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Economic Articles

Machiavellian Economics

Notes Toward a Theory of the Business Cycle

Math, Not Econ

Economics: An Autopsy

Economics Blog


Political Articles

The Democratic Farce

Moral Externalities

Irrelevance of Social Justice

True & False Conservatism

Was Machiavelli Evil?

Elitism Good and Bad

Macaulay on Machiavelli

Carlyle's Inaugural Address


Philosophy

Ayn Rand Versus the Idealist

The Quotable Realist

Ayn Rand Contra Human Nature

Theory of Realism

In Defense of Intuition

Realism and the Spiritual Life


Literature

Telling It Like It Is

Cultural Blog

The Superfluous Ones





































































































































Notes Toward a Theory of the Business Cycle

Note: this is merely an excerpt taken from a rough draft of an essay that will appear in my forthcoming book, Visions of Reality.   —Greg Nyquist

Mainstream economics — by which I mean, the sort of economics that is taught in universities and promulgated in the mainstream press — is clearly in a grievous state and has been so for many decades now. One of the most serious deficiencies of academic economists is their incorrigible obtuseness concerning the business cycle. Despite all their theories about how business cycles come about and all the statistical evidence they have compiled detailing what happens when an economy goes into its inevitable malaise, they are still at sea when it comes to prognostication. Nor is it simply a matter of not being able to say precisely when an economy will rise or fall. Exact predictions in economics are impossible. But at least one would expect economists to have a rough idea of where the economy is likely to go. Even in respect to this very modest goal, mainstream economists fail more often than not. In June 1990, to take one example, 88% of economists polled predicted a continued economic expansion. [Prechter, The Crest of the Wave, 19] A month later, the economy promptly nose-dived into the worst recession in a decade. Economists really ought to do better if they expect any intelligent man to take them seriously.

Their grasp of the financial side of things is little better. Mainstream economists were just as clueless about the nineties' stock market as they were about the economy as a whole. "Economists are as perplexed as anyone by the behavior of the stock market," Stanford economics professor Robert Hall confessed. To the question, "Is the Stock Market too high?" Berkeley economics professor J. Bradford De Long answered, "No one knows." Is this not incredible? What good are all their graduate and postgraduate degrees, all their mathematical and empirical training, all their models and analysis, if they cannot explain something so simple as the behavior of the stock market?

Now as long as the economy is humming along at a good pace and most people are doing just fine, the fact that the overwhelming majority of professional economists are clueless about business cycles provokes little interest. Why should any of us care, as long as the paychecks keep flowing into our bank accounts and our credit card debt is manageable? But as soon the economy begins to flounder and we find ourselves facing unemployment and crushing debts, we are likely to take a different attitude towards the intellectual malfeasance of mainstream economists. Their ignorance now seems to be implicated in our misfortune. Perhaps if they knew something more about business cycles than do palmists and tarot card readers, we could turn to them for guidance in time of crisis. But given their track record, this would clearly not be a very wise thing to do.

Who, then, in a time of economic crisis, should we turn to? Is there anyone at all who understands these mysterious fluctuations in economic activity that lead so inevitably to booms and busts? Or is the science of economics, and especially of business cycle research, one vast and perpetual morass of unintelligibility?

To know nothing is to be in a lamentable to state. But even worse is to think one knows when one is actually quite ignorant. Mainstream economists may appear ignorant to those who observe them from the outside and can hardly fail to notice how often they are wrong concerning the direction of the economy. But this is not how they perceive the matter. In their own eyes, they are great interpreters of economic fact, men whose understanding and wisdom soars well above the common herd. Icarus had his wings, all wax and feathers, and economics its "science," all mathematics and intellectual pretense; yet neither, I fear, can hold fast under the bright warm glare of truth. Economists have compiled all sorts of theories to try to explain the business cycle, none of which, alas, are all that convincing or can be counted on in the practical matter of guiding fiscal and monetary policy. Consider, as one example, perhaps the most influential business cycle theory within the economics profession today, the Keynesian theory, as expounded by the pundit-master of liberal economics himself, Paul Krugman. "As is so often the case in economics (or for that matter in any intellectual endeavor), the explanation of how recessions can happen, though arrived at only after an epic intellectual journey, turns out to be extremely simple," Krugman smugly assures us. "A recession happens when, for whatever reason, a large part of the private sector tries to increase its cash reserves at the same time." [Slate, 12-3-98]

This explanation, like so many propagated by Lord Keynes and his followers, raises more questions than it answers. Business cycles, we are told, happen when, for some inexplicable reason, a whole lot of people suddenly decide to increase their cash holdings. But why should such a thing ever occur in the first place? Why would so many people, at the very same time, decide to start stuffing their mattresses with cash? How can we explain so singular an occurrence? Is it mere coincidence? A malignant conjunction of the planets? Or is it perhaps a wave of temporary hoarding insanity that spreads through the population like a vulgar fashion or a bad cold? It is very odd that a man of Krugman's stamp, who is so sure that he alone is right and that everyone who disagrees with him is a complete dunce, should offer up so ridiculous a theory. For it should be clear that Krugman's Keynesian theory of recessions suffers from an egregious superficiality. Imagine if some medical researcher had written an editorial in the New York Times insisting that the common cold is caused by a sore throat! Yet Krugman's statement is no more credible. Increased cash reserves is merely a symptom of a recession, not its cause. If you cannot provide a coherent explanation of why a large part of the private sector increases its cash reserves at the commencement of an economic crisis, you will never explain why recessions happen.

If mainstream economics cannot provide us with an adequate explanation of the business cycle, who on earth can? Has any progress at all been made in explicating this great mystery? Well, yes, some progress has been made. Not in mainstream economics, but on fringes, a few economists can give you at least a rough idea of the how and why of recessions. The best theories are those that arose at the turn of the century out of Austria. Two men in particular deserve mention: Ludwig von Mises and Joseph Schumpeter. In 1911, they each published a book introducing a new theory of the business cycle. Mises' theory, introduced in his classic The Theory of Money and Credit, is known as the Austrian theory of the trade cycle, because it relies heavily on the work of the two great founders of the so-called "Austrian school" of economics, Carl Menger and Eugen Böhm-Bawerk. Schumpeter's theory, which, due to its unique and heterodox nature, has no special name of its own and belongs to know particular school (though it dovetails nicely with certain aspects of the Austrian theory), was first introduced to the world in the pathbreaking The Theory of Economic Development. While neither of these theories is fully adequate, they both provide the essential groundwork for grasping the inner workings of the business cycle.

[This concludes the excerpt of the essay "Notes Toward a Theory of the Business Cycle"]