed Chalabi told us that
everything was going to be swell." Chalabi, the exiled leader of the Iraqi
National Congress, has often been blamed for making rosy predictions about the
ease of governing postwar Iraq. "So we predicted that everything was going to be
swell, and we didn't plan for things not being swell." Here Feith paused for a
few seconds, raised his hands with both palms up, and put on a "Can you believe
it?" expression. "I meanムone would really have to be a simpleton. And
whatever people think of me, how can anybody think that Don Rumsfeld is that
dumb? He's so evidently not that dumb, that how can people write things like
that?" He sounded amazed rather than
angry.
o one contends that Donald
Rumsfeld, or Paul Wolfowitz, or Douglas Feith, or the Administration as a whole
is dumb. The wisdom of their preparations for the aftermath of military victory
in Iraq is the question. Feith's argument was a less defensive-sounding version
of the Administration's general response to criticisms of its postwar policy:
Life is uncertain, especially when the lid comes off a long-tyrannized society.
American planners did about as well as anyone could in preparing for the
unforeseeable. Anyone who says otherwise is indulging in lazy, unfair
second-guessing. "The notion that there was a memo that was once written, that
if we had only listened to that memo, all would be well in Iraq, is so
preposterous," Feith told me.
The
notion of a single memo's changing history is indeed farfetched. The idea that a
substantial body of knowledge could have improved postwar prospects is not. The
Administration could not have known everything about what it would find in Iraq.
But it could haveムand should haveムdone far more than it
did.
Almost everything, good and
bad, that has happened in Iraq since the fall of Saddam Hussein's regime was the
subject of extensive pre-war discussion and analysis. This is particularly true
of what have proved to be the harshest realities for the United States since the
fall of Baghdad: that occupying the country is much more difficult than
conquering it; that a breakdown in public order can jeopardize every other goal;
that the ambition of patiently nurturing a new democracy is at odds with the
desire to turn control over to the Iraqis quickly and get U.S. troops out; that
the Sunni center of the country is the main security problem; that with each
passing day Americans risk being seen less as liberators and more as occupiers,
and targets.
All this, and much
more, was laid out in detail and in writing long before the U.S. government made
the final decision to attack. Even now the collective efforts at planning by the
CIA, the State Department, the Army and the Marine Corps, the United States
Agency for International Development, and a wide variety of other groups inside
and outside the government are underappreciated by the public. The one pre-war
effort that has received substantial recent attention, the State Department's
Future of Iraq project, produced thousands of pages of findings, barely one
paragraph of which has until now been quoted in the press. The Administration
will be admired in retrospect for how much knowledge it created about the
challenge it was taking on. U.S. government predictions about postwar Iraq's
problems have proved as accurate as the assessments of pre-war Iraq's strategic
threat have proved flawed.
But the
Administration will be condemned for what it did with what was known. The
problems the United States has encountered are precisely the ones its own expert
agencies warned against. Exactly what went wrong with the occupation will be
studied for yearsムor should be. The missteps of the first half year in
Iraq are as significant as other classic and carefully examined failures in
foreign policy, including John Kennedy's handling of the Bay of Pigs invasion,
in 1961, and Lyndon Johnson's decision to escalate U.S. involvement in Vietnam,
in 1965. The United States withstood those previous failures, and it will
withstand this one. Having taken over Iraq and captured Saddam Hussein, it has
no moral or practical choice other than to see out the occupation and to help
rebuild and democratize the country. But its missteps have come at a heavy cost.
And the ongoing financial, diplomatic, and human cost of the Iraq occupation is
the more grievous in light of advance warnings the government
had.
Before September 11, 2001:
The Early Days
Concern about
Saddam Hussein pre-dated the 9/11 attacks and even the inauguration of George W.
Bush. In 1998 Congress passed and President Bill Clinton signed the Iraq
Liberation Act, which declared that "it should be the policy of the United
States to support efforts to remove the regime headed by Saddam Hussein from
power." During the 2000 presidential campaign Al Gore promised to support groups
working to unseat Saddam Hussein. In the week before Bush took office, Nicholas
Lemann reported in The New Yorker that "the idea of overthrowing Saddam is not
an idle fantasyムor, if it is, it's one that has lately occupied the minds
of many American officials, including people close to George W. Bush." But the
intellectual case for regime change, argued during the Clinton years by some
Democrats and notably by Paul Wolfowitz, then the dean of the Johns Hopkins
School of Advanced International Studies, shifted clearly toward operational
planning after the destruction of the World Trade
Center.
For much of the public
this case for war against Iraq rested on an assumed connection (though this was
never demonstrated, and was officially disavowed by the President) between
Saddam Hussein's regime and the terrorist hijackers. Within the government the
case was equally compelling but different. September 11 had shown that the
United States was newly vulnerable; to protect itself it had to fight terrorists
at their source; and because Saddam Hussein's regime was the leading potential
source of future "state-sponsored" terrorism, it had become an active threat,
whether or not it played any role in 9/11. The very next day, September 12,
2001, James Woolsey, who had been Clinton's first CIA director, told me that no
matter who proved to be responsible for this attack, the solution had to include
removing Saddam Hussein, because he was so likely to be involved next time. A
military planner inside the Pentagon later told me that on September 13 his
group was asked to draw up scenarios for an assault on Iraq, not just
Afghanistan.
Soon after becoming
the Army Chief of Staff, in 1999, General Eric Shinseki had begun ordering
war-game exercises to judge strategies and manpower needs for possible combat in
Iraq. This was not because he assumed a war was imminent. He thought that the
greater Caspian Sea region, including Iraq, would present a uniquely difficult
challenge for U.S. troops, because of its geography and political tensions.
After 9/11, Army war games involving Iraq began in
earnest.
In his first State of
the Union address, on January 29, 2002, President Bush said that Iraq, Iran, and
North Korea were an "axis of evil" that threatened world peace. "By seeking
weapons of mass destruction, these regimes pose a grave and growing danger. They
could provide these arms to terrorists, giving them the means to match their
hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to blackmail the United
States."
By the time of this
speech efforts were afoot not simply to remove Saddam Hussein but also to
imagine what Iraq would be like when he was gone. In late October of 2001, while
the U.S. military was conducting its rout of the Taliban from Afghanistan, the
State Department had quietly begun its planning for the aftermath of a
"transition" in Iraq. At about the time of the "axis of evil" speech, working
groups within the department were putting together a list of postwar jobs and
topics to be considered, and possible groups of experts to work on
them.
One Year Before the War: The
"Future of Iraq"
Thus was born the
Future of Iraq project, whose existence is by now well known, but whose findings
and potential impact have rarely been reported and examined. The State
Department first publicly mentioned the project in March of 2002, when it
quietly announced the lineup of the working groups. At the time, media attention
was overwhelmingly directed toward Afghanistan, where Operation Anaconda, the
half-successful effort to kill or capture al-Qaeda and Taliban fighters, was
under way.
For several months
before announcing the project the State Department had been attempting to
coordinate the efforts of the many fractious Iraqi exile organizations. The
Future of Iraq project held the potential for harnessing, and perhaps even
harmonizing, the expertise available from the exile
groups.
It was also in keeping
with a surprisingly well established U.S. government tradition of preparing for
postwar duties before there was a clear idea of when fighting would begin, let
alone when it would end. Before the United States entered World War II, teams at
the Army War College were studying what went right and wrong when American
doughboys occupied Germany after World War I. Within months of the attack on
Pearl Harbor a School of Military Government had been created, at the University
of Virginia, to plan for the occupation of both Germany and Japan. In 1995,
while U.S. negotiators, led by Richard Holbrooke, were still working at the
Dayton peace talks to end the war in the Balkans, World Bank representatives
were on hand to arrange loans for the new
regimes.
Contemplating postwar
plans posed a problem for those who, like many in the State Department, were
skeptical of the need for war. Were they making a war more likely if they
prepared for its aftermath? Thomas Warrick, the State Department official who
directed the Future of Iraq project, was considered to be in the antiwar camp.
But according to associates, he explained the importance of preparing for war by
saying, "I'm nervous that they're actually going to do itムand the day
after they'll turn to us and ask, 'Now what?'" So he pushed ahead with the
project, setting up numerous conferences and drafting sessions that would bring
together teams of exilesムamong them Kanan Makiya, the author of the
influential anti-Saddam book Republic of Fear, first published in 1989. A small
number of "international advisers," mainly from the United States, were also
assigned to the teams. Eventually there would be seventeen working groups,
designed systematically to cover what would be needed to rebuild the political
and economic infrastructure of the country. "Democratic Principles and
Procedures" was the name of one of the groups, which was assigned to suggest the
legal framework for a new government; Makiya would write much of its report. The
"Transitional Justice" group was supposed to work on reparations, amnesty, and
de-Baathification laws. Groups studying economic matters included "Public
Finance," "Oil and Energy," and "Water, Agriculture and
Environment."
In May of 2002
Congress authorized $5 million to fund the project's studies. In the flurry of
news from Afghanistan the project went unnoticed in the press until June, when
the State Department announced that the first meetings would take place in July.
"The role of the U.S. government and State Department is to see what the Iraqis
and Iraqi-Americans want," Warrick said at a conference on June 1, 2002. "The
impetus for change comes from [Iraqis], not us. This is the job of Iraqis inside
and outside."
hat same day
President Bush delivered a graduation speech at West Point, giving a first look
at the doctrine of pre-emptive war. He told the cadets, to cheers, "Our security
will require all Americans to be forward-looking and resolute, to be ready for
pre-emptive action when necessary to defend our liberty and to defend our
lives." Later in the summer the doctrine was elaborated in a new National
Security Strategy, which explained that since "rogue states" could not be
contained or deterred, they needed to be destroyed before they could
attack.
Whenever National
Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was interviewed that summer, she talked mainly
about the thinking behind the new policy. When Vice President Dick Cheney was
interviewed, he talked mainly about Saddam Hussein's defiance of international
law. But when Secretary of State Colin Powell was interviewed, he constantly
stressed the value of an international approach to the problem and the need to
give UN arms inspectors adequate time to do their
job.
War with Iraq was not
inevitable at this point, but it seemed more and more likely. Daily conversation
in Washington, which usually reverts to "So, who do you think will be the next
President?," switched instead to "So, when do you think we're going to
war?"
It was in these
circumstances that the Future of Iraq project's working groups deliberated. Most
of the meetings were in Washington. Some were in London, and one session, in
early September, took place in Surrey, where representatives of a dozen mutually
suspicious exile groups discussed prospects for democratic coexistence when
Saddam Hussein was gone. (Along with Chalabi's INC the meeting included several
rival Kurdish groups, Assyrian and Turkomen organizations, the Iraqi
Constitutional Monarchy Movement, and
others.)
The project did not
overcome all the tensions among its members, and the results of its
deliberations were uneven. Three of its intended working groups never actually
metムincluding, ominously, "Preserving Iraq's Cultural Heritage." The
"Education" group finally produced a report only six pages long, in contrast to
many hundreds of pages from most others. Some recommendations were quirky or
reflected the tastes of the individual participants who drafted them. A report
titled "Free Media" proposed that all Iraqi journalists be taken out of the
country for a month-long re-education process: "Those who 'get it' go back as
reporters; others would be retired or reassigned." A group that was considering
ways of informing Iraq about the realities of democracy mentioned Baywatch and
Leave It to Beaver as information sources that had given Iraqis an imprecise
understanding of American society. It recommended that a new film, Colonial
America: Life in a Theocracy, be shot, noting, "The Puritan experiments provide
amazing parallels with current Moslem fundamentalism. The ultimate failures of
these US experiments can also be vividly illustratedムwitch trials,
intolerance, etc."
But whatever
may have been unrealistic or factional about these efforts, even more of what
the project created was impressive. The final report consisted of thirteen
volumes of recommendations on specific topics, plus a one-volume summary and
overview. These I have readムand I read them several months into the
occupation, when it was unfairly easy to judge how well the forecast was
standing up. (Several hundred of the 2,500 pages were in Arabic, which sped up
the reading process.) The report was labeled "For Official Use Only"ムan
administrative term that implies confidentiality but has no legal significance.
The State Department held the report closely until, last fall, it agreed to
congressional requests to turn over the
findings.
Most of the project's
judgments look good in retrospectムand virtually all reveal a touching
earnestness about working out the details of reconstructing a society. For
instance, one of the thickest volumes considered the corruption endemic in Iraqi
life and laid out strategies for coping with it. (These included a new "Iraqi
Government Code of Ethics," which began, "Honesty, integrity, and fairness are
the fundamental values for the people of Iraq.") The overview volume, which
appears to have been composed as a series of PowerPoint charts, said that the
United States was undertaking this effort because, among other things, "detailed
public planning" conveys U.S. government "seriousness" and the message that the
U.S. government "wants to learn from past regime change
experiences."
For their part, the
Iraqi participants emphasized several points that ran through all the working
groups' reports. A recurring theme was the urgency of restoring electricity and
water supplies as soon as possible after regime change. The first item in the
list of recommendations from the "Water, Agriculture and Environment" group
read, "Fundamental importance of clean water supplies for Iraqis immediately
after transition. Key to coalition/community relations." One of the groups
making economic recommendations wrote, "Stressed importance of getting
electrical grid up and running immediatelyムkey to water systems, jobs.
Could go a long way to determining Iraqis' attitudes toward Coalition
forces."
A second theme was the
need to plan carefully for the handling and demobilization of Iraq's very
sizable military. On the one hand, a functioning army would be necessary for
public order and, once coalition forces withdrew, for the country's defense.
("Our vision of the future is to build a democratic civil society. In order to
make this vision a reality, we need to have an army that can work alongside this
new society.") On the other hand, a large number of Saddam's henchmen would have
to be removed. The trick would be to get rid of the leaders without needlessly
alienating the ordinary troopsムor leaving them without income. One group
wrote, "All combatants who are included in the demobilization process must be
assured by their leaders and the new government of their legal rights and that
new prospects for work and education will be provided by the new system." Toward
this end it laid out a series of steps the occupation authorities should take in
the "disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration" process. Another group, in
a paper on democratic principles, warned, "The decommissioning of hundreds of
thousands of trained military personnel that [a rapid purge] implies could
create social problems."
Next the
working groups emphasized how disorderly Iraq would be soon after liberation,
and how difficult it would be to get the country on the path to
democracyムthough that was where it had to go. "The removal of Saddam's
regime will provide a power vacuum and create popular anxieties about the
viability of all Iraqi institutions," a paper on rebuilding civil society said.
"The traumatic and disruptive events attendant to the regime change will affect
all Iraqis, both Saddam's conspirators and the general populace." Another report
warned more explicitly that "the period immediately after regime change might
offer these criminals the opportunity to engage in acts of killing, plunder and
looting." In the short term the occupying forces would have to prevent disorder.
In the long term, according to a report written by Kanan Makiya, they would need
to recognize that "the extent of the Iraqi totalitarian state, its absolute
power and control exercised from Baghdad, not to mention the terror used to
enforce compliance, cannot be overestimated in their impact on the Iraqi psyche
and the attendant feeling of fear, weakness, and shame." Makiya continued,
"These conditions and circumstances do not provide a strong foundation on which
to build new institutions and a modern nation
state."
Each of the preceding
themes would seem to imply a long, difficult U.S. commitment in Iraq. America
should view its involvement in Iraq, the summary report said, not as it had
Afghanistan, which was left to stew in lightly supervised warlordism, but as it
had Germany and Japan, which were rebuilt over many years. But nearly every
working group stressed one other point: the military occupation itself had to be
brief. "Note: Military government idea did not go down well," one chart in the
summary volume said. The "Oil and Energy" group presented a "key concept":
"Iraqis do not work for American contractors; Americans are seen assisting
Iraqis."
Americans are often
irritated by the illogic of "resentful dependence" by weaker states. South
Koreans, for example, complain bitterly about U.S. soldiers in their country but
would complain all the more bitterly if the soldiers were removed. The authors
of the Future of Iraq report could by those standards also be accused of
illogical thinking, in wanting U.S. support but not wanting U.S. control.
Moreover, many of the project's members had a bias that prefigured an important
source of postwar tension: they were exiles who considered themselves the
likeliest beneficiaries if the United States transferred power to Iraqis
quicklyムeven though, precisely because of their exile, they had no
obvious base of support within
Iraq.
To skip ahead in the story:
As chaos increased in Baghdad last summer, the chief U.S. administrator, L. Paul
"Jerry" Bremer, wrestled constantly with a variant of this exile paradox. The
Iraqi Governing Council, whose twenty-five members were chosen by Americans, was
supposed to do only the preparatory work for an elected Iraqi government. But
the greater the pressure on Bremer for "Iraqification," the more tempted he was
to give in to the council's demand that he simply put it in charge without
waiting for an election. More than a year earlier, long before combat began, the
explicit recommendations and implicit lessons of the Future of Iraq project had
given the U.S. government a very good idea of what political conflicts it could
expect in Iraq.
Ten Months Before
the War: War Games and Warnings
As
combat slowed in Afghanistan and the teams of the Future of Iraq project
continued their deliberations, the U.S. government put itself on a wartime
footing. In late May the CIA had begun what would become a long series of
war-game exercises, to think through the best- and worst-case scenarios after
the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. According to a person familiar with the
process, one recurring theme in the exercises was the risk of civil disorder
after the fall of Baghdad. The exercises explored how to find and secure the
weapons of mass destruction that were then assumed to be in and around Baghdad,
and indicated that the hardest task would be finding and protecting scientists
who knew about the weapons before they could be killed by the regime as it was
going down.
The CIA also
considered whether a new Iraqi government could be put together through a
process like the Bonn conference, which was then being used to devise a
post-Taliban regime for Afghanistan. At the Bonn conference representatives of
rival political and ethic groups agreed on the terms that established Hamid
Karzai as the new Afghan President. The CIA believed that rivalries in Iraq were
so deep, and the political culture so shallow, that a similarly quick transfer
of sovereignty would only invite
chaos.
Representatives from the
Defense Department were among those who participated in the first of these CIA
war-game sessions. When their Pentagon superiors at the Office of the Secretary
of Defense (OSD) found out about this, in early summer, the representatives were
reprimanded and told not to participate further. "OSD" is Washington shorthand,
used frequently in discussions about the origins of Iraq war plans, and it
usually refers to strong guidance from Rumsfeld, Wolfowitz, Feith, and one of
Feith's deputies, William Luti. Their displeasure over the CIA exercise was an
early illustration of a view that became stronger throughout 2002: that postwar
planning was an impediment to
war.
Because detailed thought
about the postwar situation meant facing costs and potential problems, and thus
weakened the case for launching a "war of choice" (the Washington term for a war
not waged in immediate self-defense), it could be seen as an "antiwar"
undertaking. The knowledge that U.S. soldiers would still be in Germany and
Japan sixty-plus years after Pearl Harbor would obviously not have changed the
decision to enter World War II, and in theory the Bush Administration could have
presented the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in a similar way: as a job that had to
be done, even though it might saddle Americans with costs and a military
presence for decades to come. Everyone can think of moments when Bush or
Rumsfeld has reminded the nation that this would be a long-term challenge. But
during the months when the Administration was making its case for the
warムsuccessfully to Congress, less so to the United Nationsムit
acted as if the long run should be thought about only later
on.
On July 31, 2002, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee invited a panel of experts to discuss the case for
war against Iraq. On August 1 it heard from other experts about the likely "day
after" consequences of military victory. Senator Joseph Biden, a Democrat from
Delaware, was then the chairman of the committee. That first day Biden said that
the threat of WMD might force him to vote in favor of the war (as he ultimately
did). But he worried that if the United States invaded without full allied
support, "we may very well radicalize the rest of the world, we may pick up a
bill that's $70 billion, $80 billion, we may have to have extensive commitment
of U.S. forces for an extended period of time in
Iraq."
Phebe Marr, an Iraq
scholar retired from the National Defense University, told the committee that
the United States "should assume that it cannot get the results it wants on the
cheap" from regime change. "It must be prepared to put some troops on the
ground, advisers to help create new institutions, and above all, time and effort
in the future to see the project through to a satisfactory end. If the United
States is not willing to do so, it had best rethink the project." Rend Rahim
Francke, an Iraqi exile serving on the Future of Iraq project (and now the
ambassador from Iraq to the United States), said that "the system of public
security will break down, because there will be no functioning police force, no
civil service, and no justice system" on the first day after the fighting.
"There will be a vacuum of political authority and administrative authority,"
she said. "The infrastructure of vital sectors will have to be restored. An
adequate police force must be trained and equipped as quickly as possible. And
the economy will have to be jump-started from not only stagnation but
devastation." Other witnesses discussed the need to commit U.S. troops for many
yearsムbut to begin turning constitutional authority over to the Iraqis
within six months. The upshot of the hearings was an emphasis on the short-term
importance of security, the medium-term challenge of maintaining control while
transferring sovereignty to the Iraqis, and the long-term reality of commitments
and costs. All the experts agreed that what came after the fall of Baghdad would
be harder for the United States than what came
before.
Six Months Before the War:
Getting Serious
One week before
Labor Day, while President Bush was at his ranch in Texas, Vice President Cheney
gave a speech at a Veterans of Foreign Wars convention in Nashville. "There is
no doubt that Saddam Hussein now has weapons of mass destruction [and that he
will use them] against our friends, against our allies, and against us," Cheney
said. Time was running out, he concluded, for America to remove this threat. A
few days later CNN quoted a source "intimately familiar with [Colin] Powell's
thinking" as saying that Powell was still insistent on the need for allied
support and would oppose any war in which the United States would "go it alone
... as if it doesn't give a damn" about other nations' views. Just after Labor
Day, Powell apparently won a battle inside the Administration and persuaded Bush
to take the U.S. case to the United Nations. On September 12 Bush addressed the
UN General Assembly and urged it to insist on Iraqi compliance with its previous
resolutions concerning
disarmament.
Before the war the
Administration exercised remarkable "message discipline" about financial
projections. When asked how much the war might cost, officials said that so many
things were uncertain, starting with whether there would even be a war, that
there was no responsible way to make an estimate. In part this reflected
Rumsfeld's emphasis on the unknowability of the future. It was also politically
essential, in delaying the time when the Administration had to argue that regime
change in Iraq was worth a specific number of billions of
dollars.
In September, Lawrence
Lindsay, then the chief White House economic adviser, broke discipline. He was
asked by The Wall Street Journal how much a war and its aftermath might cost. He
replied that it might end up at one to two percent of the gross domestic
product, which would mean $100 billion to $200 billion. Lindsay added that he
thought the cost of not going to war could conceivably be greaterムbut
that didn't placate his critics within the Administration. The Administration
was further annoyed by a report a few days later from Democrats on the House
Budget Committee, which estimated the cost of the war at $48 billion to $93
billion. Lindsay was widely criticized in "background" comments from
Administration officials, and by the end of the year he had been forced to
resign. His comment "made it clear Larry just didn't get it," an unnamed
Administration official told The Washington Post when Lindsay left. Lindsay's
example could hardly have encouraged others in the Administration to be
forthcoming with financial projections. Indeed, no one who remained in the
Administration offered a plausible cost estimate until months after the war
began.
In September the United
States Agency for International Development began to think in earnest about its
postwar responsibilities in Iraq. It was the natural contact for nongovernmental
organizations, or NGOs, from the United States and other countries that were
concerned with relief efforts in
Iraq.
USAID's administrator,
Andrew Natsios, came to the assignment with a complex set of experiences and
instincts. He started his career, in the 1970s, as a Republican state legislator
in Massachusetts, and before the Bush Administration he had been the
administrator of the state's "Big Dig," the largest public-works effort ever in
the country. Before the Big Dig, Natsios spent five years as an executive at a
major humanitarian NGO called World Vision. He also served in the Persian Gulf
during the 1991 Gulf War, as an Army Reserve officer. By background he was the
Administration official best prepared to anticipate the combination of wartime
and postwar obligations in Iraq.
At any given moment USAID is drawing up contingency plans for countries that
might soon need help. "I actually have a list, which I will not show you,"
Natsios told me in the fall, "of countries where there may not be American
troops soon, but they could fall apartムand if they do, what we could do
for them." By mid-September of 2002, six months before the official beginning of
Operation Iraqi Freedom, Natsios had additional teams working on plans for Iraq.
Representatives of about a dozen relief organizations and NGOs were gathering
each week at USAID headquarters for routine coordination meetings. Iraq occupied
more and more of their time through 2002. On October 10, one day before Congress
voted to authorize the war, the meetings were recast as the Iraq Working
Group.
Five Months Before the War:
Occupiers or Liberators?
The
weekly meetings at USAID quickly settled into a pattern. The representatives of
the NGOs would say, "We've dealt with situations like this before, and we know
what to expect." The U.S. government representatives would either say nothing or
else reply, No, this time it will be
different.
From Atlantic
Unbound:
Sage, Ink: "History
Lessons" (September 26, 2002)
A cartoon
by Sage Stossel.
The NGOs
had experience dealing with a reality that has not fully sunk in for most of the
American public. In the nearly three decades since U.S. troops left Vietnam, the
American military has fought only two wars as most people understand the term:
the two against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. But through the past thirty years U.S.
troops have almost continuously been involved in combat somewhere. Because those
engagementsムin Grenada, Lebanon, Panama, Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo,
Afghanistan, and elsewhereムhave no obvious connection with one another,
politicians and the public usually discuss them as stand-alone cases. Each one
seems an aberration from the "real" wars the military is set up to
fight.
To the NGO world, these and
other modern wars (like the ones in Africa) are not the exception but the new
norm: brutal localized encounters that destroy the existing political order and
create a need for long-term international supervision and support. Within the
U.S. military almost no one welcomes this reality, but many recognize that
peacekeeping, policing, and, yes, nation-building are now the expected military
tasks. The military has gotten used to working alongside the NGOsムand the
NGOs were ready with a checklist of things to worry about once the regime had
fallen.
An even larger question
about historical precedent began to surface. When Administration officials
talked about models for what would happen in Iraq, they almost always referred
to the lasting success in Japan and Germanyムor else to countries of the
former Soviet bloc in Eastern Europe. (A civilian adviser who went to Baghdad
early in the occupation recalls looking at his fellow passengers on the military
transport plane. The ones who weren't asleep or flipping through magazines were
reading books about Japan or Germany, not about the Arab world. "That was not a
good sign," he told me.) If one thought of Iraq as Poland, or as the former East
Germany, or as the former Czechoslovakia, or as almost any part of the onetime
Soviet empire in Eastern Europe other than Romania, one would naturally conclude
that regime change in itself would set the country well along the path toward
recovery. These countries were fine once their repressive leaders were removed;
so might Iraq well be. And if the former Yugoslavia indicated darker
possibilities, that could be explained as yet another failure of Clinton-era
foreign policy.
Many NGO
representatives assumed that postwar recovery would not be so automatic, and
that they should begin working on preparations before the combat began. "At the
beginning our main message was the need for access," I was told by Sandra
Mitchell, the vice-president of the International Rescue Committee, who attended
the USAID meetings. Because of U.S. sanctions against Iraq, it was illegal for
American humanitarian organizations to operate there. (Journalists were about
the only category of Americans who would not get in trouble with their own
government by traveling to and spending money in Iraq.) "Our initial messages
were like those in any potential crisis situation," Mitchell said, "but the
reason we were so insistent in this case was the precarious situation that
already existed in Iraq. The internal infrastructure was shot, and you couldn't
easily swing in resources from neighboring countries, like in the Balkans." The
NGOs therefore asked, as a first step, for a presidential directive exempting
them from the sanctions. They were told to expect an answer to this request by
December. That deadline passed with no ruling. By early last year the NGOs felt
that it was too dangerous to go to Iraq, and the Administration feared that if
they went they might be used as hostages. No directive was ever
issued.
hrough the fall and
winter of 2002 the International Rescue Committee, Refugees International,
InterAction, and other groups that met with USAID kept warning about one likely
postwar problem that, as it turned out, Iraq avoidedムa mass flow of
refugeesムand another that was exactly as bad as everyone warned: the
lawlessness and looting of the "day after" in Baghdad. The Bush Administration
would later point to the absence of refugees as a sign of the occupation's
underreported success. This achievement was, indeed, due in part to a success:
the speed and precision of the military campaign itself. But the absence of
refugees was also a sign of a profound failure: the mistaken estimates of Iraq's
WMD threat. All pre-war scenarios involving huge movements of refugees began
with the assumption that Saddam Hussein would use chemical or biological weapons
against U.S. troops or his own Kurdish or Shiite populationsムand that
either the fact or the fear of such assaults would force terrified Iraqis to
evacuate.
The power vacuum that
led to looting was disastrous. "The looting was not a surprise," Sandra Mitchell
told me. "It should not have come as a surprise. Anyone who has witnessed the
fall of a regime while another force is coming in on a temporary basis knows
that looting is standard procedure. In Iraq there were very strong signals that
this could be the period of greatest concern for humanitarian response." One
lesson of postwar reconstruction through the 1990s was that even a short period
of disorder could have long-lasting
effects.
The meetings at USAID
gave the veterans of international relief operations a way to register their
concerns. The problem was that they heard so little back. "The people in front
of us were very well-meaning," says Joel Charny, who represented Refugees
International at the meetings. "And in fairness, they were on such a short
leash. But the dialogue was one-way. We would tell them stuff, and they would
nod and say, Everything's under control. To me it was like the old four-corners
offense in basketball. They were there to just dribble out the clock but be able
to say they'd consulted with
us."
And again the question arose
of whether what lay ahead in Iraq would be similar to the other "small wars" of
the previous decade-plus or something new. If it was similar, the NGOs had their
checklists ready. These included, significantly, the obligations placed on any
"occupying power" by the Fourth Geneva Convention, which was signed in 1949 and
is mainly a commonsense list of dutiesムfrom protecting hospitals to
minimizing postwar reprisalsムthat a victorious army must carry out. "But
we were corrected when we raised this point," Sandra Mitchell says. "The
American troops would be 'liberators' rather than 'occupiers,' so the
obligations did not apply. Our point was not to pass judgment on the military
action but to describe the
responsibilities."
From the
archives:
"Four-star Generalists"
(October 1999)
Military history pierces
the philosophical fog that often surrounds the other humanities. By Robert D.
Kaplan
n the same
mid-October week that the Senate approved the war resolution, a team from the
Strategic Studies Institute at the Army War College, in Carlisle Barracks,
Pennsylvania, began a postwar-planning exercise. Even more explicitly than the
NGOs, the Army team insisted that America's military past, reaching back to its
conquest of the Philippines, in 1898, would be a useful guide to its future
duties in Iraq. As a rule, professional soldiers spend more time thinking and
talking about history than other people do; past battles are the only real
evidence about doctrine and equipment. The instituteムin essence, the War
College's think tankムwas charged with reviewing recent occupations to
help the Army "best address the requirements that will necessarily follow
operational victory in a war with Iraq," as the institute's director later said
in a foreword to the team's report. "As the possibility of war with Iraq looms
on the horizon, it is important to look beyond the conflict to the challenges of
occupying the country."
The
study's principal authors were Conrad Crane, who graduated from West Point in
the early 1970s and taught there as a history professor through the 1990s, and
Andrew Terrill, an Army Reserve officer and a strategic-studies professor. With
a team of other researchers, which included representatives from the Army and
the joint staff as well as other government agencies and think tanks, they began
high-speed work on a set of detailed recommendations about postwar priorities.
The Army War College report was also connected to a pre-war struggle with yet
another profound postwar consequence: the fight within the Pentagon, between the
civilian leadership in OSD and the generals running the Army, over the size and
composition of the force that would conquer
Iraq.
Four Months Before the War:
The Battle in the Pentagon
On
November 5, 2002, the Republicans regained control of the Senate and increased
their majority in the House in national midterm elections. On November 8 the UN
Security Council voted 15-0 in favor of Resolution 1441, threatening Iraq with
"serious consequences" if it could not prove that it had abandoned its weapons
programs.
Just before 9/11 Donald
Rumsfeld had been thought of as standing on a banana peel. The newspapers were
full of leaked anonymous complaints from military officials who thought that his
efforts to streamline and "transform" the Pentagon were unrealistic and
damaging. But with his dramatic metamorphosis from embattled Secretary of
Defense to triumphant Secretary of War, Rumsfeld's reputation outside the
Administration and his influence within it rose. He was operating from a
position of great power when, in November, he decided to "cut the
TPFDD."
"Tipfid" is how people in
the military pronounce the acronym for "time-phased force and deployment data,"
but what it really means to the armed forces, in particular the Army, is a way
of doing business that is methodical, careful, and sure. The TPFDD for Iraq was
an unbelievably complex master plan governing which forces would go where, when,
and with what equipment, on which planes or ships, so that everything would be
coordinated and ready at the time of attack. One reason it took the military six
months to get set for each of its wars against Iraq, a comparatively pitiful
foe, was the thoroughness of TPFDD planning. To its supporters, this approach is
old-school in the best sense: if you fight, you really fight. To its detractors,
this approach is simply oldムponderous, inefficient, and, although they
don't dare call it cowardly, risk-averse at the
least.
A streamlined approach had
proved successful in Afghanistan, at least for a while, as a relatively small
U.S. force left much of the ground fighting to the Northern Alliance. In the
longer run the American strategy created complications for Afghanistan, because
the victorious Northern Alliance leaders were newly legitimized as warlords.
Donald Rumsfeld was one member of the Administration who seemed still to share
the pre-9/11 suspicion about the risks of nation-building, and so didn't much
care about the postwar consequences of a relatively small invasion force. (His
deputy, Paul Wolfowitz, was more open to the challenge of rebuilding Iraq, but
he would never undercut or disobey Rumsfeld.) In November, Rumsfeld began
working through the TPFDD, with the goal of paring the force planned for Iraq to
its leanest, lightest acceptable
level.
The war games run by the
Army and the Pentagon's joint staff had led to very high projected troop levels.
The Army's recommendation was for an invasion force 400,000 strong, made up of
as many Americans as necessary and as many allied troops as possible. "All the
numbers we were coming up with were quite large," Thomas White, a retired
general (and former Enron executive) who was the Secretary of the Army during
the war, told me recently. But Rumsfeld's idea of the right force size was more
like 75,000. The Army and the military's joint leadership moderated their
requests in putting together the TPFDD, but Rumsfeld began challenging the force
numbers in detail. When combat began, slightly more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers
were massed around Iraq.
"In what
I came to think of as Secretary Rumsfeld's style," an Army official who was
involved in the process told me recently, "he didn't directly say no but asked a
lot of hard questions about the plan and sent us away without approval. He would
ask questions that delayed the activation of units, because he didn't think the
planned flow was right. Our people came back with the understanding that their
numbers were far too big and they should be thinking more along the lines of
Afghanistan"ムthat is, plan for a light, mobile attack featuring Special
Forces soldiers. Another participant described Rumsfeld as looking line by line
at the deployments proposed in the TPFDD and saying, "Can't we do this with one
company?" or "Shouldn't we get rid of this unit?" Making detailed, last-minute
adjustments to the TPFDD was, in the Army's view, like pulling cogs at random
out of a machine. According to an observer, "The generals would say, Sir, these
changes will ripple back to every railhead and every
company."
The longer-term problem
involved what would happen after Baghdad fell, as it inevitably would. This was
distinctly an Army rather than a general military concern. "Where's the Air
Force now?" an Army officer asked rhetorically last fall. "They're back on their
basesムand they're better off, since they don't need to patrol the
'no-fly' zones [in northern and southern Iraq, which U.S. warplanes had
patrolled since the end of the Gulf War]. The Navy's gone, and most of the
Marines have been pulled back. It's the Army holding the sack of shit." A
related concern involved what a long-term commitment to Iraq would do to the
Army's "ops tempo," or pace of operationsムespecially if Reserve and
National Guard members, who had no expectations of long-term foreign service
when they signed up, were posted in Iraq for months or even
years.
The military's fundamental
argument for building up what Rumsfeld considered a wastefully large force is
that it would be even more useful after Baghdad fell than during actual combat.
The first few days or weeks after the fighting, in this view, were crucial in
setting long-term expectations. Civilians would see that they could expect a
rapid return to order, and would behave accordinglyムor they would see the
opposite. This was the "shock and awe" that really mattered, in the Army's view:
the ability to make clear who was in charge. "Insights from successful
occupations suggest that it is best to go in real heavy and then draw down
fast," Conrad Crane, of the Army War College, told me. That is, a larger force
would be necessary during and immediately after the war, but might mean a much
smaller occupation presence six months
later.
"We're in Baghdad, the
regime is toppledムwhat's next?" Thomas White told me, recounting
discussions before the war. One of the strongest advocates of a larger force was
General Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of Staff. White said, "Guys like Shinseki,
who had been in Bosnia [where he supervised the NATO force], been in Kosovo,
started running the numbers and said, 'Let's assume the world is linear.' For
five million Bosnians we had two hundred thousand people to watch over them. Now
we have twenty-five million Iraqis to worry about, spread out over a state the
size of California. How many people is this going to take?" The heart of the
Army's argument was that with too few soldiers, the United States would win the
war only to be trapped in an untenable position during the
occupation.
A note of personal
rancor complicated these discussions, as it did many disagreements over postwar
plans. In our interview Douglas Feith played this downムmaintaining that
press reports had exaggerated the degree of quarreling and division inside the
Administration. These reports, he said, mainly reflected the experience of
lower-level officials, who were embroiled in one specific policy area and "might
find themselves pretty much always at odds with their counterparts from another
agency." Higher up, where one might be "fighting with someone on one issue but
allied with them on something else," relations were more collegial. Perhaps so.
But there was no concealing the hostility within the Pentagon between most
uniformed leaders, especially in the Army, and the civilians in
OSD.
Donald Rumsfeld viewed
Shinseki as a symbol of uncooperative, old-style thinking, and had in the past
gone out of his way to humiliate him. In the spring of 2002, fourteen months
before the scheduled end of Shinseki's term, Rumsfeld announced who his
successor would be; such an announcement, which converts the incumbent into a
lame duck, usually comes at the last minute. The action was one of several
calculated insults.
From the
archives:
"Abizaid of Arabia"
(December 2003)
General John Abizaid
has driven big changes in the American military. Now, as he commands U.S. forces
in the Middle East, his ideas are being put to the test. By Sydney J. Freedberg
Jr.
From OSD's point of
view, Shinseki and many of his colleagues were dragging their feet. From the
Army's point of view, OSD was being reckless about the way it was committing
troops and high-handed in disregarding the military's professional advice. One
man who was then working in the Pentagon told me of walking down a hallway a few
months before the war and seeing Army General John Abizaid standing outside a
door. Abizaid, who after the war succeeded Tommy Franks as commander of the
Central Command, or CENTCOM, was then the director of the Joint Staffムthe
highest uniformed position in the Pentagon apart from the Joint Chiefs. A
planning meeting for Iraq operations was under way. OSD officials told him he
could not take part.
The
military-civilian difference finally turned on the question of which would be
harder: winning the war or maintaining the peace. According to Thomas White and
several others, OSD acted as if the war itself would pose the real challenge. As
White put it, "The planning assumptions were that the people would realize they
were liberated, they would be happy that we were there, so it would take a much
smaller force to secure the peace than it did to win the war. The resistance
would principally be the remnants of the Baath Party, but they would go away
fairly rapidly. And, critically, if we didn't damage the infrastructure in our
military operation, as we didn't, the restart of the country could be done
fairly rapidly." The first assumption was clearly expressed by Cheney three days
before the war began, in an exchange with Tim Russert on Meet the
Press:
RUSSERT: If your analysis
is not correct, and we're not treated as liberators but as conquerors, and the
Iraqis begin to resist, particularly in Baghdad, do you think the American
people are prepared for a long, costly, and bloody battle with significant
American casualties?
CHENEY: Well,
I don't think it's likely to unfold that way, Tim, because I really do believe
that we will be greeted as liberators ... The read we get on the people of Iraq
is there is no question but what they want to get rid of Saddam Hussein and they
will welcome as liberators the United States when we come to do
that.
Through the 1990s Marine
General Anthony Zinni, who preceded Tommy Franks as CENTCOM commander, had done
war-gaming for a possible invasion of Iraq. His exercises involved a much larger
U.S. force than the one that actually attacked last year. "They were very proud
that they didn't have the kind of numbers my plan had called for," Zinni told
me, referring to Rumsfeld and Cheney. "The reason we had those two extra
divisions was the security situation. Revenge killings, crime, chaosムthis
was all foreseeable."
Thomas White
agrees. Because of reasoning like Cheney's, "we went in with the minimum force
to accomplish the military objectives, which was a straightforward task, never
really in question," he told me. "And then we immediately found ourselves
shorthanded in the aftermath. We sat there and watched people dismantle and run
off with the country,
basically."
Three Months Before
the War
In the beginning of
December, Iraq submitted its 12,000-page declaration to the UN Security Council
contending that it had no remaining WMD stores. Near the end of December,
President Bush authorized the dispatch of more than 200,000 U.S. soldiers to the
Persian Gulf.
There had still
been few or no estimates of the war's cost from the Administrationムonly
contentions that projections like Lawrence Lindsay's were too high. When pressed
on this point, Administration officials repeatedly said that with so many
uncertainties, they could not possibly estimate the cost. But early in December,
just before Lindsay was forced out, The New York Review of Books published an
article by William Nordhaus titled "Iraq: The Economic Consequences of War,"
which included carefully considered estimates. Nordhaus, an economist at Yale,
had served on Jimmy Carter's Council of Economic Advisers; the article was
excerpted from a much longer economic paper he had prepared. His range of
estimates was enormous, depending on how long the war lasted and what its impact
on the world economy proved to be. Nordhaus calculated that over the course of a
decade the direct and indirect costs of the war to the United States could be as
low as $121 billion or as high as $1.6 trillion. This was a more thoroughgoing
approach than the congressional budget committees had taken, but it was similar
in its overall outlook. Nordhaus told me recently that he thinks he should have
increased all his estimates to account for the "opportunity costs" of stationing
soldiers in Iraqムthat is, if they are assigned to Iraq, they're not
available for deployment somewhere
else.
On the last day of
December, Mitch Daniels, the director of the Office of Management and Budget,
told The New York Times that the war might cost $50 billion to $60 billion. He
had to backtrack immediately, his spokesman stressing that "it is impossible to
know what any military campaign would ultimately cost." The spokesman explained
Daniels's mistake by saying, "The only cost estimate we know of in this arena is
the Persian Gulf War, and that was a sixty-billion-dollar event." Daniels would
leave the Administration, of his own volition, five months
later.
In the immediate run-up to
the war the Administration still insisted that the costs were unforeseeable.
"Fundamentally, we have no idea what is needed unless and until we get there on
the ground," Paul Wolfowitz told the House Budget Committee on February 27, with
combat less than three weeks away. "This delicate momentムwhen we are
assembling a coalition, when we are mobilizing people inside Iraq and throughout
the region to help us in the event of war, and when we are still trying, through
the United Nations and by other means, to achieve a peaceful solution without
warムis not a good time to publish highly suspect numerical estimates and
have them drive our declaratory
policy."
Wolfowitz's stonewalling
that day was in keeping with the policy of all senior Administration officials.
Until many months after combat had begun, they refused to hazard even the
vaguest approximation of what financial costs it might involve. Shinseki, so
often at odds with OSD, contemplated taking a different course. He was scheduled
to testify, with Thomas White, before the Senate Appropriations Committee on
March 19, which turned out to be the first day of actual combat. In a routine
prep session before the hearing he asked his assistants what he should say about
how much the operations in Iraq were going to cost. "Well, it's impossible to
predict," a briefer began, reminding him of the official
line.
Shinseki cut him off. "We
don't know everything," he said, and then he went through a list of the many
things the military already did know. "We know how many troops are there now,
and the projected numbers. We know how much it costs to feed them every day. We
know how much it cost to send the force there. We know what we have spent
already to prepare the force and how much it would cost to bring them back. We
have estimates of how much fuel and ammunition we would use per day of
operations." In short, anyone who actually wanted to make an estimate had plenty
of information on hand.
At this
point Jerry Sinn, a three-star general in charge of the Army's budget, said that
in fact he had worked up some numbersムand he named a figure, for the
Army's likely costs, in the tens of billions of dollars. But when Senator Byron
Dorgan, of North Dakota, asked Shinseki at hearings on March 19 how much the war
just beginning would cost, Shinseki was loyally vague ("Any potential discussion
about what an operation in Iraq or any follow-on probably is undefined at this
point").
When Administration
officials stopped being vague, they started being unrealistic. On March 27,
eight days into combat, members of the House Appropriations Committee asked Paul
Wolfowitz for a figure. He told them that whatever it was, Iraq's oil supplies
would keep it low. "There's a lot of money to pay for this," he said. "It
doesn't have to be U.S. taxpayer money. We are dealing with a country that can
really finance its own reconstruction, and relatively soon." On April 23 Andrew
Natsios, of USAID, told an incredulous Ted Koppel, on Nightline, that the total
cost to America of reconstructing Iraq would be $1.7 billion. Koppel shot back,
"I mean, when you talk about one-point-seven, you're not suggesting that the
rebuilding of Iraq is gonna be done for one-point-seven billion dollars?"
Natsios was clear: "Well, in terms of the American taxpayers' contribution, I
do; this is it for the U.S. The rest of the rebuilding of Iraq will be done by
other countries who have already made pledges ... But the American part of this
will be one-point-seven billion dollars. We have no plans for any further-on
funding for this." Only in September did President Bush make his request for a
supplemental appropriation of $87 billion for operations in
Iraq.
lanning for the postwar
period intensified in December. The Council on Foreign Relations, working with
the Baker Institute for Public Policy, at Rice University, convened a working
group on "guiding principles for U.S. post-war conflict policy in Iraq." Leslie
Gelb, then the president of the Council on Foreign Relations, said that the
group would take no position for or against the war. But its report, which was
prepared late in January of last year, said that "U.S. and coalition military
units will need to pivot quickly from combat to peacekeeping operations in order
to prevent post-conflict Iraq from descending into anarchy." The report
continued, "Without an initial and broad-based commitment to law and order, the
logic of score-settling and revenge-taking will reduce Iraq to
chaos."
The momentum toward war
put officials at the United Nations and other international organizations in a
difficult position. On the one hand, they had to be ready for what was coming;
on the other, it was awkward to be seen discussing the impending takeover of one
of their member states by another. "Off-the-record meetings were happening in
every bar in New York," one senior UN official told me in the fall. An American
delegation that included Pentagon representatives went to Rome in December for a
confidential meeting with officials of the UN's World Food Programme, to discuss
possible food needs after combat in Iraq. As The Wall Street Journal later
reported, the meeting was uncomfortable for both sides: the Americans had to
tell the WFP officials, as one of them recalled, "It is looking most probable
you are going to witness one of the largest military engagements since the
Second World War." This was hyperbole (Korea? Vietnam?), but it helped to
convince the WFP that relief preparations should
begin.
On December 11 an ice storm
hit the Mid-Atlantic states. For Conrad Crane and his associates at the Army War
College, deep in their crash effort to prepare their report on postwar Army
challenges, this was a blessing. "The storm worked out perfectly," Crane told me
afterward. "We were all on the post, there was no place anyone could go, we
basically had the whole place to
ourselves."
By the end of the
month the War College team had assembled a draft of its report, called
"Reconstructing Iraq: Insights, Challenges, and Missions for Military Forces in
a Post-Conflict Scenario." It was not classified, and can be found through the
Army War College's Web site.
The
War College report has three sections. The first is a review of
twentieth-century occupationsムfrom the major efforts in Japan and Germany
to the smaller and more recent ones in Haiti, Panama, and the Balkans. The
purpose of the review is to identify common situations that occupiers might face
in Iraq. The discussion of Germany, for instance, includes a detailed account of
how U.S. occupiers "de-Nazified" the country without totally dismantling its
bureaucracy or excluding everyone who had held a position of responsibility.
(The main tool was a Fragebogen, or questionnaire, about each person's past
activities, which groups of anti-Nazi Germans and Allied investigators reviewed
and based decisions on.)
The
second section of the report is an assessment of the specific problems likely to
arise in Iraq, given its ethnic and regional tensions and the impact of decades
of Baathist rule. Most Iraqis would welcome the end of Saddam Hussein's tyranny,
it said. Nonetheless,
Long-term
gratitude is unlikely and suspicion of U.S. motives will increase as the
occupation continues. A force initially viewed as liberators can rapidly be
relegated to the status of invaders should an unwelcome occupation continue for
a prolonged time. Occupation problems may be especially acute if the United
States must implement the bulk of the occupation itself rather than turn these
duties over to a postwar international
force.
If these views about the
risk of disorder and the short welcome that Americans would enjoy sound
familiar, that is because every organization that looked seriously into the
situation sounded the same note.
The last and most distinctive part of the War College report is its "Mission
Matrix"ムa 135-item checklist of what tasks would have to be done right
after the war and by whom. About a quarter of these were "critical tasks" for
which the military would have to be prepared long before it reached Baghdad:
securing the borders so that foreign terrorists would not slip in (as they in
fact did), locating and destroying WMD supplies, protecting religious sites,
performing police and security functions, and so on. The matrix was intended to
lay out a phased shift of responsibilities, over months or years, from a mainly
U.S. occupation force to international organizations and, finally, to sovereign
Iraqis. By the end of December copies of the War College report were being
circulated throughout the Army.
According to the standard military model, warfare unfolds through four phases:
"deterrence and engagement," "seize the initiative," "decisive operations," and
"post-conflict." Reality is never divided quite that neatly, of course, but the
War College report stressed that Phase IV "post-conflict" planning absolutely
had to start as early as possible, well before Phase III "decisive
operations"ムthe war itself. But neither the Army nor the other services
moved very far past Phase III thinking. "All the A-Team guys wanted to be in on
Phase III, and the B-team guys were put on Phase IV," one man involved in Phase
IV told me. Frederick Barton, of the Center for Strategic and International
Studies, who was involved in postwar efforts in Haiti, Rwanda, and elsewhere,
put it differently. "If you went to the Pentagon before the war, all the
concentration was on the war," he said. "If you went there during the war, all
the concentration was on the war. And if you went there after the war, they'd
say, 'That's Jerry Bremer's job.'" Still, the War College report confirmed what
the Army leadership already suspected: that its real challenges would begin when
it took control of Baghdad.
Two
Months Before the War
On January
27, 2003, the chief UN weapons inspector, Hans Blix, reported that "Iraq appears
not to have come to a genuine acceptance, not even today, of the disarmament
that was demanded of it." Twenty-four hours later, in his State of the Union
address, President Bush said that the United States was still hoping for UN
endorsement of an action against Iraqムbut would not be limited by the
absence of one.
Increasingly the
question in Washington about war was When? Those arguing for delay said that it
would make everything easier. Perhaps Saddam Hussein would die. Perhaps he would
flee or be overthrown. Perhaps the UN inspectors would find his weapons, or
determine conclusively that they no longer existed. Perhaps the United States
would have time to assemble, if not a broad alliance for the battle itself, at
least support for reconstruction and occupation, so that U.S. soldiers and
taxpayers would not be left with the entire job. Even if the responsibility were
to be wholly America's, each passing month would mean more time to plan the
peace as thoroughly as the war: to train civil-affairs units (which specialize
in peacekeeping rather than combat), and to hire Arabic-speakers. Indeed,
several months into the U.S. occupation a confidential Army "lessons learned"
study said that the "lack of competent interpreters" throughout Iraq had
"impeded operations." Most of the "military linguists" who were operating in
Iraq, the study said, "basically [had] the ability to tell the difference
between a burro and a burrito."
Those arguing against delay said that the mere passage of time wouldn't do any
good and would bring various risks. The world had already waited twelve years
since the Gulf War for Saddam Hussein to disarm. Congress had already voted to
endorse the war. The Security Council had already shown its resolve. The troops
were already on their way. Each passing day, in this view, was a day in which
Saddam Hussein might deploy his weapons of
terror.
Early in January the
National Intelligence Council, at the CIA, ran a two-day exercise on postwar
problems. Pentagon representatives were still forbidden by OSD to attend. The
exercise covered issues similar to those addressed in the Future of Iraq and
Army War College reportsムand, indeed, to those considered by the Council
on Foreign Relations and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee: political
reconstruction, public order, border control, humanitarian problems, finding and
securing WMD.
On January 15 the
humanitarian groups that had been meeting at USAID asked for a meeting with
Donald Rumsfeld or Paul Wolfowitz. They never got one. At an earlier meeting,
according to a participant, they had been told, "The President has already spent
an hour on the humanitarian issues." The most senior Pentagon official to meet
with them was Joseph Collins, a deputy assistant secretary of defense. The
representatives of the NGOs were generally the most senior and experienced
figures from each organization; the government representatives were not of the
same stature. "Without naming names, the people we met were not real
decision-makers," Joel Charny
says.
On January 24 a group of
archaeologists and scholars went to the Pentagon to brief Collins and other
officials about the most important historic sites in Iraq, so that they could be
spared in bombing. Thanks to precision targeting, the sites would indeed survive
combat. Many, of course, were pillaged almost immediately
afterward.
On January 30 the
International Rescue Committee, which had been participating in the weekly Iraq
Working Group sessions, publicly warned that a breakdown of law and order was
likely unless the victorious U.S. forces acted immediately, with martial law if
necessary, to prevent it. A week later Refugees International issued a similar
warning.
t the end of January,
Sam Gardiner entered the picture. Gardiner is a retired Air Force colonel who
taught for years at the National War College in Washington. His specialty is war
gaming, and through the 1990s he was involved once or twice a year in major
simulations involving an attack on Baghdad. In the late 1990s Gardiner had been
a visiting scholar at the Swedish National Defense University, where he studied
the effects of the bombing of Serbia's electrical grid. The big discovery was
how long it took to get the system up and running again, after even a precise
and limited attack. "Decapitation" attacks on a regime, like the one planned for
Iraq, routinely begin with disabling the electrical grid. Gardiner warned that
this Phase III step could cause big Phase IV
problems.
Late in 2002 Gardiner
had put together what he called a "net assessment" of how Iraq would look after
a successful U.S. attack. His intended audience, in government, would recognize
the designation as droll. "Net assessment" is a familiar term for a CIA-style
intelligence analysis, but Gardiner also meant it to reflect the unusual origin
of his data: none of it was classified, and all of it came from the Internet.
Through the power of search engines Gardiner was able to assemble what in other
days would have seemed like a secret inside look at Iraq's infrastructure. He
found electricity diagrams for the pumps used at Iraq's main water stations; he
listed replacement parts for the most vulnerable elements of the electrical
grid. He produced a scheme showing the elements of the system that would be
easiest to attack but then quickest to repair. As it happened, damage to the
electrical grid was a major postwar problem. Despite the precision of the
bombing campaign, by mid-April wartime damage and immediate postwar looting had
reduced Baghdad's power supply to one fifth its pre-war level, according to an
internal Pentagon study. In mid-July the grid would be back to only half its
pre-war level, working on a three-hours-on, three-hours-off
schedule.
On January 19 Gardiner
presented his net assessment, with information about Iraq's water, sewage, and
public-health systems as well as its electrical grid, at an unclassified forum
held by the RAND Corporation, in Washington. Two days later he presented it
privately to Zalmay Khalilzad. Khalilzad was a former RAND analyst who had
joined the Bush Administration's National Security Council and before the war
was named the President's "special envoy and ambassador-at-large for Free
Iraqis." (He has recently become the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan.) Gardiner
told me recently that Khalilzad was sobered by what he heard, and gave Gardiner
a list of other people in the government who should certainly be shown the
assessment. In the next few weeks Gardiner presented his findings to Bear
McConnell, the USAID official in charge of foreign disaster relief, and Michael
Dunn, an Air Force general who had once been Gardiner's student and worked with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff as acting director for strategic plans and policy. A
scheduled briefing with Joseph Collins, who was becoming the Pentagon's point
man for postwar planning, was canceled at the last minute, after a description
of Gardiner's report appeared in Inside the Pentagon, an influential
newsletter.
The closer the nation
came to war, the more the Administration seemed to view people like Gardiner as
virtual Frenchmenムthat is, softies who would always find some excuse to
oppose the war. In one sense they were right. "It became clear that what I was
really arguing was that we had to delay the war," Gardiner told me. "I was
saying, 'We aren't ready, and in just six or eight weeks there is no way to get
ready for everything we need to do.'" (The first bombs fell on Baghdad eight
weeks after Gardiner's meeting with Khalilzad.) "Everyone was very interested
and very polite and said I should talk to other people," Gardiner said. "But
they had that 'Stalingrad stare'ムpeople who had been doing stuff under
pressure for too long and hadn't had enough sleep. You want to shake them and
say, 'Are you really with me?'"
From Atlantic Unbound:
Sage, Ink:
"Party Politics" (May 7, 2003)
A
cartoon by Sage Stossel.
t the regular meeting of the Iraq Working Group on January 29, the NGO
representatives discussed a recent piece of vital news. The Administration had
chosen a leader for all postwar efforts in Iraq: Jay M. Garner, a retired
three-star Army general who had worked successfully with the Kurds at the end of
the Gulf War. The NGO representatives had no fault to find with the choice of
Garner, but they were concerned, because his organization would be a subunit of
the Pentagon rather than an independent operation or part of a civilian agency.
"We had been pushing constantly to have reconstruction authority based in the
State Department," Joel Charny told me. He and his colleagues were told by Wendy
Chamberlin, a former ambassador to Pakistan who had become USAID's assistant
administrator for the area including Iraq, that the NGOs should view Garner's
appointment as a victory. After all, Garner was a civilian, and his office would
draw representatives from across the government. "We said, 'C'mon, Wendy, his
office is in the Pentagon!'" Charny says. Jim Bishop, a former U.S. ambassador
who now works for InterAction, pointed out that the NGOs, like the U.S.
government, were still hoping that other governments might help to fund
humanitarian efforts. Bishop asked rhetorically, "Who from the international
community is going to fund reconstruction run through the
Pentagon?"
From Atlantic
Unbound:
Sage, Ink: "Civics
Lesson" (April 16, 2003)
A cartoon by
Sage Stossel.
Garner
assembled a team and immediately went to work. What happened to him in the next
two months is the best-chronicled part of the postwar fiasco. He started from
scratch, trying to familiarize himself with what the rest of the government had
already done. On February 21 he convened a two-day meeting of diplomats,
soldiers, academics, and development experts, who gathered at the National
Defense University to discuss postwar plans. "The messiah could not have
organized a sufficient relief and reconstruction or humanitarian effort in that
short a time," a former CIA analyst named Judith Yaphe said after attending the
meeting, according to Mark Fineman, Doyle McManus, and Robin Wright, of the Los
Angeles Times. (Fineman died of a heart attack last fall, while reporting from
Baghdad.) Garner was also affected by tension between OSD and the rest of the
government. Garner had heard about the Future of Iraq project, although Rumsfeld
had told him not to waste his time reading it. Nonetheless, he decided to bring
its director, Thomas Warrick, onto his planning team. Garner, who clearly does
not intend to be the fall guy for postwar problems in Baghdad, told me last fall
that Rumsfeld had asked him to kick Warrick off his staff. In an interview with
the BBC last November, Garner confirmed details of the firing that had earlier
been published in Newsweek. According to Garner, Rumsfeld asked him, "Jay, have
you got a guy named Warrick on your team?" "I said, 'Yes, I do.' He said, 'Well,
I've got to ask you to remove him.' I said, 'I don't want to remove him; he's
too valuable.' But he said, 'This came to me from such a high level that I can't
overturn it, and I've just got to ask you to remove Mr. Warrick.'" Newsweek's
conclusion was that the man giving the instructions was Vice President
Cheney.
From the
archives:
"The Mind of George W.
Bush" (April 2003)
What are Bush's
gifts and limitations as a decision-maker? The author, a journalist and a
historian, speaks to people who have known the President for many years, and
concludes that Bush's greatest strength is clarity of vision. The unknown
quantity? Imagination. By Richard Brookhiser
From Atlantic
Unbound:
Interviews: "What Makes
W. Tick?" (March 11, 2003)
The
historian and journalist Richard Brookhiser weighs in on George W.
Bushムhis management style, his mean streak, his religiosity, and his
recovery from alcoholism.
This is the place to note that in several months of interviews I never once
heard someone say "We took this step because the President indicated ..." or
"The President really wanted ..." Instead I heard "Rumsfeld wanted," "Powell
thought," "The Vice President pushed," "Bremer asked," and so on. One need only
compare this with any discussion of foreign policy in Reagan's or Clinton's
Administrationムor Nixon's, or Kennedy's, or Johnson's, or most
othersムto sense how unusual is the absence of the President as prime
mover. The other conspicuously absent figure was Condoleezza Rice, even after
she was supposedly put in charge of coordinating Administration policy on Iraq,
last October. It is possible that the President's confidants are so discreet
that they have kept all his decisions and instructions secret. But that would
run counter to the fundamental nature of bureaucratic Washington, where people
cite a President's authority whenever they possibly can ("The President feels
strongly about this, so ...").
To
me, the more likely inference is that Bush took a strong overall
positionムfighting terrorism is this generation's challengeムand
then was exposed to only a narrow range of options worked out by the contending
forces within his Administration. If this interpretation proves to be right, and
if Bush did in fact wish to know more, then blame will fall on those whose
responsibility it was to present him with the widest range of choices: Cheney
and Rice.
One Month Before the
War
On February 14 Hans Blix
reaffirmed to the United Nations his view that Iraq had decided to cooperate
with inspectors. The division separating the United States and Britain from
France, Germany, and Russia became stark. On February 15 antiwar demonstrators
massed in major cities around the world: a million in Madrid, more than a
million in Rome, and a million or more in London, the largest demonstration in
Britain's history.
On February 21
Tony Blair joined George Bush at Camp David, to underscore their joint
determination to remove the threat from
Iraq.
Three Weeks Before the
War
As the war drew near, the
dispute about how to conduct it became public. On February 25 the Senate Armed
Services Committee summoned all four Chiefs of Staff to answer questions about
the warムand its aftermath. The crucial exchange began with a question
from the ranking Democrat, Carl Levin. He asked Eric Shinseki, the Army Chief of
Staff, how many soldiers would be required not to defeat Iraq but to occupy it.
Well aware that he was at odds with his civilian superiors at the Pentagon,
Shinseki at first deflected the question. "In specific numbers," he said, "I
would have to rely on combatant commanders' exact requirements. But I think ..."
and he trailed off.
"How about a
range?" Levin asked. Shinseki repliedムand recapitulated the argument he
had made to Rumsfeld.
I would say
that what's been mobilized to this point, something on the order of several
hundred thousand soldiers, are probably, you know, a figure that would be
required.
We're talking about
post-hostilities control over a piece of geography that's fairly significant,
with the kinds of ethnic tensions that could lead to other problems. And so, it
takes significant ground force presence to maintain safe and secure environment
to ensure that the people are fed, that water is distributed, all the normal
responsibilities that go along with administering a situation like
this.
Two days later Paul
Wolfowitz appeared before the House Budget Committee. He began working through
his prepared statement about the Pentagon's budget request and then asked
permission to "digress for a moment" and respond to recent commentary, "some of
it quite outlandish, about what our postwar requirements might be in Iraq."
Everyone knew he meant Shinseki's
remarks.
"I am reluctant to try to
predict anything about what the cost of a possible conflict in Iraq would be,"
Wolfowitz said, "or what the possible cost of reconstructing and stabilizing
that country afterwards might be." This was more than reluctanceムit was
the Administration's consistent policy before the war. "But some of the
higher-end predictions that we have been hearing recently, such as the notion
that it will take several hundred thousand U.S. troops to provide stability in
post-Saddam Iraq, are wildly off the
mark."
This was as direct a
rebuke of a military leader by his civilian superior as the United States had
seen in fifty years. Wolfowitz offered a variety of incidental reasons why his
views were so different from those he alluded to: "I would expect that even
countries like France will have a strong interest in assisting Iraq's
reconstruction," and "We can't be sure that the Iraqi people will welcome us as
liberators ... [but] I am reasonably certain that they will greet us as
liberators, and that will help us to keep requirements down." His fundamental
point was this: "It's hard to conceive that it would take more forces to provide
stability in post-Saddam Iraq than it would take to conduct the war itself and
to secure the surrender of Saddam's security forces and his army. Hard to
imagine."
None of the government
working groups that had seriously looked into the question had simply "imagined"
that occupying Iraq would be more difficult than defeating it. They had
presented years' worth of experience suggesting that this would be the central
reality of the undertaking. Wolfowitz either didn't notice this evidence or
chose to disbelieve it. What David Halberstam said of Robert McNamara in The
Best and the Brightest is true of those at OSD as well: they were brilliant, and
they were fools.
Two Weeks Before
the War
At the beginning of March,
Andrew Natsios won a little-noticed but crucial battle. Because the United
States had not yet officially decided whether to go to war, Natsios had not been
able to persuade the Office of Management and Budget to set aside the money that
USAID would need for immediate postwar efforts in Iraq. The battle was the more
intense because Natsios, unlike his counterparts at the State Department, was
both privately and publicly supportive of the case for war. Just before combat
he was able to arrange an emergency $200 million grant from USAID to the World
Food Programme. This money could be used to buy food immediately for Iraqi
relief operationsムand it helped to ensure that there were no postwar food
shortages.
One Week Before the
War
On March 13 humanitarian
organizations had gathered at USAID headquarters for what was effectively the
last meeting of the Iraq Working Group. Wendy Chamberlin, the senior USAID
official present, discussed the impending war in terms that several participants
noted, wrote down, and later mentioned to me. "It's going to be very quick," she
said, referring to the actual war. "We're going to meet their immediate needs.
We're going to turn it over to the Iraqis. And we're going to be out within the
year."
On March 17 the United
States, Britain, and Spain announced that they would abandon their attempt to
get a second Security Council vote in favor of the war, and President Bush gave
Saddam Hussein an ultimatum: leave the country within forty-eight hours or
suffer the consequences. On March 19 the first bombs fell on
Baghdad.
Afterward
On
April 9 U.S. forces took Baghdad. On April 14 the Pentagon announced that most
of the fighting was over. On May 1 President Bush declared that combat
operations were at an end. By then looting had gone on in Baghdad for several
weeks. "When the United States entered Baghdad on April 9, it entered a city
largely undamaged by a carefully executed military campaign," Peter Galbraith, a
former U.S. ambassador to Croatia, told a congressional committee in June.
"However, in the three weeks following the U.S. takeover, unchecked looting
effectively gutted every important public institution in the cityムwith
the notable exception of the oil ministry." On April 11, when asked why U.S.
soldiers were not stopping the looting, Donald Rumsfeld said, "Freedom's untidy,
and free people are free to make mistakes and commit crimes and do bad things.
They're also free to live their lives and do wonderful things, and that's what's
going to happen here."
This was a
moment, as when he tore up the TPFDD, that Rumsfeld crossed a line. His embrace
of "uncertainty" became a reckless evasion of responsibility. He had only
disdain for "predictions," yes, and no one could have forecast every
circumstance of postwar Baghdad. But virtually everyone who had thought about
the issue had warned about the risk of looting. U.S. soldiers could have
prevented itムand would have, if so
instructed.
The looting spread,
destroying the infrastructure that had survived the war and creating the
expectation of future chaos. "There is this kind of magic moment, which you
can't imagine until you see it," an American civilian who was in Baghdad during
the looting told me. "People are used to someone being in charge, and when they
realize no one is, the fabric
rips."
On May 6 the
Administration announced that Bremer would be the new U.S. administrator in
Iraq. Two weeks into that job Bremer disbanded the Iraqi army and other parts of
the Baathist security
structure.
If the failure to stop
the looting was a major sin of omission, sending the Iraqi soldiers home was, in
the view of nearly everyone except those who made the decision, a catastrophic
error of commission. There were two arguments for taking this step. First, the
army had "already disbanded itself," as Douglas Feith put it to
meムsoldiers had melted away, with their weapons. Second, the army had
been an integral part of the Sunni-dominated Baathist security structure.
Leaving it intact would be the wrong symbol for the new Iraqムespecially
for the Shiites, whom the army had oppressed. "These actions are part of a
robust campaign to show the Iraqi people that the Saddam regime is gone, and
will never return," a statement from Bremer's office
said.
The case against wholesale
dissolution of the army, rather than a selective purge at the top, was that it
created an instant enemy class: hundreds of thousands of men who still had their
weapons but no longer had a paycheck or a place to go each day. Manpower that
could have helped on security patrols became part of the security threat.
Studies from the Army War College, the Future of Iraq project, and the Center
for Strategic and International Studies, to name a few, had all considered
exactly this problem and suggested ways of removing the noxious leadership while
retaining the ordinary troops. They had all warned strongly against disbanding
the Iraqi army. The Army War College, for example, said in its report, "To tear
apart the Army in the war's aftermath could lead to the destruction of one of
the only forces for unity within the
society."
"This is not something
that was dreamed up by somebody at the last minute," Walter Slocombeムwho
held Feith's job, undersecretary of defense for policy, during the Clinton
Administration, and who is now a security adviser on Bremer's teamムtold
Peter Slevin, of The Washington Post, last November. He said that he had
discussed the plan with Wolfowitz at least once and with Feith several times,
including the day before the order was given. "The critical point," he told
Slevin, "was that nobody argued that we shouldn't do this." No one, that is, the
Administration listened to.
ere
is the hardest question: How could the Administration have thought that it was
safe to proceed in blithe indifference to the warnings of nearly everyone with
operational experience in modern military occupations? Saying that the
Administration considered this a truly urgent "war of necessity" doesn't explain
the indifference. Even if it feared that Iraq might give terrorists fearsome
weapons at any moment, it could still have thought more carefully about the day
after the war. World War II was a war of absolute necessity, and the United
States still found time for detailed occupation
planning.
The President must have
known that however bright the scenarios, the reality of Iraq eighteen months
after the war would affect his re-election. The political risk was enormous and
obvious. Administration officials must have believed not only that the war was
necessary but also that a successful occupation would not require any more
forethought than they gave it.
It
will be years before we fully understand how intelligent people convinced
themselves of this. My guess is that three factors will be important parts of
the explanation.
One is the
panache of Donald Rumsfeld. He was near the zenith of his influence as the war
was planned. His emphasis on the vagaries of life was all the more appealing
within his circle because of his jauntiness and verve. But he was not careful
about remembering his practical obligations. Precisely because he could not
foresee all hazards, he should have been more zealous about avoiding the ones
that were evidentムthe big and obvious ones the rest of the government
tried to point out to him.
A
second is the triumphalism of the Administration. In the twenty-five years since
Ronald Reagan's rise, political conservatives have changed position in a way
they have not fully recognized. Reagan's arrival marked the end of a half
century of Democrat-dominated government in Washington. Yes, there has been one
Democratic President since Reagan, and eventually there will be others. But as a
rule the Republicans are now in command. Older Republicansムthose who came
of age in the 1960s and 1970s, those who are now in power in the
Administrationムhave not fully adjusted to this reality. They still feel
like embattled insurgents, as if the liberals were in the driver's seat. They
recognize their electoral strength but feel that in the battle of ideology their
main task is to puncture fatuous liberal
ideas.
The consequence is that
Republicans are less used to exposing their own ideas to challenges than they
should be. Today's liberals know there is a challenge to every aspect of their
world view. All they have to do is turn on the radio. Today's conservatives are
more likely to think that any contrary ideas are leftovers from the tired 1960s,
much as liberals of the Kennedy era thought that conservatives were in thrall to
Herbert Hoover. In addition, the conservatives' understanding of modern history
makes them think that their instincts are likely to be right and that their
critics will be proved wrong. Europeans scorned Ronald Reagan, and the United
Nations feared him, but in the end the Soviet Union was gone. So for reasons of
personal, political, and intellectual history, it is understandable that members
of this Administration could proceed down one path in defiance of mounting
evidence of its perils. The Democrats had similar destructive self-confidence in
the 1960s, when they did their most grandiose Great Society
thinking.
The third factor is the
nature of the President himself. Leadership is always a balance between making
large choices and being aware of details. George W. Bush has an obvious
preference for large choices. This gave him his chance for greatness after the
September 11 attacks. But his lack of curiosity about significant details may be
his fatal weakness. When the decisions of the past eighteen months are assessed
and judged, the Administration will be found wanting for its carelessness.
Because of warnings it chose to ignore, it squandered American prestige,
fortune, and lives.
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in Post &
Riposte.
James Fallows
is a national correspondent for The Atlantic. His Atlantic cover story "The
Fifty-first State?" (November 2002), about postwar Iraq, won the National
Magazine Award for Public Interest.
Copyright ゥ 2004 by The Atlantic
Monthly Group. All rights reserved.
The Atlantic Monthly; January/February 2004; Blind Into Baghdad; Volume 293, No.
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