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The work of Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer during the Restoration demonstrates that a reassessment of the nature of nineteenth century liberalism in general and early nineteenth century French liberalism in particular is required. The picture of nineteenth century liberalism which emerges from traditional accounts does not prepare one for the kind of liberalism advocated by Comte and Dunoyer, with their ideas of class analysis, exploitation, the relationship between the mode of production and political culture (or "morals" as Dunoyer expressed it), and the historical evolution from one mode of production to another through definite stages of economic development. I have used the expression "mode of production" to translate a variety of terms which Dunoyer uses, such as "la manière même dont ils pouvaient à leurs besoins," "les modes d'existence," "la manière de vivre," and "la mode imparfait de subsistance," all of which were taken from a few pages in Charles Dunoyer, L'Industrie et la morale considérées dans leurs rapports avec la liberté (1825).[1] I chose this translation for two reasons. Firstly, it seemed to carry the meaning of what Dunoyer was trying to say. Secondly, the appropriation of this term by Marxists gives the impression that it was they who invented the concept. By associating it with an obviously liberal social theorist my intention it to show that the term was much more broadly used than is commonly recognised. One has been led by many historians to expect that these issues and even this terminology were the exclusive preserve of the early utopian socialists, such as Auguste Comte and the Saint-Simonians, or the Marxists. Since it was Karl Marx who developed the most influential theory of class conflict and historical evolution through economic stages, it has been assumed that these ideas were somehow peculiarly "socialist." They are considered by some historians even to be a distinguishing feature of this tradition of thought.

On the other hand, we have been told, liberals restricted themselves to purely political concerns, such as freedom of speech and constitutional government, or economic concerns, such as free trade and deregulation, and eschewed the so-called "social" issues of class, exploitation and the relationship between the mode of production and political culture. I will argue in this work that there was a group of liberals in Restoration France which does not fit this traditional demarcation between liberals and socialists. Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer combined a traditional liberal concern with political and constitutional liberty and a social theory of class and exploitation which they developed during the late 1810s and 1820s. Since their strong advocacy of private property, individual liberty and laissez-faire economic policies makes it impossible to classify them as "proto-socialists" or "early socialists" however much their theories may have influenced later socialists including Karl Marx, one is obliged to classify them as liberals. Yet, they are quite unlike the mainstream liberals of the early nineteenth century we have come to know through traditional accounts. It is my conclusion that historians, with a very few exceptions, have badly misunderstood the nature of early nineteenth century liberalism by focusing excessively on political and economic policy matters. A study of liberals like Comte and Dunoyer shows there is another dimension to liberalism which has never been adequately appreciated, a "social" dimension in which the problems of class, exploitation and the evolution of societies through definite economic stages played an important rôle.

When one acknowledges that our understanding of liberalism must be changed in order to include what I have called "the social dimension," it quickly becomes apparent that there are many other nineteenth century liberals who share Comte's and Dunoyer's interest in such things as class and exploitation, but who are often left out of or only selectively used in histories of nineteenth century liberalism. A history of liberalism, based upon my expanded redefinition of what liberalism is, would now have to include, in addition to Charles Comte and Charles Dunoyer, others such as Thomas Hodgskin, Herbert Spencer, Gustave de Molinari, Vilfredo Pareto, and Max Weber, along with the traditionally highly regarded figures such as Benjamin Constant, John Stuart Mill, Richard Cobden, and Alexis de Tocqueville. Even these latter liberals have an interest in class and exploitation which has not yet been fully explored by historians. For example, Benjamin Constant's economic writings have been largely ignored by historians and his most interesting piece of social theory, the "De l'esprit de conquête et de l'usurpation dans leurs rapports avec la civilisation européene" (1814)[2] which so influenced Dunoyer, has not always been recognised as such. Mill's interest in social issues is well documented, especially in the Principles of Political Economy (1848) and the Essays in French History and Historians. Collected Works of John Stuart Mill (1985), but the important discussion of the nature of subjection under feudalism in The Subjection of Women has not been fully appreciated.[3] Richard Cobden uses an undeveloped theory of class and exploitation in his speeches and pamphlets where he analyses the rôle of the aristocratic classes in the British Empire and military services.[4] Seymour Drescher and Roger Boesche have constantly asserted that Tocqueville's economic and social contributions are just as important as the other aspects of his work which are more commonly discussed and Boesche has attempted to uncover the "hidden" Tocqueville in a series of important articles.[5]

I suggest that a new interpretation of early nineteenth century liberalism, which would take into account this social dimension is urgently required. One looks in vain in recent overviews of the history of liberalism to find any mention of this "social" dimension. John Gray, for example, acknowledges the importance of the idea of the autonomous individual, private property and the free market to liberal theory, but makes no mention of any theory of class, exploitation, or historical development.[6] Because the social dimension plays no part in Gray's account of liberalism, it is not surprising that he dismisses Hodgskin, for example, as just one of "a host of lesser figures" who "produced valuable work (unspecified by Gray) in the classical liberal individualist tradition." While grudgingly acknowledging Hodgskin's philosophical individualism, Gray ignores entirely Hodgskin's theory of property and the vitally important idea of class and exploitation which he developed from it.[7] Max Weber and Vilfredo Pareto suffer similar fates of dismissive neglect. Spencer is congratulated for his "Principle of Equal Freedom," but his synthetic philosophy or social theory is quickly disposed of as an unfortunate aberration. Comte, Dunoyer, and Molinari are not mentioned at all - a symptom of the narrow, anglocentric perspective of most historians of liberalism.[8]

There is, however, a liberal theory of society and social evolution which Gray does accept and that is the idea of "spontaneous order" taken from the Scottish Enlightenment, via the writings of Friedrich Hayek.[9] According to Hayek, the very methodology of liberal theory, that is methodological individualism, precludes a liberal theory of class, a liberal theory of history, or indeed a liberal sociology at all - a view which many historians of liberalism share. Hayek seems to be unaware of Comte and Dunoyer, but he displays his considerable irritation with social theories in his discussion of Auguste Comte and Saint Simon in The Counter-Revolution of Science: Studies in the Abuse of Reason. [10] Following Hayek, Gray gives the impression that, between Adam Ferguson in the eighteenth century and Friedrich Hayek in the twentieth century, liberalism did not have a social theory, except for the bizarrerie of Herbert Spencer's synthetic philosophy. Liberals like Hayek and Gray recognise the importance of the Scottish Enlightenment, especially such figures as Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and John Millar, in the development of a liberal social theory, but assume that the matter ended there until Hayek rediscovered the idea of "spontaneous order." Ignoring the important contributions of the Physiocrats in France (Turgot in particular), not to mention the entire tradition of liberal thinking on social theory which existed in the nineteenth century, Hayek argues that, after an exciting period of innovation and development in the 1750s, 1760s, and 1770s, the insights of the Scottish Enlightenment petered out after the hiatus of the French Revolution and Napoleon's Empire. In the period covered by the Restoration and the July Monarchy, when the foundations of the three major ideological movements of the nineteenth century (that is conservatism, liberalism, socialism) were being forged, Hayek believes that liberals ignored or had forgotten the Scottish tradition of social theory. Other theorists, most notably Auguste Comte and Saint Simon, who pursued an interest in social questions, became sidetracked by their infatuation with "reason" and science in the development of their theory of class and social evolution. Hayek believes that all theories of class and history are an "abuse of reason" and "collectivist" by their very nature, the result of the "composite" method of analysis (as opposed to methodological individualism of which Hayek approves).

Furthermore, Hayek seems to link all theories of class and history to political illiberalism. This is certainly true for the social theory of Auguste Comte and Saint Simon, who believed in the rule of a technocratic elite of engineers, scientists and bankers, and Karl Marx, whose teleological social theory was to result in the nirvana of socialism. It is my belief that Hayek and other historians have badly misinterpreted nineteenth century liberal thought. Firstly, they have ignored the "social" dimension to much liberal thought, especially French liberal thought, and secondly, they have falsely associated any theory of class and social evolution with socialism. The study of Comte's and Dunoyer's liberalism shows the necessity of correcting these misinterpretations.

Some historians might prefer to deny Comte and Dunoyer membership in the tradition of nineteenth century liberal thought altogether, rather than redefine what liberalism is. One might argue that Comte and Dunoyer began their careers in 1814 as liberals but, as they developed their social theory in the late 1810s and 1820s, they steadily moved away from liberalism towards something else. This something else was, if not "socialism," then the confused melting pot of ideas which became socialism in the 1830s and 1840s. According to this interpretation, in the new circumstances of the early nineteenth century, interest in class analysis, exploitation and theories of economic evolution was the preserve of a new tradition of thinking, which has come to be known as "socialism." Almost by definition then, anyone who developed theories of class and theories of economic evolution was a "socialist" and anyone who defended property rights and constitutional limits to state power was a liberal. Since Comte and Dunoyer had strayed from these political and economic issues, they had entered a new domain of political philosophy. One might view them as "fellow travellers" of Auguste Comte and Saint Simon and just two more of the many writers who influenced the development of Marx's theory.

However, to define rigidly the boundaries of liberalism and socialism in this manner and to exclude Comte and Dunoyer from the liberal tradition, or even to accuse them of abandoning liberalism under the influence of "socialist" ideas of class and exploitation, would be to deny them their impeccable liberal credentials won at such personal cost during their struggles against censorship and authoritarian government throughout the Restoration. If belief in class analysis and a theory of history based upon the concept of modes of production disqualifies Comte and Dunoyer from membership in the liberal camp, then it is hard to understand their continuing interest in "traditional" liberal causes during the period these ideas were being developed. When Comte and Dunoyer were writing their books on social theory during the 1820s they continued to be part of liberal circles in France, Switzerland and England. They participated in campaigns to protect freedom of speech and trial by jury, they sought and got political office under the more liberal July Monarchy, they became members of the liberal Academy of Moral and Political Sciences, they wrote on various issues of liberal political economy, and Dunoyer, since he outlived Comte by some years, was an active member of the Political Economy Society and wrote many articles for the preeminently liberal Journal des Économie from the early 1840s onwards.

I believe that a reading of Comte and Dunoyer shows the inadequacy of traditional accounts of the nature of nineteenth century liberalism. It will become clear in the course of this dissertation that Comte's and Dunoyer's theory of class and history follow logically from their very liberal theory of private property, the free market, and individual liberty. Since the latter three concepts are essential to liberalism, Comte's and Dunoyer's belief in them must qualify them as members of the liberal tradition. Furthermore, the social theory of class and history they developed from their liberal political and economic ideas must also be considered a legitimate part of the nineteenth century liberal tradition. This necessitates a redefinition, or rather an "expansion" of one's definition of liberalism, so that it includes theorists like Comte and Dunoyer and ideas such as their view of class and history. What this means is that the family of individuals who make up the tradition of nineteenth century liberalism is a more complex and diverse group than many have previously suspected. It also means that ideas of class and theories of history commonly associated with the socialist tradition, if they are combined with a belief in property and the free market, are also an important part of the liberal tradition.