[86c-89c] Back to the original question: is virtue teachable? An investigation by hypothesis: what would virtue have to be like to be teachable? Answer: knowledge. Therefore, if virtue is knowledge, it is teachable. Virtue is good in itself. So: is there anything good in itself that isn’t knowledge? No. Virtue as ‘mindfulness’. Two sub-arguments: 1) if virtue were innate, it would be recognizable but is not; 2) since virtue is ‘mindfulness’, i.e. knowledge, it should be teachable.

86c

S: Since we are of one mind that one should seek to find what one does not know, shall we try to find out together what virtue is?

M: Certainly. But Socrates, I would really like to investigate and hear your answer to my original question – the one about whether we should proceed on the assumption that virtue is teachable, or an innate gift, or a thing that comes however it may to men.

87

S: If I could order you about, Meno – not just myself – we would not have begun looking into the teachability of virtue before investigating its very nature. But because you do not even bother to keep yourself in line – you want to be free – you insist on tethering me. And so it goes. What to do? It seems we have no choice but to investigate a particular quality of a thing whose general nature is – we know not what. However, please loosen my collar just one notch; please consent to investigate whether virtue is teachable or not by means of an hypothesis. I have in mind a method geometers often employ to get on with their investigations. For example, if they are asked whether a specific area is equal to that of a triangle inscribed in a given circle, one of them might say: ‘I don’t yet know whether this area has that property, but I think I have an hypothesis that will move us forward, namely: if the area in question is such that when you apply it to the diameter of the circle, you find it falls short by an area equal to the applied figure, then I think you have one consequence, and if it is impossible for it to fall short by this much, then some other consequence. Using this hypothesis I am willing to tell you what will result concerning the inscription of this area in the circle, whether it is impossible or not. ’ Let us do the same with virtue, since we know neither what it is, nor what properties it has. Let us investigate whether it is teachable or not by means of a hypothesis. Let us say this: of all the sorts of things existing in the soul, what sort would virtue have to be, in order to be teachable or not? First, if it is not a sort of knowledge, is there any chance of anyone being taught it – that is, as we have been saying, recollecting it? We don’t need to worry ourselves too much about which name we give the process. Our question is a simple one: will it be teachable? Isn’t it plain to everyone that no one is going to be taught anything but knowledge?

M: That would be my view.

S: But if virtue is a kind of knowledge, it is clear that it could be taught.

M: Of course.

S: That question was quickly settled, then – namely, under what condition virtue would be teachable.

M: Yes.

S: The next point to consider, it seems, will be whether virtue is knowledge, or something other than knowledge.

M: That does seem to be the next question.

S: Well now, do we say virtue is anything other than good in itself? Will this serve as our hypothesis, that it is something good?

M: Of course.

S: If, then, there is anything else good that is different and separate from knowledge, virtue might well not be a kind of knowledge; but if every good thing is to be found under the general heading of knowledge, we would be right to suspect that it is a kind of knowledge.

M: That is so.

S: Surely virtue makes us good?

M: Yes.

S: And if we are good, we do good; for all that is good does good. Isn’t that the way it works?

M: Yes.

S: So virtue is something that does good?

M: That follows from all this.

S: Then let us consider, one by one, the sorts of things that do us good: health, let’s say, and strength, and beauty, and wealth. We say that these things, and others of the same kind, do us good, don’t we?

M: We do.

88

S: Yet we say that these same things also sometimes do us harm. Do you agree or not?

M: I do.

S: Look then, what deciding factor determines in each case whether these things do us good or harm? Isn’t goodness a function of correct use, and harm a function of misuse?

M: Certainly.

S: Let us now look at the qualities of the soul. There is a thing you call moderation, and justice, courage, intelligence, memory, nobility, so on and so forth?

M: There is.

S: Consider any and all items on this list you believe not to be knowledge but something else instead; don’t they all at times harm us, at other times do us good? Courage, for example, when not based on forethought, is mere recklessness; when a man is thoughtlessly confident, he gets hurt; but when he is mindful of what he does, things go well.

M: Yes.

S: The same is true of patience or mental quickness. A brain like a sponge and an even temper are all very well in one who minds the proper use of such things; to anyone else, they may bring harm.

M: Very much so.

89

S: Therefore, in short, all the soul does, and has done to it, concludes happily – if directed mindfully. Otherwise, things may end badly?

M: That is likely.

S: If then virtue is something in the soul, and necessarily good, it must be a matter of mindfulness. For all other qualities of soul are in themselves neither good nor harmful. As accompanied by forethought or thoughtlessness, they become good or harmful. This argument shows that virtue, being good, must be a kind of mindfulness.

M: I agree.

S: Furthermore, those other items we were considering – wealth and the like – are at times good, at times harmful. Here again it is as with the soul: mindfulness produces benefits; thoughtlessness causes harm; so in these cases, if the soul uses and directs things rightly, benefits result; bad use causes harm?

M: Quite

S: The mindful soul directs rightly, the thoughtless soul wrongly?

M: That is so.

S: So we can generalize: all human activities depend on the soul, and those of the soul depend on mindfulness, if they are to be good. According to this argument what does good would be mindfulness, and we say that virtue does good?

M: Certainly.

S: Virtue then, as a whole or in part, is a matter of mindfulness?

M: What you say, Socrates, seems to me quite right.

S: Then, if that is how it is, the good are so by nature?

M: I do not think they are.

S: For if they were, this would follow: if the good were so by nature, we would have people who recognized those among the young who were naturally good; we would take those they pointed out and guard them in the Acropolis. We would vault them up there more carefully than gold, lest someone corrupt them. When they reached maturity they would be useful to their cities.

M: Reasonable proposal, Socrates.

S: Since the good are not good by nature, does learning make them so?

M: I now think that must necessarily be so, Socrates. And clearly, on our hypothesis, if virtue is knowledge, it can be taught.

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