A Larger Standoff
Manileño for May 2006
WHAT WAS the government thinking when it moved against the most critical members of the Philippine press following the issuance of Presidential Decree 1017?
Police raided the editorial offices of the Daily Tribune—an opposition paper few people had taken seriously before the raid—and, more ominously, tried but failed to secure a warrant to search the offices of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ). There were strong indications that the government had sought to muzzle ABS-CBN’s running reportage of the six-hour standoff at Marine headquarters last February 26. Sliding from the sublime to the ridiculous, the snicker-prone Secretary of Justice, Raul Gonzales, threatened to go after the Panay News, a small provincial rag from his hometown that’s been a thorn in his side.
Granted, no journalists have actually been hauled off to prison (excepting the odd columnist picked up at a rally), and no papers or stations have actually been shut down (although one radio program suddenly found itself gutted). There’s been nothing like the wholesale closure of media and arrests of editors, columnists, and reporters that immediately followed the declaration of martial law in 1972.
On the other hand, Gonzales hasn’t stopped waving the sword of sedition over the heads of President Arroyo’s staunchest critics—singling out the PCIJ for his special attention, and making no secret of the fact that he has been monitoring the center and its associates for, among others, posting on its website “many things I consider as inciting to sedition.” Those “many things” include the “Garci” tape and its transcript, which nearly brought Arroyo down last July, and which Gonzales insists violates the anti-wiretapping law, but which, as PCIJ Executive Director Sheila Coronel points out, had already been publicly played in Congress itself.
Clearly, PD 1017 wasn’t crafted to gag the Tribune and Panay News, whose paid subscribers could probably fit in three taxicabs. The administration’s real targets can only have been the media giants and the nastiest nettles—ABS-CBN, the PCIJ, Newsbreak, et al. (and especially the Lopez-owned ABS-CBN, the Lopezes being in the political doghouse these days).
So why didn’t the administration move more forcefully against these targets? Because it couldn’t afford to—not yet—not while its political support remains squishy at best. (In the most recent Pulse Asia survey, more than 60% of Filipinos still wanted GMA out of office.) Taking on ABS-CBN or the PCIJ would have revived the very specter of martial law that Arroyo has been at pains to avoid with her halfway declaration of a “state of national emergency” and galvanized what, to her good fortune, has been an inchoate opposition.
It’s the same reason and situation that explains why, all the noises aside, the government can’t take draconian action against the officers and soldiers it’s accused of plotting the most recent coup, leaving it to the military to sort out internally its seething dissensions. GMA knows that she can quote the Constitution all day (the same Constitution she conveniently set aside for Edsa 2), but also that there’s no deep wellspring of affection for her in the barracks. Very few soldiers, if any, are going to kill and die for her—or maybe even something so abstract and so often perverted as “the Constitution.” How many Marines and Scout Rangers can you put in the stockade?
(I should note that, on the other hand, those perceived to be weak at the moment—primarily the Left—have been picked on with impunity, with labor and student leaders and journalists being reported killed by police or military elements.)
Where we are these days is a larger standoff, with the government making blustery threats and the opposition refusing to vanish but failing at the same time to muster the critical mass it needs to unseat Arroyo. That 60-plus-percent disapproval rating shows that, for whatever reason, most Filipinos don’t like their president; on the other hand, it’s a dissatisfaction that has yet to cohere firmly enough to result in a regime change anytime soon.
The administration would like to have us think that this inaction is a sign of political maturity, just as George W. Bush might post the same low ratings and yet not have to worry about serving out the rest of his term. It could be, indeed, that we Pinoys are learning to play it cool, after decades of incendiary, street-level activism.
Maybe so. Maybe this impasse, this period of shadow-playing, is a good time for all Filipinos to take stock of their positions, consolidate their forces, map out options, cultivate new leaders, and, just as importantly, see what can be negotiated, given the emerging realities and opportunities on the ground.
On the other hand, threatening the media with sedition in the same cavalier way by which any anti-GMA rally gets dispersed these days cannot lead to anything but a hardening of positions—and a revelation of the true nature of what we are dealing with. No matter how raucous or ridiculous the Philippine press may occasionally get, a government and a justice secretary who can find the time and energy to intimidate writers can’t be any better, and can offer little comfort to those who still believe in a free press as a cornerstone of a modern democracy.
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