Journal of Law and Religion

2004-2005

Article

*423 RAWLS'S DANGEROUS IDEA?: LIBERALISM, EVOLUTION AND THE LEGAL

REQUIREMENT OF RELIGIOUS NEUTRALITY IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS [FNa1]

Francis J. Beckwith [FNd1]

Copyright © 2004-2005 Hamline University; Francis J. Beckwith

I. Introduction

Since the mid-1990s the debate over the teaching of evolution in public schools has acquired new life, largely as a result of a new generation of critics of evolution. [FN1] In comparison to their predecessors, today's critics are better credentialed, [FN2] have published works with *424 respected academic and university presses and periodicals including peer-reviewed ones, [FN3] and offer much more sophisticated arguments. The purpose of this essay, however, is not to engage the scientific merits of the arguments offered by these maverick scholars. Rather, the purpose of this essay is to explore a problem of jurisprudence, raised by philosopher Alvin Plantinga [FN4] and responded to by philosopher of science Robert T. Pennock, [FN5] whose resolution has relevance to the constitutional question of whether the teaching of evolution along with the works of its critics is permissible in a society whose citizens embrace contrary philosophical and religious points of view.

*425 Plantinga has offered an intriguing argument in which he concludes that it is politically unjust for public schools to teach either evolution or creationism unconditionally. Because Plantinga's argument, and its notion of political justice, relies heavily on a version of political liberalism found in the writings of John Rawls, [FN6] I first offer a brief presentation of Rawls's view and then move on to Plantinga's application of that view to the debate over the teaching of evolution in public schools. I then present and assess Pennock's critique of Plantinga's argument. In the final section of this article I offer a brief summary of the federal courts' holdings on evolution and public science education. I argue that a fair reading of these holdings is consistent with, and is supported by, both the Rawlsian approach defended by Plantinga and my reply to Pennock's critique of Plantinga.

The issue that this essay explores is for most of us difficult to fairly and sensibly assess because of the cultural baggage with which it has been associated in both the academic world and the popular press. And because of this, Plantinga's argument may be thought to say something it is not actually saying. Therefore, it is important that I briefly, though carefully, define what I mean by evolution and creationism, which are the key terms in this debate. This will help the reader to understand Plantinga's argument and why it is a potent challenge to the usual way legal scholars have traditionally examined this issue.

A. Evolution

The term "evolution" has multiple meanings. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for "Darwinism"--both the theory defended by Charles Darwin (1809-82) in his On the Origin of Species [FN7] as well as the subsequent refinements of Darwin's theory. Arguing from what he observed occurs when domestic breeders engage in selection, Darwin offered natural selection as the engine by which species adapt, survive, acquire new characteristics, and pass them on to their offspring. [FN8] According to Darwin, the complex diversity of living things in our world, through small, incremental and beneficial mutations over long eons of time, is all the result of one bacterial cell. That is, all living beings share a common ancestor, giving the appearance of being *426 designed, though in reality engineered by the unintelligent forces of natural selection. "Natural selection is the blind watchmaker," writes Richard Dawkins,

because it does not see ahead, does not plan consequences, has no purpose in view. Yet the living results of natural selection overwhelmingly impress us with the appearance of design as if by a master watchmaker, impress us with the illusion of design and planning. [FN9] Consequently, different species--with different body plans, characteristics, and a wide range of complexities-- develop as a result of the sorts of attributes that are needed for their survival in their particular regions of the globe and for the sorts of challenges they face in striving for survival. In the early to mid-20th century, Darwin's views were merged with the growing knowledge of genetics. This is called the "neo-Darwinian synthesis."

Evolution, however, is more than just an account of biological change of living organisms over time. It also includes the origin of the first life--the first bacterial cell--from inorganic matter from which all life arose and branched out into the diversity of living beings that now populate the earth. According to Douglas J. Futuyama,

The implications [in arguing that life came from inorganic matter] are so daunting that Darwin himself was reluctant to commit his beliefs to paper. In The Origin of Species he limited himself to saying that "probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth, have descended from one primordial form, into which life was first breathed"--a phrase which is certainly open to theological interpretation. Futuyama, however, argues that

[w]e will almost certainly never have direct fossil evidence that living molecular structures evolved from nonliving precursors. Such molecules surely could not have been preserved without degradation. But a combination of geochemical evidence and laboratory experiment shows that such evolution is not only plausible but almost undeniable. [FN10]

But evolution is even more than just an account of the origin of life from non-life and the subsequent development of that life on earth. It also includes the origin of the universe itself and the galaxies, stars, and planets that resulted from an initial explosion called the Big Bang, an *427 event that scientists claim occurred over fifteen billion years ago. [FN11] Thus, evolution's place in contemporary science is more than a theory of biological change; it is a grand materialist explanation for the diversity and apparent design of entities that make up what we call nature, including both organic and inorganic entities. [FN12] An informative and eloquent presentation of this ontological narrative is offered by the Wright Center for Science Education at Tufts University:

At the beginning of a whole new millennium, modern science is now helping us construct a truly big picture. We are coming to appreciate how all objects--from quark to quasar, from microbe to mind--are interrelated. We are attempting to decipher the scenario of cosmic evolution: a grand synthesis of all the many varied changes in the assembly and composition of radiation, matter, and life throughout the history of the Universe . . . . [T]hese are the changes, operating across almost incomprehensible domains of space and nearly inconceivable durations of time, that have given rise to our galaxy, our star, our planet, and ourselves . . . . Now emerging is a unified worldview of the cosmos, including ourselves as sentient beings, based upon the time-honored concept of change. Change--to make different the form, nature, and content of something--has been the hallmark in the origin, evolution, and fate of all things, animate or inanimate. From galaxies to snowflakes, from stars and planets to life itself, we are beginning to identify an underlying pattern penetrating the fabric of all the natural sciences--a sweepingly encompassing view of the formation, structure, and function of all objects in our multitudinous Universe. [FN13]

Francis Crick, discoverer (with James D. Watson) of the molecular structure of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA), explains this with exceptional clarity:

In addition to our knowledge of basic chemistry and physics, the earth sciences (such as geology) and cosmic science (astronomy and cosmology) have developed pictures of our world and our *428 universe that are quite different from those common when the traditional religions were founded. The modern picture of the universe, and how it developed in time, forms an essential background to our present knowledge of biology. [FN14]

Because this commitment to materialism has shaped the way in which we think of science, [FN15] and because science is considered to have a place of epistemological privilege in our culture, knowledge claims that challenge this paradigm either explicitly or implicitly (e.g. claims that immaterial entities such as souls, natures, substances, God, etc. have or may have ontological standing) are dismissed as metaphorical, [FN16] a God-of-the-gaps strategy, [FN17] problems to be resolvable by a future naturalistic explanation, [FN18] or a confusing of two mutually exclusive categories, [FN19] one *429 of which ("science") has the proper role of evaluating the rationality of the other ("religion").

To place this in the context of jurisprudence, one can put it this way: in a culture in which a particular worldview--in this case, philosophical naturalism (or materialism)--is the backdrop against which we judge whether a particular citizen's claims count as knowledge, apparently "religious" claims-- or at least those that are congenial to a theological worldview--are epistemologically marginalized and thus it is not necessary that we assess the quality of the arguments for such claims because they can never be defeaters to "science." [FN20]

*430 B. Creationism

Those who challenge the materialist paradigm are often called creationists, a term of derision that elicits images of scientifically illiterate Bible-thumping preachers standing on the school house steps demanding the expulsion of "Godless evolution" from the science textbooks. In academic parlance, to be called a "creationist" is nearly as bad as being called a Holocaust denier. This is why academics (especially in the sciences) who may harbor even minor doubts about the ontological monopoly of philosophical naturalism in their disciplines, and appreciate the implications of those doubts on what is considered "knowledge," are fearful of communicating that skepticism to their peers. I am not saying that one will not find theologically serious people in the academy, scholars who are devout in their faith. Rather, what I am saying is that as long as a scholar does not think of her theological tradition as a knowledge tradition whose metaphysical and epistemological claims may count against, or be defeaters to, the deliverances of a discipline that assumes philosophical naturalism and is labeled "science," that scholar will not become an object of derision and labeled a creationist by her peers.

However, as a matter of law, creationism is a term of art synonymous with young-earth creationism. This view, according to Phillip E. Johnson (who is not a young-earth creationist), is associated with the

*431 term "creation-science," as used in the Louisiana law [struck down in Edwards v. Aguillard 482 U.S. 578 (1987)], [and] is commonly understood to refer to a movement of Christian fundamentalists based upon an extremely literal interpretation of the Bible. "Creation-scientists," writes Johnson,

do not merely insist that life was created; they insist that the job was completed in six days no more than ten thousand years ago, and that all evolution since that time has involved trivial modifications rather than basic changes . . . . [Young-earth creationism] attributes the existence of fossils to Noah's flood. [FN21] When most people think of creationism, this is the view they have in mind. And this is why scholars who have their doubts about materialism in general and evolution in particular typically keep it to themselves.

But in order to dispute naturalistic evolution as defined above, one does not have to embrace this sort of creationism. (It is certainly not a view I embrace or have ever embraced). This is why it is more accurate to define creationism in the context of Plantinga's argument as any viewpoint that denies that naturalism as a worldview is correct, and that affirms that there are apparently natural aspects of the universe, or of the universe as a whole, that can be reasonably accounted for an agent with the appropriate resources. In other words, an exhaustive materialist (or naturalist) description and explanation of the events and entities in the universe is not a real possibility, for there are causes, agents, and entities, including God, that are non-material (or non-natural) and are thus non-detectable under the strictures of a materialist paradigm. Under this definition, any view, including Aristotle's cosmology, [FN22] that asserts that one can know that there exists non-material agents or entities (finite or infinite) responsible for apparently natural phenomena in the universe or the universe as a whole is "creationist." This is what I mean by creationism in this essay, [FN23] unless I indicate otherwise.

*432 II. Rawls, Political Liberalism, and State Impartiality

According to most versions of political liberalism, the government ought to be impartial on metaphysical questions over which there is deep and impassioned disagreement. This view has had a tremendous impact on the law and the way in which courts (especially the Supreme Court) have dealt with "social issues," including the debate over teaching origins. [FN24]

According to Rawls's version of political liberalism, a state (or government) is just if it is the result of principles people would have arrived at if they knew nothing about what they are or what they will become (i.e., whether they are rich or poor, black or white, homosexual or heterosexual, short or tall, male or female, etc.). [FN25] To employ Rawls's terminology, the principles of justice are those agreed to by parties in "the original position" (an imaginary time and place where there is no government) behind "a veil of ignorance" (an imaginary situation in which nobody has any personal knowledge of themselves or their futures). In other words, the principles of justice are those arrived at by means of a social contract that all the "unbiased" parties would agree on so that they can receive full political and social freedom and a minimum standard of financial entitlement just in case it turns out that one is, for example, not well-off, not naturally gifted, or holds unpopular political, religious and/or philosophical opinions. This means that Rawls's principles of justice have little or nothing to do with the good, the true, or the beautiful in any metaphysically robust sense. They are political principles for ensuring economic entitlement as well as for preventing conflict between free and equal individuals each pursuing his or her own vision of the good life.

*433 According to Rawls, "no comprehensive doctrine is appropriate as a political conception." [FN26] A doctrine is comprehensive, according to Rawls, "when it includes conceptions of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and character, that are to inform much of our nonpolitical conduct (in the limit of our life as a whole)." [FN27] Rawls maintains that both religious and philosophical perspectives can be comprehensive doctrines. Thus, for example, Christianity, Marxism, naturalism, and Kantianism are all comprehensive doctrines. Rawls argues that the principles of justice, as the political ground of a society of free and equal citizens who embrace competing comprehensive doctrines, entail state impartiality between these doctrines. Although Rawls maintains that this does not prevent proponents of comprehensive doctrines from influencing public policy, their proposals must not be in conflict with the principles of justice (which are the basis, according to Rawls, of Constitutional rights) and they must provide publicly accessible reasons for their positions. [FN28] According to Rawls, "Political liberalism sees its form of political philosophy as having its own subject matter: how is a just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution?" His answer is state impartiality when it comes to comprehensive doctrines: "To maintain impartiality between comprehensive doctrines, [political liberalism] it does not specifically address the moral topics on which those doctrines divide." [FN29] He is not saying that a comprehensive doctrine may not be true or that one may not have better arguments for it than a rival doctrine. Rather, he is arguing that a comprehensive doctrine cannot be the basis of a just and fair society of free and equal citizens who embrace a diversity of comprehensive doctrines, many of which are reasonable and one of which may be true. [FN30]

This is where Rawls's book Political Liberalism departs from his earlier work A Theory of Justice. Rawls concedes that the thesis of the *434 latter depended on a premise that, he now maintains, his present views rule out:

[I]n the well-ordered society of justice as fairness [as defended in A Theory of Justice], citizens hold to the same comprehensive doctrine, and this includes aspects of Kant's comprehensive liberalism, to which the principles of justice as fairness might belong. [FN31]

Explaining Rawls's changing view, Robert P. George writes:

The problem with this idea is that neither liberalism, considered as a "comprehensive doctrine," nor any other comprehensive view that is held by citizens generally in pluralistic societies such as ours. Nor is it reasonable under the circumstances of political freedom that characterize modern constitutional democratic regimes to expect that "comprehensive liberalism," or any other competing comprehensive view, ever would be adopted by citizens generally. Rawls refers to this state of affairs as "the fact of reasonable pluralism," and it is the starting point of his revised argument for an antiperfectionist resolution to the problem of moral disagreement. [FN32]

This does not commit the Rawlsian to a political framework absent of any notion of goodness. After all, Rawls is providing an argument for the rationality of certain principles that may serve as the basis on which a populace of free and equal citizens with competing comprehensive doctrines may have a just and fair society. This is what Rawls calls the "thin theory of the good," [FN33] a political conception arrived at through rational argument but not dependent upon the acceptance and/or veracity of any comprehensive doctrine. [FN34]

Although Rawls believes that the philosophical case for his principles succeeds, he understands that for political liberalism to be the ground of a stable and enduring society of competing comprehensive doctrines, each proponent must conclude that Rawls's principles of *435 political liberalism are reasonable from her perspective. This is what Rawls calls an "overlapping consensus." "Thus," according to Rawls, political liberalism looks for a political conception of justice that we hope can gain the support of an overlapping consensus of reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines in a society regulated by it. [FN35]

Rawls writes that it is permissible for one to support a policy proposal based on the beliefs one holds as part of one's comprehensive doctrine. Nevertheless, as I noted above, in the public square one ought to provide a public reason, [FN36] which Rawls defines as a reason (1) that aims for public justification . . ., [that appeals] to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political institutions and policies; [FN37] and (2) guided by the criterion of reciprocity, the notion that "our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions." [FN38]

Paul J. Weithman, in clarifying Rawls's argument, states that "Rawls did not say that citizens may not appeal to religious doctrines when constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice are at stake or that appealing to public reason is preferable." Rather, according to Weithman, Rawls is arguing that "what virtuous citizenship--the virtue of civility--requires is that citizens be ready and able to show how their views can be supported by public reason." [FN39]

*436 It is clear that Rawls maintains that at some point in one's political argument for a particular policy that touches on constitutional essentials and basic justice, one must be prepared to present a public reason if one wants to advance one's views in a society whose diverse citizenry arrive at the public square armed with contrary comprehensive doctrines. [FN40]

Many have raised questions about the width of public reason's scope. For example, does it include or exclude traditions of moral reasoning that appeal to publicly accessible reasons whose reasonableness depends on their consistency with natural law, a comprehensive doctrine defended by publicly accessible reasons? [FN41] However, resolving that dispute is not necessary for our present purposes. For the argument that Plantinga proposes, as we shall see, seems to assume a narrow interpretation of public reason's scope, that public reason not only excludes idiosyncratic appeals to special revelation and/or secret knowledge but also methodological assumptions and ontological entailments that fellow citizens--especially those who embrace religious comprehensive doctrines--are within their epistemic rights in rejecting, even though these assumptions and entailments are publicly accessible in the sense of being non-revelatory, not based on secret knowledge, and open to rebuttal by contrary reasons and arguments that can be understood by all reasonable citizens. That is, citizens who reject evolution (as I define it in this essay), to use Rawls's language, hold reasonable comprehensive doctrines which can be neither the target nor the basis of public policies that are based on other citizens' comprehensive doctrines such as naturalism. On the other hand, if Plantinga were to embrace a wide interpretation of public reason's scope, critics of evolution could then employ publicly accessible non-revelatory and non-idiosyncratic arguments and reasons to justify their altering of public school curricula to include criticisms of evolution even though these publicly accessible reasons and arguments are more at home in certain comprehensive doctrines than others. Thus, Plantinga's *437 case is unaffected regardless of which interpretation of public reason's scope one may accept.

III. Plantinga's Argument

Plantinga, in a paper presented at the 1998 Eastern Division meeting of the American Philosophical Association (and published in 2001), takes a Rawlsian version of political liberalism and applies it to debate in public education over the teaching of evolution. [FN42] His argument goes something like this: because naturalistic evolution presupposes a controversial epistemological position (methodological naturalism) [FN43] that entails a controversial metaphysical position (ontological materialism or philosophical naturalism), [FN44] a comprehensive doctrine over which reasonable citizens disagree, therefore, naturalistic evolution should not be taught in public schools unless students are told that it is likely the best explanation of origins only if one accepts methodological naturalism. Consequently, those who seek to institutionalize naturalistic evolution violate political liberalism when they employ the coercive power of the state to indoctrinate citizens who reject naturalism.

In order to make his case, Plantinga makes a number of points. First, we live in a pluralistic society, one in which its citizens believe a *438 diversity of comprehensive doctrines including philosophical naturalism. [FN45] Second, citizens typically believe that their children ought to be taught the correct and true comprehensive doctrine; "they think it is a matter of great importance which comprehensive beliefs their children adopt, some even thinking that one's eternal welfare depends on accepting the true comprehensive beliefs." [FN46] This is why some parents who cannot afford private religious schools enroll their children in after-hours or weekend church, synagogue or mosque education programs, so that these children may be taught the fundamental beliefs of their family's religious tradition. Third, public schools, which are supported by the tax dollars of a diverse citizenry, cannot teach every comprehensive belief as true or even pick one as true and exclude all others. According to Plantinga, "fairness dictates that no belief be taught as the settled truth that conflicts with the comprehensive beliefs of some group of citizens party to the [social] contract." [FN47] He calls this "the basic right" (BR). Consequently, "[e]ach of the citizens party to the contract has the right not to have comprehensive beliefs taught to her children that contradict her own comprehensive beliefs." [FN48] Plantinga draws the conclusion:

So there is therefore a clear prima facie question of justice here: these citizens are party to the implicit contract; they pay their taxes; they support these schools, and send their children to them. But then they have a prima facie right to have their children taught, as settled fact, only what is consistent with their comprehensive beliefs. And this means that it is unfair or unjust to teach evolution--universal common ancestry, for example--in the public schools, at any rate where there is a substantial segment of the population whose comprehensive beliefs are incompatible with evolution. In the very same way, of course, it would be unjust to teach creationism as the settled truth. Both doctrines conflict with the comprehensive beliefs of some of the parties of the contract. [FN49]

Plantinga presents an objection to his view: [FN50] although BR right *439 may be a prima facie right, it should be trumped by requirements of truth. After all, is not science education's primary goal to provide students a true description of the natural world? And if naturalistic evolution is the view a vast majority of scientists believe is true and grounded in empirical fact, would it not be unfair and unjust not to teach such a theory in the public schools? Plantinga believes that the reasoning behind these questions is "deeply flawed." He explains:

Suppose Christianity is in fact true, as indeed I believe it is: would that mean that it is fair to teach it in public schools where most of the citizens, citizens who support those schools, are not Christians and reject Christian comprehensive beliefs? [FN51] For teaching Christian comprehensive beliefs as true even if in fact there is good evidence and arguments that they are true, in a society of competing doctrines, is unfair since it violates the basic rights of other citizens to be treated as free and equal persons. [FN52] After all, these other citizens, the non-Christians, "also believe that their comprehensive beliefs are true: that is why they hold them." [FN53]

Plantinga deals with a variation on the previous objection: [FN54] since science deals with "facts," and since religion deals with "values," it is not unfair to teach in the public schools what apparently contradicts another's comprehensive beliefs, for such beliefs are either outside the *440 realm of "fact" or they should be disbelieved if they contradict the "facts" or the overwhelming consensus of the scientific community.

Plantinga first replies that it is mistaken to believe that religion does not deal with factual claims. For example, Muslims believe that there was such a person as Mohammed and that there is such a being as God; so, if there is no historical evidence for Mohammed and philosophical naturalism is the case, Islam has some external factual issues with which its theologians must deal.

Second, "why should we think scientific consensus overrides BR?" Maybe it is "because we think science is our best bet with respect to the discovery of the truth or the approximate truth on the subjects on which it speaks." [FN55] However, if it is the truth with which we are concerned, then current science may not be the best place to look. Plantinga points out that "[w]e all know how often scientific opinion has changed over the years; there is little reason to think that now it has finally arrived at the unrevisable truth . . ." [FN56] He then goes on to cite a number of historical examples including Newtonian physics, caloric theories of heat, vital forces in physiology, and the luminiferous ether.

Plantinga deals with one more objection to his argument: [FN57]

[T]he way to approach questions of empirical fact is by way of science, not by way of religion; thus scientific consensus trumps religious or comprehensive belief in such a way that prima facie requirements of (BR) are overridden; and hence, it is fair to teach evolution as settled fact, even if it does conflict with the religious beliefs of some of the citizens party to that implicit contract. [FN58]

This objection, Plantinga says, is grounded in the claim more primitive claim, PC:

The right way to answer questions of empirical fact--for example, questions about the origin of life, the age of the earth, whether human beings have evolved from earlier life forms--is by way of science, or scientific method. [FN59] Plantinga first points out "that [the more primitive claim] is not, of course, itself a question of empirical fact." [FN60] It is a question of philosophy, for the more primitive claim is not a claim of science, but a claim about science. This is an observation almost universally *441 acknowledged among philosophers of science. [FN61] Thus, the objection to which Plantinga is responding concerns the philosophical question of whether a certain epistemology (methodological naturalism) and metaphysics (philosophical naturalism) are able to settle ultimate questions about the nature and order of things. Consequently, this dispute, according to Plantinga, "is philosophical or religious rather than scientific." [FN62]

Second, the more primitive claim is part of the comprehensive beliefs of many people, such as philosophical naturalists; but its denial is part of the comprehensive doctrines embraced by others who are also part of the social contract, such as orthodox Christians, Jews, and Muslims.

Thus, according to Plantinga, one's acceptance of any theory of origins is contingent upon the epistemic base--a part of one's comprehensive doctrine--on which one grounds his or her knowledge claims. Therefore, if one embraces methodological naturalism as part of one's epistemic base, then naturalistic evolution is more likely true than not. However, if one believes that one has epistemic warrant in believing all sorts of claims that are inconsistent with philosophical naturalism, then one may rationally reject methodological naturalism. But if one were to do that, one would think that naturalistic evolution is unlikely to be true; in fact, one might think that its truth is highly improbable. This is why Plantinga suggests the following should occur in the public schools.

Naturalistic evolution should be taught as "the best hypothesis (the one most likely to be true), or even that it is much more likely than not *442 with respect to" the naturalist's epistemic base. [FN63] That claim would be consistent with anyone's comprehensive doctrine, for even the critic of evolution would agree that given the naturalist's epistemic base, naturalistic evolution is probably true. And second, "the same would go for creationism: with respect to certain widely shared epistemic bases, the most likely or satisfactory hypothesis will be the claim that God created human beings specially . . ." [FN64] This too would not be inconsistent with anyone's comprehensive doctrine, for even the philosophical naturalist would agree that given the falsity of the naturalist's epistemic base as well as the truth of other epistemic bases, some form of Creationism is more likely true than not. Plantinga concludes: "should Creationism be taught in the public schools? Should evolution? The answer is in each case the same: no, neither should be taught unconditionally; but yes, each should be taught conditionally." [FN65] In other words, if one were to teach in public schools any theory of origins without these conditions, one would violate political liberalism, for one would be basing a public policy on a comprehensive doctrine.

IV. Pennock's Reply

The core of Pennock's reply is his rejection of BR, the basic right, which, according to Plantinga, "dictates that no belief be taught as the settled truth that conflicts with the comprehensive beliefs of some group of citizens party to the [social] contract." [FN66] According to Pennock, "My argument is not, as Professor Plantinga supposes, that science overrides (BR). I would not accept (BR) in the first place, nor should anyone who is concerned with justice." [FN67]

*443 Because Plantinga is applying a Rawlsian understanding of political justice, Pennock correctly points out that Plantinga must provide to us a Rawlsian justification for the BR; that is, he must provide to us the reason or reasons that "would lead free and equal people in Rawls's Original Position to agree to such a basic right." [FN68] Not finding such reasons in Plantinga's essay, [FN69] Pennock speculates that Plantinga may want to offer the following:

One knows that people are likely to disagree about "comprehensive beliefs" such as those profound religious beliefs about God and God's method of Creation, but under the veil of ignorance one does not know what one's own view will be on such matters or whether, say, one would be in a position to see to it that only those beliefs are taught in the schools. Plantinga must think that under such conditions rational persons would agree to institute (BR) as a defensive safeguard--since no one could be sure that their own preferred view would be taught, they all would want at least the right to see to it that another view that opposes it not be taught either. [FN70]

In reply to this reason, Pennock asserts that "[r]ational agents would never agree to such a gag rule as a basic right for a variety of reasons," [FN71] three of which Pennock presents in his essay: (A) it would "gut the curriculum," [FN72] (B) children's interests should also be considered behind the veil of ignorance, and (C) rational agents in the original position behind the veil of ignorance would in fact choose a distinction between public and private knowledge consistent with Pennock's own sensibilities.

A. The Basic Right Would Gut the Curriculum

According to Pennock, because virtually everything taught in *444 public schools may offend someone's comprehensive beliefs, there would be nothing left to teach, except trivial things, if Plantinga's BR were fundamental to political justice. Not only would creationists be permitted to expunge from the curriculum the well-established facts of evolutionary biology and other sciences, but also "thousands of special interests groups that would use such a right to prohibit the teaching of specific facts or even whole subjects they objected to." [FN73] To make matters worse, the BR would give license to parents "who would object to teaching about racial equality, the facts of reproductive health, or that even that the earth is round." [FN74] Consequently, "[n]o rational person would agree to such a situation." [FN75]

Plantinga is not arguing, as Pennock seems to think, that whenever people disagree on what's true on a particular subject, public schools should teach none of them as true. Rather, Plantinga is arguing that when it comes to differing comprehensive beliefs (or as Rawls calls them, comprehensive doctrines) i.e., worldviews that attempt to answer ultimate questions about the order and nature of things, a public school teacher should not instruct her students that one of them is the official view of the state. So, for example, schools should not teach students that naturalism or Christianity or Islam is the correct comprehensive belief, even though one of them may be the correct comprehensive belief. The schools may teach the well-known facts of astronomy (e.g. the earth is spherical) and human reproduction (e.g. sperm/egg unions may result in conceptions) and the fundamental principle of racial equality (e.g. citizens are free and equal persons), but the schools may not, under the guise of "science" or "health," teach methodological naturalism (or ontological materialism) or permissive views of human sexuality, each of which is inexorably tied to controversial metaphysical points of view about the nature of reality and human persons i.e., comprehensive doctrines. To conscript for our purposes a distinction made by Rawls, these well-known facts of astronomy and human reproduction are not topics over which the limits implemented by public reason must apply since they do not touch on constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice. [FN76] Racial equality, in contrast, does touch on *445 constitutional essentials, for it is a constitutional essential, [FN77] and thus is a necessary condition for a politically just regime. On the other hand, Pennock's beliefs (whatever they may be) on methodological naturalism (or ontological materialism) or human sexuality, drawn from his comprehensive doctrine, would touch on constitutional essentials if Pennock were to employ the mechanism of the state to require that these comprehensive doctrine-based beliefs be taught in public schools as the truth.

Thus Plantinga is not committed, as Pennock suggests, to a thoroughgoing democratic relativism, such that parents who object to, let's say, the teaching of racial equality, may force the government schools to teach no lessons on that subject at all. In fact, if one were to choose racial equality as an illustration of Pennock's confusion, Plantinga's notion of the basic right seems to commit him, and other political liberals in the Rawlsian tradition, to "the conception of persons as citizens viewed as free and equal." [FN78] For the BR, if it is truly basic, is a property had by all citizens even if their governments do not recognize it. It is, some may say (though not Rawls), [FN79] a natural right, one to which we are all entitled by virtue of our metaphysical patrimony. But this puts Pennock in a curious predicament. For many of his fellow naturalists have shown a peculiar enthusiasm to extend the Darwinian paradigm to the domain of political and moral philosophy, concluding that non-material metaphysical properties are not had by human beings, [FN80] for we are, like mice, germs, and canyons, merely a collection *446 of material parts thrown together by the non-rational forces of non-directed nature. There is no ontological room in such a scenario for an immaterial property essential to all human beings that grounds our equality but has its roots in a teleology and a robust metaphysic, [FN81] to which Pennock bids good riddance. [FN82] Consequently, if Pennock is concerned about racial equality and social justice, perhaps he has more *447 to fear from anti-Rawlsian Darwinian parents than those whose metaphysical sensibilities better ground these notions of equality and justice and would better contribute to an overlapping consensus. (After all, would you rather have your children, or your neighbor's children, tutored on the reasonableness of racial equality by Charles Darwin [FN83] or Martin Luther King, Jr.?). [FN84]

Thus, far from gutting the curriculum, Plantinga's proposal allows for a richer intellectual engagement, encouraging public school pupils to think deeply and thoughtfully about the philosophical implications that flow from the Darwinian paradigm.

B. Children's Interest Behind the Veil of Ignorance

According to Pennock, Plantinga makes the mistake of focusing only on the parents' interests rather than including the children's interests as well. After all, children whose parents are bigots or ideologues would be deprived of a good education if these parents choose to exercise their BR and shape the curricula so that ideas offensive to them or inconsistent with their private religious beliefs would be expunged from the public schools. In addition, even disciplines that Plantinga himself believes should be taught as settled truths--"arithmetic, and chemistry and geography" [FN85]--"would [not] pass muster if we grant with him that each person may appeal to (BR) from the warrant of her personal 'epistemic base."' Because the only hope for the offspring of the unenlightened is "a good education" that will provide them "a clear picture of the world and to an open future," therefore, "to agree to (BR) would be to close that window" and to harm these children. [FN86] There are at least three problems with Pennock's argument.

*448 First, he misrepresents the BR by extracting it from its philosophical context from which Plantinga employs it, Rawlsian liberalism. For, as I have already noted, Plantinga's notion of the basic right seems to commit him, and other political liberals in the Rawlsian tradition, to "the conception of citizens as free and equal persons." [FN87] The BR is not an absolute right that trumps all other political values. Thus, a society that recognizes the BR is one marked by its overt rejection of bigotry and irrational ideology as playing any part in its social framework. Consequently, the government could exclude the influence of bigots and ideologues in its education system precisely because of the BR. [FN88]

Second, as I pointed out in my critique of Pennock's first argument, Pennock is simply mistaken when he asserts that what Plantinga regards as settled truth "would not pass muster" under a liberal regime that respects the BR of parents, for the BR only applies to questions that touch on constitutional essentials and basic justice; it does not apply to everything. Political liberalism, according to Rawls, "presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons" for the purpose of avoiding "disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious questions" that cannot be resolved politically. [FN89] The settled truths to which Plantinga refers are not among these questions.

Third, Pennock presents us with a parade of horribles, a tactic that can easily be employed against his position. After all, if parents who are bigots and ideologues can possibly harm society if they exercise Pennock's mistaken understanding of the BR, perhaps the state should consider forcibly removing these children from their wicked parents and send the children to re-education camps, or sterilize the parents so that they will not be able to beget and corrupt more children, or nullify the parents' right to vote or hold public office until they change their views to the satisfaction of the thought police. I am not saying that this is Pennock's position. Rather, by employing my own parade of horribles, I am suggesting that it takes little imagination to interpret another's position in its weakest version (as I believe Pennock does to Plantinga's *449 position), caricature it, and then shoot it down in a rhetorical flourish.

C. Separating Private and Public Epistemologies

Pennock suggests that public schools "be constrained to public knowledge," that is,

[i]n teaching about the empirical world, this means that the schools should limit their science curriculum to scientific findings--testable conclusions that we can rationally draw on the basis of observational evidence and the methodological assumption of natural law. [FN90] For this is precisely what rational agents would agree to behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance in the original position:

[R]ational agents . . . would assent, I believe, to something very similar to our current system, along the lines I mentioned above--a separation of the public and the private. They would require that public institutions, like the public schools, not teach views based on "private epistemologies" such as special revelation, because one cannot rationally adjudicate among beliefs that different persons purport "to know" simply "as a Christian" or a Hindu, a Raelian, a Pagan, or whatever. [FN91]

Pennock is suggesting that if Plantinga is to be Rawlsian, then he should be a Rawlsian all the way by restricting public policy decisions to public reasons that can be understood by reasonable citizens who hold to different comprehensive doctrines. That is, the content of public policy should be based on public, rather than, private epistemologies or metaphysical commitments. But Pennock's suggestion, ironically, is precisely the problem that Plantinga attempts to unearth in his paper: methodological naturalism is a private epistemology that impermissibly privileges naturalism, a comprehensive doctrine, whenever naturalism is confronted with a possible defeater. By merely reasserting his position rather than engaging Plantinga's argument, Pennock begs the question. Consider the following example.

Many neurophysiologists tell us that human beings are merely physical systems, property-things, and "thought" is entirely the result of the firing of neurons in the brain. The mind may be an "epiphenomenon," but it is not a non-material thing that really exists as a substance in its own right. That is, there are no non-material substances, like souls or minds, from which thought arises. Suppose, *450 however, a philosophical theologian, armed with arguments defending the existence of the soul--arguments she believes are persuasive and rationally defensible apart from appeals to special revelation--rejects the neurophysiologist's materialist description of human nature. Who wins? I suspect that Pennock would say the neurophysiologist wins, for he is proposing a scientific theory based on a public epistemology (i.e., a materialist explanation) while the philosophical theologian is appealing to non-natural entities (i.e., immaterial substances) and thus is suggesting "a private epistemology." This is just a kind, though condescending, way of saying that the philosophical theologian is giving us her "beliefs" (or "religious opinion") and not providing us with any real knowledge. But the philosophical theologian seems to be fulfilling her Rawlsian obligations, for she is providing public, though non-materialist, reasons for rejecting a materialist view of persons, a view whose plausibility is contingent upon the veracity of a controversial comprehensive doctrine. Thus, in order to reject the philosophical theologian's argument, one must show that her premises are suspect and/or they are not adequate to support her conclusion. That is, one must provide public, and not private, reasons to reject her case. To appeal to the conclusion's and/or the premises' inconsistency with methodological naturalism as a reason to reject the argument is either crass question-begging and/or precisely the sort of appeal to a "private" epistemology i.e., a comprehensive doctrine, that Pennock believes he finds in Plantinga's modest proposal. But a metaphysical litmus test, whether it is theistic or naturalistic, is no substitute for actual argument analysis.

According to Pennock, public schools should teach what is true and not what is false. [FN92] But if science is committed a priori to methodological naturalism (to which Pennock is apparently committed), and if scientific claims cannot be defeated by non-natural claims (to which Pennock is apparently committed), [FN93] then Pennock has accepted *451 in principle the possibility that a theory consistent with materialism should be taught as the best theory even if a better theory inconsistent with materialism has stronger arguments in its favor. Unless materialism is the absolute unrevisable truth [FN94]--a private epistemology if there ever was one-- Pennock violates his own prescription and commits him to the view that public schools are obligated to not teach the better theory. If, however, Pennock were to concede that the philosophical theologian in the above illustration is in fact giving public reasons for a point of view that is a possible defeater to the evolutionary paradigm, then he is conceding the reasonableness of Plantinga's employment of Rawlsian principles in the legal debate over the teaching of origins in public schools.

V. The Law, State Impartiality, and Public School Science

In this final section I offer a brief summary of the federal courts' holdings on evolution and public science education. I argue that a fair reading of these holdings is consistent with, and is supported by, the Rawlsian approach defended by Plantinga and supported in my reply to Pennock's critique of Plantinga. I also argue that an appeal to the religious motives of those that support statutes that embody a Plantingian-type of curriculum on evolution (or something similar to it), rely on an unconstitutional basis for dismissing such legislation: the beliefs of those that support it. Beliefs, unlike practices and their reasons, cannot be the object of judicial analysis.

A. Evolution and The Courts

It seems to me that that Plantinga's central point is that most citizens' objections to the teaching of evolution in public schools have less to do with Darwinism (or neo-Darwinism) per se than they have to do with what these citizens have reason to believe the government schools are teaching their children, namely, an exclusively materialist account of what counts as knowledge. And thus, by implication, the government is teaching these children that they can never have epistemic warrant for the theological beliefs that may serve as defeaters to the deliverances of the materialist science they are being taught in school. This is why I believe that Plantinga's argument offers a valuable insight for helping to resolve the political and legal debate on the teaching of *452 evolution in public schools. However, the current legal situation in the United States cannot be fully understood without appreciating the role of Darwinism in shaping America's jurisprudence on this matter. (Because I have already defined Darwinism above, I will not repeat it here.)

Because Darwinism appeared to conflict with the dominant reading of the Bible in late-nineteenth century and early-twentieth century America, some states passed laws that prohibited the teaching of evolution in public school classes. One of those states, Tennessee, featured the first real legal battle over such a law, the Scopes Trial. The trial took place in 1925 in the small town of Dayton. The case involved John Scopes, a local teacher who used a textbook that included sections explaining and defending Darwinism. Scopes's arrest was orchestrated with his consent by a group of prominent Dayton officials and businessmen who wanted to increase the visibility of their small town. Drawing the attention of a worldwide audience, the Scopes Trial featured the legendary civil liberties attorney Clarence Darrow, who represented Scopes, and the three-time Democratic presidential candidate William Jennings Bryan who was part of the prosecution's legal team. Although Scopes was convicted, it is widely believed that the Scopes Trial was a cultural victory for Darwinism. [FN95]

It was not until 1968 that the U.S. Supreme Court dealt with an anti-evolution statute. In Epperson v. Arkansas (1968), [FN96] the Court struck down an Arkansas law that was similar to the statute upheld in Scopes. The Court held that the statute "must be stricken because of its conflict with the constitutional prohibition of state laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof." [FN97] The Court concluded that the statute proscribed evolution solely because it is inconsistent with the creation story in the Book of Genesis. Thus, the statute had no secular purpose.

In the face of Epperson, opponents of evolution developed a "balanced treatment" approach, a strategy that resulted in the crafting of statutes that required a balanced treatment in public schools between evolution and "creation science," a unique religious doctrine transparently derived from a literal reading of the first chapters of the Book of Genesis though portrayed by its proponents as a scientific alternative to Darwinian evolution.

*453 Balanced-treatment acts in Arkansas and Louisiana were struck down as unconstitutional by a federal district court in McLean v. Arkansas (1982) (Arkansas) [FN98] and by the U.S. Supreme Court in Edwards v. Aguillard (1987) (Louisiana). [FN99] Although the statutes were not identical, they were similar and the reasoning that the courts applied to each was similar as well. The courts held that the real purpose of the Acts was to advance a particular religious viewpoint, creation science, and thus held that the acts violated the Establishment Clause. Four issues dominated the analysis in both cases:

The statute's historical continuity with Scopes as well as the creation/evolution battles throughout the 20th century;

How closely the curricular content required by the statute parallels the creation story in Genesis, and/or whether the curricular content prohibited or regulated by the statute is treated as such because it is inconsistent with the creation story in Genesis;

The motives of those who supported the statute in either the legislature or the public square;

Whether the statute was a legitimate means to achieve appropriate state ends.

Ironically, Pennock's third argument in reply to Plantinga--private, non-public, epistemological claims have no place in a liberal public square--seems consistent with the U.S. federal courts' rejection of the statutes authored by creationists and rejected in Epperson, McLean, and Edwards. The courts were convinced that the statutes had no secular purpose and that they became law for only one reason: to protect or advance a particular religious belief derived from special revelation, the creation story in Genesis. The courts concluded that in a nation whose Constitution prohibits government establishment of religion, and which contains a citizenry with diverse religious points of view, a public school curriculum may not include one of these religious points of view unless it provides public, non-sectarian, reasons for its inclusion. The courts found no such reasons in either the statutes' texts or legislative histories. To employ Pennock's language, the courts rejected the employment of private epistemologies as a justification for shaping public school curricula.

However, the U.S. Supreme Court, unlike Pennock, seems to understand state impartiality as permitting alternatives to evolution even *454 if those alternatives may be inconsistent with methodological naturalism and/or ontological materialism. In Edwards, the Court maintained that its holding does "not imply that a legislature could never require that scientific critiques of prevailing scientific theories be taught." [FN100] The Court asserted that "teaching a variety of scientific theories about the origins of humankind to schoolchildren might be validly done with the clear secular intent of enhancing the effectiveness of science instruction." [FN101] Justice Powell writes in his concurring opinion that a decision respecting the subject matter to be taught in public schools does not violate the Establishment Clause simply because the material to be taught "happens to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions." [FN102] In addition, the Court pointed out, with apparent approval, that the unconstitutional Balanced-Treatment Act was unnecessary because the state of Louisiana already did not prohibit teachers from introducing students to alternative points of view. [FN103] So, contra Pennock, the teaching of a non-naturalist view of origins may be consistent with state impartiality as long as it is justified by public or secular reasons. [FN104]

The Court seems to be affirming principles consistent with Rawls's requirement that reason is public if it (1) aims for public justification . . ., [that appeals] to ascertainable evidence and facts open to public view, in order to reach conclusions about what we think are the most reasonable political *455 institutions and policies [FN105]; and (2) is guided by the criterion of reciprocity, the notion that "our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the reasons we offer for our political action may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those actions." [FN106]

B. The Religious Motive Argument: An Illegitimate Analysis of Belief

It seems to me that there is only one analysis that a court could employ to reject as unconstitutional the teaching of a non-naturalist view of origins supported by public or secular reasons: the legislators and/or citizens who support the law have religious motives. Although this sort of analysis found its way into McLean, [FN107] Edwards, [FN108] and some uncharitable descriptions of the intelligent design movement, [FN109] it is constitutionally suspect. For it is tantamount to a religious test for civic participation and would literally penalize citizens who fail to excise their own religious motives from their own minds, even though these same citizens have fulfilled all their liberal obligations in providing public or secular reasons and have done so through the proper channels and institutions of government.

*456 After all, a motive is a type of belief that furnishes a reason for the agent (i.e., citizen) to act--e.g. one is motivated by a desire to improve public schools. But the motive is not the act or policy itself, and neither is the motive the reason that justifies the particular policy or act. For two people can have the exact same motive for two contrary policies or acts--e.g. Bob opposes, and Fred supports, welfare reform because each is motivated by a desire to help the poor. Moreover, one policy or act may be supported by citizens with contrary motives--e.g. Bob opposes welfare reform because he is motivated to help the poor; Tom opposes welfare reform because he is motivated to get re-elected and most of his constituents oppose welfare reform. In addition, one policy or act may be supported by two citizens with the same motive but each may justify the policy or act for different reasons--e.g. Bob and Sid both oppose welfare reform because each is motivated to help the poor, but Bob justifies the policy by showing that a similar policy in California failed whereas Sid justifies the policy by appealing to what he thinks are sound principles of social justice. A motive in many ways is a belief properly basic to one's personal constitution, character, and inner life and cannot be "unbelieved" by an act of will in the way that one may willingly and without much difficulty offer different reasons or purposes for the same policies and acts one may advance throughout one's life.

In terms of constitutional law, these distinctions are important. For the Supreme Court holds that "[t]he Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such . . ." [FN110] This is because the Court makes a distinction between belief and practice: "Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices." [FN111] To be sure, government (including the courts) may assess its own actions and those of its citizens, as well as the reasons for those actions. But the beliefs that propel the citizen or legislator--i.e., his or her motives--to embrace particular policies and engage in particular actions may not be used by *457 government to limit a citizen's or legislator's legitimate liberties or powers.

Although it is probably the case that most critics of philosophical naturalism (and neo-Darwinism in particular) are religious believers who see non-naturalistic accounts of origins as lending support to their worldview, it is difficult to believe that anyone would suggest in a liberal democracy that this motivation would be a good reason to declare as unconstitutional a policy that permits a modest, fair and non-sectarian introduction to non-naturalist views in the public school science classroom (along the lines of Plantinga's proposal). For this would impose a special burden on the political activity of religious citizens that has no logical relation to the content of, or public reasons for, the policy they are suggesting. It would result in political exclusion based on belief, something the Supreme Court has held is de facto, not just prima facie, unconstitutional. [FN112]

This burden would require the courts to assess the religiosity of the beliefs of its citizens and legislators and the part these beliefs play in motivating them to support a policy that is offered as a remedy for what these citizens and legislators perceive as state endorsement of philosophical naturalism. Aside from the constitutional problems already mentioned, this reasoning presents a Catch-22 that makes it nearly impossible for religious citizens to remedy public policies that they believe are uniquely hostile to their beliefs. For who but the citizens whose views are marginalized would be the most vocal critics of such policies and the most visible proponents of ways to mitigate them? This is a sort of burden not placed on secular political participation. And for this reason, it cannot be just.

VI. Conclusion

What Plantinga is suggesting by his argument is consistent with Rawlsian liberalism, for he is isolating in the debate over teaching evolution the philosophical components--i.e., methodological *458 naturalism and ontological materialism--which reasonable citizens connect to the plausibility of their reasonable comprehensive doctrines. So, for the philosophical naturalist who is convinced that his worldview is true and that public school science education should teach it unconditionally, Rawls reminds him :it is vital to the idea of political liberalism that we may with perfect consistency hold that it would be unreasonable to use political power to enforce our own comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral view [even if it is naturalism], which we must, of course, affirm as true or reasonable (or as not unreasonable).” [FN113]

Rather than arguing for a ban on teaching evolution or calling for the resources of the state to be employed to advance a narrow religious agenda, Plantinga has opted for a modest strategy, Rawlsian in tone and in principle, that allows for a full-orbed teaching of evolution while acknowledging and respecting the diverse and reasonable religious and philosophical points of view that are represented by the students in America's classrooms. This seems consistent with both America's tradition of church-state separation as well as its tradition of tolerance and celebration of diversity.

[FNa1]. The title of this article was inspired by the title of a book authored by philosopher Daniel C. Dennett, Darwin's Dangerous Idea: Evolution and the Meanings of Life (Simon & Schuster 1996). I began working on this article while I was a Madison Research Fellow in the Politics Department at Princeton University (2002-03). For this reason, I would like to thank the Director of Princeton's James Madison Program, Robert P. George, for providing me and the other visiting Madison fellows an idyllic setting in which to work on our various projects. While on the faculty at Princeton, I delivered an earlier version of this paper at the 2002 meeting of the Evangelical Philosophical Society in Toronto, Ontario (Canada), November 20-22, 2002. A number of attendees, especially William Lane Craig (Talbot School of Theology, Biola University), offered valuable comments, some of which found their way into this article's final version. Special thanks to Alvin Plantinga (University of Notre Dame) for reading another earlier version of this paper and providing important feedback. Thanks also to an anonymous referee whose suggestions improved the quality of this article. However, I take full responsibility for this article's flaws.

[FNd1]. Associate Director, J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-State Studies, and Associate Professor of Church-State Studies, Baylor University, Waco, Texas. Ph.D. (philosophy), M.A. (philosophy), Fordham University; M.J.S. (Master of Juridical Studies), Washington University School of Law, St. Louis.

[FN1]. See Book Note, Not Your Daddy's Fundamentalism: Intelligent Design in the Classroom, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 964 (Jan. 2004); Thomas Woodward, Doubts About Darwin: A History of Intelligent Design (Baker Books 2003); Barbara Forrest & Paul Gross, Creationism's Trojan Horse: The Wedge of Intelligent Design (Oxford U. Press 2004); Francis J. Beckwith, Law, Darwinism, and Public Education: The Establishment Clause and the Challenge of Intelligent Design (Rowman & Littlefield 2003).

[FN2]. For example: Michael Behe is Professor of Biological Sciences, Lehigh University in Pennsylvania (Ph.D. in biochemistry, University of Pennsylvania); William A. Dembski is Carl F. H. Henry Professor of Theology and Science, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary (Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Illinois, Chicago; Ph.D. in mathematics, University of Chicago); Robert Kaita is Principal Research Physicist, Plasma Physics Laboratory, Princeton University (Ph.D. in physics, Rutgers University); Alvin Plantinga is John A. O'Brien Professor of Philosophy, University Notre Dame (Ph.D. in philosophy, Yale University); Walter L. Bradley is Distinguished Professor of Engineering, Baylor University (Ph.D., in materials science, University of Texas, Austin); Scott Minnich is Associate Professor of Microbiology, University of Idaho (Ph.D., Iowa State University); and Del Ratzsch is Professor of Philosophy, Calvin College (Ph.D. in philosophy, University of Massachusetts, Amherst).

[FN3]. See e.g. Michael Behe, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (The Free Press 1996); William A. Dembski, No Free Lunch: Why Specified Complexity Cannot Be Purchased Without Intelligence (Rowman & Littlefield 2002); William A. Dembski, The Design Inference: Eliminating Chance Through Small Probabilities (Cambridge Studies in Probability, Induction, and Decision Theory No. 6, Cambridge U. Press 1998); Debating Design: From Darwin to DNA (William A. Dembski & Michael Ruse eds., Cambridge U. Press 2004); Darwinism, Design, and Public Education (John A. Campbell & Stephen C. Meyer eds., Mich. St. U. Press 2003); Stephen C. Meyer, The Origin of Biological Information and the Higher Taxonomic Categories, 117 Proc. Biological Socy. Wash. 213 (2004); W.E. Lönnig & H. Saedler, Chromosome Rearrangements and Transposable Elements, 36 Annual Rev. Genetics 389 (2002); Alvin Plantinga, An Evolutionary Argument Against Naturalism, in Faith in Theory and Practice: Essays on Justifying Religious Beliefs (Carol White & Elizabeth Radcliffe eds., Open Court 1993); Alvin Plantinga, Warrant and Proper Function 216-237 (Oxford U. Press 1993); M.J. Denton, J.C. Marshall & M. Legge, The Protein Folds as Platonic Forms: New Support for the pre-Darwinian Conception of Evolution by Natural Law, 219 J. Theoretical Biology 325 (2002); M.J. Behe, Self-Organization and Irreducibly Complex Systems: A Reply to Shanks and Joplin, 67 Phil. Sci. 155 (Mar. 2000); William Lane Craig, God, Creation, and Mr. Davies, 37 British J. Phil. Sci. 168 (1986); William Lane Craig, Barrow and Tipler on the Anthropic Principle vs. Divine Design, 38 British J. Phil. Sci. 389 (1988); Sarah A. Mims & Forrest M. Mims III, Fungal spores are transported long distances in smoke from biomass fires, 38 Atmospheric Env. 651 (2004); Del Ratzsch, Nature, Science, and Design: The Status of Design in Natural Science, Philosophy and Biology Series (SUNY Press 2001); Scott Minnich & Stephen C. Meyer, Genetic Analysis of Coordinate Flagellar and Type III Regulatory Circuits, in Proceedings of the Second International Conference on Design & Nature (Rhodes, Greece) (M.W. Collins & C.A. Brebbia eds., WIT Press 2004); M.J. Behe & D.W. Snoke, Simulating Evolution by Gene Duplication of Protein Features That Require Multiple Amino Acid Residues, 13 Protein Sci. 2651 (2004); D.K.Y. Chiu & T.H. Lui, Integrated Use of Multiple Interdependent Patterns for Biomolecular Sequence Analysis 4(3) Intl. J. Fuzzy Systems 766 (Sept. 2002); M.J. Denton & J.C. Marshall, The Laws of Form Revisited, 410 Nature 417.I (Mar. 22, 2001); Jonathan Wells, Do Centrioles Generate a Polar Ejection Force?, 98 Rivista di Biologia/Biology Forum 37 (2005).

[FN4]. Alvin Plantinga, Creation and Evolution: A Modest Proposal, paper delivered at the Eastern Division Meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 27-30, 1998). This paper was subsequently published under the same title in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics: Philosophical, Theological, and Scientific Perspectives 779 (Robert T. Pennock ed., M.I.T. Press 2001). Citations of this essay are to the published version.

[FN5]. Robert T. Pennock, Reply to Plantinga's "Modest Proposal," in Intelligent Design Creationism, supra n. 4, at 793.

[FN6]. See John Rawls, Political Liberalism (1st ed., Colum. U. Press 1993) [hereinafter Rawls, PL1]; John Rawls, Political Liberalism (2d ed., Colum. U. Press 1996) [hereinafter Rawls, PL2]; John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Harv. U. Press 1971).

[FN7]. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species, A Facsimile of the 1st ed. (1859) (Ernst Mayr intro., Harv. U. Press 1964).

[FN8]. See id. at 80-130.

[FN9]. Richard Dawkins, The Blind Watchmaker 39 (Norton 1986).

[FN10]. Douglas J. Futuyama, Science on Trial: The Case for Evolution 95 (Pantheon Books 1983), quoting from Darwin, supra n. 9, at 4 (emphasis added).

[FN11]. The "Big Bang" is the dominant theory of the origin of the universe in cosmology: "The presently accepted view ... suggests that at a distant time in the past the whole universe was a small sphere of concentrated energy/matter. This substance then exploded in a big bang to form hydrogen first and then eventually all the galaxies and stars." Monroe W. Strickberger, Evolution 76 (3d ed., Jones & Bartlett 2000).

[FN12]. Id. In this widely-used textbook, now in its third edition, the author presents in great detail in 25 chapters this grand materialist explanation.

[FN13]. The Wright Center for Science Education (Tufts University), Cosmic Evolution: An Interdisciplinary Approach, from the website Cosmic Evolution-- From the Big Bang to Humankind (available at http://www.tufts.edu/as/wright_ center/cosmic_evolution/docs/fr_1/fr_1_site_summary.html (accessed Aug. 8, 2005)).

[FN14]. Francis Crick, The Astonishing Hypothesis: The Scientific Search for the Soul 5 (C. Scribner's Sons 1994) (emphasis added).

[FN15]. For example, Futuyama writes:

By providing materialistic, mechanistic explanations, instead of miraculous ones, for the characteristics of plants and animals, Darwin brought biology out of the realm of theology and into the realm of science. For miraculous spiritual forces fall outside the province of science; all of science is the study of material causation.

Futuyama, supra n. 10, at 37. What Futuyama is suggesting is that Darwin's theory resulted in a shift in the dominant "scientific episteme." According to J.P. Moreland, "a scientific episteme is not just a view within science about the nature of living organisms and their development. It is also a second-order philosophical view about science that defines the nature, limits, metaphysics, and epistemology of 'good' science." J.P. Moreland, Christianity and the Nature of Science 215 (Baker Books 1989).

[FN16]. See Crick, supra n. 14, at 7 ("Many educated people, especially in the Western world, also share the belief that the soul is a metaphor and that there is no personal life either before conception or after death"); Michael Ruse, Can a Darwinian Be a Christian?: The Relationship Between Science and Religion 153 (Cambridge U. Press 2001).

(If evolution be true, then in some very real sense we humans are all part of one big family, no matter what our numbers. For the Christian, is this not the fulfillment of God's promise to Abraham? "I will make of you a great nation" .... Christians should not read this literally. Rather, as one could read the creation stories metaphorically - as telling us of God's relationship to humans and our obligations to nature--so one could read this promise metaphorically, as referring to the family status of humankind.).

[FN17]. "God-of-the-gaps" is said to occur when a scientist, unable to develop a natural explanation for an observation or event, resorts to God or some other supernatural agency or power as an explanation. When the scientist or a future scientist discovers a natural explanation, God is no longer needed to fill the gap and so is discarded as an explanation. So, according to conventional wisdom, a God-of-the-gaps strategy short circuits scientific investigation. For analyses of this problem, see John Mark Reynolds, God of the Gaps: Intelligent Design & Bad Apologetic Advice, in Mere Creation: Science, Faith & Intelligent Design 313-331 (William A. Dembski ed., InterVarsity Press 1998); J.P. Moreland, Theistic Science & Methodological Naturalism, in The Creation Hypothesis: Scientific Evidence for an Intelligent Designer 59-60 (J. P. Moreland ed., InterVarsity Press 1994).

[FN18]. An implicit example of this is John Searle's candid comments about why just about every philosopher of mind embraces some view of the mind that relies on a materialist (or physicalist) construal of the human person, even though it seems inconsistent with our well-grounded intuitions:

How is it that so many philosophers and cognitive scientists can say so many things that, to me at least, seem obviously false? .... I believe one of the unstated assumptions behind the current batch of views is that they represent the only scientifically acceptable alternatives to the anti-scientism that went with traditional dualism, the belief in the immortality of the soul, spiritualism, and so on. Acceptance of the current views is motivated not so much by an independent conviction of their truth as by a terror of what are apparently the only alternatives. That is, the choice we are tacitly presented with is between a "scientific" approach, as represented by one or another of the current versions of "materialism," and an "unscientific" approach, as represented by Cartesianism or some other traditional religious conception of the mind.

John Searle, The Rediscovery of the Mind 3-4 (M.I.T. Press 1992).

[FN19]. In the preface to a 1984 pamphlet published by the National Academy of Sciences, its then-president Dr. Frank Press writes,

It is false ... to think that the theory of evolution represents an irreconcilable conflict between religion and science. A great many religious leaders and scientists accept evolution on scientific grounds without relinquishing their belief in religious principles. As stated in a resolution by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences in 1981, however, "Religion and science are separate and mutually exclusive realms of human thought whose presentation in the same context leads to misunderstanding of both scientific theory and religious belief."

National Academy of Sciences, Science and Creationism: A View from the National Academy of Sciences 5-6 (1984).

[FN20]. This is what seems to me to be lurking beneath what is often called the "culture wars." That is, there is an epistemological division of labor which tells us that science or empirical knowledge is about facts and religion or theology is about opinion, matters of personal taste, and/or deeply held spiritual beliefs that have no relation to the real stuff that science and our senses know. So, this is why Ron Reagan, the son of the late U.S. President Ronald W. Reagan, can tell a national television audience in his speech before the 2004 Democratic National Convention that many who oppose embryonic stem cell research "are well-meaning and sincere," but this is based on nothing more than belief, "an article of faith," to which of course they "are entitled." However, asserts Reagan, "it does not follow that the theology of a few should be allowed to forestall the health and well-being of the many." Ronald P. Reagan, PBS Online NewsHour, Democratic National Convention, Tuesday, July 27, Speeches, Ron Reagan, Jr. (available at http:// www.pbs.org/newshour/vote2004/demconvention/speeches/reagan.htm).

Reagan seems to be saying those who oppose embryonic stem cell research for apparently theological reasons are advancing a position inconsistent with our nation's tradition of church-state separation. For the pro-life position on abortion or stem-cell research--that the fetus is a full-fledged member of the human community and thus a subject of rights from the moment of conception-- depends on a religious metaphysics. E.g. the extended argument in Peter S. Wenz, Abortion Rights as Religious Freedom (Temple U. Press 1992). This is partly correct, for opponents of both abortion and embryonic stem cell research usually accept a view of the nature of the preborn that is consistent with their religion's philosophical anthropology. However, those who offer this point of view in the public square do not merely stipulate the veracity of their position, as one would expect from people whose purpose is to simply propound indefensible dogmas to condemn their irreligious adversaries. Rather, they offer arguments that consist of reasons that are remarkably public. For these reasons are not extracted uncritically from a religious text or from the pronouncements of a religious authority, and they are fully accessible to even those who dispute their veracity and/or the conclusion for which they are conscripted. See e.g. Patrick Lee, Abortion and Unborn Human Life (Cath. U. Am. Press 1996); J.P. Moreland & Scott B. Rae, Body & Soul: Human Nature & the Crisis in Ethics (InterVarsity Press 2000). But Reagan and his allies attempt to justify their position by offering a different metaphysical account, one that picks out certain presently exercisable abilities or functions that a being must have in order to be accorded the protections of our laws. So, for example, Reagan explains that early embryos "have no fingers and toes, no brain or spinal cord. They have no thoughts, no fears. They feel no pain." Reagan, supra n. 20. Surely, Reagan must know that his opponents know these facts as well but do not consider them decisive in judging whether a human being has rights. It is his duty to respond to that point of view and the arguments offered for it rather than merely to recite the well-known facts of embryonic development and dismiss his opponents as embracing nothing more than an ungrounded belief. Thus, there seems to be no good reason, except for a type of crass philosophical apartheid, to accept Reagan's view as "science" and his opponents' view as "religion."

[FN21]. Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial 4 (Regnery/Gateway 1991).

[FN22]. For Aristotle, "God" was a theoretical entity, an Unmoved Mover, he posited to explain the motion of the universe. God was not an object of worship. See Aristotle, Physics, VII, 311, a, 4; Aristotle, Metaphysics, XII, 6, 1071, b, 2.

[FN23]. I say "in this essay," because, given the common and legal definition of "creationism," other non-naturalist alternatives, such as intelligent design, are not "creationist." However, in order to offer the strongest version of Plantinga's position, I define creationism in this essay more broadly and far more inclusively than the courts and ordinary opinion understand it. In other words, my definition of creationism includes views based on revelatory claims (e.g. Creation-Science) and those that appeal to established empirical claims, well-founded conceptual notions, and reasonable inferences from both (e.g. intelligent design, some forms of theistic evolution). For an overview of the differences between creationism (in its ordinary usage) and intelligent design, see Francis J. Beckwith, Public Education, Religious Establishment, and the Challenge of Intelligent Design, 17 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Policy 461, 497-500 (2003).

[FN24]. For example, the Court writes in Epperson v. Ark. that "government ... must be neutral in matters of religious theory, doctrine, and practice. It may not be hostile to any religion or to the advocacy of nonreligion; and it may not aid, foster, or promote one religion or religious theory against another or even against the militant opposite. The First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and between religion and nonreligion." Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97, 103-104 (1968).

[FN25]. See Rawls, PL1, supra n. 6, at 22-28. Rawls's two principles of justice are:

a. Each person has an equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all; and in this scheme the equal political liberties, and only those liberties, are to be guaranteed their fair value.

b. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.

Id. at 5-6.

[FN26]. Id. at 135.

[FN27]. Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at 175.

[FN28]. Id. at 195-211.

[FN29]. Rawls, PL1, supra n. 6, at xxviii.

[FN30]. Rawls writes: "[The] impartiality [of political liberalism] is shown in various ways. For one thing, political liberalism does not attack or criticize any reasonable view. As part of this, it does not criticize, much less reject, any particular theory of the truth of moral judgments." (Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at xxi-xxii). He adds elsewhere:

[I]t would be fatal to the idea of a political conception to see it as skeptical about, or indifferent to, truth, much less as in conflict with it. Such skepticism or indifference would put political philosophy in opposition to numerous comprehensive doctrines, and thus defeat from the outset its aim of achieving an overlapping consensus.

Id. at 150. See also id. at 150-154.

[FN31]. Id. at xl.

[FN32]. Robert P. George, Public Reason and Political Conflict: Abortion and Homosexuality, 106 Yale L. J. 2475, 2477-2478 (Summer 1997) (note omitted).

[FN33]. Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at 178.

[FN34]. Rawls writes:

Thus, the aim of justice as fairness as a political conception is practical, and not metaphysical or epistemological. That is, it presents itself not as a conception of justice that is true, but one that can serve as a basis of informed and willing political agreement between citizens viewed as free and equal persons .... To secure this agreement we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions.

John Rawls, Justice as Fairness: Political Not Metaphysical, in Collected Papers 394 (Samuel Feeman ed., Harv. U. Press 1999).

[FN35]. Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at 10 (note omitted).

[FN36]. Rawls makes a distinction between secular and public reason, arguing that the former depends on a comprehensive doctrine, a secular one:

We must distinguish public reason from what is sometimes referred to as secular reason and secular values. These are not the same as public reason. For I define secular reason as reasoning in terms of comprehensive nonreligious doctrines. Such doctrines and values are much too broad to serve the purposes of public reason.

John Rawls, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 765, 775 (1997). Because the courts have considered irreligion, or secularism, as a religion for both establishment and free exercise purposes, it seems fair to say that when the courts use the term "secular reason" or something similar to it, they mean roughly the same thing as Rawls does when he employs the term "public reason." On the legal definition of religion, see Michael W. McConnell, John H. Garvey & Thomas C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution 869-905 (Aspen Publishers 2002).

[FN37]. Rawls, supra n. 36, at 786.

[FN38]. Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at xlvi.

[FN39]. Paul J. Weithman, Introduction: Religion and the Liberalism of Reasoned Respect, in Religion and Contemporary Liberalism 12-13 (Paul J. Weithman ed., U. Notre Dame Press 1997). To support this interpretation of Rawls, Weithman cites Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, 217, 218, 243. This seems to be consistent with one of Rawls's most recent works: Rawls, supra n. 36. For recent critiques of Rawls's view of public reason, see George, supra n. 32; John Finnis, Public Reason, Abortion, and Cloning, 32 Val. U. L. Rev. 361 (Spring 1998).

[FN40]. According to Rawls,

[I]n a democratic society public reason is the reason of equal citizens who, as a collective body, exercise final political and coercive power over one another in enacting laws and in amending their constitution. The first point is that the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we may call "constitutional essentials" and questions of basic justice ... this means that political values alone are to settle such questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the special subject of public reason.

Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at 214.

[FN41]. See e.g. Robert P. George, In Defense of Natural Law 201-205 (Oxford U. Press 1999).

[FN42]. Plantinga, supra n. 4.

[FN43]. Methodological naturalism is, according to William A. Dembski, "the view that science must be restricted solely to undirected natural processes ...." William A. Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology 119 (InterVarsity Press 1999). According to Phillip E. Johnson, "[a] methodological naturalist defines science as the search for the best naturalistic theories. A theory would not be naturalistic if it left something out (such as the existence of genetic information or consciousness) to be explained by a supernatural cause." Therefore, "all events in evolution (before the evolution of intelligence) are assumed attributable to unintelligent causes. The question is not whether life (genetic information) arose by some combination of chance and chemical laws, to pick one example, but merely how it did so." Phillip E. Johnson, Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law, & Education 208 (InterVarsity Press 1996)

[FN44]. Ontological materialism, which may be employed interchangeably with the terms "naturalism," "philosophical naturalism," "scientific materialism," and "materialism," is the view that the natural universe is all that exists and all the entities in it can be accounted for by strictly material processes without resorting to any designer, Creator or non-material entity as an explanation or cause for either any aspect of the natural universe or the universe as a whole. Thus, if science is the paradigm of knowledge (as is widely held in our culture), and it necessarily presupposes methodological naturalism, then ontological materialism is the only worldview for which one can have "knowledge."

Although one may employ the terms "naturalism" and "materialism" interchangeably, they are not necessarily synonymous. As J.P. Moreland points out, "[O]ne could be a naturalist without being a physicalist [or materialist], say be embracing Platonic forms, possibilia or abstract objects like sets, and one can be a physicalist [or materialist] and not a naturalist (e.g. if one held that God is a physical object)." Moreland, supra n.17, at 50.

[FN45]. Plantinga defines philosophical naturalism as "the idea that there is no such person as God or anything or anyone at all like him: on this use, naturalism is or can be a quasi-religious view." Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 780.

[FN46]. Id. at 781.

[FN47]. Id.

[FN48]. Id.

[FN49]. Id. at 783.

[FN50]. Id., citing, and responding to, a paper presented by Pennock at the same meeting at which Plantinga delivered his paper, the 1998 annual meeting of the Eastern Division of the American Philosophical Association. Pennock's paper was subsequently published under the title, Why Creationism Should Not Be Taught in Public Schools, in Intelligent Design Creationism and Its Critics, supra n. 4 at 755.

[FN51]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 784.

[FN52]. As Rawls writes,

To secure [the agreement of political liberalism] ... we try, so far as we can, to avoid disputed philosophical, as well as disputed moral and religious, questions. We do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically .... Philosophy as the search for truth about an independent metaphysical and moral order cannot, I believe, provide a workable and shared basis for a political conception of justice in a democratic society.

Rawls, supra n. 34, at 394, 395.

[FN53]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 784 (note omitted).

[FN54]. Id. (attributing this objection to Stephen J. Gould). Gould suggests what he calls the NOMA principle, "non-overlapping magisteria":

Each subject [science and religion] has a legitimate magesterium, or domain of teaching authority--and these magesteria do not overlap .... The net of science covers the empirical universe; what it is made of (fact) and why does it work this way (theory). The net of religion extends over questions of moral meaning and value.

Stephen Jay Gould, Nonoverlapping Magisteria, 106 Nat. History 16 (Mar. 1997).

But to what magisterium does NOMA belong? It seems to be a philosophical principle by which Gould assesses the nature of science and religion, and thus Gould is implying that philosophy is logically prior to science and thus the appropriate discipline by which to assess questions of the nature of science. If that's what he is implying, then it is not clear on what grounds he could object to or not seriously consider intelligent design arguments against methodological naturalism, for they are typically philosophical challenges to the prevailing view of the nature of science.

[FN55]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 785.

[FN56]. Id.

[FN57]. Id. (attributing this objection to Pennock, supra n. 52).

[FN58]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 785-786.

[FN59]. Id. at 786.

[FN60]. Id.

[FN61]. The words of philosopher John Kekes, who is not a critic of evolution, are instructive here:

Science is committed to several presuppositions: that nature exists, that it has discoverable order, that it is uniform, are existential presuppositions of science; the distinctions between space and time, cause and effect, the observer and the observed, real and apparent, orderly and chaotic, are classificatory presuppositions; while intersubjective testability, quantifiability, the public availability of data, are methodological presuppositions; some axiological presuppositions are the honest reporting of results, the worthwhileness of getting the facts right, and scrupulousness in avoiding observational or experimental error. If any one of these presuppositions were abandoned, science, as we know it, could not be done. Yet the acceptance of the presuppositions cannot be a matter of course, for each has been challenged and alternatives are readily available.

John Kekes, The Nature of Philosophy 156-157 (Rowman & Littlefield 1980).

See also Larry Laudan, The Demise of the Demarcation Problem, in But Is It Science?: The Philosophical Question In The Creation/Evolution Controversy 337 (Michael Ruse ed., Prometheus Books 1988); Larry Laudan, Progress and Its Problems: Towards a Theory of Scientific Growth (U. Cal. Press 1977); Moreland, supra n. 15.

[FN62]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 786.

[FN63]. Id. at 789.

[FN64]. Id at 790.

[FN65]. Id.

[FN66]. Id. at 781. As an aside at the beginning of his reply, Pennock claims that Plantinga "uses idyosyncratic and shifting definitions of evolution, seriously underestimates the evidential support for various evolutionary hypotheses, and makes some misleading statements about these." Pennock, supra n. 5, at 793. In an endnote following this quote, Pennock provides an illustration of Plantinga's confusion:

For instance, while it is true that scientists still know rather little about how life originated from nonlife, that organic life arose from inorganic is well confirmed, and progress continues to be made in understanding the chemical processes that were involved, such as the discovery that RNA can act as its own catalyst.

Id. at 796, n. 1. Yet, in another place Pennock asserts "the schools should limit their science curriculum to scientific findings--testable conclusions that we can rationally draw on the basis of observational evidence and the methodological assumption of natural law." Id. at 796. But if we do not know "how life originated from nonlife," in what sense is the claim "that organic life arose from inorganic" testable, "well confirmed," and based on observational evidence?

[FN67]. Id. at 793.

[FN68]. Id. at 794.

[FN69]. Pennock suggests that Plantinga offers little if any support for the BR. He does, however, attribute to Plantinga one reason: "Professor Plantinga argues for (BR) as follows: 'The teacher can't teach all or even more than one of ... conflicting sets of beliefs as the truth; therefore it would be unfair to select any particular one and teach that one as the truth."' Id. at 793- 794, quoting Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 781. Pennock correctly dismisses this reason as not sufficient to establish the BR: "[T]his argument is seriously flawed; even if there is no way for everyone to eat the whole pie, it does not follow that there is no fair way to divide it or even to pick just one person who will get it." Id. at 794. But, as we shall see, there is good reason to believe that the reason Pennock attributes to Plantinga is not doing the logical work Pennock seems to think it is doing.

[FN70]. Id.

[FN71]. Id.

[FN72]. Id.

[FN73]. Id.

[FN74]. Id. at 794-795.

[FN75]. Id. at 795.

[FN76]. According to Rawls, as I noted in n. 40,

the limits imposed by public reason do not apply to all political questions but only to those involving what we may call "constitutional essentials" and questions of basic justice .... This means that political values alone are to settle such questions as: who has the right to vote, or what religions are to be tolerated, or who is to be assured fair equality of opportunity, or to hold property. These and similar questions are the special subject of public reason.

Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at 214.

[FN77]. Writes Rawls:

Since we start within the tradition of democratic thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic ideas [sic] is that in virtue of their two moral powers (a capacity for a sense of justice and for a conception of the good) and the powers of reasons (of judgment, thought, and inference connected with these powers), persons are free. Their having these powers to the requisite minimum degree to be fully cooperating members of society makes persons equal.

Id. at 18-19.

[FN78]. Rawls, supra n. 34, at 395.

[FN79]. See id. at 393-395. Rawls claims that this notion of equality is not dependent of any metaphysical or epistemological position.

[FN80]. For example, Steven Pinker writes:

[E]thical theory requires idealizations like free, sentient, rational, equivalent agents whose behavior is uncaused, and its conclusions can be sound and useful even though the world, as seen by science, does not really have uncaused events .... A human being is simultaneously a machine and a sentient free agent, depending on the purpose of the discussion.

Steven Pinker, How The Mind Works 55-56 (Norton 1997).

See also E.O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The New Synthesis (Harv. U. Press 1975); E.O. Wilson, On Human Nature (Harv. U. Press 1978); Richard A. Posner, The Problematics of Moral and Legal Theory, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1638 (1998); Michael Ruse, The New Evolutionary Ethics, in Evolutionary Ethics (Matthew H. Nitecki & Doris V. Nitecki eds., SUNY Press 1993). Ruse writes:

[C]onsidered as a rationally justifiable set of claims about an objective something, [morality] it is illusory. I appreciate that when somebody says, "Love thy neighbor as thyself," they think they are referring above and beyond themselves .... Nevertheless, to a Darwinian evolutionist it can be seen that such reference is truly without foundation. Morality is just an aid to survival and reproduction, and has no being beyond or without this ... [A]ny deeper meaning is illusory ...

Michael Ruse, The Darwinian Paradigm: Essays on Its History, Philosophy, and Religious Implications 268-269 (Routledge 1989).

Of course, not all Darwinists agree with this assessment of morality. See e.g. James Q. Wilson, The Moral Sense (The Free Press 1993); Ronald Dworkin, Darwin's New Bulldog, 111 Harv. L. Rev. 1718 (1998).

[FN81]. See e.g. Does God Exist?: The Debate Between Theists and Atheists 111-135 (J.P. Moreland & Kai Nielsen eds., Prometheus Books 1993); John E. Hare, Naturalism and Morality, in Naturalism: A Critical Analysis (William Lane Craig & J.P. Moreland eds., Routledge 2000); J.L.A. Garcia, "'Dues sive Natura': Must Natural Lawyers Choose?," in Natural Law, Liberalism, and Morality (Robert P. George ed., Oxford U. Press 1996); Louis P. Pojman, A Critique of Contemporary Egalitarianism: A Christian Perspective, 8.4 Faith & Philosophy 481 (Oct. 1991); Louis P. Pojman, Are Human Rights Based on Equal Human Worth?, 52.3 Phil. & Phenomenological Research 605 (Sept. 1992).

[FN82]. Pennock writes: "Aristotle had held that all species were characterized by some defining essential characteristic that differentiated them from other species, and Darwin's discoveries overturned this view forever." Robert T. Pennock, Tower of Babel: The Evidence Against the New Creationism 156 (MIT Press 1999). See also Pennock's rejection of natural teleology in id. at 242-272.

Of course, one may still believe, and think that one has justification for, holding to some form of egalitarianism or objective morality while affirming a materialist worldview that denies any form of essentialism or teleology. But it is not clear how one can actually pull this off without bracketing the metaphysical implications of materialism from one's ethical deliberations. This is why, for example, Kai Nielsen writes:

We're [Rawls and I] concerned with the justification of moral beliefs, practices, and principles, so we don't try to say what truth is, whether there's moral truth or anything. We say here's a bunch of moral judgments that a culture shares and that I may or may not share. And we see whether those fit together with everything else we know and match with our considered convictions.

Does God Exist?, supra n. 81, at 128 (note omitted). According to the late atheist philosopher J.L. Mackie, the presence of moral properties in the universe "constitute so odd a cluster of qualities and relations that they are most unlikely to have arisen in the ordinary course of events, without an all-powerful god to create them." J.L. Mackie, The Miracle of Theism 115 (Oxford U. Press 1982). Instead of wrestling with the strongest presentation of this problem, Pennock sets up a straw man that virtually no sophisticated defender of theistic moral realism would actually defend: he employees Socrates' famous Euthyphro Dilemma to reject the notion that objective morality is best grounded in a theistic worldview. See Pennock, supra n. 82, at 324-337.

[FN83]. For example, Darwin writes:

At some future period, not very distant as measured by centuries, the civilized races of man will almost certainly exterminate and replace the savage races throughout the world. At the same time the anthropomorphous apes ... will no doubt be exterminated. The break between man and his nearest Allies will then be wider, for it will intervene between man in a more civilized state, as we may hope, even than the Caucasian, and some ape as low as the baboon, instead of as now between the Negro or Australian and the gorilla.

Charles Darwin, The Descent of Man 178 (2d ed., A.L. Burt Co. 1874).

[FN84]. King asserts: "I have a dream that one day this nation will rise up and live out the true meaning of its creed. We hold these truths to be self-evident that all men are created equal." Martin Luther King, Jr., I Have a Dream, speech, 1963 (available at http://www.csamerican.com/Doc.asp?doc=King #dreams).

[FN85]. Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 779.

[FN86]. Pennock, supra n. 5, at 795.

[FN87]. Rawls, supra n. 34, at 395.

[FN88]. This is why I think that Plantinga does not have to resort "special circumstances" to explicitly exclude Nazi-ideas from being taught in public schools. See Plantinga, supra n. 4, at 782.

[FN89]. Rawls, supra n. 34, at 394. It should be noted that Rawls asserts that "we do this not because these questions are unimportant or regarded with indifference, but because we think them too important and recognize that there is no way to resolve them politically." Id. (note omitted).

[FN90]. Pennock, supra n. 5, at 795-796.

[FN91]. Id. at 795.

[FN92]. "Is it right to teach children that something that is known to be true is false?" Pennock, supra n. 50, at 756.

[FN93]. For example, Pennock writes "[S]cience rejects all special ontological substances that are supernatural, and it does so without prejudice, be they mental or vital or divine." Pennock, supra n. 82, at 324. But he writes elsewhere that "Aristotle had held that all species were characterized by some defining essential characteristic that differentiated them from other species, and Darwin's discoveries overturned this view forever." Id. at 156. But to say that a particular metaphysical position is overturned forever is to prejudge all future arguments as unsound, that is, to embrace a prejudice. In addition, one cannot reject all non-natural substances without prejudice unless one knows either that non-natural substances cannot in-principle count against Darwinian accounts of the natural world (but that can't be, because Pennock says that Darwin's discoveries overturned them) or that non-natural substances cannot exist by definition (but in that case, there was nothing for Darwin to overturn).

[FN94]. Pennock's comments cited in the above note (n. 93) seem to be consistent with his believing that this is in fact the case.

[FN95]. See Edward J. Larson, Trial and Error: The American Controversy Over Creation and Evolution 58-72 (Oxford U. Press 1985).

[FN96]. Epperson v. Ark., 393 U.S. 97 (1968).

[FN97]. Id. at 103.

[FN98]. McLean v. Ark. Bd. of Educ., 529 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ark. 1982).

[FN99]. Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987).

[FN100]. Id. at 593.

[FN101]. Id. at 594.

[FN102]. Id. at 605; see Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 319 (1980); McGowan v. Md., 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961) (Powell, J., concurring).

[FN103]. According to the Court, Louisiana's Balanced-Treatment Act did not give teachers any more academic freedom than what they already had in supplanting "the present science curriculum with the presentation of theories, besides evolution, about the origin of life." Edwards, 482 U.S., 587. Because "[t]he Act provides Louisiana school teachers with no new authority [,] ... the stated purpose is not furthered by it." Id. at 587. The Court of Appeals made a similar observation. See Aguillard v. Edwards, 765 F.2d 1251, 1257 (5th Cir. 1985).

[FN104]. As I pointed out in n. 36, Rawls makes a distinction between secular and public reason, arguing that the former depends on a comprehensive doctrine, a secular one:

Since the idea of public reason specifies at the deepest level the basic political values and specifies how the political relation is to be understood, those who believe that fundamental political questions should be decided by what they regard as the best reasons according to their own idea of the whole truth--including their religious or secular comprehensive doctrine--and not by reasons that might be shared by all citizens as free and equal, will of course reject the idea of public reason.

Rawls, supra n. 36, at 771. As I also pointed in n. 36, because the courts have considered irreligion, or secularism, as a religion for both establishment and free exercise purposes, it seems fair to say that when the courts use the term "secular reason" or something similar to it, they mean roughly the same thing as Rawls does when employs the term "public reason." On the legal definition of religion, see McConnell, Berg, Garvey, supra n. 36, at 869-905.

[FN105]. Rawls, supra n. 36, at 786.

[FN106]. Rawls, PL2, supra n. 6, at xlvi.

[FN107]. The federal district court took motive into consideration, though it was not dispositive:

The unusual circumstances surrounding the passage of Act 590, as well as the substantive law of the First Amendment, warrant an inquiry into the stated legislative purposes. The author of the Act had publicly proclaimed the sectarian purpose of the proposal. The Arkansas residents who sought legislative sponsorship of the bill did so for a purely sectarian purpose. These circumstances alone may not be particularly persuasive, but when considered with the publicly announced motives of the legislative sponsor made contemporaneously with the legislative process; the lack of any legislative investigation, debate or consultation with any educators or scientists; the unprecedented intrusion in school curriculum; and official history of the State of Arkansas on the subject, it is obvious that the statement of purposes has little, if any, support in fact.

McLean, 529 F. Supp., 1264. (footnote omitted; emphasis added).

[FN108]. The Court writes in Edwards:

Besides Senator Keith, several of the most vocal legislators also revealed their religious motives for supporting the bill in the official legislative history. See, e.g., id., at E-441, E-443 (Sen. Saunders noting that bill was amended so that teachers could refer to the Bible and other religious texts to support the creation-science theory); 2 App. E-561--E-562, E-610 (Rep. Jenkins contending that the existence of God was a scientific fact).

Edwards, 482 U.S., 593 n. 13.

[FN109]. For example, Barbara Forrest writes: "At heart, proponents of intelligent design are not motivated to improve science but to transform it into a theistic enterprise that supports religious faith." Barbara Forrest, The Newest Evolution of Creationism: Intelligent Design is About Politics and Religion, Not Science, 111.3 Nat. History 80 (Apr. 2002).

[FN110]. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978) (emphasis added).

[FN111]. Reynolds v. U.S., 98 U.S. 145, 166 (1878). The Court did say in Wis. v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) that "[t]his case [Yoder], therefore, does not become easier because respondents were convicted for their 'actions' in refusing to send their children to the public high school; in this context belief and action cannot be neatly confined in logic-tight compartments." However, I do not believe the general principle in Reynolds is jettisoned, for in Yoder the concern was whether the state's prohibition of the religious action in question (the free exercise right of Amish parents to be exempted from the compulsory education laws) could be rejected on the grounds that their actions and not their beliefs were being prohibited by the state in a case in which belief and action overlapped at points. But it was clear the Court did not touch the long-held principle that mere belief could not be proscribed by government.

[FN112]. The Court writes in McDaniel, 435 U.S. at 626:

If the Tennessee disqualification provision were viewed as depriving the clergy of a civil right solely because of their religious beliefs, our inquiry would be at an end. The Free Exercise Clause categorically prohibits government from regulating, prohibiting, or rewarding religious beliefs as such ... [references omitted]. In Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961), the Court reviewed the Maryland constitutional requirement that all holders of "any office of profit or trust in this State" declare their belief in the existence of God. In striking down the Maryland requirement, the Court did not evaluate the interests assertedly justifying it but rather held that it violated freedom of religious belief.

[FN113]. John Rawls, Justice As Fairness: A Restatement 184 (Erin Kelly ed., Harv. U. Press 2001).

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