(9e-11b) Euthyphro’s new definition: ‘what all the gods love is holy; what they all hate is unholy.’ Now a question: ‘is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the god?’ An explanation of the question follows (considerably more confusing than the question itself.) And an answer: holiness causes god love, not vice versa. Therefore, Euthyphro’s definition cannot be correct; it implies a contradiction: if A is prior to B, and A = B; then (by substitution), B is prior to A.

E: I would certainly say the holy is what all the gods love, and the opposite – what all the gods hate – is unholy.

S: Then let us examine, once again, whether what we have here is a sound proposition. We could, of course, just let it pass; whenever we – or anyone – says something is so, we could simply take it to be so. Alternatively, we could look and see what it all means.

E: We must look and see, but I really think what we have now is a sound proposition.

S: And soon we will know whether it is. Consider this: is the holy loved by the gods because it is holy, or is it holy because it is loved by the gods?

E: I don't know what you mean, Socrates.

S: Let me try to explain more clearly: we speak of something carried and of a carrier; of something guided and a guide; of something seen and one who sees. You understand that, and how, these things are distinct?

E: I think I do.

S: So there are those who are loved and those who love, and the two are not the same?

E: Of course.

S: Tell me then whether the thing carried is carried because someone carries it, or for some other reason.

E: No, that’s the reason.

S: Likewise, the thing guided is guided because someone guides it, and the thing seen is seen because someone sees it.

E: Of course.

S: It isn’t that someone sees it because the thing is seen. It’s the other way round: it is seen because someone sees it; likewise, something’s being guided doesn’t cause its guide; the thing is guided because of a guide; nor do carriers come to be by things getting carried; instead, things are carried because someone carries them. Is what I am getting at clear, Euthyphro? I am getting at this: when something changes, or undergoes some effect, the change doesn’t happen just because it happens; everything happens for a reason. Likewise, effects don’t happen because things undergo effects; effects happen because of causes. Or don’t you agree?

E: I do.

S: Either belovedness is something that just develops naturally, or it is something brought about by someone’s love?

E: Certainly.

S: So this case is analogous to those just mentioned: the thing is not loved because of its belovedness; rather, it is loved because of one who loves it.

E: Necessarily.

S: What then do we say about holiness, Euthyphro? Surely that it is loved by all the gods, by your account?

E: Yes.

S: Is it loved because it is holy, or is there some other reason?

E: There is no other reason.

S: It is loved then because it is holy, but it is not holy because it is loved?

E: So it seems.

S: And because the gods love it, it becomes loved by the gods and god-beloved?

E: Of course.

S: What is loved by the gods is not, then, identical to what is holy, Euthyphro; nor does holy mean god-beloved, as you maintain; these are distinct things.

E: How so, Socrates?

S: Because we agree that what is holy is loved because of its holiness; it isn’t holy because it is loved. Isn’t that so?

E: Yes.

S: And, on the other hand we agree that what is loved by the gods is loved because of the fact of the gods’ loving it; love of something does not come about because of that thing’s belovedness.

E: True.

S: But if that which is loved by the gods and that which is holy were one and the same, dear Euthyphro, and if the holy were loved because it was holy, then what is loved by the gods would be loved by the gods because it was loved by the gods; and if what is loved by the gods were loved by the gods because it was loved by the gods, then the holy would also be holy because it was loved by the gods. But now you see we have two quite opposite sorts of cases here – very different from one another. We have someone who loves a thing, making it be loved; and we have a lovable thing, which makes someone love it. I’m afraid that when I asked you what holiness is, Euthyphro, you didn’t want to make its nature clear to me. Instead, you told me about an effect or quality of it – namely the quality holiness has of being loved by all the gods. But you have yet to tell me what holiness is in itself. Now, if you please, stop hiding things from me and start over again from the beginning, telling me what holiness is. We won’t argue about whether it is loved by the gods, or has some other such quality; just look sharp and teach me what holiness and unholiness are.

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