Politics, like
ethics, is a normative branch of philosophy.” No where is the basic
problem of the Objectivist theory of politics more aptly expressed than
in this statement by Leonard Peikoff. Peikoff is expressing the
Objectivist view that political philosophy is primarily concerned, not
with the basic facts of political conduct in the real world, but with
how politics ought to be conducted. “Politics defines the principles of
a proper social system, including the proper functions of government,”
Peikoff blithely insists. “Politics is the application of ethics to
social questions.” (Peikoff, 1991, 351)
It is precisely this
ethical taint in the Objectivist politics that prevents Rand and her
followers from being able to distinguish between political facts and
their own wishful thinking. By turning politics into a “normative”
branch of philosophy, they have merely subjected it to the whims and
vagaries of their own private prejudices. Instead of seeking to connect
fact with fact and trying to discover scientifically corroborated
uniformities in political phenomenon, Objectivists seek to find
rationalizations for their political ideals. For this reason, the
Objectivist theory of politics tells us far more about Rand and her
followers than it does about the empirical world.
This mania for turning the study of politics into a mere
rationalization of one’s subjective preferences is not confined to Rand
and her Objectivist cohorts. Outside of a handful of practical men who
gain their understanding of political reality from first hand
experience, knowledge of politics is almost everywhere distorted by an
obsession with what ought to be at the expense of what actually is.
Most of the books, articles, and editorials written on politics today
are hardly worth the paper they are printed on. Over and over again we
find contemporary experts on politics making assertions which are
directly contradicted by the empirical facts. Too many commentators on
politics assume the existence in the social and political order of
simple causation in which the effect is completely dependent on a
single cause when as a matter of fact what we find when we study
politics scientifically is numerous factors existing in a relation of
causal interdependence.
Another widespread
error committed by our political pundits involves their unquestioned
faith in the power of the ballot. How touching it is to hear them
warble their conviction that, in a democracy, power resides in the
people! Although this might be the way things are in some theoretical
dreamland envisioned by philosophers suffering from a pathological
inability to distinguish wishes from facts, in the real world things
stand otherwise. “We find everywhere…that the power of the elected
leaders over the electing masses is almost unlimited,” wrote the
political scientist Robert Michels. “That which is oppresses that which
ought to be.”(Political Parties , 401) So it always has been
and so, in all likelihood, will it continue to be.
As a result of the
overwhelming influence of sentiment on political thinking, debates over
politics tend to quickly degenerate into futile wrangling over contrary
sentiments. This is no where more true than it is of the controversies
surrounding Rand’s political views. Most of Rand’s detractors are
motivated by nothing more than the desire to substitute their own moral
prejudices for those of Rand. Nothing of any scientific value can be
learned by such means. If criticism of Rand’s philosophy is going to
make us a jot wiser, it must deal, not with mere prejudices decked out
in gaudy rhetoric, but with actual facts that can be corroborated by
scientific observation. Any other approach would simply be a waste of
time.
