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REPONSES TO STRAWMAN ISSUES FREQUENTLY RAISED BY ELECTION OFFICIALS AGAINST SWITCHING TO MACHINES THAT PRODUCE A VOTER-VERIFIED RECORD

"QUESTIONING THE MACHINES UNDERMINES VOTER CONFIDENCE."

The burden of proof needs to be on election officials to prove thay any new system is recording votes as the voter intended. But, with systems based on proprietary (secret) software and not producing a Voter Verified Permanent Record (VVPR), they are not able to make this case. Voter confidence can be assured if the voting systems are publicly reviewed/verified and if they allow voters to verify their votes are cast as intended. Voters have the right and responsibility to independently evaluate their voting systems. We should not be expected to place blind faith in systems so fundamentally important for our democracy.

"WE'VE BEEN USING ELECTRONIC MACHINES FOR YEARS AND THEY'VE WORKED ALL RIGHT."

How do we know? The problem is that the accuracy of machines that don't produce a Voter Verified Permanent Record (VVPR) cannot be proved or disproved. Who can prove that elections using e-vote machines are accurate? The only way to do that is to compare a sampling of VVPRs with corresponding machine tally. This has never been done.  All machines need a VVPR to allow meaningful accuracy checks and recounts. 

"YOU'RE ASKING US TO PROVE A NEGATIVE.  YOU CANT PROVE THAT."

Er..Well, that's our point.  In fact its already proven insecure:  there's plenty of known cases of voting machine errors already.  So we dont think there's anything left to prove here. VVNM wants to move on past this moot infallability claim and  to confront the fact that errors are going to occur.  So how do we detect when an error has occured and how we independently recount the ballots after the error has occured?   VVPR can do both.

"THE MACHINES WE CHOSE ARE THE SAFE. ONLY DIEBOLD IS UNSAFE.  WE DID NOT CHOOSE DIEBOLD."

 Even after 7 years of debugging Microsoft still finds critical flaws in their Windows98 operating system. If you have a magic wand that locates software bugs you are wasting your gift as an election offical.  The only difference between Diebold and the other vendors is that Diebold became a lightning rod because they inadvertantly exposed their inept source code.  Indeed since Diebold has now received more scrutiny one could perhaps argue its now the others vendors that are the "pig in the poke".

"CERTIFICATION AND TESTING ENSURE THAT MACHINES ARE ACCURATE AND RELIABLE"

All of the many documented errors on voting machines occured on ones that were "comprehensively tested and certified". The federal certification process is not open to public review or confirmation so we cannot verify the thoroughness or comprehensiveness of that process. We do know it has failed miserably for many voting systems currently certified and in use. Logic and accuracy tests run by state governments cannot discern many types of software problems.  For that matter, the notorious punchcards machines were "comprehensively tested and certified".  It is not effective.

" `RECOUNTS' ARE POSSIBLE WITHOUT VVPR."

Yes, but not meaningful ones. Instead of producing a VVPR, many existing machines can, at the end of the day, output a detailed record of each voters ballot selections  rather than a simply totals for each race.   If the machine misrecorded the vote, then any so-called "ballot images", paper or electronic, created from the machine memory contain the same mistakes. It is not an independent check of machine accuracy and cannot audited for "voter intent" in the event of a manual recount.

"A VOTER-VERIFIED SYSTEM DISCRIMINATES AGAINST THE DISABLED."

This is not true. The Justice department has already issued a finding that Voter Verified Paper Records so not violate the spirit or the laws regarding disabled access.  Machines that can produce a VVPR can also have audio capability to give blind voters the ability to vote unaided. Several states, including New York, have worked out this issue to the satisfaction of the disabled. A voter-verified system is also capable of meeting the needs of non-English-speaking voters. We need to push for certification and purchase of machines that offer ALL needed capabilities. 

"BALLOT PRINTERS ARE EXPENSIVE AND UNRELIABLE."

While proper quality-assurance is needed in design, the result will be neither expensive nor unreliable.  Already Santa Clara County in CA, has contracts for future Sequoia Systems with ballot printers at no additional cost.  The Touchscreen kiosks with ticket printers at the Albuquereque airport print more paper each month than a typical Voting terminal would in a year.  They dont require ink, they dont constantly jam, and thermal printers can be archival quality.

"IF VOTERS FIND MISTAKES ON THE PRINTOUT THEY WILL HAVE TO REVOTE AND THIS WILL CAUSE DELAYS"

HAVA requires that voters be shown a summary of their voting choices before they actually cast their vote.  Whether this is on-paper on on-screen they may spot mistakes they made during the entry of their choices and wish to revote.  Thus this is not a problem special to paper.  If you are suggesting that they will scrutinize the paper ballot more carefully than the screen one,  then this is only a good thing.

"PRINTER FAILURE WILL CAUSE LONG WAITS, DISCOURAGE VOTERS."

Studies show that the VVPR printers are reliable and can easily be set up to last through the voting day, regardless of turnout. As with any voting system component, back-up equipment must be available at each polling place. On Election Day, the failure of any system or system component at the polling place can cause long lines and voter disenfranchisement. Certainly, electronic voting machines now being used can and do fail at a high rate, as election officials report from at least 14 states. Let's ensure that all components of all voting systems are reliable.

"THE FEDERAL HELP AMERICA VOTE ACT DOES NOT REQUIRE VVPR."

Some election officials interpret HAVA to say that VVPR is not necessary. Yet, Senator Ensign (R Nevada), who wrote the amendment to HAVA that requires the VVPR capability, says that's exactly what the amendment's intent was. The former head of the FEC concurs.  The contrary interpretation appears to be based on concerns that requiring VVPR will interfere with the ease and efficiency of running elections.   To clarify this 128 congressman have co-sponsored HR2239 making this intent unmistakably explicit.

"WE CAN BUY WHAT WE WANT BECAUSE HR 2239 WONT PASS THIS YEAR AND NIST HAS NOT ISSUED THE NEW SAFETY STANDARDS YET"

So? HR2239 is obviously still a good idea regardless of when it becomes law.  If you buy machines now, they wont meet the federal requirements that are coming.  They dont meet common sense now.   Buying now wastes our money and gets insecure machines.

"PAPERLESS MACHINES ALREADY PRODUCE BACK-UP COPIES."

Many of these systems have redundant vote storage. Yet, if what the machine recorded originally is wrong, then back-up copies also contain the same errors.  It's like xeroxing a document with a typo in it--a copy faithfully preserves the error.

"PAPER BALLOTS ARE SUBJECT TO MISUSE."

 Eliminating voter-verified paper ballots because of concerns about their integrity does away with the only meaningful check on system accuracy. The VVPR is not a receipt for the voter to take home. The voter does not even have to touch it, just verify that it is correct. Voter-verified paper ballot needs to be part of the permanent record. And coupled with the electronic record both are more secure.