(11b-12E) Euthyphro’s claims are like statues of Daedalus. A fresh start: all that is holy is necessarily just. But: is all that is just holy? Comparison with the case of fear and shame. Holiness is only one part of the domain of justice. But which part?

E: But Socrates, I can’t possibly explain to you what I have in mind, because whatever proposition we advance runs around in circles, refusing to stay put where we plant it.

S: Your propositions, Euthyphro, seem like the property of my ancestor, Daedalus. If it were me stating them and setting them forth, you might make fun of me, saying my conclusions have inherited from him the trait of running around and not staying in one place. Since these are your propositions, however, we will have to come up with a different joke – because it’s true, as you say, that these things of yours really won’t stay put.

E: I think that joke fits in fine with our discussion, Socrates, because I’m not the one making these things go around and around, instead of sitting still. You’re the Daedalus here, because if it were up to me, these things would stay still, just as they are.

S: Then it looks as if I must be even cleverer than Daedalus, my friend, since his skill only extended to animating things he made himself, whereas mine makes other people’s creations move about as well. And the pinnacle of my genius is my cleverness, minus any desire to be clever. For I would give up the wealth of Tantalus as well as the cleverness of Daedalus, if only these things you say to me would stand still. But enough of this. Since it seems to me you are making all this needlessly difficult, we must both be equally eager to find some way for me to get taught by you about holiness; so don’t give up before you find the way. Consider whether you think all that is holy is necessarily just.

E: I think so.

S: So, then, is all that is just holy? Or is all that is holy just, but not all that is just holy, but some is and some not?

E: You lost me there, Socrates.

S: And yet youth is on your side, just as wisdom is. As I said, you are throwing up obstacles by way of hoarding your wealth of wisdom. Pull yourself together, my good man, because the thing I’m saying is not that hard to grasp. I am saying the opposite of what that poet said, who wrote: ‘you do not wish to name Zeus, who has done it, and who made all things grow, for where there is fear there is also shame.’ I disagree with the poet. Shall I tell you why?

E: Please do.

S: I don’t think that ‘where there is fear there is also shame,’ for I think many people who fear disease and poverty and many other things feel fear but are not ashamed of what they fear. Don’t you agree?

E: I do indeed.

S: But where there is shame there is also fear. For is there anyone who, when ashamed and embarrassed about anything, does not at the same time fear and dread a reputation for wickedness?

E: He is certainly afraid.

S: Then it isn’t right to say, ‘where there is fear there is also shame,’ rather that where there is shame there is also fear, because fear covers a larger area than shame. Shame is part of fear’s domain just as odd is part of the domain of number – from which it follows that it isn’t true that where there is number there is also oddness, rather that where there is the oddness there is also number. Do you follow me now?

E: Absolutely.

S: This is the kind of thing I was asking about before: whether where there is holiness there must also be justice, and whether where justice is present, holiness may be absent – holiness being but one part of justice’s domain. Shall we say so, or do you think otherwise?

E: No, that’s fine; what you say seems right.

S: See what comes next: if holiness is part of justice, we must, it seems, find out what part of justice it is. Now if you asked me a similar question about the thing I just mentioned – what portion of numbers are even, and what those numbers are, I would say they are those numbers divisible into two equal, not unequal, parts. Or don’t you think so?

E: I do.

S: Try to give me a similar account of that part of justice that is holiness – so that you can tell Meletus not to wrong us any more, and not to indict me for sacrilege, since I have learned enough from you to be able to tell the difference between what is sacred and holy and what is not.

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