[96d-100b] Knowledge versus true belief. The advantage of the former is that it doesn’t ‘run away’, like a statue of Daedalus. The importance of being lucky: success in public affairs is not a matter of wisdom but of divine inspiration. Virtue is a gift of from the gods.

96d

S: We are probably poor specimen samples, you and I, Meno. Gorgias has not adequately cultured you, nor Prodicus me. We must then at all costs make our selves our own concern and find someone who will in some way make us better. I say this in view of our recent investigation, for it is ridiculous that we quite failed to notice that it is not only by the light of knowledge that men succeed in their affairs; that is perhaps why the understanding of how good men come to be eludes us.

M: How do you mean, Socrates?

S: I mean this: we were right to agree that good men must do good, and that things cannot be otherwise. Isn’t that so?

M: Yes.

S: And that they will do good if they guide us correctly in conducting our affairs. We did well in agreeing to this?

M: Yes.

97

S: But that one cannot guide correctly without knowledge: our agreement to this proposition is likely to be incorrect.

M: How do you mean?

S: I will tell you. A man who knew the way to Larissa, or anywhere else you like, who went there and guided others there would surely lead them well?

M: Certainly.

S: What if someone had a true opinion about which way was the right way, but he hadn’t gone there himself and wasn’t acquainted with the place. Wouldn’t he also lead the way correctly?

M: Certainly.

S: As long as he has the right opinion concerning that which other people know, he will not be a worse guide than one who knows. For he has a true opinion, though not knowledge.

M: In no way worse.

S: So true opinion is in no way an inferior guide to action than knowledge. This is what we overlooked in our investigation of the nature of virtue, when we said only knowledge can culminate in proper action; for true opinion can do just as well.

M: So it seems.

S: So correct opinion is no less useful than knowledge?

M: Yes, to an extent, Socrates. But the man with knowledge will always succeed, whereas he who has true opinion will only succeed at times.

S: How do you mean? Won’t the one with the right opinion always be right, as long as his opinion is right?

M: That appears to be necessarily the case, and it makes me wonder, Socrates – this being the way of it – why knowledge is rated so much more highly than correct opinion, and what the difference is.

S: Do you know what is puzzling you, or shall I tell you?

M: Go ahead, tell me.

S: It is because you have paid no attention to the statues of Daedalus – but perhaps you don’t have any over in Thessaly.

M: What are you driving at, Socrates?

S: That they too run away and escape if you forget to tie them down; but they stay put if properly tethered.

M: So what?

98

S: Acquiring an untied work of Daedalus is not worth much; it’s like a runaway slave – for it won’t stay put. A statue that is tied down, though, is very valuable, because the man’s works are very beautiful. What am I driving at here? True opinions. True opinions, for as long as they remain, are fine things and do nothing but good. But they don’t hang around for long; they escape from a man's mind, so that they are not worth much until one tethers them with chains of reasons why. And these, Meno my friend, are threads of memory, as previously agreed. After opinions are tied down, in the first place they become knowledge; secondly, they remain in place. That is why knowledge is prized more highly than correct opinion; knowledge differs from correct opinion in being tied down.

M: Yes, by Zeus, Socrates, it does seem to go something like that.

S: Indeed, I too speak now like a man offering guess-work in lieu of knowledge. However, I certainly do not think I am guessing when I say that true opinion is a different thing from knowledge. If I do claim to know anything else – and I would make that claim about few things - I would put this down on the list as one thing I do know.

M: Rightly so, Socrates.

S: Well then, isn’t it the case that when true opinion guides the course of each action, it comes off no worse than knowledge?

M: I think you are right here too.

S: True opinion, then, is neither inferior to knowledge nor does less good in action, nor does the man who has true opinion in lieu of knowledge come off the worse.

M: That is so.

S: And we agreed that the good man does good.

M: Yes.

S: Since, then, it is not only through knowledge but also through true opinion that men are good, and do good to their cities; and since neither knowledge nor true opinion is innate in men, but both are acquired – unless you think either of these is naturally in-born?

M: I don’t think so.

S: Then if these things are not innate, men are not naturally good.

M: Surely not.

S: As goodness is not innate, we inquired next whether it could be taught.

M: Yes.

S: We thought it could be taught if it was knowledge?

M: Yes.

S: And that it was knowledge if it could be taught?

M: Quite so.

S: And that if there were teachers of it, it could be taught, but if there were not, not?

M: That is so.

S: And then we agreed that there were no teachers of it?

M: We did.

S: So we agreed that it was neither teachable not knowledge?

M: Quite so.

S: But we certainly agree that virtue is a good thing?

M: Yes.

S: And that which guides correctly is both useful and good?

M: Certainly.

99

S: And that only these two things, true belief and knowledge, guide correctly, and that if a man possesses these he gives correct guidance. The things that turn out right by some chance are not due to human guidance, but where there is correct human guidance it is due to two things, true belief or knowledge.

M: I think that is so.

S: Now because it cannot be taught, virtue no longer seems to be knowledge?

M: It seems not.

S: So one of the two good and useful things has been excluded, and knowledge is not the guide in public affairs.

M: I don’t think it can be.

S: So it not through some wisdom, or by being wise, that such men lead their cities – I mean the likes of Themistocles, and those others mentioned by Anytus just now? Here is the reason they cannot make others like themselves: it is not knowledge that makes them what they are.

M: You are probably right, Socrates.

S: Therefore, if it isn’t through knowledge, the only alternative is that it is through true opinion that statesmen settle on the right course for their cities. As regards knowledge, they are no different from seers and prophets. They too say many true things when the divine inspiration strikes them, but they don’t actually know what they are talking about.

M: That is probably so.

S: Likewise, Meno, don’t these other men deserve to be called ‘divine’: those who fail to comprehend the true import of what they say and do, yet say and do much that is truly important? – Certainly.

S: So we would be right to say the seers and prophets just mentioned are ‘divine’ and ‘inspired’ – likewise, everyone with a knack for poetry. Likewise, politicians and public figures are nothing less than divine and possessed when – under some god’s inspiration and influence – they give speeches that lead to success in important matters, even they have no idea what they are talking about. – Quite so.

S: Women are always calling good men ‘god-like’, and the Spartans do the same when they deliver a eulogy; they say, ‘this man is divine.’

M: And they seem to be, Socrates – though perhaps Anytus here will be annoyed with you for saying so.

100

S: I don’t mind about that. We can hash it out with him some other time. But for now, if we have been right in how we investigated and what we said, virtue turns out to be neither innate nor earned. It is something that comes to those who possess it as a free gift from the gods – with understanding not included; unless, that is, you can point to some statesmen who could make another man a statesman. If there were such a one, he could be said to rank among the living as Homer said Teiresias ranked among the dead: namely, ‘he alone kept his wits collected while the others flitted about like shadows.’ In the same way such a man would, as far as virtue is concerned, stand forth as someone of substance – opposed, as it were, to mere shadows.

M: I think that is an excellent way to put it, Socrates

S: It follows from this whole line of reasoning, Meno, that virtue appears present in those who have it only as a gift from the gods. We will only really know about this, however, if and when we try to investigate what virtue itself is – an investigation that must come before that of how it comes to be in men. But the time has come for me to go. Now you persuade your guest friend Anytus here of all these things you have been persuaded to agreed to, in order that he himself may become more agreeable. If you succeed, you will also thereby confer a benefit upon the Athenians.

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