DiaBlogue<A>: The Ethical Trilemma
I. Ontological dependence on an
omnipotent, benevolent Deity as the ultimate source of virtue and
truth
II. Epistemic dependence on received
Scripture as a reliable indicator of divine will
Alan and I can now turn our
attention to pursuing answers rather than merely seeking questions! I'll start
with the first one, where I assert:
I. Belief in a transcendent
moral
purpose for the universe is as well-justified and essential for
social
inquiry as belief in the transcendent
mathematical
nature of the universe is for
scientific
inquiry.
Note that in (I) I am merely
trying to establish the meaning and relevance of Deity -- what might be called
Strong Deism -- not full Theism.To be sure, Alan has implied in the past that he
doesn't object to deism per se, but his response implies that he sees no need
for
this
kind of deity.
Obviously, I do. [Read
more] to find out why...
To start, let me make a couple of things clear. I
readily accept that:
I. Atheists are
not
intrinsically immoral. It is an easily observable fact that many
self-proclaimed atheists (such as Alan) in fact lead more ethically defensible
lives than many self-proclaimed Christians (cf. certain medieval
popes).
II. It
is
possible to construct useful ethical systems without explicitly invoking God. In
fact, I find many admirable qualities in A
Secular Humanist Declaration and "What
an Atheist Ought to Stand For", two sources Alan is fond of quoting
and which I presume reflect his personal
beliefs.Further, I think Alan and I
both agree that certain thing are objectively "good" (or at least demonstrably
"better" than others), and that it is possible to rationally explore these
questions. Right, Alan?Where, then,
do we disagree?The short answer is
that the atheistic ethics I've seen feel a bit to me like Aristotelian physics: useful and well-thought
out as far as they go, but lacking the sort of deep grounding we've expected
from physics since Newton established a coherent mathematical foundation for
physical inquiry. Put another way, I
can readily see why atheists might (and do) believe in such noble ethics as
above, but I've never been quite clear why it is not equally possible for them
to believe in something
else.In particular, I've yet
to see a rational system that can fully address what I call "The Ethical
Trilemma." The Trilemma arises in trying to identify the greatest
good. That is, what is the destination of virtue -- the thing sought
for itself -- as opposed to those things which are merely good in relation to
something else.Building on Alan's
earlier statements, and other ethical
systems, I see three potential candidates for things that are
"inherently good":
A. Belief in truth
B. The welfare of society
A. I ought always to act so as to maximize my
ability to believe/obey
truth
B. I ought always to act so as to maximize the
good of others
C. I ought always to act so as to maximize my
personal
happiness
Given these rough (but
hopefully still meaningful) definitions, the Ethical Trilemma is simply
this:
How can we reconcile these
three competing ethical claims?
I would hope it is obvious that these three
principles are at least prima
facie in conflict: that is, though
sometimes all three are in happy alignment, it is fairly easy to construct
scenarios ("moral dilemmas") where this is no apparent way
to resolve the tension between competing imperatives. In fact, I believe Alan
already alluded to such, when discussing [link?] whether it was better to
investigate the habits of snails or save a drowning
neighbor.This is more than an academic
exercise. I would argue that this in fact
the
problem which every political, religious, and ethical system has to solve; and
further, that a failure to adequately address this question becomes the ultimate
cause of a system's mortality.As far
as I can see,there are only three possible responses to the
trilemma:
ii. Affirm one or two, and deny the other(s),
the way some Romanticists deny Truth, Egoists deny Love, and Altruists deny Happiness. To be sure, they may
pay lip service to the missing leg as an "indirect beneift", but when push comes
to shove they are willing to sacrifice it for the sake of the
others
iii. Make the ontological assertion that all
three are ultimately
always
aligned, and it is only our imperfect understanding that creates the illusion of
conflict.
This third option (iii) is aesthetically the
most attractive, but it is an enormously strong statement. It basically asserts
that the multitude of biological, psychological, and evolutionary forces
responsible for humanity are
fundamentally
compatible with the scientific, philosophical, and intellectual investigation of
the ultimate nature of reality -- even when there appears to be strong evidence
for conflict!To me, (iii) is an
ethical assertion equivalent to the modern belief in the unitary nature of
physical law. That is, all physicists fundamentally believe that at some deep
level general relativity and quantum mechanics
must be
reconcilable to a common mathematical "theory of everything" -- even though we have no
tangible proof that such a theory exists, or must be comprehensible to human
minds. So, the questions I have for
Alan are:
a. Do you accept my formulation of the Trilemma
as a meaningful question?
b. Might you phrase it differently, but still
accept the fundamental tension between these three?
c. If so, how (if at all) do you resolve that
tension?
d. If you choose (iii), do you have any rational
basis for that belief?
e. Do you have any empirical evidence for the
viability of your approach?
f. Do you see why I consider (iii) equivalent to
asserting a "transcendent moral purpose for the
universe"?
Sorry for the deluge of
questions, but this Trilemma has been bugging me for several months, and I'm
dying to hear Alan's answers. Over to you, Alan.
Posted: Wed - September 13, 2006 at 06:50 PM