From Slate:
More likely though, Anbar was chosen because it's seen as the clearest place where some success has been evident. But Anthony Cordesman, an Iraq expert, tells the NYT that Anbar isn't really exemplary of a successful American strategy since any progress there has more to do with the local frustration with al-Qaida in Iraq. Although Bush tried to bring both sides together yesterday, there is clearly still distrust between the Shiite central government and the Sunnis as many doubt the Anbar model can be exported to other areas.
But that is exactly what the new U.S. strategy in Iraq has become, reports the WSJ in a Page One piece. The paper says that "after almost four years of trying to build Iraq's central government in Baghdad" the United States has concluded that "what appears to work best in the divided country is just the opposite." In other words, the United States is increasingly trying to prop up local leaders and the WSJ suggests this might amount to dividing the country into different areas, a strategy that sounds a lot like the "soft partition" that several Democrats have been advocating for some time. The thinking is that the United States should worry a bit less about the central government and hope that the country will remain united in the long run because local leaders will still depend on Baghdad for money.
And, wait a minute, isn't that a strategy shift from the stated goals of the "surge" that was supposed to give some breathing room for politicians in Baghdad so they could make progress and create a model democracy in the Middle East? The "big change in the debate has come about because the surge failed, and it failed in an unexpected way," points out the NYT's David Brooks (subscription required) who says there is now a consensus that "peace will come to the center last, not to the center first.”
This is a really bad idea for the long term. By throwing their support behind the local leaders and not the central government, the US is encouraging warlords and fiefdoms and a multitude of forces whose primary loyalties will be to something other than the state of Iraq. This is an extension of the policy that put Shiite and Kurdish militias into uniforms to create the illusion of progress in the creation of an Iraqi army, so that now we hear all sorts of stories about how these very same militias have “infiltrated” these units and are using them for their own purposes.
This is, in fact, an excellent way to turn the country into the kind of failed state Afghanistan was before the Taliban took over, or Somalia before the Islamists exerted their control. Two examples you would think the US would be careful to avoid.
The strategy does carry with it the possibility of what John Robb called the “
Controlled Chaos” exit. As the local warlords focus on exerting their control on their local fiefdoms, the level of overall violence may lessen to the point that the US could extricate itself without suffering too many casualties. Only they won’t. They will point to the lessening as a sign of progress and claim like Bill Kristol has been fond of saying the last little while, “now we finally have a good general and a good strategy and we need to give them time to make it work.” The jellyfish in Congress will go along once again and the war will continue.
The apparent signs of progress will vanish as the local warlords start turning on each other, and the situation will be worse than ever, but by that time the administration and its supporters will either have another “brilliant strategy” and General Scapegoat lined up to repeat the process, or they’ll be able to hand off the horrible FUBAR to whichever poor schmuck wins the election next November, which for them will be the real “Mission Accomplished”.
