DiaBlogue<A>: "Naturalism" AND "Mysticism" Are Dead
Today's title is homage to the Tom
Stoppard play, "Rosencrantz and Guildenstern are Dead", which in
turn is inspired by the two most casual murders in a tragedy filled
with death. I don't think Alan was still at Caltech when TACIT put it on
the former, but I still have fond memories of it, perhaps because the cast
(including me, as one of the thespians) got to meet Tom Stoppard. Even though
half my friends who attended hated the show, due to what one of them labeled
"existential claptrap."I mention this
not to discuss the show's existential philosophy (that'll come up later
:-), but rather the philosophy of existence (what "is" is :-). In
particular, I want to suggest that the issues Alan and I have been murkily
wrestling with in his Deep
Thoughts
and my Ontologically Correct have been similarly
overtaken by events, and rendered moot. Specifically, I am arguing
that:
b. The whole Naturalism vs. Mysticism debate is
actually an artifact of classical physics
c. Alan and I are actually pretty close in our
current understanding of Naturalism
d. The real alternative to Theism might better
be called "economic Deism."I
realize that's a lot to prove, but I'm going to give it a shot. [Read more] for
my inquest into the mutual deaths of the Rosencrantz of Naturalism and the
Guildenstern of Mysticism.
First of all, I want to thank Alan for his
humility and forthrightness in clarifying his position, including his own
uncertainty. It is one of the things I treasure most about this dialogue, that
(at our best) we both are genuinely trying to approach truth, not merely justify our own
viewpoint.I also want to point out
that "This Ain't Easy." We really are trying to answer some of the deep
questions of the millenia, and language is a very imperfect tool (though still
better than all the others :-) for doing so. One of Aristotle's great
achievements, I'm told, is that he managed to elucidate all the different sense
of "to be", since before that philosophers couldn't even agree about "nothing!"
So, I appreciate Alan's patience as we work through layers of mutual
misunderstanding, since in many cases these are to due to actual confusion in
our mental models, not just limitations in our
language.Let me start with Alan's
definition:my tentative
position is still naturalism, that conciousness and behavior and choice (or the
illusion thereof) are all manifestations of
purely physical
processes. Positing a separate
spiritual existence to explain them does make things easier, but it strikes me
as being very much a sort of "God of the gaps" explanation when we attribute to
something "unnatural" anything we cannot (yet)
explain.All well and good, but
what exactly qualifies as a "physical process"? I'm not a historian, but I hope
Alan will allow me to indulge in a parable that may be wrong in details, but
captures the essential trends. In the
18th and 19th century, it was "obvious" what was physical. Classical physics
implicitly assumed that:
i. the universe is as it appears to
be
ii. matter, space, time, and energy were discrete
and concrete concepts
iii. natural laws are universal, objective, and
immutable
iv. we know, and can now, at least in principle
what all the laws are like
v. thus, the universe is intrinsically objective
and deterministic, indifferent to human
action
In other words, there was no
room for God, free will, or spiritual phenomena. In reaction to this,
mysticism asserted that:
i. the world we see is an illusion concealing a
deeper reality
ii. there are forces and levels of reality beyond
human understanding and control
iii. we live in a universe of open-ended
possibility, of which humans are meaningful
actorsOf course these are both gross
simplifications, and would not fairly characterize all players on either side.
However, I do think these fundamental ontological differences captured the heart
of the tension between them at that time, as well as their enduring
enmity.But, a funny thing happened on
the way to the 21st century: naturalism won the battle, but lost the war. Yes,
methodological naturalism has crushed spiritualism as a means of explaining reality.
But in so doing, it has also crushed many of the assumptions our naturalistic
forefathers took as gospel. In the new, post-Einsteinian physics:
i. the observable world is an artifact of
observation, not an intrinsic aspect of reality
ii. nature is inherently
unpredictable
iii. there are forces beyond the realm of
immediate human detection which we do not
understandI'm sure Alan would be quick
to point out that this is still
essentially
naturalism, and I would not disagree. But the larger point is that the main
objections that mysticists (in my view) had to naturalism have disappeared. In
the new "quantum naturalism", concepts like "consciousness" and "choice" are not
merely conceivable, but (at least potentially)
well-defined.In particular, I would
argue that there is no measurable nor philosophical difference between thinking
of the mind as a "coherent quantum state emerging from the complexity of neural
interconnects" versus "the interaction of soul and matter." In particular, once
you grant the existence of such a quantum field in the brain, who is to say that
it is not entangled with other fields, which may or may not be directly coupled
to the material universe we directly perceive with our
senses?Thus, I am perfectly willing to
accept "quantum naturalism" as a valid conceptual model for our mutual
understanding of reality. However, I assert that I am still free to define my
relevant spiritual concepts -- God, angels, etc. -- in similar terms, as quantum
fields (or potentially sub-quantum fields) which interact with the field of
consciousness, and thus valid ontological concepts in our
universe.You might argue -- and
probably would -- that such "fields" are very different than the "spirits" which
inhabit a mystical universe. But if so, how? The usual answer is that fields
have no "sentience", while spirits do. But, that begs
the question, "What is sentience?" If you can assign sentience to a human
field, why can I not assign one to a non-human
field?Thus, by conceding the point
about naturalism (suitably modified), I have replaced it with a deeper -- but
hopefully clearer -- mystery of sentience. As I see it, you [Alan] can
assert:
a. There is no such thing as sentience or
choice, either sub-, super-, or mere human
b. Human beings are the only (or maximal)
expression of sentience in the observable universe
c. Sentience must be tied to observable,
material objects
d. You have no idea whether sentience exists or
doesn't exist
Of course, there are
other variations on these, but hopefully this gets you pointed in the right
direction.
My usual understanding of
naturalism is that it concedes that:
• humans are sentient, but
• the universe (as we experience it) does
not include any [other] observable
sentiencewhich corresponds to point (b), or
-- using our earlier definition of divinity -- what I would call "economic
Deism."Would you agree, Alan? Or are
you at least more meaningfully confused? :-)
Posted: Thu - April 13, 2006 at 08:48 AM