77b-79e Meno: virtue is to want the best and to get it. Socrates: no one ever wants bad things. So the question comes down to the getting – by fair means or foul. Meno admits that the good things should be gotten justly. Back to virtue-as-justice. Meno is guilty, again, of trying to define the species by means of a single species.

77b

M: I think, Socrates, that virtue is, as the poet says, "to find joy in beautiful things and have power." Therefore I say that virtue is to want all the best things in life, and to have the power to get them.

S: Do you mean that the man who desires the best things in life desires good things?

M: That’s certainly right.

S: Do you take it for granted that there are people who desire bad things, and others who desire good things? Don’t you think, my good man, that all men desire good things?

M: I certainly don’t.

S: You think some want bad things, then?

M: Yes.

S: Do you mean that they believe the bad things to be good, or that they know they are bad and want them anyway?

M: I think there are both kinds.

S: Do you think, Meno, that anyone, knowing that bad things are bad, still wants them?

M: I certainly do.

S: Wants in what way? To have for himself?

M: What else?

S: Does he think the bad things benefit he who has them, or does he perfectly well know they will harm him?

M: There are some who believe bad things benefit them, others who know that they harm them.

S: And do you think that those who believe that bad things benefit them know they are bad?

M: No, that’s something I can’t quite believe.

S: It’s clear, then, that those who do not know things to be bad do not want what is bad. What they want are things they think are good, that are in fact bad. It follows that those who have no knowledge about these things and believe them to be good clearly want good things. Isn’t that right?

M: It is likely.

S: Well then, those who you say want bad things, believing bad things harm those who have them, know they will be harmed by them?

M: Necessarily.

78

S: And don’t they think those who are harmed are miserable to the extent that they are harmed?

M: That seems unavoidable.

S: And don’t they think those who are miserable are unhappy?

M: I think so.

S: Does anyone want to be miserable and unhappy?

M: I do not think so, Socrates.

S: Then no one wants what is bad, Meno – unless he wants to be in such a state. For what else is misery if not wishing for bad things, and having one’s wish come true?

M: You are probably right, Socrates. No one really wants what is bad.

S: Weren’t you saying just now that virtue is the desire for good things, and the power to acquire them?

M: Yes, I was.

S: It seems everyone satisfies the ‘desire for’ part of this definition, and no one is better than anyone else in this respect.

M: So it appears.

S: Clearly then, if any man is going to turn out better than the next, it is going to be due to superior talent at actually getting the things.

M: Quite so.

S: So this is what virtue turns out to be, according to your argument: the power to acquire good things.

M: I think, Socrates, that now we have hit the nail on the head.

S: Let’s make sure, first, that what you have said is true – for it may well be. You say that the capacity to get good things is virtue?

M: I do.

S: And by good things you mean, for example, health and wealth?

M: Yes. It’s also a matter of amassing plenty of gold and silver – and winning honors and public office.

S: So, by ‘good things’ you don’t mean other sorts of things than these?

M: No, I mean all things of this kind.

S: Very well. According to Meno – hereditary guest friend of the Great King – virtue is getting one’s hands on the gold. Do you qualify this definition, Meno, with the words ‘justly’ and ‘piously’? Or is it all the same to you – virtue either way – if you make your fortune unjustly?

M: Certainly not, Socrates.

S: You would call it evil, then?

M: That I would.

S: It seems, then, that the getting of gold must go along with justice or moderation or piety or some other element of virtue; if it does not, it won’t be virtue, however many good things are gotten.

M: Yes. How could there be virtue if these elements were missing?

S: Then failing to acquire gold and silver, whether for oneself or for another, whenever it would not be just to do so, would be a case of virtue?

M: So it seems.

79

S: It follows that getting hold of the goods will not be virtue any more so than failing to do so is; apparently it’s the case that whatever is done justly is virtue; whatever is not done justly is a sort of vice or evil.

M: I think it has to be as you say.

S: We said a little while ago that each of these things was a part of virtue – namely, justice and moderation and all such things?

M: Yes.

S: Then it seems you have been playing me for a fool, Meno.

M: How so, Socrates?

S: Because I begged you just now not to break apart or portion out virtue, and I gave examples of how you should formulate your answer. You paid no attention, going on to tell me that virtue is being able to get good things justly; and this, you say, is part of virtue.

M: Yes, I do.

S: It follows then, from what you have agreed to, that to act with just one part of virtue whenever you do something, is virtue. For you say that justice is a part of virtue, and that other, similar qualities are too. Why do I mention this? Because although I begged you to tell me about virtue as a whole, you haven’t come close to doing so. Instead you say that every action that is virtuous in a particular sort of way is virtue, as if you had already told me all about virtue as a whole – so that I would already know all about that – even as you break it apart into bits. I think we must take it from the top and begin at the beginning, my dear Meno: what is virtue, if every action that is virtuous in a particular sort of way is virtue? For that is what you are saying when you say every action performed justly is virtuous. Don’t you think you should have to answer the same question all over again? Or maybe you think you can know what is partly virtuous, without knowing what it is as a whole?

M: I don’t think so.

S: If you will recall, when I was answering you concerning shape, we rejected all answers like that one I tried to give in terms that were not agreed upon, and that might themselves be in need of investigation.

M: And we were right to reject them.

S: Then surely, my good man, you must not think, while the nature of virtue as a whole is still under investigation, that you can make its nature clear to anyone by telling them about what is partly virtuous. The only thing that is going to happen is that the same question will be put to you all over again – namely, what do you take the nature of virtue to be when you say what you say? Or maybe you think there’s no point to all this that I’m saying?

M: I think what you say is right.

S: Starting over again from the beginning: what do you and your friend say virtue is?

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