(7a-8a) Euthyphro’s first attempt at definition: what the gods love is holy; what is unloved by them is unholy. An awkward consequence: some things will be both holy and unholy.

E: Well then, what the gods love is holy; what is unloved by them is unholy.

S: Magnificent, Euthyphro! You have now answered in just the way I wanted. As to whether your answer is a true one – that’s a little something I don’t know just yet; but you are obviously going to show me things are as you say.

E: Certainly.

S: Come then, let us examine what has been said. A man or deed loved by the gods is holy, whereas one hated by the gods is unholy. They are not one and the same – in fact, they are diametrical opposites: the holy and the unholy. Isn’t that so?

E: It is indeed.

S: This seems to you a sound proposition?

E: I think so, Socrates.

S: We have also declared, Euthyphro, that the gods exist in a state of discord, that they are at odds, indeed that they hate one another. Haven’t we said this, too?

E: We have.

S: What sorts of things are they which, when causes of argument, are causes of anger and enmity? Let’s look at it this way. If you and I were to get into an argument about which of two numbers was the larger, would this turn us into furious enemies; or would we sit down, count up, and quickly smooth our differences?

E: That is certainly just what we would do.

S: Likewise, if we had a fight about bigger and smaller, we would avail ourselves of measurement and swiftly settle the matter.

E: That is so.

S: And we would employ a scale, I think, if we disagreed about what was heavier and what lighter?

E: Of course.

S: What sorts of things might we argue about that would make us angry and hostile, if we couldn’t reach agreement? Maybe you don’t have an immediate answer; but see whether you think it’s these things: justice and injustice, beauty and ugliness, the good and the bad. Aren’t these the very things for causing disputes which, when they prove unresolvable, provoke irreconcilable differences between you, me and everyone else.

E: That’s just how it goes in arguments about such things, Socrates.

S: What about the gods, Euthyphro? If in fact they get in arguments, won’t they be about these sorts of things?

E: That must be how it is, Socrates.

S: Then according to your argument, good Euthyphro, different gods consider different things to be just, beautiful, ugly, good, and bad – for they wouldn’t be at odds unless they disagreed about these things, would they?

E: You are right.

S: Each of them loves what each considers beautiful, good, and just, and each hates the opposite of these things?

E: Certainly.

S: But you say the same things are considered just by some gods, unjust by others. It is disputes over such things that set them at odds and at war. Isn’t it so?

E: It is.

S: The same things, then, are loved by the gods and hated by the gods, and will be both god-loved and god-hated.

E: It seems likely.

S: And the same things will be both holy and unholy, according to the terms of this argument?

E: I'm afraid so.

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