Pure Practicality: The
Concept of Self in Neo-Confucian Thought
I.
These reflections address two perennial topics of philosophy --the
self and
practicality--within the context of the neo- Confucian tradition
in general and Chu Hsi's commentary on classic texts in particular.
Only when the self is discussed in connection with practicality
can its centrality and perspicacity in neo- Confucian thought,
both political/ethical and metaphysical/cosmological, become evident.
The neo-Confucian concept of self provides a key to neo-Confucian
thought as a whole, but the effort required to conceive of this
"self" demands a suspension of the Western metaphysical
and pragmatic legacy. If this suspension can be maintained the
possibility of entering into the frame of neo-Confucian thought
without the distortions of western categories opens before us.
About the Confucian tradition it is generally accepted that the
common good,
understood as the well-being of the hierarchy of social institutions
ranging from family to state, requires the subordination of the
individual to the body politic. The notion of inviolable personal
rights which must needs be protected by political institutions,
indeed which even provides the fundamental justification for political
sovereignty, has no basis in Confucian thinking. Remarkably, the
neo-Confucian "self", through the paradigm of self-cultivation,
is conceived as simultaneously supporting the centrally important
doctrine of individual moral responsibility while denying any
sense of autonomy to the individual moral agent. Respect for the
institutions of family and government, sincere adherence to established
rituals and pieties and generally holding the common good above
one's own private desires was the Confucian path to a happy and
well-ordered life which avoided conflict and excess passion to
the highest degree possible. These are practical solutions to
mundane problems. Such practicality, in the Confucian view, demands
the subjugation of the self to the commonweal. On this basis Confucian
philosophy could be summed up as a set of instructions for practical
living which only minimally indulge individual or private concerns.
It seems unlikely, then, in Western terms, that Confucian philosophy
could harbor a well developed notion of self. In the
Sung dynasty, however, Confucian thinkers offered a new set of
emphases to
the orthodox Confucian doctrines. Their teachings reflect what
has been called the inward turn in Chinese thought. Prompted by
various foreign challenges, ranging from the loss of the Northern
plains to Jürchen invaders to the growing influence of Buddhism
in China, the turn inward raised the question of principle (li).
It. asked for an underlying meaning, valid independent of practical
success or failure, to support Confucian moral teachings. In this
quest for "principle," the "self" was given
new status. This self, neither individualistic nor privatistic,
was grounded in principle and practicality. Chu Hsi was the key
figure among the Sung thinkers to investigate principle and practicality.
He is recognized as one of the great synthetic thinkers in Chinese
history, consolidating and expanding the positions of his Sung
predecessors,
especially Chou Tun-i and Ch'eng I. Not only was he devoted to
Confucian thought, he was also familiar with and influenced by
Buddhist and Taoist positions. His work is contained in his annotations
of classic texts, his correspondence and memorials, and his recorded
conversations. Thus his viewpoint is always reactive and present
in some form of dialogical exchange. References to Chu's thought
are in this context.
II.
If, then, our considerations of self must navigate away from the
artificial
moorings of Western essentialism, subjectivity and dialectics
and direct itself
towards a practically situated self, a thing/event emerging out
of the
interpenetration of thought and action (word and deed as unity),
we must first
consider practicality itself before attempting to understand the
cosmological
components which informed Chu Hsi's viewpoint. The status of "practicality"
in the neo-Confucian tradition (as several terms, but most especially
hsi is rendered) is ambiguous and the focus of much dispute. As
Chung-ying Cheng has put it:
"Confucian philosophy is practical in the sense of being
concerned with morality, social interaction, and political activity,
but it is not practical in the sense of being concerned with economy
and technology. If we call practicality in the former sense moral
practicality and in the latter sense utilitarian practicality,
we may say that the Confucian philosophy in general is a philosophy
of moral practicality but not of utilitarian practicality."
This distinction, while accurate, only indicates part of the problem
in
understanding the neo-Confucian approach to the practical. The
moral practicality of neo-Confucianism is marked by its lack of
consequentialism. Unlike actutilitarianism, neo- Confucian morality
does not contemplate action according to how effectively it promotes
a consequent benefit. For reasons that will become clear, and
in order to contrast it with a consequentialist view, neo-Confucian
moral practicality will here be called "pure practicality."
Much of the dispute surrounding the status of "practicality"
in Confucian and neo-Confucian thinking arose in response to John
Dewey's influential lecture tour of China in 1919-1921. Pragmatism
was at that time allegedly discovered as an established Chinese
philosophy in the work of the 17th century thinker, Yen Yuan.
In 1921, Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, discussing the "Yen-Li School
and the Modern Stream of Educational Thought," said:
"Since Dewey's lecture tour in China, pragmatism has become
a fashionable teaching in our educational circles. This [is] ...
a welcome phenomena. Three hundred years ago in our country there
were a Mr Yen Hsi-chai and his disciple, Mr Li Shu-ku. They established
a school, commonly known as the Yen-Li school. Their ideas were
similar to those of Dewey and his colleagues, And in certain ways
their ideas were more penetrating than those of Dewey and his
colleagues.
Yet as Tu Wei-ming has clearly demonstrated, when Yen Yuan's thought
is reviewed within its context, viz., Chu Hsi's neo-Confucianism,
it offers very little support either for a pragmatic or utilitarian
outlook. Despite the great appeal of John Dewey to Chinese intellectuals
and the claim that his philosophy had antecedents in Chinese thought,
this is not supported by a careful reading of the texts. What
is found instead is an entirely different kind of practicality;
one in some ways more akin to existentialist notions than to the
pragmatic theories of Pierce or Dewey. The similarity with existentialism,
which of course has clear limitations, derives from the correlation
found in Sung neo- Confucianism between inner experience and concrete
activity. In a manner that resonates more with Sartre than Dewey,
neo-Confucianism understands consciousness as action. The near
equivalence of consciousness and action is the basis of pure practicality
in neo-Confucianism. This practicality obtains when the self,
as the conjunct of nature and mind, is governed by principle.
Confucius said:
"Through nature men are alike. Through practice they have
become far apart." "Only the most intelligent
and the most stupid do not change."
Neo-Confucian thinkers interpreted these remarks in light of Mencius'
teaching of the "Four Beginnings" and human virtue.
It is through practice that virtue is
attained, but the sense meant is not practicing the virtues. Practice
refers to
what here is called pure practicality in is the process by which
li becomes
manifest in and to the mind. To clarify the meaning of this the
neo-confucian use
of the terms ch'i, li, hsing, and hsin must be explained.
Ch'i is perhaps best described as the vital energy of everything.
It is dynamic and
ever-changing, oscillating between the poles of yin and yang.
At the yin or mental
pole ch'i is quiet, hidden, contracted into itself. In this condition
ch'i is most
receptive. The other extreme, the yang or physical pole of ch'i,
is the complete
opposite. This mode of ch'i is active, evident, expansive; because
it is less
refined and more turgid, its natural receptivity is greatly diminished.
By itself
ch'i does not produce objects or things/events, but is the noumenal
basis of all experience. Individuation and the genesis of things/events
as phenomena is the stamp of li. Li is the transcendental principle
of all things, accounting for the phenomenal existence of things/events
through the individuation of ch'i. Every thing/event exhibits
li; each is what it is because of li. To know a thing is to know
its li. The continuous interaction of ch'i and li is the most
fundamental trait of nature. Hsing, or nature, is principle (li).
It is called nature rather than principle because principle refers
to what is common to all things/events in the world, while nature
is principle in itself. Nature is principle in the sense of being
the ens realisimus of all reality. To know nature in
its highest and most complete depiction is to know hsing. The
written character for hsing is made up of two parts: sheng, which
means to produce, and hsin, which means mind. This compound accurately
expresses the full meaning of hsing.
If nature conceived as principle produces mind, then that activity
of mind which
discloses principle is a matter of self discovery. As the principle
of mind is
disclosed moral purpose, called the way of heaven (tao, t'ien
ming), is apparent to self. This is the moral sense of knowing
principle which is basic to pure practicality. Neo-Confucianism
elaborates this notion in relation to the concepts of substance
and function.
"The mind has substance and function. That it embodies all
principles is substance and that it responds to all events is
function."
"Being in the state of absolute quiet is substance, and immediately
penetrating all things when acted on is function." "The
substance of the mind is nature, referring to its state of tranquility,
and the function of the mind is feeling, referring to its state
of activity. "When the mind is tranquil before the feelings
are aroused, the total substance is eminently empty like the mirror
and level like the balance, being calm there all the time."
The substance of the mind is principle; the function of the mind
is the moral
purpose of the self. The tranquility of mind that allows the effective
stamp of li
obtains when ch'i is constituted as yin. One cannot control the
oscillation of ch'i so there can be no moral techne or utilitarian
ethic. The tranquility of mind is also called the harmonization
of feelings. The harmonization of feelings is an adjustment between
the mental and physical poles of ch'i within the self. This harmonization
and adjustment is the actualization of an experience. Chu Hsi
says:
"Hsin is that which correlates yin and yang and resides in
ch'i."
"Self" in neo-Confucian thought is li viewed from the
perspective of practical
experience. When li is viewed from the perspective of the practical,
the question
of moral purpose dominates. Self is the category under which the
issue of moral purpose is taken up. Self, as li in its dynamic
interaction with the flux of ch'i, achieves its moral purpose
when the harmonization of feelings with nature is realized in
actual experience. It is from this perspective that the neo-Confucian
self can be called the agency of pure practicality. Its moral
purpose consists in the ironic project of self redescription.
It is both a given thing/event emerging out of the manifestation
of li in ch'i and itself an ordering principle aware of its ordering.
Self cultivation consists in precisely this ironic redescription;
its medium is ritual wherein an individual actively practices
toward passive receptivity.
Perhaps the most simple elicitation of this notion is found in
the attitude Chu Hsi maintained toward certain of the ritual practices
meant to heighten understanding. For him, indeed for Confucians
in contrast to Buddhists, such practices were not postures to
evoke an alterior state of enlightenment. His devotion, e.g.,
to the practice of Quiet Sitting, was itself a virtue and neither
the measure of virtue nor an activity instrumental toward some
goal beneficial to the self. This is consonant with his idea of
the meaning of self cultivation. Self cultivation was not a therapy;
not developmental nor corrective. Self cultivation was that nurturing
described by Mencius which is neither forced nor threatened. For
Chu Hsi self cultivation is non-instrumental in this sense due
to the spontaneous interaction of li and ch'i.
Remarks of Chu Hsi about Quiet Sitting help to illustrate how,
for him, self
cultivation, self discovery and self realization -- the project
of the self in pure
practicality-- is spontaneous, unforced and non-instrumental.
Li Tung taught that Quiet Sitting allowed one to see the disposition
before the feelings of pleasure, anger, sorrow and joy have been
aroused. In other words Quiet Sitting was a mode of tranquility
representing the mental (yin) pole of ch'i. As such it is the
natural condition of the "self" in which the "Four
Beginnings" are evident to introspection. For the most part
Chu Hsi agrees with this assessment, although he thinks even this
tends toward an incorrect instrumentalism. He said:
"There is no harm if one sits quietly and understands principle,
but it will not do simply to insist on quiet sitting. When one
understands principle clearly and thoroughly, one is naturally
quiet. Nowadays people generally insist on Quiet-Sitting in order
to avoid things. That will not do. ... [But] if one's mind is
excited, how can one perceive principle? One must be quiet before
principle
emerges. What is called Quiet-Sitting simply means not to have
anything to bother one's mind. Only then will principle come out.
As principle comes out, one's mind will be even clearer and more
quiet."
The quest for principle in this sense is exactly what is meant
by pure
practicality. The centrality of pure practicality to human moral
purpose is already suggested in the first sentence of the Analects
of Confucius. There it is stated:
"The Master said, 'Is it not pleasant to learn with a constant
perseverance and
application (hsi)?' "
The striking thing about this comment is the implication of practical
activity as
learning. The word hsi means both to learn and to practice (etymologically
interpreted the character depicts a bird learning to fly) and
in the Analects
refers to the process by which learning is interiorized. The implication
in the
Analects is that the interior life and the practical are reciprocal
functions of
each other. In neo-Confucian thinking this reciprocity becomes
a near identity. It
is in this sense that pure practicality, the identity of thought
and action, is the
basis of the neo-Confucian conception of self.
III.
One might, on the other hand, be tempted to read the Confucian
notion of self as consonant with the teaching of wu wei or Buddhist
teachings of vacuity. Indeed Chu Hsi despite the occasional stridency
of some of his later criticisms of Buddhism nonetheless remained
influenced by some of its metaphysical teachings. Yet the Confucian
"self" is best characterized as a principle of action
or as agency, not non-action or receptivity. The cultivation of
"self" as a moral discipline to the level of superior
or profound person (chun tzu) is at the very heart of Confucian
teaching.
As a practical thinker Chu Hsi took specific positions on matters
of current
political interest. These were informed in profound ways by his
readings of
numerous texts including those attributed to Confucius and Mencius,
works of Taoism and Buddhism, the writings of his neo-Confucian
predecessors Chou Tun-i and the Ch'eng brothers and, most importantly,
the I Ching and the Chung Yung and Ta Hsüeh. Because of the intersection
of mind and nature in the self these latter two texts were by
Chu Hsi considered together. Each constituted a chapter in the
ancient Li Chi ("Book of Rites") and were selected,
edited and annotated by him as two of the "Four Books"
to be the canonical basis of Confucian learning. The Ta Hsüeh
primarily addresses political and social issues while the Chung
Yung deals with psychology and metaphysics. As Wing-tsit Chan
succinctly puts it:
"The Great Learning
discusses the mind but not human nature, whereas with the Doctrine
of the Mean the opposite is true." These two short texts
exhibit in their reciprocality the interpenetration of social-political
history and metaphysics. This interpenetration is, if anything,
extended by Chu Hsi.
The Ta Hsüeh sums up the Confucian political, moral and educational
programs under the so called Three Items, viz., "Clear Character,"
"Loving the People" and "Abiding in the Highest
Good." This is articulated according to the famous Eight
Steps which begin with the "Investigation of Things."
Although the Ta Hsüeh does not explicitly discuss metaphysical
issues, it does present the "Investigation of Things,"
which is a mode of ontological inquiry, as the starting point
in moral and social life. The claim is not, however, that an "ought"
follows from the "is". Although difficult to conceive
in this manner, it is as if the "is" and "ought"
mutually cause --in a non-mechanistic sense-- each other. Practical
considerations penetrate nature (hsing) but nature (tao) is already
in mind (hsin) as principle (li). This approach is completely
consistent with the general Confucian emphasis on learning and
provides the inseparable foundation for Chu Hsi's own metaphysical
speculations.
Chu Hsi's metaphysics are, to a large extent, an elaborate explanation
of the
"Eight Steps." Indeed Chu Hsi was so confident that
his metaphysical understanding was correct that he took the extraordinary
step of rearranging the ancient test of the Classic in order to
have the section on the "Investigation of Things" appear
before that on the "Sincerity of the Will." To Chu Hsi
ko wu meant to investigate things, both inductively and deductively,
on the premiss that "principle" (li), the reason of
being, is inherent in all things.
The specified subjects of the Chung Yung are (1) "Human Nature"
and (2) the "Way to Heaven." According to the text,
Human Nature, endowed by Heaven, is revealed through the states
of equilibrium and harmony, which are themselves "the condition
of the world" and the "universal path (Tao)." The
way of heaven transcends time, space, substance and motion and
is also unceasing, eternal and evident. The unceasing, eternality
of the universal tao of heaven refers to the constant and undeniable
fact of change in experience. In Chu Hsi's view, derived largely
from the I Ching, change occurs in a cyclical process with stages
that follow a sequence. To pass through all the stages constitutes
completion (ch'eng). But in nature as a whole the process of change
is unending, since the vital energy (ch'i) forever expands and
contracts. The completion of an individual human life does not
mark the cessation of the expansion and contraction of ch'i. The
self is preserved because ch'i continues through the life of the
family or clan, indeed is never ending. The metaphor of plant
growth through generations of agriculture for the persistence
of human vital energy in nature is clear. In this image the self
is reseeded,season upon season, bearing the same fruit.The never
ending process of nature, however, is not always obvious. The
truth ofnature consists in its transition from a state of being
hidden to one of being revealed. What is hidden or subtle (yin)
becomes manifest. This is stated explicitly in Chung Yung:
"There is nothing more visible than what is hidden."
(See below.) For Chu Hsi the hidden and the revealed are the modes
in which nature manifests itself. He says: "Tao combines
substance and function and also what is hidden and what is revealed."
The hidden and the revealed are the attributes of principle (li).
The Ta Hseuh asserts the famous Confucian notion, central to understanding
the claim that metaphysics and social-political issues interpenetrate,
that individual self-cultivation and the attainment of the good
society are not only linked but that the former is a necessary
condition for the latter. The famous formulation of this position
in Chapter Five of the Ta Hsüeh is the point of departure for
much of Chu Hsi's thought. It reads as follows:
1. When things are investigated, knowledge is extended;
2. When knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere;
3. When the will is sincere, the mind is rectified;
4. When the mind is rectified, the personal life is cultivated;
5. When the personal life is cultivated, the family will be regulated;
6. When the family is regulated, the state will be in order;
7. And when the state is in order,
8. There will be peace throughout the world.
In this context the salient points to be noted are: 1) The process
is initiated
with the investigation of things; 2) Inward states of being "establish"
political
conditions; 3) Self- cultivation is political action; 4) The inevitable
consequence
is universal harmony. Consider these four points in order.
1. The Investigation of Things: Chu Hsi uses three expressions
when discussing the relationship between the knower and the known.
They are "T'i wu," "Chu wu," and "Ko
wu." "T'i wu" refers to knowing the thing through
one's body; "chu wu" the immediate contact with the
thing; "ko wu" the acquaintance with the thing by way
of investigation. Although on all three levels this sort of knowledge
is empirically derived, it is also a matter of rational formulation.
Chu Hsi specifically states that "knowledge comes from thought."
2. Inward States of Being Establish Political Conditions: This
statement should not suggest a mind-body or inner-outer dualism.
From Chu Hsi's point of view and indeed generally in the Confucian
world-view the whole is to be understood cosmologically: "mind"
(hsin) and "nature" (hsing) are one with mind being
a microcosmic specification of nature. The cultivation of mind
therefore contributes to the refinement of all nature much as
tending to one's yard contributes to the beauty of the entire
landscape. The individual yard is a contingent delimitation of
the whole landscape; its individuality can be revised at any moment.
3. Self-cultivation is Political Action: Thought when completed
or perfected
through the investigation of things (ko wu) is already action
insofar as it orders
or rectifies the environment which is its extension. This simple
notion, that
thought and action do not differ, except as they are hidden or
evident, is
fundamental to Chu Hsi's theory. Indeed it is this point which,
to some, makes
Chinese thought seem unscientific, even to express something akin
to magic. Chu Hsi maintains, however, that this unity is discerned
in experience.
It is precisely at this point where "pure practicality"
appears. This practicality
is the conscious corridor unifying the interior and exterior lives;
it is thinking
as praxis. It is what is attained by the superior person and is
the sine qua non of
ideal statecraft. In the sense suggested above with reference
to Quiet-Sitting, the
occasion of this unification is ritual. However, it is not mere
ritual, empty
ritual, but that which is the true expression of sincerity, i.e.,
the sincerity of
pure practicality.
4. The result of the Chain is Universal Harmony: "Everything
under Heaven" responds to and is part of total process. A
stable political situation is not the only goal of such discipline.
Chu Hsi's comment on this section of Ta Hsüeh makes all this clear.
"The meaning ... is this: If we wish to extend our knowledge
to the utmost, we must investigate the principles of all things
we come in contact with, for the
intelligent human mind is certainly formed to know, and there
is not a single thing in which its principles do not inhere. It
is only because all principles are not investigated that knowledge
is incomplete. ... After exerting oneself in this way [i.e., investigating
the principles of things] for a long time, will one achieve a
wide and far reaching penetration. Then the qualities of all things
... , the
refined or the coarse, will be apprehended, and the mind, in its
total substance and great functioning, will be perfectly intelligent.
This is called the
investigation of things. This is called the perfection of knowledge."
By the "perfection of knowledge" Chu Hsi refers to the
condition of mind (hsin)
where principle is clear and the way of heaven is in force. The
perfection of
knowledge could also be called the "harmonization of feelings."
It is in this
fashion that one achieves a "wide and far reaching penetration."
Before turning to Chung Yung, a word about its title. In the Analects
(sayings) of Confucius Chung Yung is often translated "the
mean," denotes moderation, but in
this case chung means what is central and yung what is universal
and harmonious. (Thus Tu Wei-ming renders Chung Yung as Centrality
and Commonality.) The former refers to human nature, the latter
its relation to the universe. The title asserts that there is
harmony in human nature and that this harmony underlies our moral
being and prevails throughout the universe. In short, human kind
and nature form a unity. This notion is prominent throughout traditional
Chinese philosophy. The Chung Yung states:
"What Heaven [t'ien] imparts to humans is called human nature.
To follow our nature is called the way [tao]. Cultivating the
way is called education. The way cannot be separated from us for
a moment. What can be separated is not the way. Therefore the
profound person [chun tzu] is cautious over what is not seen and
apprehensive over what is not heard. There is nothing more visible
than what is hidden and nothing more manifest than what is subtle.
Therefore the profound person is watchful over himself when alone.
Before the feelings of pleasure, anger, joy and sorrow are aroused
it is called equilibrium [chung]. When these feelings are aroused
and each and all attain due measure and degree, it is called harmony
[yung]. Equilibrium is the great foundation of the world and harmony
its universal path. When equilibrium and harmony are realized
to the highest degree, Heaven and earth will attain their proper
order and all things will flourish." And again Chu Hsi's
comment:
"It shows clearly that the origin of the way is traced to
Heaven and is
unchangeable, while its concrete substance is complete in ourselves
and may not be departed from. [Then] it speaks of the essentials
of preserving, nourishing and examining the mind. Finally, it
speaks of the meritorious achievements and transforming influence
of the sage and the profound person in their highest degree."
The organic unity of the life of the mind, politics and the operations
of nature is
again asserted. That they did cohere and interpenetrate was not,
from the point of view of Chinese philosophy, very surprising.
Indeed, as demonstrated above, this
supposed unity seemed to answer to experience. What was to be
wondered at was not
that it all hung together, but how, and this investigation was
to begin with
"things-at-hand," the phenomena of everyday life, viz.,
social-political affairs.
Chu Hsi's highly editorialized rendition of two short chapters
from the Book of
Rites, his emphasis on the Mencian tradition of Confucianism and
his use of the I
Ching to elucidate the transcendent character of experience together
present his
philosophy or "metaphysics" of mind. This metaphysics
is not intended as a science of first principles, but rather as
a purely descriptive account of mind and nature as disclosed in
experience. It is fully within the horizon of experience and presumes
no further foundation. Yet despite the contingent and perspectival
character of this investigation, Chu Hsi finds in it the basis
for political action and social commitment which was the objective
of the inward turn. For Chu Hsi science does not copy nature and
mind is not the mirror or reality. Metaphysical propositions are
not logically certain distillations from the given truth of what
is. Rather understanding derives from experience because mind
and nature interpenetrate: mind and nature "dwell" in
each
other.
This metaphysics of mind is not the propedeutic to ethics but
rather emerges from ethics. Ethics derives from pure practicality,
which is the experience of moral purpose --through the recognition
of li-- as actualized in the self. The pure practicality of the
self implies the self's moral agency, while at the same time situating
the self within the harmony of all nature. The actualization of
experience is itself moral action because harmony with the natural
order is
obtained.
IV.
Summary: In Chu Hsi's "metaphysics", which combines
social ethics with ontological cosmology, principle (li), mind
(hsin) and nature (hsing or sometimes t'ien) are coextensive,
an interpenetrating dynamic unity. In this account of the patterns
of things/events a strict material-immaterial distinction cannot
be made; reality is simply not conceived along those lines. The
"self" is described within this context. The concept
of self indicates the neo-Confucian interest in the question of
moral purpose. "Self" is an individual's historically
contingent account, given from the perspective of pure practicality
and within the domain of experience, of the principle (li) of
mind-nature (hsin- hsing). Thus understood "self" is
actually the ironic project of self redescription based on the
receptivity and reaffirmation of the way of heaven as it is contingently
patterned within the ch'i of one's own existence.