Monday, May 19, 2008

The Problem with Iran - Part I

Can We Live With a Nuclear Iran?

In a refreshing change from the, “Iran can’t be allowed to have nuclear weapons at any cost” rhetoric that seems the most common these days, retired General John Abizaid points out that it is actually quite possible to live with a nuclear-armed Iran.

Every effort should be made to stop Iran from obtaining nuclear weapons, but failing that, the world could live with a nuclear-armed regime in Tehran, a recently retired commander of U.S. forces in the Middle East said Monday.

. . .

"Iran is not a suicide nation," he said. "I mean, they may have some people in charge that don't appear to be rational, but I doubt that the Iranians intend to attack us with a nuclear weapon."

The Iranians are aware, he said, that the United States has a far superior military capability.

"I believe that we have the power to deter Iran, should it become nuclear," he said, referring to the theory that Iran would not risk a catastrophic retaliatory strike by using a nuclear weapon against the United States.

"There are ways to live with a nuclear Iran," Abizaid said in remarks at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a think tank. "Let's face it, we lived with a nuclear Soviet Union, we've lived with a nuclear China, and we're living with (other) nuclear powers as well."


I’m no fonder of the idea of a nuclear-armed Iran than anyone else, but the argument that we have to attack Iran militarily because they might possibly, someday, acquire a nuclear weapon and such a thing cannot ever, ever be allowed under any circumstances, is one of the more irrational I’ve heard.

The argument that the Iranian leadership would use nukes if they had them attributes qualities to them that would be unique in history. It argues that they are more fanatical and irrational than men like Stalin and Mao. Even Hitler refused to use chemical weapons on the battlefield in WWII. And unlike those regimes or Saddam’s next door, Iran isn’t a run by a single individual whose cult of personality would allow him to act however he chooses. They have a rather Byzantine power structure that would require irrationality not from one person with his finger on the button, but from dozens of competing factions and individuals, which is far less likely.

It also ignores the history of this regime. During the Iran-Iraq War, when Saddam was using chemical weapons with the winking support of western governments and few could have faulted retaliation in kind, and while Saddam actually was pursuing a nuclear arsenal, the Iranians stuck to conventional weapons and never tried to develop the nuclear reactors the US government had happily given the Shah. Despite all this, we are told that as soon as the regime in Tehran gets their hands on nuclear weapons, they will behave in a manner inconsistent with their own history and more irrationally than some of the worst dictators in human history and start firing them off.

The truth is that nuclear weapons tend to be far more similar to white elephants than an effective weapons system. So great is the stigma attached to the weapons, that every country that has developed them has also codified a no first-use policy for them, (with the notable exceptions of the US and Israel). Using the weapon makes you an automatic pariah at best and risks your total destruction at worst. MAD may not be the most pleasant way to live, but it does seem to work quite well.

More to the point, while the possession of nuclear weapons is supposed to act as a deterrent, it only seems to work between nuclear powers. India tested its first device in 1974, but that didn’t stop Pakistan from fighting them over Kashmir. Israel is believed to have had nukes since 1968. It never stopped Egypt and Syria from attacking in ’73, and it certainly hasn’t stopped their other enemies from launching attacks to this day. Even Saddam didn’t mind firing off Scuds at them during the first Gulf War. Argentina didn’t seem too worried when they invaded the Falklands. The deterrent status of nuclear weapons is highly overrated.

As for allowing the Iranians to expand their influence because their opposition would be afraid to fight back, the examples abound. France in Algeria, India in Sri Lanka, the Soviets in Afghanistan and the Russians in Chechnya, Israel in the Palestinian Territories and Lebanon, the US in Vietnam, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iraq. Did having nukes make any of these powers any more capable of imposing their will on an unwilling population? Did it stop opposing powers from supporting the nuclear states’ enemies?

Possession of a nuclear weapon will make the Iranians no more capable of expanding their influence than they are now. Of course, for some, that capability is already far too great, and it is that which is the real reason behind all the war-drum beating.

Because the one real power nuclear weapons seem to have is to make opposing nuclear powers avoid conflict. The Americans and Soviets fought bloody proxy wars like those in Vietnam and Afghanistan, but never went after each other. Now that India and Pakistan both have nuclear weapons, they do a lot more talking rather than risk another war over Kashmir, because they know the consequences of such a conflict would be mutually devastating. Even the US quickly lost its belligerent tone and sat down at the negotiating table when the North Koreans cobbled together a device.

The fear is that if Iran does get its hands on a nuclear device, the US will no longer be able to do to Iran what they did to Iraq. Not that Iraq has worked out all that well for the US, but it has been far worse for Iraqis. Without the ability to break recalcitrant regimes to its will, US dominance of the Middle East is no longer assured, and that is the real problem that they believe can’t be allowed.

Oddly, it is precisely this argument that is used by many to claim that the only possible reason for the Iranian nuclear program is to acquire nuclear weapons. After all, under such circumstance, it makes strategic sense for the Iranians to want to acquire nuclear weapons, so that must be what they’re trying to do. I’ll deal with that argument tomorrow.

Part II - What are the Iranians pursuing?