DiaBlogue<A>: Epistemology of Empirical Essentialism, Take
Deux
Though it did take me four blog
posts:
I. Belief in truth is
inherently
[WAS: absolutely] good
II. Knowledge is contextually accurate,
paradigmatically-justified belief.
III. More accurate knowledge enables more
accurate predictions
IV. Knowledge approaches truth via
honest, collaborative inquiry amongst competing
alternatives
Note that I've added
the term "absolute" to (I), reflecting our shared belief that Truth is
"inherently" good, not contingent on some other good. I've also added
"competing alternatives" to (IV) to address the "groupthink" problem. I trust
these emendations meet with Alan's
approval.
Now that we've poured our
foundation, we need to discuss what exactly we should build upon it. [Read
more] for some possible directions.
I've always been fond of epistemologies, because
you can do so many wonderful things with them. In particular, now that Alan
have agreed that the Epistemology of Empirical Essentialism ("E3", for short) is
both true and valid, we can use it to:
⁃ make meaningful assertions about what is
and is not true
⁃ make meaningful assertions about what can
and can not, or is and is not, known
⁃ critique each others assertions and reach
a well-defined consensus about their
accuracy
I'm sure Alan has a long list
of assertions I've made (or refused to make :-) that he'd like to test according
to these standards. However, what is even more intriguing to me is that because
of the way this particular epistemology is constructed, it also provides a
fairly strong constraint on both ontology and ethics. In
particular:
A. Ontologically, it
explicitly assumes the existence of:
• Belief
• Truth
• Absolutes
• Good
• Knowledge
• Paradigms
• Accuracy
• Predictions
• Alternatives
•
Competition
B. Ethically, it
implicitly asserts virtues related to:
• Character ("honesty")
• Community ("collaborative")
• Reality
("inquiry")
To Alan's earlier point,
these are not themselves frameworks, but they do provide constraints, such
that:
• any framework which doesn't support these
concepts and virtues is, at best, incomplete
• any framework which conflicts with them
is a
priori invalid
So, the questions for Alan
are:
1. Do you agree that the above formulation of our
mutual epistemology is a valid and reliable (not perfect, but near-optimal)
method of characterizing truth?.
2. Do you accept the validity of the ontological
and ethical inferences I've drawn from that epistemology?
3. What are the specific assertions, ontologies,
and/or ethics that you would like to examine
next?
The ball (bail? bailiff?) is in
your court...
Posted: Sun - February 26, 2006 at 09:35 AM