A Hegel TranslatorG W F Hegel is widely acknowledged to be one of
the most difficult philosophers to read, largely because of his extensive use of
highly obscure and technical vocabulary, and his opaque writing style. This
term, I've been studying Hegel's
Philosophy of Right and have found that a lot
of the words used in the current Cambridge translation are either misleading, or
are confusing in a modern context, where they are generally used to mean
something completely different (e.g.
corporation,
which we take to mean a company but to Hegel means a professional guild or trade
union).
In an attempt to overcome this confusion, I've been keeping a list of some of the worst offenders and the ideas that they seem to be intended to convey, which is reproduced below on the off-chance that it may be of use to other would-be Hegelians. Although this list is by no means exhaustive, it should hopefully give a general introduction to the most important terms, such as the universal-particular-individual dialectic, which features so heavily in Hegel's moral philosophy. In many cases, simply substituting the word (e.g. Idea) with the proposed alternative (e.g. Form) makes for a much clearer reading. In others, it is necessary to reinterpret the text in light of the intended meaning. For example… “The concept of this Idea has
being only as spirit, as self-knowledge and actuality, because it is the
objectivization of itself, the movement through the form of its
moments.”
becomes: “The idea of this Form has existence only as mind, as self-knowledge and its fully developed concept, because it is the objectivization of itself, the movement through the structure of its elements.” (OK, so the translated version is still pretty hard to understand, but you get the general idea—that's with a small ‘i’, not the Hegelian ‘Idea’, which would of course need to have objective form in order to become fully actual! Sorry, philosophers joke…) For a more comprehensive guide to Hegel's terminology, see Inwood's A Hegel Dictionary which goes into great (and sometimes mind-numbing) detail about the etymology and interpretation of each term. Yawn… –––––––– accident: an incidental, inessential or contingent feature of something. actual: something that is fully realised and developed according to its concept; e.g. unlike a fully grown oak tree, an acorn is not actual, although it is of course real. concept (Begriff): idea in the normal sense of the word. content: relating to substance or subject, as opposed to form or structure. contingent: accidental or could have been otherwise; opposite of necessary. corporation(s): professional guilds or trades unions. dialectic: the highest form of rational thought in which the structure of concepts is deduced by reflecting upon how they develop or ‘unfold’ into one another. (The whole of Hegel's philosophy is effectively an ‘unfolding’ of the basic ontological category of being.) estate(s): the three basic sectors of society: agriculture (the substantial estate), trade and industry (the reflective estate) and the public sector (the universal estate). Estate(s): the upper and lower houses of the legislature; i.e. parliament. The members of the upper house are drawn from the landed gentry of the substantial estate, whereas the lower house is elected from the corporations representing trade and industry. existence (Dasein): Being. The Cambridge translation of Hegel's Philosophy of Right misleadingly translates both Existenz and Dasein as ‘existence’, but substituting Dasein with ‘Being’ seems to make for a clearer reading (the capitalisation also helps). This is very remiscent of Plato's discussion of Being in The Republic, which similarly objectifies the quality of Being (a noun), as opposed to the mere fact of existence (as a verb or predicate). formal: in virtue of its form or structure; i.e. without (or irrespective of) content. Idea: Form. For Hegel, the Idea is the full realisation of the concept as it exists in reality. Although Form would be a more natural translation, some readers may find this confusing as the meaning is exactly the opposite of Plato's Forms, which are purely abstract entities (and in fact should probably be called Ideas for precisely this reason!). individual: an indivisible entity whose particular characteristics are a reflection of the universal, and is typically aware of itself of such (i.e. it is fully realised or actual). The individual is a dialectical progression that sublates both of these concepts. intention: the normal and rationally foreseeable consequences of an action. According to Hegel, we are responsible for our actions in as far as their effects can be known in advance or foreseen, regardless of whether this was part of our original purpose or not. moment: an element or part. objective: pertaining to actuality or physical form. Thus, objective spirit is spirit (mind) that has been given physical or some other universally recognisable form. particular: individual, subjective, specific, as opposed to universal. person: an individual rights holder. Married couples are treated as honorary persons in the eyes of the law, in addition to comprising the basic family unit. personality: personhood, i.e. the status of being a legal person or rights holder. police: the public authority. The law enforcement body is only one part of Hegel's Politzei, which includes all the operational branches of government and the welfare state. property: material possessions (as opposed to real estate). purpose: a conscious intention (cf. intention). ratiocination: deductive reasoning; used in the pejorative sense in relation to the understanding. right: encompasses rights as they are conventionally understood, what is in accordance with morality, extending into the political sphere. ‘The Philosophy of Right’ could reasonably be translated as ‘moral philosophy’. sex: gender. In §166, Hegel makes the mistake of equating sex with gender, leading him to pronounce (somewhat rashly) that the women's place is in the home whilst only the man can play an active part in civil society and the sciences. Correcting this by substituting the more appropriate concept of gender brings Hegel back in sync with modern thinking, which allows for the fact that both sexes can play both roles. (Interestingly, this also puts Hegel in favour of gay marriage, but that is beside the point!) spirit (Geist): mind. subjective: relating to the person or individual. sublate (aufheben): to transcend or subsume. This is the crucial moment of Hegel's dialectical process in which two opposing notions are transformed into a higher-level, more powerful concept that incorporates them both, as in the universal-particular-individual (UPI) dialectic. understanding, the: the faculty of deductive or analytic reasoning. Inherently limited, the understanding is often contrasted with true speculative reasoning, or dialectic. universal: fundamental, global, applies to all. Contrasts with particular. Posted on Wednesday - November 23, 2005 at 04:48 PM |
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Published On: Sep 07, 2007 08:02 AM 
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