A reflection on what I was thinking about the Iraq war back in
November
John
Burke
December 1,
2003
Vietnam vs.
Iraq: Public Opinion of U.S. Foreign Occupation
In foreign conflicts there are those who
favor diplomacy and there are those who favor war. In the United States
throughout the twentieth century and the early part of the twenty-first century
war has been, far too often, the favored option and sometimes the only option
available as a means of resolving volatile international conflicts. Either as a
means of intervention or as defense to future national and international
tranquility, U.S. troops have been deployed to nearly every continent in varying
degrees by presidents, past and present. The issue of American foreign
occupation has at times united, as well as polarized the citizens of this
country. The shedding of American blood on foreign soil under the pretext of
international security has never been taken lightly by the public and it seems
it is an issue on which nearly every person has an
opinion.
In the following pages I
will analyze public opinion regarding the recent U.S. occupation in Iraq and the
war on terrorism in comparison to past public opinion regarding the U.S.
occupation during the Vietnam War in the 1960s and 1970s. I will make a
comparison of the motives for occupation, as well as a comparison of domestic
issues from both eras that have been a key factor in hindering popular support
for such occupations. Also, I will be drawing conclusions over continued
support for the Iraq occupation in comparison to the eventual loss of support of
the efforts in
Vietnam.
Vietnam
and Public Opinion
In
December 1961, President Ngo Dinh Diem asked the United States for assistance.
President Kennedy sent U.S. military advisers to South Vietnam to help the
government deal with the aggression from the North. In March of 1965, President
Johnson sent Marine units to the Danang area of Vietnam to defend U.S.
installations there. In July 1965, he decided to commit in upwards of 125,000
U.S. combat troops to Vietnam. In the ensuing years, the situation escalated
and by the spring of 1969, the U.S. had reached its greatest troop strength of
543,000, in Vietnam (U.S. State Dept. background note,
2003).
The U.S. bombing of North
Vietnam, which began in March 1965, was partially halted in 1968. U.S. and
North Vietnamese negotiators met in Paris on May 15, 1968, to discuss terms for
a complete halt and to arrange for a conference of all interested parties in the
Vietnam War. President Johnson ordered all bombing of the North stopped as of
November 1, 1968, and the negotiators met for their first session on January 25,
1969. The Paris meetings, which began with much optimism, ended up moving
slowly. However, the U.S. did agree to a troop withdrawal program on the grounds
that the South Vietnamese armed forces would take on a larger role in the
defense of their own country. While the United States withdrew from all ground
combat by 1971, it still provided air and sea support to the South Vietnamese
until the signing of the cease-fire agreements. The peace agreement was
concluded on January 27, 1973 (State Dept. background note,
2003).
While the North continued to
proclaim its support of the peace agreement, it illegally sent thousands of tons
of sophisticated offensive weaponry into South Vietnam. Tens of thousands of
North Vietnamese troops infiltrated South Vietnam to join the troops already
positioned there at the time of the cease-fire. Numerous attacks were then
carried out against installations, lines of communication, economic facilities,
and, occasionally, population
centers.
At the beginning of 1975,
the North Vietnamese began a large military campaign in the South that succeeded
in infiltrating the American defenses. After taking over key points in the
South, forces from the demilitarized zone overwhelmed South Vietnamese
defenders. Pressures from the Cambodian border region led to a military
collapse, which in turn resulted in the fall of Saigon itself by the end of
April, 1975. Faced with the threat of a takeover by a communist regime, tens of
thousands of Vietnamese refugees hastily fled the country (State Dept.
background notes, 2003).
In the
early 1960s, initial public opinion was favorable towards U.S. involvement in
the war. From 1964 to 1965, Gallup polls showed that about 80 percent of the
population agreed with Johnson and were in favor of the war (Gallup Poll, Nov.
1964, Jun. 1965). Americans at this time saw themselves as the good guys in the
war, the ones who were there to defend the Vietnamese from the evils of
communism. Keeping in mind that the war occurred at the height of the cold war
and anti-communist propaganda was prevalent; there was an overall distrust by
Americans of communism and the East. This made a sort of domino theory
regarding the spread of communism very popular, and therefore, people were
prepared to let Johnson stop it at nearly any cost. U.S. confidence was high.
After all, the U.S. was considered to have the best army and air force in the
world at that time (Jamieson 157,
1995).
In 1967, Johnson introduced
the Conscription Act, a military draft. This was unpopular as people started to
question why they were being sent half way around the world to fight a war that
conceivably had nothing to do with America. People started tearing up their
draft cards. The Conscription Act, for a time, excluded people between the ages
of 18 and 21 and people who were attending college. This exclusion applied
mainly to middle and upper class whites and was seen by many as an intentional
act to fill the army with the lower classes and African Americans, making
efforts unpopular. At this time, media coverage was playing a role as well.
Vietnam became known as the television war. Shocking war images bombarded the
public and support for the war quickly fell. The press was bringing home the
realities of the war and people were growing sick of it (Jamieson 158, 1995).
The war, initially, was meant to be
a quick victory; an in and out campaign with minimal American casualties.
However, as the casualties rose, people started to question America’s
involvement. Soldiers and veterans were coming home with stories of how they
were encouraged to kill anything that moved. Returning soldiers were not given a
hero's welcome, and, especially towards the end of the war, soldiers were
generally outcast by the American
public.
In the late 1960s there was
a huge peace movement taking place with the younger generation. They were
starting to revolt against the ideals set by their parents in favor of a life of
peace. They saw the war as a thing they could fight against, and so they
started holding protests and peace demonstrations against the war. At
universities across the country, there were strikes and demonstrations (Jamieson
157, 1995).
By 1968, people started
to doubt how the war could be won. “Top military advisors were warning
that there was little hope of winning the war, and this understandably
undermined the morale of both soldiers and the public” (Jamieson 157,
1995). Doubts continued, and a Gallup poll in early 1969 showed that over half
the country was against the war and less than 40 percent of the country was in
favor of it (Gallup, March 1969).
By
1969, it was clear to military advisors and citizens alike, that the war was not
going to be won. If troops were not pulled out of Vietnam, they would most
certainly be fighting a losing battle and sustain even greater casualties. The
guerrilla style fighting was not what the U.S. was used to. No matter how many
thousands of tons of bombs were dropped, the enemy continued to maintain an
advantage.
This was turning out to
be a very unpopular war. The death toll was rising. Casualties were not as
high as in previous wars (but still outstanding), and the combination of
thousands of severely injured soldiers and graphic press coverage was not at all
appealing to the population. “The media showed how troops were inhumane
and oblivious to the differences between civilians and the Viet Cong. The
sickened public was appalled at these sights and stories and the youth movement,
among others continued protesting against Vietnam” (Jamieson 159, 1995).
The population towards the end of
the sixties started to move towards pacifism, or at least heartily disagreed
with the Vietnam War. The whole country had, in the end, become very war weary.
People were unwilling to fight, support for the war was diminishing, and people
were tired of the endless stream of terrible images put onto their television
sets by the media coverage.
By
1970, the number of troops started to fall, and by 1972, there were only 47,000
troops compared to 539,000 in 1969. This was a direct result of President
Nixon's less aggressive stance towards the communists, compared to
Johnson’s, but was also due to the pressures of public opinion. This did
not mean that the cold war was over. The nuclear arms race with the Soviet
Union continued, but it did mean that the Vietnam War fiasco was finally coming
to an end (State Dept. background note,
2003).
By no means is the
situation in Iraq another Vietnam, but the potential for another drawn out
occupation exists. In recent months, public support for the Iraq war has
maintained fairly even poll numbers. The public is nearly evenly divided over
continuing to keep troops in Iraq or whether to withdraw them and end the
campaign. The latest Gallup surveys also show that the public’s
assessment of how well the war is going remains more pessimistic than
optimistic. A majority of Americans now disapprove of Bush’s handling of
the situation in Iraq; however, a majority still says the war was not a mistake
(Gallup, Nov. 2003).
In scale, the
two wars differ greatly in terms of number of troops deployed and the number of
casualties, however, public opinion is very similar, especially regarding the
opinion people have had on the handling of the occupation by the respective
presidential administrations, then and now. The numbers for, then, President
Johnson and currently, President Bush, are very similar.
One of the most telling numbers of late:
Four in 10 Americans, 39 percent, think the united states made a mistake by
sending troops into Iraq – roughly the same number that said that about
Vietnam in the summer of 1967. Early on, people approved of Johnson’s
handling of Vietnam by a 2-1 margin, according to Gallup polls from 1965. By
the summer of 1967, four in 10 thought Vietnam was a mistake, and people were
evenly divided on Johnson’s handling of the war. Public support then
slipped steadily. The decline in public opinion about Iraq has come more
quickly for Bush. In April, three-fourths approved of the way Bush was handling
the war. In a CNN-USA Today-Gallup poll released Thursday, November 6, 2003, 54
percent disapproved and 45 percent approved. The number who say it was a
mistake to send in troops has almost doubled from the 22 percent who thought so
in July (Lester, 2003).
Early
in the Vietnam buildup, in mid-1965, Johnson was holding majority support for
his efforts and over the next couple of years that number took a steady
downward decline to a low of just
26% approval of the situation in 1967 (Gallup, June 1965, Aug. 1967).
Bush’s numbers are very
similar. In April of 2003, just after the Iraq invasion, Bush actually held a
formidable 76% public approval of his efforts, but as the war progressed, that
number in a relatively short time declined to just 50% approval by the end of
the summer and by early November, 54% of Americans actually disapproved of
Bush’s handling of the situation (Gallup, April
2003).
In both conflicts, the
American people expected, and perhaps were led to believe that there would be
much quicker results, in and out campaigns. Because of the drawn out
occupations and rising numbers of casualties, both presidents suffered greatly
in terms of public support of their efforts. Though casualties now are lower,
the press has had an effect in the public’s opinion.
Unlike the Vietnam era, today’s public
is more exposed to each violent incident because of the Internet and
round-the-clock cable television news, compared to newspaper accounts and
reports on the networks’ evening news in the 1960s. ‘When
there’s more reporting of bad news, as there is with 24-7 news coverage,
it can have more of an impact on public opinion,’ said Andrew Kohut,
director of the Pew Research Center for the People & the Press. ‘For
Bush to improve in the polls, there has to be a sense that things are getting
better, and he will really be hurt if they get worse’ (Lester,
2003).
In both situations, people
have questioned the motives of occupation, as well. For instance, in Vietnam
the U.S. was fighting the spread of communism, which at that time, was a very
real fear in the minds of many Americans and the reason why Johnson was so
committed to helping South Vietnam, but people still questioned whether or not
the South actually wanted U.S.
help.
Bush chose to go into Iraq
under the pretext of fighting the war on Terrorism and the fight against the
production of weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear and chemical
weapons. Again, terrorism may be perceived a very real threat to America now,
just as Communism was in 1965, but without any evidence of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq, as Bush has claimed, it is very reasonable to believe that
his support will only continue to drop. “If [Saddam] had no WMD at the
outset of the war, then the war’s stated purpose was false. That is no
minor embarrassment. The failure to find WMD has a bearing not just on the
short-term pros and cons of the war, but also on the willingness of the
Americans and their friends to fight the next time” (Crook, The War
Against Iraq). Iraq is key for the future of Bush’s fight against
terrorism. “If fierce fighting leaves many American casualties,
emboldening Arab radicals to think that it is possible to stand up to Western
might – and making the United States far more wary of future engagements
in the Middle East,” it could have dire consequences (Susser, 2003). Not
only would Bush lose support of the American people, but he risks losing the
already limited support from the Global community, as
well.
In Vietnam, after an
embarrassingly ineffective effort, high casualties, and a drawn out occupation,
it was the strength of public opinion that pressured the concession of the war
and the eventual withdrawal of troops. Because Bush’s claims of weapons
of mass destruction and Iraq’s ties to terrorism have, so far, been
unfounded, it is perhaps predictable that public opinion for the war will
produce the same results. Now the focus for Bush is on the rebuilding efforts.
If he can show significant progress in a timely fashion on rebuilding Iraq and
installing a successful democratic government, it is possible for him to gain
back the popular support of Americans. However, if the Iraqi insurgency
continues on the scale that it has recently, with suicide bombings and organized
attacks on troops, people will most likely start calling for withdrawals of
troops on a large scale. Already, as of early November, a Gallup poll showed
that 32% of Americans are, in fact, wanting Bush to pull at least some troops
out of the region (Gallup, Nov.
2003).
Other similarities between the
two occupations include public worries over the costs of the war efforts, then
and now, and the state of the economy. In 1968, 13% of all U.S. government
spending was aimed at the Vietnam War, and by the end of the war, the U.S. spent
nearly $28 billion in its efforts, outraging many people who felt domestic
issues were greatly suffering. Similarly, people today have shown much concern
over Bush’s designation of a whopping $87 billion for the rebuilding
efforts in Iraq (State Dept. background note,
2003).
Johnson took much heat over
domestic issues such as the state of the economy, social security, healthcare,
and at that time, racism as well. In the current situation, Americans
overwhelmingly feel the most pressing domestic issue is the state of the
economy. Polling showed that 70% of people in November had only a fair or poor
outlook on the economy, an issue that Bush must be losing sleep over when an
election year is just around the corner (Gallup, Nov.
2003).
Just as in Vietnam, the
situation in Iraq is turning out to be another publicly unpopular occupation of
foreign soil. Instead of Americans seeing themselves as the good guys who are
out to liberate a long-time oppressed Iraqi society, people are caught up more
on the issue at hand that, possibly, Iraq was not the imminent threat to America
and the rest of the world that the Bush administration (and Tony Blair’s
administration) initially played it out to be.
Also, people may be concluding that
the cost of invading and rebuilding Iraq may not have been worth the effort in
the long run, because there are other regions not just in the middle east, but
in Southeast Asia and North Korea as well, that pose a much more imminent threat
of terrorism, as well as the production of weapons of mass destruction, and it
appears to many that Bush has spread the country’s financial and military
resources thin in the likelihood that action must be taken in those regions.
Domestic issues also have
contributed to lack of support for occupying Iraq, because people are genuinely
worried about the state of the economy. The economy is such an identifiable
problem that people feel it needs to be addressed first, before so much funding
is pledged to military efforts. With the economic downturn and 6% national
unemployment, an $87 billion dollar aid package and a globally unpopular
occupation, people are just not seeing U.S. efforts as a sound commitment not
just on a domestic level, but for the sake of future global relations, as well.
If Bush is going to keep support for his efforts in Iraq and his war on
terrorism, he is going to have to prove to people that it is, in fact, worth the
effort and all risks involved. If he is successful and the economy continues to
bounce back, as in recent months, and unemployment levels are reduced, people
will in turn be less critical of his war spending in Iraq. People are looking
for positive results. Without these results people will only continue to have a
pessimistic opinion of the administration. Bush needs to provide a specific
plan and, at least, a rough timeline on rebuilding efforts and the eventual U.S.
withdrawal from Iraq. America’s patience is running thin and if people
are not seeing progress in these areas it may very well cost him a second term
in office, but he might not be shaking in his boots just yet.
About 30 years ago, Johnson faced a
rebellion over the war from the political left and presided over the slowing of
a lengthy and robust economic expansion. Bush’s political outlook is far
different. With solid support from his Republican base, the incumbent has no
GOP primary challengers and has amassed a hefty war chest that outranks those of
his Democratic rivals. The economy is showing signs of revival. Still, footage
of car bombings in Iraq, funerals at Arlington National Cemetery and grieving
families are taking a toll (Lester,
2003).
It is not just speculation by
the press and pollsters that elude to similarities of Vietnam and distrust of
the occupation.
Republican Sen. John McCain, who spent 5 1/2
years in solitary confinement as a prisoner of war in Vietnam, told Newsweek:
‘This is the first time I have seen a parallel to Vietnam in terms of
information the administration is putting out versus the actual situation on the
ground.’ Speaking of the Bush administration, another decorated Vietnam
War veteran, Democratic presidential candidate John Kerry, said last month,
‘At the rate that they’re going, it reminds me of the “light
at the end of the tunnel” language during Vietnam’ (Lester,
2003).
There is one key difference between
the Vietnam War, and the current situation in Iraq. That is, the U.S. cannot
afford to fail in Iraq as it did in Vietnam. The consequences may be much more
costly, especially in the Israeli region.
U.S. failure in Iraq would encourage Iran to
ignore American pressure about its nuclear program and to produce nuclear
weapons as soon as possible. Iran already has developed and tested a prototype
missile, the Shihab 3, which can reach Israel with either conventional or
non-conventional payloads. The Iran-Syria_Hezbollah triangle also would get a
boost from American failure in Iraq. Indeed, an American setback in Iraq would
encourage radical terrorists throughout the world, and especially in the Middle
East, to step up their campaigns – and Israel would be a prime target
(Susser, 2003).
Because the U.S. has
come this far in Iraq, for strategic purposes, and to win back America’s
support of Bush’s efforts, failure cannot be an option. Iraq is, in fact,
a very strategic location in the Middle East. For the first time, the U.S. has
secured standing military bases in the region, which may be key in continuing
ousting other terrorist-supporting regimes such as in Iran or Syria. Before,
the U.S. continually had to rely on offshore naval support and permission by
either Saudi Arabia in the South, or Turkey to the North to use their bases for
staging efforts, such as what occurred in the first Gulf War. Secondly, Saddam
is a very identifiable target and it was easy to rally popular support for
fighting an old enemy that, without question, was a brutal dictator. The U.S.
knew it would not be terribly difficult to oust Saddam and his regime. To send
a message to America’s other enemies, it is crucial that our show of power
and willingness to strike preemptively has a positive outcome in
Iraq.
The situation in Iraq cannot
yet be called a failure. There have been setbacks, due in part to a hastily
thrown together post-war rebuilding strategy, but there is still much hope for
success. The U.S. needs to take into account its failures in the past in
Vietnam, and use the lessons learned in that occupation and apply them to the
current situation, as well as possible future occupations of the same magnitude.
The American people will not continue to provide the overall support for
Bush’s global war on terrorism if the U.S. gets caught in a quagmire
situation, a guerrilla-style war in Iraq. This may be the last time Bush can
take on a military campaign based on a unilateral effort. The war on terrorism
is, indeed, a global one, and the breadth of the current situation cannot be
continued over a lengthy period of time, as it seems it will be, by just the
efforts of the U.S. alone. Global cooperation is key and that is where Bush
needs to focus his efforts.
Although in serious military campaigns, such
as in Afghanistan, most potential allies bring little military capacity to the
table, including them for the sake of doing so may reduce effectiveness of
combat operations. This is not the same, however, for postwar reconstruction.
This cannot be done without involvement of allies and international institutions
(Rosecrance, 2003).
The war on
terrorism must include finding different terrorist cells hiding in other
countries, stopping the flow of money to these groups, and above all, sharing
accurate and credible intelligence regarding possible attacks. “This will
ultimately work best through reciprocity. If we want others to cooperate with
us when we need them, we need to learn to cooperate with them when they need us.
Genuine multilateralism is vital for the war on terrorism” (Rosecrance,
2003).
If these steps can be taken,
a repeat of Vietnam will be avoided. Increasingly, the American public will be
watching to see signs of real progress and not a stagnant occupation. Americans
have always been willing to fight for a just cause, not just in defense of
national security, but as a protectorate for the rest of the world. It will be
interesting to see how public opinion plays a role in the outcome of Iraq and
its success or failure and the continued role the U.S. takes in the global fight
on terrorism. If Bush survives for another term, it will only be because he
played to the demands of the public and the demands of the global community.
With global cooperation, the days of the United States being a global police
force may be over, or at least greatly diminished, in lieu of a coalitional
approach to global threats.
Citations
Beatty,
Jack. “The Friedman Principle”. The Atlantic Online, October 2003.
Web:
www.theatlantic.com.
Crook,
Clive. “The War Against Iraq: All a Big Mistake?”. The Atlantic
Online,
November 2003. Web:
www.theatlantic.com.
Gallup
Poll, November 3-5, 2003. Gallup Brain,
http://brain.gallup.com.
August 24-29, 1967. Gallup Brain,
http://brain.gallup.com.
June 24-29, 1965. Gallup Brain,
http://brain.gallup.com.
Jamieson,
Neil L. Understanding Vietnam. University of California Press,
1995.
Lester, Will.
“Vietnam and Iraq: How Public Opinion Shifts.” The Olympian,
November 9,
2003.
Rosecrance, Richard.
“Unilateralism Vs. Cooperation: New Paradigms of Global
Cooperation”. John F. Kennedy
School of Government. Remarks at May 2003
Terrorism Conference. Web:
www.ksg.harvard.edu.
Susser,
Leslie. “For Israel, U.S. success or failure in Iraq has major
consequences.” JTA
Online,
March 2003. Web:
www.jta.org.
U.S. Department of
State. Background Note: Vietnam. Bureau of East Asian and Pacific
Affairs, July 2003.
Posted: Sat
- August 28, 2004 at 10:03 AM