In September 2003, the money in Iraq was frozen in a battle for the 87 billion dollars that was allocated to the war by Congress.  "What fight?"  You ask.  Most people will not remember.  The fight over funds was not advertised in the media very well at the time; but the effects on the troops were significant just the same. 

One distinction between then and now must be clear.  The fight then over the money was between the State Department and the Department of Defense.  The argument was over who would control the funds.  But the effect on the troops and the mission was immediate.  Even after the money started to flow again in December 2003, the pernicious effects that the lack of funds initiated continued unabated. 

I would argue that it was this lack of funds that started the slide that has until recently just reversed through the implementation of the surge.

Here is what happened in October 2003.  At the time I was the commander of Forward Operation Base Regulars.  One day we were building protective barriers, billets, dinning facilities, electrical system grids, motor pools, sewer systems, armoring vehicles and the like.  The next day the money was "suspended." 

We managed to convince some of the contractors to keep working by giving them IOUs, but most could not continue work.  For almost two months the money was unavailable.  Work stopped, protection improvement stopped.  The daily attacks continued.  The fighting continued; but we were not making any improvements. 

In counterinsurgency there are no timeouts.   Money is the most important ammunition of the counterinsurgent [ref. Field Manual 3-24 (Counterinsurgency), paragraph 1-153]