The Turkish Front
An article in a major Turkish newspaper yesterday is cause for some discussion for its take on what is becoming a more and more likely Turkish incursion into northern Iraq.
The Turks have shown a remarkable patience and reluctance to attack so far. Think for a moment what the likely response would have been had the recent attack against their troops instead been carried out by Hezbollah against Israeli forces? This is no doubt because the Turks, at least, have a considerable understanding of the possible negative consequences of such actions. Even now it isn’t clear whether or not they will launch a large-scale attack.
As with most things, the question to ask isn’t whether or not action is justified, but whether it makes strategic sense and if there is a smart way to do it.
The Israeli attack on Lebanon offers a good case to use for comparison. Even though their incursion could be justified by Hezbollah’s raid, the justification quickly fell by the wayside when the Israelis went far beyond targeting Hezbollah and instead attacked the entire Lebanese state; blockading the country, bombing its airports, bridges, roads, power stations, and so forth. To some extent, that’s exactly what the Turkish author is advising the Turkish military to do to Iraqi Kurdistan.
The effect in Israel’s case was to rally the Lebanese people to support Hezbollah’s battle against Israel, (at least until the fighting was over, at which point internal rivalries resurfaced). It also brought down international condemnation. It is important to remember that for the first few days, even the Arab states were criticizing Hezbollah and not Israel. It was only after the Israeli response was clearly both outsized for the infraction and targeting far more than just the perpetrators that world opinion shifted firmly against them.
For the Turks, the same dynamics will be in play, but to some extent this part will be easier. For one, the list of recent attacks by the PKK is a fairly long one, which adds weight to their justification argument. For Israel, beyond the raid itself, the previous six years had been fairly quiet without any Hezbollah attacks against Israeli civilians. Minimal attacks justify minimal responses. It didn’t take long for the Israelis to use up their credit. To some extent, the Turks restraint in the face of repeated attacks has bought them more leeway for when they do react in a big way.
Second, while the Israeli attacks weakened the Lebanese government’s legitimacy, (and consequently strengthened Hezbollah’s), because the government proved both incapable and unwilling to resist the Israeli attacks, the Turks have far less to worry about.
Even the most far-fetched scenarios don’t see Turkey bombing Baghdad or blockading Basra. Whatever action they take will be limited to Iraqi Kurdistan. The Kurdish region has been all but independent for the last 15 years and doesn’t even allow the Iraqi flag to fly in its territory. As far as hurting the central Iraqi government’s legitimacy, it can’t lose what it doesn’t have. Not only doesn’t it control Kurdistan, it doesn’t control any other part of Iraq to any real extent and has to lean heavily on the US just to ensure its survival.
Still, the Turks will have to be careful with what targets they hit. I have no idea how popular the PKK is in the region, but when foreigners come in and bomb your houses, you tend to support those fighting against them regardless whether or not you agree with their goals.
That means I don’t encourage the Turks to follow the authors advice to bomb the Kurds back to the Saddam years. (Of course, the Kurds are probably the only group of Iraqis where going back to the conditions under Saddam would actually be worse.)
In addition, if there are significant civilian casualties, it will be very hard for the US to sit on the sidelines. Bluster aside, the Turks are no more prepared to take on the US in a conventional battle than anyone else, and the US certainly doesn’t want to go to war with a NATO ally that has troops serving in Afghanistan. (Aside: Given Turkey is a NATO country and has been attacked, what's the rest of the alliance willing to do about it?)
Three other mistakes the Israelis made that the Turks should avoid. Set realistic goals, don’t underestimate your opponents, and don’t prolong the war.
For the Israelis, all three were interrelated. They set out to destroy Hezbollah as a threat and get their soldiers back, and believed they could do so by a swift application of airpower within a couple of days. They were, to say the least, sorely mistaken. Rather than being destroyed, Hezbollah began firing rockets into northern Israel, and the Israelis upped the ante by saying they would also destroy Hezbollah’s rocket force. Instead the rockets continued at a rate, and at ranges, that would continually increase as the war continued.
Frustrated by their inability to decisively defeat Hezbollah, the Israelis continually escalated their efforts and expanded their target lists. They sent in ground forces, which they hadn’t prepared for, only to discover the enemy well dug-in and prepared to receive the worst the Israelis could throw at them.
Finally, international pressure and the realization that they weren’t going to fulfill the mission forced them to accept a face-saving peacekeeper force on the border. Hezbollah remains intact and unbowed, and the soldiers remain in their custody
Lesson for Turkey: Pick your targets well, hit them hard and fast, and get the hell out.
Don’t pretend you’re going to destroy the PKK. Don’t get drawn in to fighting further because they hit back at you while you’re making your incursion. Don’t get caught up in punishing the Iraqi Kurds because they haven’t done enough to stop the PKK from raiding.
A short, sharp shock. Anything more, and you’ll lose more, possibly far more, than you gain.
