Back to 18-Feb-04 press release
How do we know? The problem is that the accuracy of machines that don't produce a Voter Verified Permanent Record (VVPR) cannot be proved or disproved. Who can prove that elections using e-vote machines for past 12 years are accurate? The only way to do that is to compare a sampling of VVPRs with corresponding machine tally. All machines need a VVPR to allow meaningful accuracy checks and recounts.
The burden of proof needs to be on election officials to prove that these systems are recording votes as the voter intended. But, with systems based on proprietary (secret) software and not producing a VVPR, they are not able to make this case. Voter confidence can be assured if the voting systems are publicly reviewed/verified and if they allow voters to verify their votes are cast as intended. Voters have the right and responsibility to independently evaluate their voting systems. We should not be expected to place blind faith in systems so fundamentally important for our democracy.
This is true and underscores the need to improve ballot handling and accountability systems to ensure ballot security. Eliminating voter-verified paper ballots because of concerns about their integrity does away with the only meaningful check on system accuracy. The VVPR is not a receipt for the voter to take home. The voter does not touch it, just verifies that it is correct. Voter-verified paper ballot needs to be part of the permanent record.
Yes, but not meaningful ones. Instead of producing a VVPR, many existing machines produce a paper summary (machine tally) of how the machine recorded votes. We are told that recounts can be performed by comparing the machine tally to the ballot image tape, which contains electronic images of how the machine recorded each vote. The image tape is simply another representation of how the machine recorded votes and is not a valid and independent check of machine accuracy and voter intent.
This is not true. Machines that can produce a VVPR can also have audio capability to give blind voters the ability to vote unaided. Several states, including New York, have worked out this issue to the satisfaction of the disabled. A voter-verified system is also capable of meeting the needs of non-English-speaking voters. We need to push for certification and purchase of machines that offer ALL needed capabilities.
Studies show that the VVPR printers are reliable and can easily be set up to last through the voting day, regardless of turnout. As with any voting system component, back-up equipment must be available at each polling place. On Election Day, the failure of any system or system component at the polling place can cause long lines and voter disenfranchisement. Certainly, electronic voting machines now being used can and do fail at a high rate, as election officials report from at least 14 states. Let's ensure that all components of all voting systems are reliable.
Some election officials interpret HAVA to say that VVPR is not necessary. Yet, Senator Ensign (R Nevada), who wrote the amendment to HAVA that requires the VVPR capability, says that's exactly what the amendment's intent was. The contrary interpretation appears to be based on concerns that requiring VVPR will interfere with the ease and efficiency of running elections.
Many of these systems do have excellent redundant back-up capability. Yet, if what the machine recorded originally is wrong, then back-up copies also contain the same errors.
Documentation of the serious failures and inaccuracies of "comprehensively tested and certified" voting machines is large and still growing. The federal certification process is not open to public review or confirmation so we cannot verify the thoroughness or comprehensiveness of that process. We do know it has failed miserably for many voting systems currently certified and in use. Logic and accuracy tests run by state governments cannot discern many types of software problems.