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Faith, Reason, and the Christian University

What Pope John Paul II Can Teach Christian Academics

BAYLOR UNIVERSITY, the world's largest Baptist university, is a remarkable place with many fine Christian men and women on its faculty and in its student body. It boasts a rich tradition of academic excellence, and it is a privilege for me to be able to make a contribution to that tradition, however modest my contribution may be. However, soon after my arrival at Baylor in 2003 it came as a surprise to me to learn that among the university's most respected faculty, denominational leaders, and alumni are those who reject creeds as normative for Christian belief. For example, one theologian of this stripe, James Dunn, enthusiastically asserted that the only creed his tradition accepts is "Ain't nobody but Jesus goin' to tell me what to believe."¹ Of course, there are many Baptists, including Baylor faculty, alumni, and regents, who disagree with the point of view held by Dunn and others.²

As one would suspect, this anti-creedalism, as its advocates argue, has implications for the life of a Christian university. For they maintain that an academic institution's embracing of a creed—as a standard of orthodoxy to assist the university in assessing the Christian faith of prospective and current faculty members—is a viola-

tion of academic freedom as well as oppressive to the believer's liberty and spiritual integrity.

I believe this view is mistaken, but not because its advocates do not mean well or that they are not committed to the truth of the Gospel or the primacy of the Christian message. Rather, it is because they have assimilated into their theological understanding, sometimes inadvertently, philosophical beliefs about the nature of liberty and knowledge that are inconsistent with the preservation of their institutions' theological commitments.

I. Anti-Creedalism and the Christian University

In order to make my case, I want to conscript the work of Pope John Paul II. For the late pontiff, the sort of view embraced by anti-creedalists seems impossible to sustain if one claims simultaneously that one's academic institution has a particular character or end in mind that must be developed, nurtured, and promulgated. Although he is writing of Catholic universities in *Ex corde ecclesiae*, John Paul's remarks may be applied to non-Catholic Christian institutions as well:

A Catholic University pursues its objectives through its formation of an authentic human community animated by the spirit of Christ. The source of its unity springs from a common vision of the dignity of the human person and, ultimately, the person and message of Christ which gives the Institution its distinctive character. . . .

Every Catholic University, as Catholic, informs and carries out its research teaching, and all other activities with Catholic ideals, principles, and attitudes. It is linked with the Church either by a formal, constitutive and statutory bond or by reason of an institutional commitment made by those responsible for it. . . . The University, particularly through its structure and its regulations, is to provide means which will guarantee the expression and preservation of this identity. . . . The

responsibility for maintaining and strengthening the Catholic identity of the University rests primarily with the University itself. While the responsibility is entrusted principally to university authorities . . . it is shared in varying degrees by all members of the university community, and therefore calls for the recruitment of adequate university personnel, especially teachers and administrators, who are both willing and able to promote the identity. The identity of a Catholic University is essentially linked to the quality of its teachers and to respect for Catholic doctrine.³

John Paul is suggesting that a university as a whole cannot claim to offer a distinctive theological alternative to its peer institutions while at the same time claiming that it is illegitimate for the university to require that its individual members be committed to the particular beliefs and general worldview on which the university's unique character depends. Moreover, anti-creedalism, a belief in the wrongness of normative theological judgments, cannot by its nature function as a normative theological judgment even though it must do so in order to make any sense. Anti-creedalism, in a word, is incoherent.

To say that an idea or belief is incoherent is to claim that it is unintelligible or makes no sense. Some cases of incoherent ideas are obvious, such as a married-bachelor or a square-circle. Others are not so obvious, and in fact may seem at first perfectly coherent and understandable. For example, the belief that *every belief must be supported by evidence* is itself a belief that one does not believe on the basis of evidence, for it is a first principle one accepts in order to get on with the business of assessing other beliefs. Yet, it is incoherent, since it violates its own standard of warrant. Anti-creedalism suffers from a similar problem when it is applied to an academic institution that calls itself "Christian."

To examine this more fully, I will reflect upon comments made by the president of Baptist-affiliated Mercer University, William D. Underwood. An anti-creedal Baptist, he states:

We not only have an advantage over state schools, Baptist universities also enjoy an advantage among other faith-based schools. We have no pronouncements by the organized Church to limit our exchange of ideas, as do some Christian universities. And, at least historically, we have had no binding denominational creeds, as do some evangelical colleges, that might otherwise be used to limit inquiry. What Baptist universities have instead is the historical and theological commitment of Baptists to individual freedom of thought and expression. Because of our Baptist commitment to freedom, we among all universities, faith-based or secular, should have the most open and robust exchange of ideas—the fullest and most rewarding pursuit of truth.⁴

According to Underwood, a normative creed is inconsistent with individual liberty, for it would require that the community affirm that there is such a thing as correct belief and that those who depart from that correct belief are in fact mistaken. This, according to Underwood, is not conducive to his tradition's view that we are responsible for our own souls and that "this responsibility . . . requires us to think for ourselves and come to our own conclusions."⁵

Underwood is surely correct that liberty is a good, as John Paul affirms, but he is not correct that liberty is incompatible with the normativity of creeds.⁶ After all, Underwood cannot be claiming that thinking individuals should never embrace a creed after carefully and conscientiously studying the issue. For if he were to make that claim, he would be limiting the liberty of potential creedalists (according to his own understanding of liberty) and judging the converted ones as mistaken, thereby placing himself in the position of what he calls, and condemns as, "spiritual masters [who] . . . tell us what to teach, what to learn, and what to believe."⁷

Moreover, it is not obvious that the (politically) libertarian view of freedom assumed by anti-creedalists is in fact the only understanding of liberty available to Christians. One does not have to

make the false choice between John Stuart Mill and a rigid-unthinking fundamentalism. Or, as John Paul puts it in *Fides et ratio*:

The act of entrusting oneself to God . . . [is] a moment of fundamental decision which engages the whole person. In that act, the intellect and the will display their spiritual nature, enabling the subject to act in a way which realizes personal freedom to the full. . . . Indeed, it is faith that allows individuals to give consummate expression to their own freedom. Put differently, freedom is not realized in decisions made against God. For how could it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to be open to the very reality which enables our self-realization?⁸

In other words, our understanding of the meaning of freedom depends on what we know to be true about ourselves and our nature as given to us by God. If, in fact, we believe that our theology and all that it entails for philosophical anthropology and the good life is true, we can coherently claim that liberty, rightly understood, prohibits us from rejecting certain unassailable truths about ourselves without which liberty loses its point. As Jesus succinctly stated, “Ye shall know the truth; and the truth shall make you free” (Jn 8:32 KJV). To put it another way, ignorance of the truth may increase the number of possible choices one can make, but in that case one would be less free than the person who knows the truth and makes choices in life under its direction. Consider, for example, the following case.

In 2004, Baylor University’s student newspaper, the *Lariat*, published an editorial supporting the legalization of same-sex marriage.⁹ Because Baylor is a Baptist institution firmly committed to the classical Christian understanding of human sexuality,¹⁰ and because the president’s office had received a mountain of complaints from parents, alumni, and others as a result of the editorial, the administration issued a condemnation of the newspaper’s opinion, saying that the paper, as a publication of Baylor University, had supported a

point of view hostile to the institution's Christian commitment.¹¹ Mercer President Underwood, who was on the Baylor law faculty at the time, weighed in on this controversy in a January 2006 speech: "I too disagreed with the students' viewpoint, but I disagreed even more with the reaction of our president. . . . The president's reaction ended any further discussion. And our academic community lost a valuable opportunity to gain new insights through an intellectually rigorous examination of the issue."¹² Thus, according to Underwood, anything that ends further discussion is a violation of liberty. There are several reasons why this cannot be right.

First, Underwood himself does not believe that Baptist liberty is so broad that it may accommodate the freedom of a Baptist to abandon Baptist principles and still legitimately claim to be a true Baptist. He states:

It is this individual responsibility that compels us to think for ourselves and come to our own conclusions. This is what Baptists have believed from the beginning. It is a part of our earliest heritage. Freedom of individual conscience. Respect for the freedom of others who disagree. And individual responsibility. These have been bedrock Baptist principles. These principles are at stake at this moment in Baptist history. . . . Mercer may be the best hope for preserving the principles that have defined Baptists.¹³

Second, if Underwood is correct, it would mean that acquiring the truth would be inconsistent with liberty, for once one has the truth on a matter, as Underwood believes he does on the incorrigible status of "bedrock Baptist principles," no further inquiry as to its truth is required.¹⁴ (Of course, it goes without saying that serious intellectual discussions of this truth and how best to understand it, defend it, communicate it, and live it are appropriate areas of academic and philosophical inquiry in a Christian community.)

Third, concerning the issue in question, same-sex marriage, Underwood seems to be saying that an intellectually rigorous ex-

amination of that issue cannot take place in a Christian academic community unless the institution renounces, or publicly brackets, its commitment to what it believes is true about human beings (in this case, human sexuality). But that cannot be right, for at least two reasons. First, the notion that academic rigor is a good depends on a theological truth about human beings that Underwood himself cannot renounce without undercutting his criticism of the administration that condemned the *Lariat* editorial. That is, Underwood, like the defender of the exclusivity of male-female marriage, is committed to a fundamental belief about human beings that he sees no good reason to abandon and/or renounce. Second, it is just empirically false to claim that an institution's theological commitment inhibits academic rigor on the issue of marriage's nature. For it seems to me that the best and most philosophically sophisticated arguments supporting male-female marriage and the classical Christian understanding of the person are being produced by scholars nurtured in intellectual traditions and/or by academic institutions firmly committed to an understanding of theology as a knowledge tradition that can be defended and supported by rational argument.¹⁵

In contrast, the places in which this work is rare at best, or despised and marginalized at worst, are institutions that decades ago fully embraced the academic marginalization of theology that Underwood is suggesting as the proper way to understand the relationship between faith and reason. For example, it is difficult to find an elite mainline Protestant seminary (let alone university or college) in which the classical Christian understanding of marriage and the human person is given a prominent place in the faculty or in the curriculum. There may be recalcitrant faculty members who hold these views, but their views are not in ascendancy and definitely not embraced by a sizeable plurality of the faculty.

Consequently, to claim that Christians may hold contrary opinions not inconsistent with Christianity concerning whether marriage requires an opposite sex couple is to affirm that the nature of marriage has become an unsettled question and that what Chris-

tians have traditionally believed about marriage—that it is a one-flesh communion consisting only of a man and a woman—was unwarranted and *may be mistaken*. In order to grasp the significance of this, imagine that a contemporary student newspaper at a Christian university published an editorial recommending the reinstatement of the public policy of racial segregation. Would the university be justified in publicly condemning this editorial and claiming that the newspaper does not speak for the university or the moral understanding of the school's Christian commitment? It seems to me that the university would be justified in issuing these judgments, and to do so would not be inconsistent with academic freedom, since the position advanced by the editorial is contrary to the principles of the common good and the intrinsic dignity of persons in which liberty's point is fixed. So, the dispute is not really over academic freedom, but over the question of what is known about human beings and their nature, the *sine qua non* of theological anthropology.

II. The Incoherence of Anti-Creedalism

The incoherence of anti-creedalism should now be plain to see. It depends on a cluster of beliefs that function as an equivalent of a creed. For it assumes that human beings are such that the anti-creedalist's understanding of liberty is in fact a good. But that would mean that the anti-creedalist maintains an understanding of human beings, a philosophical anthropology if you will, that embraces a notion of liberty implying that other notions are in fact mistaken. This not only resembles, it in fact is a first principle concerning human conduct derived from our ontological constitution as human beings that anti-creedalists believe is true. It is also something that they claim is derived from their church's tradition, its "bedrock principles." Apparently, someone who does not embrace this understanding has committed a theological error or what the Council of Nicaea would call a heresy. So, this tradition carries with it all the earmarks of the creedalism its supporters claim to reject:

there is a correct understanding of theology that is fundamental and by which one may issue judgments about the accuracy of another's theological opinions.

Suppose, however, that anti-creedalists were to retreat and instead claim that the understanding they are offering is only *their* understanding, one that they have come to believe over their lifetime but that they would not judge others as mistaken if they did not embrace it as well. This would be a peculiar strategy for the anti-creedalist to take, since it would mean that their defenses of their understandings of theology and liberty, though appearing to offer correction to their colleagues and peers, are really no more epistemically normative than announcing on an Internet bulletin board their private tastes in ice cream or popular music. Thus, if these grounds are adequate for the anti-creedalist, then they are adequate for us as well: we can reject their position by merely announcing that our subjective proclivities differ from theirs and thus we do not find their position desirable or consistent with our personal tastes.¹⁶

But in point of fact anti-creedalists explicitly reject the idea that they are “cultural relativists” who deny “objective truth” and believe that “anything goes.”¹⁷ It is disappointing, however, that they offer no actual argument or conceptual justification that would reconcile these series of disclaimers with their enthusiasm for what appears to give aid and comfort to cultural relativism and a denial of objective truth.

III. Theology as a Knowledge Tradition

The reason for this philosophical confusion is that anti-creedalists do not think of their theology as a knowledge tradition,¹⁸ as they do their law, medicine, political theory, or monetary policy.¹⁹ Faith, according to this view, may be true, but it cannot be known to be true. Faith and reason are different ways of acquiring beliefs, with the former being the weaker epistemic stepbrother who al-

ways must answer to the latter, with the latter being equivalent to the empirical deliverances of the hard and social sciences. This is why anti-creedalists seem to consider matters of religious belief as less epistemically important than other matters. Such a posture is what happens when a religious community uncritically assimilates a “positivistic mentality,” which, according to John Paul, “not only abandon[s] the Christian vision of the world, but more especially reject[s] every appeal to a metaphysical or moral vision.”²⁰ It is, in the words of the late pontiff, one of the many fruits of *scientism*, “the philosophical notion which refuses to admit the validity of forms of knowledge other than those of the positive sciences; and it relegates religious, theological, ethical and aesthetic knowledge to the realm of mere fantasy.”²¹

In a Christian academic community in which this positivist mentality is dominant, a chemistry professor, for example, can be dismissed for denying the veracity of the periodical table, but a theology professor may treat the Apostles’ Creed as no more normative, or less so, than the editorial page of the *New York Times* or the latest issue of *Dissent*. Under this paradigm, bioethical issues are assessed in a similar fashion. To employ but one example, the resolution of the morality of abortion, according to this understanding, is a matter of faith, and thus the procedure ought to be permitted under our laws. For to forbid abortion, because we Christians happen to believe that the unborn is a person, would be to violate the religious liberty of fellow citizens who want to procure abortions because they believe that the unborn is not a person.²² But as John Paul has noted in *Evangelium vitae*, to treat as an open question, or as unknowable, the nature of human beings is in fact to call into question the very liberty affirmed by secular liberals and religious anti-creedalists, since that liberty is entailed by unassailable first principles of human conduct that the secular liberal and the anti-creedalist implicitly claim to know.²³ Thus, the secular and anti-creedalist resolution of the abortion debate is achieved by sequestering a priori any philosophical anthropology that depends on knowledge claims that are not reduc-

ible to the hard or social sciences, even though the right to abortion does not itself seem amenable to that reduction either. That is, if one thinks of the “right to abortion” as a universal right of human beings by nature, it seems that that right has all the earmarks of an irreducible immaterial property, and thus cannot be accounted for as knowable under the secularist and anti-creedal epistemological framework.²⁴

In contrast, John Paul suggests, as many Protestant scholars (including Baptists) have suggested, that faith and reason are indeed compatible, since theology is a knowledge tradition that grounds and illuminates reason and may in fact be supported by arguments unaided by special revelation.²⁵ According to this understanding, reason and faith are not incommensurable subjects, with the former (knowledge) determining the boundaries of the latter (religious belief), but two complementary sources of knowledge that contribute to our understanding of the world, our place in it, and our relationship to all things eternal and unchanging. In a sense, faith and reason are like two eyes, each of which can function well, but each on its own incompletely. However, when they work together they perform as one and provide the knower with a richer and more complete vision of the world, both material and immaterial. As John Paul affirms:

Deprived of what Revelation offers, reason has taken side-tracks which expose it to the danger of losing sight of its final goal. Deprived of reason, faith has stressed feeling and experience, and so run the risk of no longer being a universal proposition. It is an illusion to think that faith, tied to weak reasoning, might be more penetrating; on the contrary, faith then runs the grave risk of withering into myth or superstition. By the same token, reason which is unrelated to an adult faith is not prompted to turn its gaze to the newness and radicality of being.²⁶

If anti-creedal Christians require a passage of Scripture to understand what John Paul is saying, St. Paul provides one: “We destroy

arguments and every proud obstacle to the knowledge of God, and take every thought captive to obey Christ” (2 Cor 10:5 RSV).

According to St. Paul and John Paul, we have knowledge of God as well as the order and nature of things in his world, just as we have knowledge derived from the hard and social sciences. Consequently, it no more obstructs the liberty of Christian professors to suggest to them that the Apostles’ Creed conveys accurate theological knowledge than to suggest to a chemistry student that the periodic table conveys accurate knowledge of all known elements.

Notes

1. Ken Woodward, “Sex, Sin, and Salvation,” *Newsweek* (Nov. 2, 1998): 37.
2. See, for example, Barry G. Hankins and Donald D. Schmeltekopf, ed., *The Baylor Project: Taking Christian Higher Education to the Next Level* (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine’s Press, 2007).
3. John Paul II, *Ex corde ecclesiae: On Catholic Universities* (Washington, DC: United States Catholic Conference, 1990), 39, 41.
4. William D. Underwood, “Baptist Summit Speech,” University Center, Mercer University (Jan. 20, 2006), available at <http://www2.mercer.edu/President/BaptistSummitSpeech.htm>.
5. William D. Underwood, “Message to Graduates,” Baylor University commencement address (delivered Dec. 17, 2005), available at http://www.baptiststandard.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=453. Underwood gave this message in December 2005 while he was interim president of Baylor University and after he had accepted the offer to be president of Mercer University (effective July 1, 2006).
6. John Paul II, *Evangelium vitae: The Gospel of Life* (Boston, MA: St. Paul Books and Media, 1995), 33–39.
7. Underwood, “Baptist Summit Speech,” n.p.
8. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio: On the Relationship Between Faith and Reason* (Boston: St. Paul Books and Media, 1998), 22–23.
9. “San Francisco Should Pursue Same-Sex Marriage Suit” (Staff Editorial), *The Lariat Online* (Feb. 27, 2004), available at <http://www.baylor.edu/Lariat/news.php?action=story&story=19983> (Mar. 3, 2006).
10. Baylor will be guided by the understanding that human sexuality is a gift from the creator God and that the purposes of this gift include (1) the procreation of human life and (2) the uniting and strengthening of the marital bond in

self-giving love. These purposes are to be achieved through heterosexual relationships within marriage. Misuses of God's gift will be understood to include, but not be limited to, sexual abuse, sexual harassment, sexual assault, incest, adultery, fornication and homosexuality. (Baylor University Faculty Handbook [Fall 2000], 167).

11. "Espousing in a Baylor publication a view that is so out of touch with traditional Christian teachings is not only unwelcome, it comes dangerously close to violating University policy, as published in the Student Handbook, prohibiting the advocacy of any understandings of sexuality that are contrary to biblical teaching" (ibid.).
12. Greg Warner, "Mercer president-elect decries 'spiritual masters' who limit freedom," ABPNews.com (Jan. 24, 2006), available at http://www.abpnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=899&Itemid (Mar. 4, 2006).
13. Underwood, "Baptist Summit Speech," n.p.
14. Ibid.
15. See, for example, Robert P. George, *Making Men Moral: Civil Liberties and Public Morality* (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1993); Patrick Lee, *Abortion and Unborn Human Life* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996); John Finnis, "The Good of Marriage and the Morality of Sexual Relations," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 42 (1997); Patrick Lee and Robert P. George, "What Sex Can Be: Self-Alienation, Illusion, or One-Flesh Union," *American Journal of Jurisprudence* 42 (1997); Robert P. George and Gerard V. Bradley, "Marriage and the Liberal Imagination," *Georgetown Law Journal* 84 (1995); and J. P. Moreland and Scott B. Rae, *Body & Soul: Human Nature and the Crisis in Ethics* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000).
16. I suspect that Underwood, a law professor, would not conduct his course on trial practice in such a fashion, that he would not tell his students that the rules of criminal and civil procedure are matters of personal preference, that there are no stable principles of jurisprudence to which all attorneys must adhere in order to remain in good standing in their profession, and that the absence of the rule of law would strike an important blow against the enemies of individualism and anti-creedalism.
17. Underwood states:

That we are free to come to our own conclusions does not mean that there is no objective truth—that just anything goes—that one person's conclusion is just as valid as that of another, no matter what it might be—that we embrace some sort of "radical subjectivity"—that we are "cultural relativists." We know that there is truth. We know that sometimes we are wrong. Sometimes our ideas ought to be rejected by others. Our great theologians are sometimes wrong. Our philosophers can be wrong. Our preachers can be wrong. Even our university presidents are sometimes wrong. ("Baptist Summit Speech," n.p.)
18. See Francis J. Beckwith, "Taking Theology Seriously: The Status of Religious Beliefs of Judicial Nominees for the Federal Bench," *Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy* 20 (2006), 455–70.

19. A former president of Baylor University (1981–95), the late Dr. Herbert H. Reynolds (1930–2007), was a champion of this view. In a January 2004 article in *The Christian Century*, writer Robert Benne describes Reynolds's perspective after conducting an interview with the former Baylor president:

Christianity, in this form of *Baptist* piety, includes an inevitable moral imperative. But in one's relationship with Christ—which is highly individual and inward—one has “soul competency.” A true Christian shares the freedom of the priesthood of each believer. This competency and freedom compel one to read the Bible and its meanings according to conscience. Nothing about the faith should be articulated in creeds or systems of Christian thought.

“We do not believe in systematic theology,” said Reynolds, explaining his style of *Baptist* piety. According to his view, public articulations of systematic theology, as well as public displays of piety, partake in the kind of “religiosity” that Jesus condemns in Matthew 6. Moreover, such affirmations quickly become oppressive and rob other believers of their Christian freedom, their “soul competency.”

This traditionally *Baptist* construal of the faith results in a particular vision of the Christian university. Some have called it the “atmospheric” or “*two-spheres*” approach. The Christian character of the university resides in the hospitable, friendly, caring, just and edifying atmosphere created by sincere Christians. It also resides in the religion courses and the extracurricular religious activities that permeate the university. But what happens in the classrooms of this kind of Christian university is pretty much the same as what occurs in public universities. The only difference is that the Christian professor operates out of a sense of Christian vocation. Professors are in the university to “teach algebra, political science, the best way they know how, which is to me the Christian way to do it,” said Reynolds. (Robert Benne, “Crisis of Identity,” *The Christian Century* 121, no. 2 (Jan. 27, 2004), 24–25.

20. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, 62.
21. *Ibid.*
22. For a defense of this sort of position, see Paul D. Simmons, “Religious Liberty and Abortion Policy: *Casey* as ‘Catch-22,’” *Journal of Church and State* 42, no. 1 (Winter 2000) and Stuart Rosenbaum, “Abortion, the Constitution, and Metaphysics,” *Journal of Church and State* 43, no. 4 (Autumn 2001). For responses see, Francis J. Beckwith, “Law, Religion, and Metaphysics: A Reply to Simmons,” *Journal of Church and State* 43, no. 1 (Winter, 2001); Francis J. Beckwith, “When You Come to a Fork In the Road, Take It?: Abortion, Personhood, and the Jurisprudence of Neutrality,” *Journal of Church and State* 44, no. 3 (Summer 2003); and Francis J. Beckwith, “Bioethics, the Christian Citizen, and the Pluralist Game,” *Christian Bioethics* 13 (May 2007), 159–70.
23. John Paul II, *Evangelium vitae*, 115. See also Hadley Arkes, *Natural Rights and the Right to Choose* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

24. For a defense of the prolife position on abortion, see Francis J. Beckwith, *Defending Life: A Moral and Legal Case Against Abortion Choice* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007).
25. See, for example, J. P. Moreland, *Love Your God With All Your Mind: The Role of Reason in the Life of the Soul* (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 1997); J. P. Moreland, *The Kingdom Triangle* (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan, 2007); C. Stephen Evans, "The Christian University and the Connectedness of Knowledge," in *The Baptist and Christian Character of Baylor*, ed. Donald D. Schmeltekopf and Dianna Vitanza (with Bradley J. B. Toben) (Waco, TX: Baylor University, 2003); C. Stephen Evans, "Why Christian Colleges and Universities (including Baptist Ones) Should Inquire about the Religious Commitments of Prospective Faculty," in *The Baylor Project*; and Thomas A. Howe and Richard G. Howe, "Knowing Christianity Is True: The Relationship Between Faith and Reason," in *To Everyone An Answer: A Case for the Christian Worldview*, ed. Francis J. Beckwith, William Lane Craig, and J. P. Moreland (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004).
26. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, p. 62.

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