Arming the Tribesmen
Modeled on what appears to be a successful "Anbar Awakening" in Iraq, the US is apparently looking to arm Pakistani tribesmen to help in their fight against al Qaeda.
Altogether, the broader strategic move toward more local support is being accelerated because of concern about instability in Pakistan and the weakness of the Pakistani government, as well as fears that extremists with havens in the tribal areas could escalate their attacks on allied troops in Afghanistan. Just in recent weeks, Islamic militants sympathetic to Al Qaeda and the Taliban have already extended their reach beyond the frontier areas into more settled areas, most notably the mountainous region of Swat.
. . .
Historically, American Special Forces have gone into foreign countries to work with local militaries to improve the security of those countries in ways that help American interests. Under this new approach, the number of advisers would increase, officials said.
The problem here is that they're not talking about supporting the Pakistani military. They're talking about arming and supporting local militia forces that don't generally acknowledge Islamabad's authority. Doing so pushes the Pakistani state into greater instability and weakness, which only helps a non-state force like al Qaeda.
And this doesn't sound too encouraging regarding the amount of thought they've put into things:
One person who was briefed on the proposal prepared by the Special Operations Command staff members, and who spoke on condition of anonymity because the briefing had not yet been approved, said it was in the form of about two dozen slides. The slides described a strategy using both military and nonmilitary measures to fight the militants.
One slide included a chart that categorized one to two dozen tribes by location — North Waziristan and South Waziristan, for example — and then gave a brief description of their location, their known or suspected links to Al Qaeda and the Taliban, and their size and military abilities.
A couple of dozen slides? One slide to tell people about known and suspected al Qaeda links for the entire region?
It's little wonder the US rarely seems to make any good decisions when they are based on such a paucity of data.
