Singapore and Hong Kong: A Divergence in Social Policy
A comparison of Iron Fist Social Policy versus
Laisseze-Faire Social Policy among East Asian Newly-Industrialized
Nations
John
Burke
Asian
Miracles
November 20, 2003
Singapore and Hong Kong: A
Divergence in Social Policy
Governments, for centuries, have
attempted to provide, or sometimes impose social welfare programs for the
general populace of a country for several, ultimately varied reasons, either to
aid the lives of citizens or to aid their own political agendas or any
combination thereof. The same can be said for the countries known as the East
Asian Newly Industrialized Countries (NICs). The formation of
government-controlled social welfare is called social policy. Social policy
relates to direct government provision for social welfare partly through public
services and subsidies that benefit major social sectors. Generally, these
policies include government subsidized health care, provisions for public
education, subsidized child care, retirement savings and pension programs,
public transportation for labor sectors, subsidized foodstuffs, public
assistance programs, and even wage policies and labor-training programs (Deyo
1992, 50, 51).
In the East Asian NICs,
nearly all of these policies can be seen in varying forms and degrees,
especially in Singapore and Hong Kong. This paper will lay out the various
social policies of both countries, along with the motivations of government,
which guided the policies and reforms. A comparison will then be made
explaining the divergence in their separate policies from a Statist perspective,
analyzing the level of government intervention, along with alternative
explanations.
When asking why
countries impose social policy, a wide range of explanations can follow,
depending on the country and type of government. Generally, there are a few key
reasons. First of all, social pressures by one or a number of societal groups
may demand better assistance or a change in welfare aid from the government.
Many times these demands are for a basic standard quality of life, such as food,
shelter, and basic subsistence. Even when not in the government’s best
interests, it will give in to these demands in order to garner and maintain
political support.
Other times, the
government’s interests do, in fact, lie with the people and not their own
political stability. Social policies can provide incentives to people for
upward mobility within class structures, and they can provide incentives to
people for an overall more productive society. This is very important in
developing countries as some governments see a direct correlation between the
welfare of the people and the country’s potential for economic development
and continued growth. Many times in developing countries it is seen as a
worthwhile trade off on the part of the government to give up some of its
autonomous strength in order to aid its people, as well as to gain economic and
growth stimulators.
The outcomes of
these policies are not always clearly foreseen by governments. However, there
are some generalized assumptions that can be made when thinking about the
outcomes of different social
policies.
First of all, governments,
when thinking about development can assume that a healthier populace, especially
the labor force, must equal efficiency and higher productivity. Secondly, in
countries where high levels of workers are needed for manufacturing, public
housing policies can provide a centralized labor force where the labor is
needed. Public education policy can be beneficial, because the labor force can
produce higher growth through higher manufactures and more specialized industry.
By supplying a country with its most basic needs, such as direct financial
assistance, food, shelter, labor, and a means to save earnings from labor, a
government can secure its autonomy by bolstering its public support. By any
measure, most times a government will only provide welfare for the public if it
feels it can maintain or further the success of the country or for fear of
political upheaval. On the other end of the spectrum, which has typically
occurred with the Latin American NICs, political pressure for social policy
reform are simply repressed along with any other movements by groups that do not
support the current regime in power (Lorenzini
11/13/03).
Singapore
In
Singapore, several specific policies have been imposed in accordance with the
government’s post-World War II plans for development. These policies
include: labor force training, pension plans, public housing, public education,
and health and population
policies.
But when the country in the
late 1950s was just emerging as a new state, the policies were very basic in
nature. “The social policies were not neutral. They were bent on
modernizing the family for the market-oriented development goals of the state.
By tying needed social or public goods to the party-state development plan, the
state not only won support. These social policies extended social control by
forming a common core of family values and goals” (Gugler 1997,
233).
Singapore, at that time, was a
melting pot of many new immigrants and non-native war refugees, and in order to
stabilize the country, the government felt it must unify these people under one
ideology or moral and ethical code. This was really all the government was able
to do as Singapore was just breaking into the Import-Substitution market, and
was in financial turmoil.
Singapore
continued to have many economic difficulties, however, and as the country grew,
so did the demand for change, both on a development level and on a social level.
“In the mid-1960s, Singapore’s development program centered on
creating a potentially skilled, but labor-intensive and low-wage industrial
sector to produce for foreign corporations and absorb the many unemployed”
(Gugler 1997, 234). These policies eased some of the financial burden
associated with Import-Substitution Industrialization, but as Singapore would
later make the switch to Export-Led Growth, its social policy, too would need a
makeover. These new policy changes would be referred to as “Second-Stage
Development Programs” (Gugler 1997,
234).
The first area of focus would be
on labor force training. The government saw this as an investment in labor.
The goal, clearly, was to raise workers’ skills to meet the many new
demands of second-stage industrialization. These programs began providing
on-the-job training and also offered polytechnic and diploma-conferring
educational programs.
Secondly, a
pension policy was established. The Central Provident Fund (CPF) was set up
providing a universal pension plan. Under this plan, both the employee and the
employer must contribute to the employee’s CPF fund. The workers then
have the option of using their fund to save for retirement or to buy into
Singapore’s public housing sector. Once a worker commits to home buying,
however, he or she must keep working to continue their
payments.
The third area of importance
came in the housing sector. The Housing Development Board (HDB) commissioned
construction of large blocks of rental housing and the construction of large,
high-rise buildings. This policy program was designed to stimulate the market
in construction and finance and to promote an industrial way of living. This
boom of newly accessible housing propelled residents into the wage labor-force
and consumer economy, it decreased exchange with, and reliance upon kin and
neighbors for social support, and it spurred the deployment of women into the
wage labor-force (Gugler 1997,
235).
Singapore’s public housing
policies proved to be very beneficial to its labor force. In 1973-74, 43% of
Singapore’s population lived in HDB housing units, whereas 37% of the
population lived in family-owned apartments. By 1979-80, 67% of the population
lived in HDB units and of those people, 59% owned their own HDB units.
Essentially, many people were provided housing and an increasing number of
people became homeowners, or at least apartment owners. (Gugler 1997,
237).
The fourth implemented policy
was education; culturally and historically a very important part of East Asian
life. The aim of education was to mold a new national ideology out of a
multi-ethnic society. First of all, the number of all schools was increased.
Secondly, tuition was reduced and equalized allowing a broader class of students
to attend schools of their choice. Schools were to emphasize the importance of
meritocracy, or the idea that people would get jobs through their abilities and
training, not through personal ties. All admissions policies were unified and a
common core curriculum was imposed. Children could attend any school in their
region, even the more renowned schools. Interestingly, a bilingual language
system was imposed and children were given the choice between an English
curriculum or a Mandarin-Chinese curriculum. English became and continues to be
the preferred curriculum (Gugler 1997,
235).
Lastly, there was a focus on
health and the growing population. These policies aimed to increase the ratio
of the number of physicians to hospital beds. Small, substandard clinics, such
as midwives’ services, were shut down. Hospitals were required to have
maternal and child health services. This greatly reduced risk to expectant
mothers and newborn children. By the late 1970s, over 80% of births took place
at public hospitals and 90% of all newborns were enrolled for post-natal care at
neighborhood and community clinics. The “extension of state medical care
enabled the public to enjoy a better quality of life and reduced occupational
time lost to illness”, a great improvement from the previous substandard
conditions families faced (Gugler 1997,
237).
Also a concern to the Singapore
government was the large, post-war population boom. It was feared that this
could slow domestic capital formation in the long run. To counter this,
contraceptive services were offered. Also, in the late 1960s, against public
opinion, the state liberalized abortion and sterilization laws. Though
unpopular, this strategy worked. It forced the crude birth-rate to decline
over time from 44.4 births per 1,000 people in 1956 to 16.6 births per 1,000
people by 1977 (Gugler 1997,
237).
Also in an effort to control
population, the government enacted the National Family-Limitation Campaign. The
“National Family-Limitation Campaign aimed to convince people that rapid
population growth endangered both their present livelihood and their future
prospects” (Gugler 1997, 237). Adding to this, in 1973, economic and
social Disincentives Against Higher Order Births were enacted, the goal of which
was to attain zero population growth by the year 2030, at a level of 3.6 million
people. These disincentives required that all services come into line to
support the program. It imposed sanctions by hospitals and schools against
families with large and increasing numbers of children. Couples could claim no
more than two children as dependants for purposes of tax deduction. The
ultimate goal here was to reduce the competition for social services, which
“were interlaced with the new ideology of individual merit, and
responsibility for one’s own poverty. They extolled self-help,
individualism, and competition”, qualities considered to be fundamental by
Singapore’s policy-makers in such a rapidly developing state (Gugler 1997,
238, 239).
Singapore’s social
strategy, overall, began as an effort to reshape the thinking of an entire
country. The government wanted to provide a means of survival for its people in
a global economy, and the only way it could manage to do that was by garnering
the peoples’ trust. If the people trusted their leaders to establish a
new government, then they could more easily be molded to fit into it. The
government was not radical in its policies. The policies implemented were based
on the historical preferences and ideologies of the people. Confucianism was
not ignored, people were not forced to entirely give up long standing tradition,
but it was a modernized version of these traditions that ultimately allowed
people to function in a modern industrial society. Though factory life is a far
cry from family farming and rice paddies, it enabled an entire country to fit
into the modern world. It was this vision of Singapore’s leaders that
guided social policy. Without the state’s welfare, these people could
never have gotten their foot through the door of East Asian development.
Singapore is strong because its people adapted to a new world. It was a choice
by their leaders, but it was one that the country
accepted.
Hong
Kong
Hong Kong’s social
policy is much less hands-on than that of Singapore, which might be expected, as
Hong Kong today and historically has taken a very Lassaize-fare approach to
government under a Positive Non-Interventionist policy.
In Hong Kong, a “Social Welfare
Department (SWD) is responsible for implementing the government’s policies
on social welfare and for developing and coordinating social welfare services.
These include social security, family and child welfare services, medical social
services, group and community work, services for young people, services for the
elderly, rehabilitation services for people with disabilities, as well as
services for young offenders” (HKSAR 2003,
web).
Social security, important in
Hong Kong, is a responsibility of the Government, which is provided for mainly
through non-contributory schemes. There are five of these social security
schemes administered by the Social Welfare Department. The first is the
Comprehensive Social Security Assistance Scheme, which provides cash assistance
to bring the income of a household up to the prescribed level to meet basic
livelihood needs. Secondly, there is the Social Security Allowance Scheme.
This is just a basic old age allowance and disability allowance. Third, are the
Criminal and Law Enforcement Injuries Compensation Scheme. This provides cash
assistance for people injured or for dependents of those killed in crimes of
violence, or through the action of a law enforcement officer using a weapon in
the execution of his duty. Next, is the Traffic Accident Victims Assistance
Scheme, which provides early financial assistance for people injured or for
dependents of those killed in traffic accidents. Last, is the provision of
Emergency Relief, which is comprised of cash grants, food and daily necessities
that are provided for victims of natural and other disasters (HKSAR 2003, web).
Overall, social security in Hong Kong is very minimal with no publicly
contributed funds (Lorenzini,
11/13/03).
Also included under Hong
Kong’s social welfare are Family and Child Welfare services. The main
objective is to provide services that preserve and strengthen the family unit.
These services include counseling, child services, family aid, and clinical
psychological services. Also provided are services for victims of domestic
violence, including spousal abuse and child abuse. Four battered women’s
shelters have been provided with this service. Foster home programs are
provided along with adoption services both domestically and overseas (HKSAR
2003, web).
Medical services provide
for the operation of 37 medical social service units in public hospitals.
Social workers in these units provide patients and families with counseling,
financial aid, housing assistance, rehabilitation treatment, and help with
societal re-integration. The other services provided by the Social Welfare
Department include Work Services, Young People Services, Services for the
Elderly and Services for Offenders. Of these remaining services, actual
government support is very broad and consists mainly of referral services and
community planning, which consists of after school activities for children,
elderly social activities and help finding employment for released criminals and
others (HKSAR 2003, web). Overall, they appear to be very weak programs that
are mostly provided by volunteerism and groups within the community and the
policies are just a framework for these groups to
use.
It is difficult to imagine Hong
Kong’s social policies making too much of an impact on its society. They
are very general policies in comparison to those of Singapore, much less funded,
and the outcomes are not near as dramatic. “When policy-makers lack the
knowledge and abilities, or are irresponsibly unwilling to identify the
fundamental causes of problems, the effectiveness of their remedial actions is
inevitably limited. The welfare policy is no better” (Hsiung 2000, 130).
In Hong Kong the government leaves many aspects of life up to the people, as it
has done in the past. It seems unimportant in Hong Kong to impose waves of
change, as it already functions efficiently, much the same as it did under
British control. In the minds of policy makers, the sentiment of “if it
isn’t broken, don’t fix it” holds true, but the implementation
of poor policy is really no better than doing nothing at
all.
In Singapore, people wanted
stability and the government planned for it and gave it to them and the people
accepted it. It would not have worked without the social safety net to back it
up. People in Singapore would have been reluctant to change to an industrial
way of life if the government had not held their hands throughout the process.
In Hong Kong people historically enjoyed the freedom of low government
intervention and to change that type of government control would have meant that
interventionism would have been shoved down their
throats.
The Statist argument says
that countries are successful due to the level of autonomous power that
governments hold. If this is true then Singapore is a model state where the
government is in near total control of all sectors, thus explaining the
country’s success. But what about Hong Kong? State autonomy in Hong Kong
is very low. Many private sectors decided for themselves how to operate
business, and the people decide how they want to interact with the private
sector and their government. In Hong Kong, it seems no one entity, not the
state, not business, not the people have a great, overarching autonomous hold,
the power is more balanced throughout (Deyo 1992, 49,
50).
So what can explain the
divergence of Social Policy between the two countries, yet provide for the great
successes by both countries. In Singapore people needed structure after the war
just to get themselves back on level ground. Without a large trading industry
like the one Hong Kong retained, they needed a new nation-wide goal to provide
unity and a solid foundation to rebuild on. The collective focus was then aimed
at industry and to reach that goal, structure was key. In Singapore structure
is evident everywhere, but most importantly is the family and social structure.
The peoples’ way of life has been altered so that industrial growth can
take place in the most efficient way possible. The miraculous part is the fact
that these social policies did not destroy historical cultural sentiments of the
people, but used them as a model and an incentive to take on the task of
industrialization together in a way that everyone could agree on. In a way,
they reached back to their roots in order to move forward. It was a cultural
revitalization and it proved to be successful and it created a very strong, very
autonomous state.
In no way would this
same strong-armed approach have ever worked in Hong Kong. Being a trade center
meant that many cultures were being intermingled and large masses of foreign
labor were and continue today to come and go along with the fluctuations in the
job market. The social stability was never there. There was never a unified
cry by the people demanding someone give them direction and vision. The people
there were just happy to be working and, in fact, they had long established a
goal for themselves as a worldly center for trade. There would be an outcry if
these freedoms and bragging rights, the essence of Hong Kong society, were
somehow changed or infringed upon. So instead of micromanagement, the Hong Kong
government lets the people do as they have done for centuries and as long as
they hold on to their success there will not be any need for interventionism,
especially in regard to the everyday way of
living.
Citations
Deyo,
Frederic C. 1992. “Imperatives of Development and the Formation of
Social
Policy: East Asia’s Newly
Industrialized Countries”. In Modernization in East Asia: Political,
Economic, and Social Perspectives, edited by Richard Harvey Brown and William T.
Liu, chapter 4.
Gugler, Josef.
Cities in the Developing World Issues, Theory, and Policy. Oxford
University Press,
1997.
Hong Kong Special
Administrative Region Government (HKSAR). Hong Kong: The
Facts, Social Welfare. Website:
http://www.gov.hk, October
2003.
Hsiung, James C. Hong
Kong the Super Paradox Life after Return to China. St Martin’s
Press, New York.
2000.
Lorenzini, Michelle, PhD.
In-class notes, Social Policy. 11/13/03.
Posted: Sat
- August 28, 2004 at 10:41 AM