JP 508: PLANNING FOR MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR (MOOTW)
(Lesson 40)

The preface to Joint Pub 3-07 states that "While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations other than war." This lesson focuses on the unique challenges inherent in planning for MOOTW. These challenges include understanding the importance of political objectives, Peace Operations (PO) as a specific type of MOOTW, the principles of MOOTW and the use of Rules of Engagement.

LO 508.1 Comprehend the planning considerations for military operations other than war (MOOTW).

Political objectives drive MOOTW at every level from strategic to tactical. A distinguishing characteristic of MOOTW is the degree to which political objectives influence operations and tactics. Two important factors about political primacy stand out. First, all military personnel should understand the political objectives and the potential impact of inappropriate actions. Having an understanding of the political objective helps avoid actions which may have adverse political effects. It is not uncommon in some MOOTW, for example peacekeeping, for junior leaders to make decisions which have significant political implications. Secondly, commanders should remain aware of changes not only in the operational situation, but also to changes in political objectives that may warrant a change in military operations.

1. Unit Integrity. Planners should attempt to maintain unit integrity.
2. Intelligence and Information Gathering. MOOTW requires multi-disciplined, all-source, fused intelligence.

 

3. Multinational Operations

Multinational operations planning should take into account the considerations shown in figure IV-1.

When planning for operations involving multinational partners, JFCs should assign missions based on each multinational partner’s capabilities. Each nation’s political considerations will influence its degree of involvement in a specific MOOTW. Language barriers, varied cultural backgrounds, and different military capabilities and training may detract from effective coordination with multinational partners. Interoperability of equipment and coordination of different logistic support systems must be considered in assigning missions and areas of operations. Liaison and advisory teams must be adequately organized, staffed, trained and equipped to overcome these detractors. Although commanders may not normally provide a liaison team to a particular unit, in multinational operations deployment of a team may be critical to effective coordination and mission accomplishment

d. Command and Control (C2). No single C2 option works best for all MOOTW. The JFCs and their subordinates should be flexible in modifying standard arrangements to meet specific requirements of each situation and promote unity of effort. Communications planners must be prepared for rapid changes in mission that alter the types and priority of support provided. Interoperability of communications systems is critical to the success of the operation.

5. Public Affairs . The worldwide media coverage provided by satellite communications makes planning for public affairs more important than in the past. This is especially critical in MOOTW, where there can be significant political impact. Media reporting influences public opinion, which may affect the perceived legitimacy of an operation and ultimately influence the success or failure of the operation.

f. Civil Affairs (CA). The CA units contain a variety of specialty skills that support MOOTW. The CA capabilities are normally tailored to support particular operational requirements.

7. Psychological Operations. The PSYOP forces can provide significant support in MOOTW. Military PSYOP constitute a planned, systematic process of conveying messages to and influencing selected target groups.

h. Coordination with NGOs and PVOs. In MOOTW, JFCs should be prepared to coordinate civilian and military actions.

i. Interagency Operations. MOOTW will often involve other departments and agencies.

Within the United States, the Federal Emergency Management Agency normally leads the response to a natural disaster, while the DOJ or DOT could be expected to lead in a counterterrorist operation. For MOOTW outside the United States, the lead agency will normally be the DOS .

j. Legal Requirements. The MOOTW may present unique legal issues.

k. Logistics In MOOTW, logistics elements may be employed in quantities disproportionate to their normal military roles, and in nonstandard tasks; planners must be aware that overextending such forces may jeopardize their ability to support combat operations. Logistics elements may precede other military forces or may be the only forces deployed.

l. Medical Operations There is usually a requirement to provide medical support to US forces engaged in MOOTW.

m. Active/Reserve Mix. MOOTW may require units and individuals not found in the active component or may require deployment of more units or individuals possessing a capability than are available in the active component.

n. Transition from Wartime Operations to MOOTW. A commander’s campaign plan should include a transition from wartime operation to MOOTW.

o. Termination of Operations

As in war, MOOTW operational planning includes actions to be taken as soon as the operation is complete. The manner in which US forces terminate their involvement may influence the perception of the legitimacy of the entire operation.

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Peace Operations are military operations to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement and categorized as peacekeeping operations (PKO) and peace enforcement operations. The PO are conducted in conjunction with the various diplomatic activities necessary to secure a negotiated truce and resolve the conflict. Additional types of MOOTW (e.g., HA and NEO) may complement peace operations. Military PO are tailored to each situation and may be conducted in support of diplomatic activities before, during, or after conflict.

• Peacekeeping Operations. The PKO are military operations undertaken with the consent of all major parties to a dispute, designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an agreement (cease fire, truce, or othersuch agreements) and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement. An example of PKO is the US commitment to the Multinational Force Observers in the Sinai since 1982.
• Peace Enforcement Operations. The PEO are the application of military force, or threat of its use, normally pursuant to international authorization, to compel compliance with resolutions or sanctions designed to maintain or restore peace and order. Unlike PKO, such operations do not require the consent of the states involved or of other parties to the conflict. Examples of PEO are Operation POWER PACK conducted in the Dominican Republic in 1965 and the secondary effort in Somalia (UNITAF), 1992-1993.

LO 508.2 Comprehend the six principles of MOOTW.

a. Objective - Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective. This principle of war applies also to operations other than war.

b. Unity of Effort - Seek unity of effort in every operation.

c. Security - Never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. In joint operations other than war, security deals principally with force protection against virtually any person, element, or group hostile to our interests. These could include a terrorist, a group opposed to the operation, and even looters after a natural disaster. The inherent right of self-defense from the unit to the individual level applies to all operations.

d. Restraint - Apply appropriate military capability prudently. The actions of military personnel and units are framed by the disciplined application of force, including specific ROE. In operations other than war, these ROE will often be more restrictive, detailed, and sensitive to political concerns than in war. The use of excessive force could adversely affect efforts to gain or maintain legitimacy and impede the attainment of both short-term and long-term goals. This concept does not preclude the application of overwhelming force, when appropriate, to display US resolve and commitment.

e. Perseverance - Prepare for the measured, protracted application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Some operations other than war may be short, others protracted. Peacetime operations may require years to achieve the desired effects.

f. Legitimacy - Sustain the willing acceptance by the people of the right of the government to govern or of a group or agency to make and carry out decisions. This principle focuses on inter-nationally sanctioned standards, as well as the perception that authority of a government to govern is genuine, effective, and uses proper agencies for reasonable purposes.

MOOTW principles derived from the principles of war

• objective
• unity of effort
• security

MOOTW principles NOT derived from the principles of war

• restraint
• perseverance
• legitimacy

LO 508.3 Comprehend the factors that influence joint task force commander’s development of rules of engagement (ROE) for MOOTW.

• Restraint requires the careful balancing of the need for security, the conduct of operations, and the political objective. Excessive force antagonizes those parties involved, thereby damaging the legitimacy of the organization that uses it while possibly enhancing the legitimacy of the opposing party.

• ROE should be carefully scrutinized to ensure the lives and health of military personnel involved in MOOTW are not needlessly endangered.

Law – Rules of engagement are also a reflection of international or domestic law or national policy.

LESSON MATERIALS: (Total page count-57, video viewing-32:27 min.)

1. Lesson Overview Video Lecture, 9:36 min. (All)
2. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, 1 February 1995, CP CB, pp 84-93. (LO 508.1, 508.2, 508.3)
3. Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, 16 June 1995, NP/JP CB, pp 393-421. (LO 508.1, 508.2, 508.3)
4. Schneider, Military Operations Other Than War Video Lecture, 22:51 min. (LO 508.1, 508.2, 508.3)
5. Sheehan, Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY Video Presentation (Optional), 33:58 min. (LO 508.1, 508.2, 508.3)
6. Hayes and Wheatley, "Haiti: A Chronology of Events," NP/JP CB, pp 423-428. (LO 508.1, 508.2, 508.3)
7. Hunter, "An Analysis of the Application of the "Principles of MOOTW in Somalia," NP/JP CB, pp 429-435. (LO 508.2)
8. Joint Warfighting Center, JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations, NP/JP CB, pp 436-440. (LO 508.3)

The lesson overview video previews the JP 508, Planning for Military Operations Other Than War lesson.

The JP 3-0 reading provides an overview of principles, planning considerations and types of military operations other than war.

The JP 3-07 readings provide more detailed information on military operations other than war.

The Schneider video lecture gives an overview of military operations other than war.

The optional Sheehan video presentation provides an overview of the planning and execution of Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY in Haiti. It gives an actual illustration of military operations other than war.

The Hayes and Wheatley reading gives background information for the video presentation on Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

The Hunter reading provides an illustration of how the principles of MOOTW are actually applied in a military deployment.

The JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations focuses on rules of engagement and the procedures for developing them.

This lesson continues the discussion of campaign planning by focusing on planning for military operations other than war. It shows how those types of operations can incorporate deliberate planning or crisis action planning. It also shows how MOOTW has grown in importance as the strategic environment has changed.

ACSC/DLC, National Planning Systems and Joint Campaign Planning Division, DSN 493-5706