Are we losing the war against radical Islam?
Should you really make that a True or False question?
Fareed Zakaria does his best to argue that "we" aren't losing, but its a pretty loose argument.
Consider the news from just the past few months. In Indonesia, the largest Muslim nation in the world, the government announced that on June 9 it had captured both the chief and the military leader of Jemaah Islamiah, the country's deadliest jihadist group and the one that carried out the Bali bombings of 2002. In January, Filipino troops killed Abu Sulaiman, leader of the Qaeda-style terrorist outfit Abu Sayyaf. The Philippine Army—with American help—has battered the group, whose membership has declined from as many as 2,000 guerrillas six years ago to a few hundred today. In Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were Al Qaeda's original bases and targets of attack, terrorist cells have been rounded up, and those still at large have been unable to launch any major new attacks in a couple of years. There, as elsewhere, the efforts of finance ministries—most especially the U.S. Department of the Treasury—have made life far more difficult for terrorists. Global organizations cannot thrive without being able to move money around. The more that terrorists' funds are tracked and targeted, the more they have to make do with small-scale and hastily improvised operations.
North Africa has seen an uptick in activity, particularly Algeria. But the main group there, the Salafist Group for Call and Combat (known by its French abbreviation, GSPC), is part of a long and ongoing local war between the Algerian government and Islamic opposition forces and cannot be seen solely through the prism of Al Qaeda or anti-American jihad. This is also true of the main area where there has been a large and troubling rise in the strength of Al Qaeda—the Afghanistan-Pakistan borderlands. It is here that Al Qaeda Central, if there is such an entity, is housed. But the reason the group has been able to sustain itself and grow despite the best efforts of NATO troops is that through the years of the anti-Soviet campaign, Al Qaeda dug deep roots in the area. And its allies the Taliban are a once popular local movement that has long been supported by a section of the Pashtuns, an influential ethnic group in Afghanistan and Pakistan.
In Iraq, where terrorist attacks are a daily event, another important complication weakens the enemy. From a broad coalition promising to unite all Muslims, Al Qaeda has morphed into a purist Sunni group that spends most of its time killing Shiites. In its original fatwas and other statements, Al Qaeda makes no mention of Shiites, condemning only the "Crusaders" and "Jews." But Iraq changed things. Abu Mussab al-Zarqawi, the head of Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, bore a fierce hatred for Shiites, derived from his Wahhabi-style puritanism. In a February 2004 letter to Osama bin Laden, he claimed that "the danger from the Shia ... is greater ... than the Americans ... [T]he only solution is for us to strike the religious, military and other cadres among the Shia with blow after blow until they bend to the Sunnis." If there ever had been a debate between him and bin Laden, Zarqawi won. As a result, an organization that had hoped to rally the entire Muslim world to jihad against the West has been dragged instead into a dirty internal war within Islam.
All this is true, but it is also incomplete. Never mind that he never mentions Somalia, or Thailand, or even the ongoing struggle within Turkey between the secular military and an increasingly popular Islamic movement using the democratic process to make gains, he also ignores or downplays parts of the narrative in the areas he does mention.
While he de-emphasizes the uptick of violence in Algeria because of its long-standing nature, he doesn't mention that the Indonesian and Philippine violence is of even longer pedigree when he claims their success. The fact that al Qaeda, the main threat to the West from radical Islam, has also managed to survive and grow in Afghanistan/Pakistan is also downplayed.
In Iraq, even a greatly weakened al Qaeda presence is still greater than its presence before the invasion, and for some reason Fareed completely fails to mention the growth in radical Shiite militias and organizations. For that matter, nothing is mentioned of the greatly expanded influence of the Iranian theocracy next door. One assumes that when you're talking about radical Islam, the mullahs of Teheran would bear mentioning?
Saudi Arabia's ability to stamp out domestic terror cells is lauded while later in the article he points out that it is Saudi-funded wahhabist literature that inspired one of the London bombers. So, does the continued survival of the Saudi monarchy and their continued distribution and funding of the most militant form of Islam count as a victory?
In Egypt, the crackdowns have also been effective at keeping the current dictatorship in power, but the Muslim Brotherhood made impressive gains in the last so-called elections despite the crackdown. Or maybe, like Fatah, the Muslim Brotherhood is now considered moderate so it doesn't ruin Fareed's narrative.
The split between Sunnis and Shiites—which plays a role in Lebanon as well—is only one of the divisions within the world of Islam. Within that universe are Shiites and Sunnis, Persians and Arabs, Southeast Asians and Middle Easterners and, importantly, moderates and radicals. The clash between Hamas and Fatah in the Palestinian territories is the most vivid sign of the latter divide. Just as the diversity within the communist world ultimately made it less threatening, so the many varieties of Islam weaken its ability to coalesce into a single, monolithic foe. It would be even less dangerous if Western leaders recognized this and worked to emphasize such distinctions. Rather than speaking of a single worldwide movement—which absurdly lumps together Chechen separatists in Russia, Pakistani-backed militants in India, Shiite warlords in Lebanon and Sunni jihadists in Egypt—we should be emphasizing that all these groups are distinct, with differing agendas, enemies and friends. That robs them of their claim to represent Islam. It describes them as they often are—small local gangs of misfits, hoping to attract attention through nihilism and barbarism.(emphasis mine)
It's good that the author can see this, but even he points out that the leadership isn't making this distinction. Hell, read the title of his article! He lumps them together himself even while he advises that this is a bad idea. That lumping together of various foes strengthens them by forcing them to work together against their common foe. Zawahiri has repeatedly tried to make common cause with Hamas, the latest example coming to light today. The Shiite Hezbollah received support across sectarian lines while fighting Israel last year and emerged more popular and politically powerful.
So do I think we're losing the war on radical Islam? It's a very poor question when most people can't even come to a good definition of what "radical" means beyond "against US/Israeli interests".
All I do know, is that the current leadership is doing a damn poor job of it so far.
