Posted Saturday, May 24
A Sense of a Sense of an Ending

More dawdling at Ftain has rewarded me with this delightful little essaylet. Just a sample, kids:

Rogers' book terminates with a tremendous 3-page colophon, which wonders aloud if it is not perhaps “the longest colophon on record.” I take this personally, as a challenge for some day in the future, a challenge to create a colophon that transcends all colophons, a colophon that not only mentions the fonts of choice, but describes the sensuous lilt of certain descenders, offering prayers for good linespacing and a hymn to the golden ratio—a colophon that compares the kerned nestling of the “a” against the “W” in “Water” to the cuddling Madonna and child, and describes not only the paper that holds the ink but explains how the exact proportions of the lowercase “q” were debated so avidly that there was a stabbing in the foundry.

The blogosphere is such a clamorous, aggressive environment. I often find that time I might have spent shouting to the rooftops how stupid someone I've never met is - is better spent riding Ftrain. Foundry stabbings notwithstanding, a fundamentally gentle environment.

Hooked on colophonics!

Posted Saturday, May 24
Veblenpalooza!

A little link for your free books bookmarks. Someday you just might want it. Free Veblen! (Via the strangely underappreciated in the blogosphere, but maybe he likes it that way, ftrain.)

Posted Friday, May 23
The Uses and Abuses of Uselessness

Via The Derb at The Corner, this thing, by someone named Steve Sailer. It opens with a second-hand slam against philosophy that is, in my professional opinion, not wholly unfair.

In his last book, Nobel Laureate physicist Steven Weinberg pointedly titled two chapters "The Unexpected Usefulness of Mathematics" and "The Unexpected Uselessness of Philosophy." Even the most esoteric math has helped him describe the cosmos. But the only value Weinberg ever found in reading philosophers was when they refuted other philosophers who had clouded his mind. While engineers or farmers or bartenders have all learned a trick or two over the years, philosophers mostly either rehash the same old mistakes or dream up new ones that are even more ridiculous.

Of course, philosophers have learned a trick or two. Sailer must mean progress. Which raises the eternal question: bartenders? Have they really made progress? I would not have thought to use that particular term to characterize what they have made for centuries now. (I mean, I watched Cocktail with Tom Cruise. Yeah. But is that progress?) But OK, I'll admit I think there is something deep and true about the twin observations - math, why the hell does it work so well; and philosophy, why not some solider answers by now?

I mean, way back in Plato's academy, the whole math thing - find a mathematical expression for the movements of the wanderers, so forth - should have seemed like a real long-shot roll of the Pythagorean dice. Why should the world be mathematical? Just trying to figure out what was right and wrong should have seemed a more modest and humble conceptual endeavor.

Seriously, I'm a philosopher. I'll stand up and be counted among the unexpectedly useless (thereby surrending my advantage of surprise: ha-ha, Nobody expects the Useless Inquisition!) But as Montaigne says, there's nothing useless in nature, not even uselessness itself. But the first step towards finding a use for your uselessness is admitting you have a problem.

Steve Sailer needs to admit he has a problem. Next line: To this day, most philosophers suffer from Plato's disease: the assumption that reality fundamentally consists of abstract essences best described by words or geometry. (In truth, reality is largely a probabilistic affair best described by statistics.)

Now the 'most' is egregious. And the 'geometry' bit, being operated on by 'most' - is completely yelping, climb-the-walls, Hannibal-Lecter-strapped-to-a-board lunatic. Most philosophers are either Plato or Spinoza-grade geometricophiliac arch-rationalists? Most? (This from a guy bragging about the truthful puissance of statistics. Yeah, but not just any statistic you pull out of your hat! Only the true one's work that old descriptive magic. Sheesh. The crazy things they teach the kids these days.) And please note: I'm disdaining even to pause to enumerate the ways in which Sailer has already greivously mischaracterized Plato's own philosophy.

And does Sailer think that 'words' do not work well (at all?) to describe reality. This is at once striking and strikingly vague, if not sheer a priori speculation. If I say: 'I'm sitting here typing at my keyboard,' that isn't true? It would be truer if I translated it into statistics? But no one knows how to do that, I take it - I mean, not without leaving in some words to make clear what the numerals are on about. So is the thing I seemed to say just now mystically unsayable, or not true, or not precise until I tack on that the statistical chance it is true is 1, or what?

Seriously. What the hell is wrong with using words? Are we to be post-modernists, then - deconstructionist mavens of meaninglessness? No, they get it in the neck in the very next line. Sailer must not be one of them. Oh, never mind. There will always be mysteries.

The situation would seem to be: Sailer is a sort of Pythagorean. He thinks that 'all is made of number'. He has shrewdly soften this doctrine to 'all is sort of made of number', which is an improvement or not - as one cares to regard it.

I really don't mind flights of Pythagorean divine madness, mind you - Platonic doves flapping for all they are worth, a dozen wing-spans or more beyond the bounds of all possible experience. Wacky doesn't mean wrong. Anyway, such folk are graceful ornaments to our useless form of life. But it does strike me as odd when they shout back at me from across the transcendental gulfs - "I'm a commonsense, British-style empiricist!" "What?" (I must not have heard him right. It sounded like he said, 'I'm a commonsense, British-style empiricist,' but I distinctly heard him say - just before - well, something that didn't fit with that.)

You think I'm kidding?

Fortunately, one school of philosophy has actually taught us some valuable lessons over the centuries: the anti-abstract British tradition of Roger Bacon, Francis Bacon and David Hume, with its emphasis on realism, common sense and the scientific method.

Someone explain to me how the thesis that reality properly consists only of the entities described by 'statistics', not those described by 'words', is not 'abstract' but is 'common sense'? (I'm not hinting it's wrong, mind you.)

Next comes some stuff about David Stove. And admittedly, David Stove is pretty great. I blogged about him a few weeks ago, in fact. So I am on the recond as approving of Stove. Of course, his stuff on Darwin is completely barmy. Everyone knows that. So Sailer holding up Stove as the most towering exemplar of philosophical empiricism, then laying into him for his foolish attacks on Darwinism ...

And then there's some other stuff I won't go into.

Well, I'll tell you how I scored it: Sailer 3; Total Straw Man 1.

But it's true about philosophy being weirdly useless. Yet oddly, beautiful growths - science, literature, philosophy - keep springing forth from each layer of manure as it gets layed down. So there is hope for Sailer yet, I should think. And for me.

Posted Friday, May 23
From Stars? Or Civets?

We elide. You decide.

Posted Thursday, May 22
NEWSFLASH! Crazy People Are Madwashing Google!

Remember a couple days ago, that story by the guy and that other guy about how blogs are ruining google by obnoxiously linking pages to other pages? (No, I'm not going to link, thereby artificially inflating the gentlemen's googlestanding.) Anyway, I think a more serious problem is crazy people. And, if I think back, it seems they've been with us since the early days of the web. Example: pursuant of my nattering on about TIA below, I was attempting to google a half-remembered quote from Ira Glasser on the subject. And where do I find myself - a mere half dozen or so links from the tip top - but here, horrible here. I think google should add a separate search tab for things by crazy people, which they should filter out of the main web search.

Web. Images. Group. Directory. News. Nuts.

Posted Thursday, May 22
Miscellany

Our maid Tena refers to the father of Zoë's best friend as "Sir Wo." This sounds altogether more appropriate for some master swordsman in a Korean epic than for a mild-mannered Wharton MBA who teaches economics, but there you are. Maybe he has a secret identity. Regression models by day, scourge of the Korean underworld by night; something like that. This all comes about because maids in Singapore (and Hong Kong) have generalized the titles "sir" and "ma'am" to nouns and third-person forms of address. So, "my ma'am says", "if sir Lee does this--then how?" and so on. Hence, Sir Wo. Odd.

Posted Thursday, May 22
Who Wants to Be Big Brother?

Suppose you asked a representative sample of red-blooded American citizens the following questions:

1) Do you think Total Information Awareness - pardon me: Terrorism Information Awareness - sounds a tetch too Orwellian for comfort?

2) Do you think, post 9/11, that the government needs to do more to gather and efficiently analyze data that might be crucial for preventing future terrorist attacks?

My guess: 95% yes answers to both questions.Yet I do not believe I have seen a single proposal anywhere, by any critic of TIA, of what a proper solution to our little difficulty might be. This is understandable: who wants to stand up and get the inevitable Big Brother sign hung around his neck? On the other hand - well, shouldn't we try to think of something?

I blogged about this just before our recent Mesopotamian military venture got underway. Well, anyway: what do people think the right answer is?

(Thanks to Maria Gallowglass for broaching the topic this morning.)

Posted Wednesday, May 21
Sir, the Thing You Propose Is Impossible

Here’s a thing via A & L Daily: a Human Nature Review review, by a William D. Casebeer, of a book entitled The Evolution of Reason: Logic as a Branch of Biology, by a William S Cooper (Cambridge UP, 2001). Yep, that's right. Tries to reduce logic to biology, in a strong sense.

Haven’t read the book – our library doesn’t have it - but the review nicely exemplifies rifts in the field. I am on one side; Casebeer and Cooper on the other. I'm going to rattle on self-righteously at approximately three times the length of the review I am drubbing. (I sometimes behave disproportionately, like that.) Better make it a Giant Thought, then. Off you go, off you go.

Posted Wednesday, May 21
Tony Adragna has a post on how the U.N. is failing to protect civilians in the eastern Congo (also linked approvingly by the Instapundit.) After quoting a U.N. resolution on the subject, he rails:

"As security conditions permit"? Why not send in a force large enough to provide security? Or, are we going to wait around again 'til after the the bloodlust has been satisfied by, oh, somewhere between 500,000 and 1,000,000 killed?

Wouldn't all this U.N.-bashing seem a mite more legitimate if the U.S. itself hadn't just refused to send troops to Congo? "Indeed", indeed.

Posted Tuesday, May 20
D-Squared And I have Different Intuitions

D-Squared (permalinks bloggered, just scroll) has a variation on John Lemon's thought experiment (permalinks bloggered, just scroll) on egalitarianism and grades. Basically, Lemon proposes progressive redistribution ... of grades and gets students who thought they stood for this noble thing to sit back down. D-Squared tries to get them standing up again like so:

Try another thought experiment at the end of term. Get all the 'B+' students to stand up. Tell them that at the end of the year, three students have bad enough results that you will have to throw them off the course. Then offer them the deal that if the "B+" students standing agree to be marked down to a flat "B", you will let the flunked students stay on. I'm interested in the finer grains of this prejudice against redistribution of grades and suspect that the B+s will agree to a bit of fudging in order to save people from really desperate straits.

I am certain D-Squared is dead wrong. The F's will get no love from the B+'s.

Why not?

First, there is a general understanding among students (most of whom are not completely unobservant) that students who flunk a university class cannot have tried. To get an F on a paper, you usually need to argue in your paper - pretty compellingly - that you deserve an F. Seriously, F's are people who didn't show up, physically or mentally or both. Ergo, poor pity candidates. Not victims of injustice, in many peoples' eyes. (By contrast, a student who desperately needs a B+, say, to qualify for some scholarship, and only gets a B: potential pity candidate. Because it is possible to believe this person tried as hard as he/she could, almost made it, but didn't quite.) Possible exception: F student's life fell apart completely this semester, due to uncontrollable circumstances. Well, then we will want to hear the details about that. It's not part of the thought experiment as stated.

Second, D-Squared is asking the B+'s to be heroes. To which the response runs: why me? Why not ask the A+'s, or - if there aren't any of those - the A's? No one needs an A, as opposed to an A-. B+'s are anxiously clinging to the gentility of almost being on top. D-Squared is giving them the perfect excuse to beg off, and they will take it.

It may be that D-Squared is envisioning a classroom in which everyone involved is present and named - you, you and you can give up something so that those three don't get F's. Everyone makes eye contact with everyone. Quiver-lipped, needy F's assume supplicating postures, trying to look winningly pathetic. I can see the B+'s caving, but they wouldn't feel it was just. We have here a social dynamic of another sort. Lots of people have trouble saying no when asked for stuff by insistent people. These B+ folks would feel blind-sided and suckered and robbed even at the moment they said 'yes'. Worthless data, then, for purposes of clarifying intuitions about justice. (It is also confusing to one's intuitions that the prof. is behaving weirdly. The scenario is radically outside the range of normal classroom events, whatever one's intuitions about egalitarianism; and any time you get singled out in class in a weird and thoroughly unexpected way, you are likely to agree to anything - you'll turn into a veritable doormat - just to get the weirdness spotlight off you.)

Oh, and I also disagree with this (scroll down): As a social pastime, obviously, endlessly re-estimating permutations of regression models has all the disadvantages of masturbating into a sock with few of the advantages. All the disadvantages? All?

But what do I think about Lemon's cunning little experiment?

Well, consider the following alternative thought-experiment. We live in a nightmare society in the not-too-distant future in which everyone is paid according to height: the tall take all; the short starve. I am in charge of forwarding my students' vital statistics to the relevant payroll tyrants and I propose a pact: to wage war on two fronts - attacking from above and below - we shall shave a couple inches off the tallest, surreptitiously applying these to the shortest. Do we? There is obviously an inherent stupidity to the procedure. But maybe, under the circumstances - society has driven us to it. In an insane world, the sane will apppear insane. We agree to the plan.

What does this have to do with Lemon's thought-experiment? Well, it is a tad optimistic to regard grades as mere factual reports about relative performance, but it is not absurd to suggest profs sometimes do manage to discern a thing or two in the course of a semester. Redistributing people's grades is therefore willful destruction of information assiduously gathered, which feels a bit on the stupid side. If one thinks there is a problem with the way grades are being used down the line - say, A students are being paid 200% more than B students, even though B students are only 10% worse than A students - one would prefer to fix the perceived injustice by addressing it directly, rather than clunkily band-aiding it with tailored misinformation. Resistance to dumb solutions, when smart ones readily present themselves, is natural enough.

But this is not a sufficient response - namely, students will sense an ugly fix in the offing, ergo their intuitive resistance is principled. The true craftiness of Lemon's experiment consists in its deft nudging together of wealth redistribution intuitions and intuitions about "Harrison Bergeron"-type scenarios.

Haven't read it? It's a Kurt Vonnegut story in which, to make a short story shorter, beautiful people are forced to wear ugly masks, smart people have clanging bells in their ears to distrupt their thought processes, ballerinas wear hobbling weights, so forth - so that everyone is equal. Lemon isn't talking about hobbling aptitudes and gifts and so forth directly, of course, but suppressing information about talent will tend to hobble it. We don't like to see information about talent suppressed because we don't like to see talent suppressed. Really what Lemon is doing is working that last bit for all its worth.

It is relatively easy to convince people it is unjust that, say, a great poet should earn so much less than a middling middle-manager. It is less easy to convince people lousy poets should have as much right as great poets to be published in poetry anthologies because, after all, it plausibly isn't their fault they are untalented.

Or put it this way: lots of people think it's a damn shame Michael Jordan got paid so much more, all those years, than any second-grade teacher. But very few people think it's a damn shame Michael Jordan was so much better at basketball than any second-grade teacher. And fewer people still think it's a damn shame Jordan instead of some second-grade teacher was always the guy who got to play basketball on TV in front of everybody.

It's harder than one would think (but not impossible, I think) to justify these marked differences in response. Most of the obvious answers turn out to be surprisingly ad hoc and unsatisfying when given a poke. No time tonight to delve deeper, but this is where Lemon's thought-experiment points us.

Posted Monday, May 19
Globalized Guilt By Commercial Association

Chris Bertram argues libertarians should feel guilty ... about what? About the operation of the globalized free market, basically. Libertarians believe, rightly, that it would be wrong of me to coerce someone else to obtain some benefit for myself. Then - well, it's actually pretty obvious. If you aren't beating or threatening someone, you can be morally certain someone else is, on your behalf, somewhere down the line, so your cup of coffee will be there for you every morning. It is not plausible guilt can be subcontracted out with the same thoughtless facility as coercion. Ergo, we are all guilty.

In a response post, A Problem For Everyone, Matthew Yglesias points out, correctly, that ... well, the title says it. Libertarians don't drink more coffee than, say, liberals. Why pick on libertarians when it looks like only Trappist monks are in the clear?

This is quite right, but I suspect Bertram meant for his strategy to be this. Show that the most gung-ho free marketeers ought to take their coffee with a lump of guilt. Ergo, there is no such thing as a theory of justice that tells you it is OK to drink the stuff.

Which reminds me of Orwell on Kipling.

Yes, sir, I am one of those tiresome sorts, forever falling back on Orwell on Kipling, Orwell on Kipling, and dragging others after me, like so ...

All left-wing parties in the highly industrialized countries are at bottom a sham, because they make it their business to fight against something which they do not really wish to destroy. They have internationalist aims, and at the same time they struggle to keep up a standard of life with which those aims are incompatible. We all live by robbing Asiatic coolies, and those of us who are "enlightened" all maintain that those coolies ought to be set free; but our standard of living, and hence our "enlightenment," demands that the robbery shall continue. A humanitarian is always a hypocrite.

All this by way of backhandedly complimenting Kipling for being so constituted that he didn't have to be a hypocrite. His total lack of desire to 'speak truth to power', in a certain sense, frequently enabled him to speak truth about power. (All part and parcel with Orwell's tortuously straight and narrow political personality, that he should take such pleasure in rubbing his and our noses in all this.)

Bertram's point - I am putting words in his mouth, but I'll bet they correspond to the thoughts in his head - is that nothing has changed. Being a libertarian, however 'enlightened' that may seem, does not get one off hypocrisy's hook. You still have to go all the way to - well, read Orwell on Kipling to hear about one possibility. Good essay.

Posted Monday, May 19
Went To See The Matrix: Reloaded

I liked it a lot. I need to see it again before deciding whether I really, really liked it a lot.

Folks have been saying it falls down in the philosophy department (being a resident, it would be embarrassing if I failed to notice), leaving us with mere Hollywood flash. Adam Gopnik seems the most thoughtful and articulate exponent of this critical line:

The first “Matrix” - for anyone who has been living in Antarctica for the past four years - depended on a neatly knotted marriage between a spectacle and a speculation.

But:

But - to get to the bad news -“Matrix Reloaded” is, unlike the first film, a conventional comic-book movie, in places a campy conventional comic-book movie, and in places a ludicrously campy conventional comic-book movie. It feels not so much like “Matrix II” as like “Matrix XIV” - a franchise film made after a decade of increasing grosses and thinning material.

No, no, no.

But let me work up to that by inching out onto this limb: I think the second Matrix movie may well be organized around a solid, philosophical theme. Even if you think it's a flop, it can't possibly be considered a flop of the sort Gopnik indicates - Bruckheimered-out regretabilia. It can only be an extravagant, philosophical failure. Bad, over-conceived art film at worst.

The theme of Matrix: Reloaded is not so much indicated as deduced in Gopnik's own review. He provides a gratifyingly comprehensive run-down of some of the first movies major religious and philosophical and fictional antecedents and implications. Along the way, we hear:

In a long article on the first “Matrix” film, the Princeton philosopher James Pryor posed the question “What’s so bad about living in the Matrix?,” and, after sorting through some possible answers, he concluded that the real problem probably has to do with freedom, or the lack of it. “If your ambitions in the Matrix are relatively small-scale, like opening a restaurant or becoming a famous actor, then you may very well be able to achieve them,” Pryor says. “But if your ambitions are larger - e.g., introducing some long-term social change -then whatever progress you make toward that goal will be wiped out when the simulation gets reset ... One thing we place a lot of value on is being in charge of our own lives, not being someone else’s slave or plaything. We want to be politically free.”

[Here, by the by, is a link to the Pryor piece, and many other philosophical essays - of varying degrees of quality and interest - on The Matrix.]

Freedom. The theme of the first movie was appearance and reality. The theme of the second could therefore only be freedom and necessity, by way of working out how to think about the ethical implications of appearance and reality. And that's how it turned out.

Here's the thing I think is confounding the critics, Gopnik included. The plot - the narrative style - of the second installment is very different than the first, as follows. The first had a beginning, a middle and an end, in that order. And a very mythic and organized affair it was. The second has no beginning (if you haven't seen the first movie, you are lost) and no ending (sorry, anti-plot spoiler that, I suppose). Only a very complicated middle, as a result of which the implied philosophy, such as it may be, is so far implied through a scanner darkly.

So I think the movie can only be faulted on narrative grounds, not philosophical. The narrative problem - if the third installment does not satisfy - will be that all these loose threads will simply be carelessly snipped off. Let's hope not. The hope is that it will all be gloriously pulled together, in which case the second installment will appear, in retrospect, every frame as philosophically fraught as the first.

Posted Sunday, May 18
Let Them Eat Lead!

Libertarian geezers complaining about the kids coming up these days: this is silly.

An anonymous Samizdata correspondant offers this paean to the joys of an unregulated childhood:

According to today's regulators and bureaucrats, those of us who were kids in the 50's, 60's, and 70's probably shouldn't have survived, because...

Our baby cots were covered with brightly coloured lead-based paint which was promptly chewed and licked.

We had no childproof lids on medicine bottles, or latches on doors or cabinets and it was fine to play with pans.

When we rode our bikes, we wore no helmets, just flip flops and fluorescent' clackers' on our wheels.

etc., etc., etc. The poster wonders whether he might just be indulging in nostalgia by seconding this attitude, but quickly dismisses the concern. Commenters on the thread confess to being moved almost to tears by the prospect of bike helments with flames on them, the flames seeming to promise a reckless, free-wheeling attitude towards life which the dour, padded helmet joylessly contradicts.

To repeat: this is silly, bordering on insane. The freedom to eat lead-based paint? Now there's something we can all rally around. Fight the power, dudes! But why stop there? Generations past lived lives even more fraught with the zip and zing of risk than those raised in the 50's, 60's and 70's. Risks such as dying of measles! Dying of polio! Dying of diptheria! (I could go on.) None of this namby-pamby vaccination for them. Kids coming up these days never get to risk getting rickets, either, thanks to nanny-state vitamin D enrichment of milk. Never knowing whether you were going to get rickets was one of those simple childhood pleasures now just a memory. And what about the risk of getting your childish hands mangled in the iron spools of some dark satanic mill? Joy-kill government regulators have taken that small pleasure away as well, what with those damn child labor laws.

Now, I know this isn't going to cut much ice with hardcore libertarians like the Samizdatistas, but I think adults should be able to smoke crack and ride around on chopped-out Harleys, helmetless (though possibly not all at the same time.) BUT, I have to say that I don't see anything much wrong with the goverment requiring people to keep their children reasonably safe, on the grounds that the children are in no position to calculate risks for themselves (or rather, are really really really bad at it). Parents' right to raise their children as they please is not generally regarded as extending to a right to let them eat lead-based paint, and that is entirely reasonable. They can eat lead later, when they are grown up.