[75b-77b] Definitional detour. Meno: what is shape? Socrates: shape invariably accompanies color. What if I don’t know what color is? How such disputes should be handled – and a touch of geometry: shape is the limit of a solid. Meno: but what is color? A touch of Empedoclean physics: color is an ‘effluvium’ off objects. Socrates disdains his own ‘theatrical’ account.

75b

M: No! You answer it for me, Socrates.

S: You want me to do this for you as a favor?

M: I certainly do.

S: Then you will be willing to tell me about virtue?

M: I will.

S: Let’s forge on. The subject is worth it.

M: It surely is.

S: Now then, let me try to tell you what shape is. See whether you will accept the following account: shape, let’s say, is the one thing that invariably accompanies color. Does this satisfy you, or do you want to go about defining the term in some other way? For myself, I would be satisfied if you defined virtue in some such way as this.

M: But this is a silly sort of definition, Socrates.

S: How so?

M: It’s silly that you say shape always accompanies color. Because what if someone says he doesn’t know what color is. He’s just as confused about color as he is about shape. Now what do you say about your definition?

S: That it is certainly a true one; and if my questioner is going to turn out to be one of those clever debaters who turns everything into a competition I will say to him: ‘I have given my answer; if it is wrong, it’s up to you to refute it.’ On the other hand, if we are among friends – as you and I are – and if we want to pursue the question, we must answer in a manner more conducive to agreeable, productive discussion. By this I mean that answers given must not only be true; they must also be made in terms the questioner admits to understanding. I will try to abide by these rules myself. So let me ask you: have you ever heard tell of something called ‘the end’? I mean something like a ‘limit’ or ‘boundary’ – because all these terms are, so as far as I am concerned, basically synonymous. Prodicus might want to split hairs at this point, but you surely call something ‘finished’ or ‘completed’. That is all I am trying to get at, nothing fancy.

76

M: I do know of such a thing, and I think I understand what you mean.

S: Additionally, you call a certain something ‘a plane’, and a certain something else ‘a solid’, as in geometry?

M: I do.

S: Then this is enough to tell you what I mean by ‘shape’. For I say this of every shape: a shape is that which limits a solid; in a word, a shape is the limit of a solid.

M: And what do you say color is, Socrates?

S: You are outrageous, Meno! You trouble an old man to answer questions, but you yourself are not willing to recollect and tell me what Gorgias says virtue is.

M: After you have answered this, Socrates, then I will tell you.

S: Even someone who was blindfolded could tell from your way of talking that you are handsome and still have lovers.

M: How is that?

S: Because whenever there is a discussion going on, you give orders, as spoiled children do – who behave like tyrants until one day they finally grow up. I get the sense you aren’t completely oblivious to the fact that I am at a disadvantage when I’m around handsome people; so I will do you the favor of answering.

M: By all means, do me the favor.

S: Do you want me to answer á la Gorgias, this being the mode you would most easily follow?

M: Of course, I want that.

S: Both of you subscribe to Empedocles’ theory of effluvia, am I right?

M: Certainly.

S: And so you believe there are channels through which effluvia make their way?

M: Definitely.

S: And certain effluvia fit certain channels, while others are either too small or too big?

M: That is so.

S: And there is a thing you call sight?

M: There is.

S: From this, ‘comprehend what I state,’ as Pindar says, for color is an effluvium off of shapes that fits the organ of sight and is perceived.

M: That seems to me a most excellent answer, Socrates!

S: Perhaps it was delivered in the manner to which you are accustomed. At the same time, I think you can deduce from this answer what sound is, and smell, and many such things.

M: Quite so.

S: It is a theatrical answer, so it pleases you, Meno, more than the one about shape.

M: It does.

S: It is not better, son of Alexidemus. In fact, I am convinced the other one is, and I think you would agree if only you did not have to go away before the mysteries, as you told me yesterday that you must; if only you could stay and be initiated.

M: I would stay, Socrates, if you could tell me many such things as these.

77

S: I certainly won’t be lacking enthusiasm to tell you such things, for your sake and my own; but I may not be able to tell you many. Come now, you too try to fulfill your promise to me. Tell me the nature of virtue as a whole and stop making many out of one – as jokers say whenever someone breaks something. Please allow virtue to remain sound and whole, and tell me what it is, for I have given you examples of how to go about it.

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