The US recently launched one of what has been a series of airstrikes in Somalia. This time, unlike most, they seem to have actually hit their intended target, killing a UIC military leader. The US has accused the Islamists in Somalia of being linked to al Qaeda and harbouring some of those responsible for the 1998 embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, though as with most of their accusations, haven’t actually offered any proof of those claims. Given the Bush administration’s record on these matters, it is probably enough that they’re Muslims who don’t agree with the US.
In any case, since it has at least briefly brought the fighting in Somalia back into the consciousness of the mainstream, I thought it would be worthwhile to review how the US created and nurtured this mostly ignored front in the “War on Terror”.
Somalia has been in a state of near-anarchy since the overthrow of the dictator Siad Barre in 1991 by a group of warlords who, having overthrown the government, fell to fighting each other for control. (It was into this mess that the US and others sent troops, which led to the events made famous by “Black Hawk Down”)
The warlords were thugs, criminals, and worse. Their men ravaged the residents of Mogadishu, robbing, raping, and killing as they pleased. However, in the post-9/11 world, they had the advantage in the US’s eyes, of not being Islamist. In January of 2006, that point made them US allies, which didn’t work out at all as planned.
The land was little more than a patch of scrub outside the city. But this being Somalia -- lawless, fractured and armed to the teeth -- it was a patch of scrub that two of the country's most powerful families were prepared to fight over.
The fighting, which began Jan. 13, quickly took on wider significance because of the presence, at an airstrip just three miles away, of a small team of U.S. intelligence officials, according to Somalis knowledgeable about the events of that day.
The Americans were in Somalia because of concerns about terrorism, not land. But when the gunfire rang out, the sources said, the U.S. officials wrongly concluded that they were under attack by Islamic terrorists and abruptly fled. It was a provocation, U.S. officials later told Somalis, that demanded a muscular response.
In the weeks that followed this little-known incident, which U.S. officials have refused to confirm or deny, the United States expanded its role in Somalia to levels not seen since it abandoned the country in 1994. The Americans helped organize a group of secular warlords into an "anti-terror coalition" and provided them with a large, steady diet of cash.
The warlords, feared and hated by many Somalis, bragged about the money as they armed themselves as never before.
. . .
American analysts, though not knowledgeable about the incident at the airstrip, said that by giving cash to the warlords the United States triggered events that quickly moved beyond its control, producing a setback likely to hurt not only Somalis but also the U.S. war on terrorism.
. . .
Back in Mogadishu, the fight was seen differently -- as a sign of growing belligerence by the United States and the warlords it backed.
In the months leading up to the battle, Somalis say, officials of the Islamic courts had grown increasingly nervous as they watched Raghe and other suddenly flush warlords add men, guns and trucks to their arsenal. Surging demand caused the price of AK-47 assault rifles at Mogadishu's main market to more than quadruple, from $120 to $580. The price of gunmen went from $70 a month to $300, Somalis say.
"All of a sudden they were buying weapons," said Khadija O. Ali, founder of a Mogadishu women's group and a graduate student at George Mason University, speaking in Nairobi. "All of the sudden there were planes coming and the Americans were meeting only with" the warlords.
Anti-Americanism, stoked by the war in Iraq, intensified as supporters of the Islamic courts spread word that the United States was backing the warlords, whom many residents of Mogadishu say operated with impunity as their gunmen terrorized the lawless city, raping, robbing and killing as they pleased.
Public opinion gradually coalesced in favor of the Islamic courts and their militias, Somalis say. Prominent businessmen contributed men, trucks and guns to the cause of driving out the warlords. And so on Feb. 18, when Raghe and several other warlords announced the formation of an "anti-terrorism coalition" -- featuring the backing of even more American money -- the reaction was swift. Battles broke out the same day in a struggle now seen as being between homegrown Islamic militias and a hated U.S. proxy force.
The result was the routing of the warlords by the UIC, which by the summer of 2006 had extended it’s control over most of southern Somalia and brought the first period of relative stability to the country since the warlords has taken over.
The Bush administration, however, was unwilling to take the defeat of their thuggish proxies lying down. With the warlords broken and discredited, the
US turned to Ethiopia and the weak Somali interim government it was propping up. The CIA began taking over whole blocks of hotel rooms in Addis Ababa as they begin to push the Ethiopians into ousting the Islamists for them.
In December of 2006, the Ethiopians seemed to do just that, leading to a fair bit of
premature celebrating from the same crowd that figured Iraq would be a cakewalk.
Within a couple of months, it was clear that the Ethiopians were facing a growing insurgency, despite all of their “advantages”. Eric Martin
said it best:
Interestingly enough, despite Ethiopia's penchant for unrestrained brutality and disregard for international norms, as well as relatively inattentive media coverage, it appears that an insurgency is taking root and thriving regardless. To such a degree that Ethiopian forces are heading for the exits and the current Somali government can barely take up residence in the nation's capital.
Why, it's almost as if insurgencies can get by without the aid and comfort of American leftists, humanitarian groups, the UN and the treasonous Western media. One might even conclude that, at times, insurgents have goals and motivations that provide their own animating impetus - not derived solely from the domestic political situation in the occupier's home country. Imagine the implications.
. . .
To be fair, the conservatives cited above were right to point out that we can learn from Ethiopia's experiences in Somalia. They just happened to have misfired on the thrust of the curriculum. We'll give them partial credit though.
The problem for the Ethiopians and their puppet Somalis is the same as the one the US faced with the warlords, and that they face in Iraq and Afghanistan. A government that is imposed by a foreign power and that has to rely on foreign military power for its very survival is never going to be seen as legitimate in the eyes of those it purportedly rules.
By the end of last year, the Ethiopian government was forced to admit that it had gotten “
bogged down” in Somalia. They had planned for a quick ousting of the UIC, a handover to the interim government that they had supported and sheltered for years, which would allow them to quickly draw down their forces, leaving whatever pacification duties may be needed to an international force that has failed to materialize. Any of that sound familiar?
Needless to say, things didn’t go quite as planned.
Ethiopia and Somalia fought a couple of post-colonial wars and the Ethiopians are understandably less than popular in Somalia as a result. Having your government propped up by a hated rival is hardly the way to make it well-liked. The tactics
the Ethiopians have been using to fight the insurgents hasn’t made them many friends either.
Ethiopian commanders flouted international humanitarian law by firing "inherently indiscriminate" Katyusha rockets into civilian neighborhoods, the report found, and by "routinely and repeatedly" firing rockets, mortars and artillery in a manner that failed to distinguish between civilians and military targets.
The report found "strong evidence" that the indiscriminate bombardment was intentional, carried on day after day even after it was clear that scores of civilians were being killed.
In some areas, witnesses told the group, rockets and heavy artillery shells fell in a systematic pattern, as if the Ethiopians were attempting to level entire neighborhoods.
The US has been heavily involved in this mess from the get-go, providing intelligence, air strikes, and a naval blockade during the initial Ethiopian invasion, to the continued bombings and missile strikes at “suspected militants” that have sparked riots and demonstrations due to their very low success rate, unless you count blowing up a bunch of unnamed, innocent black people a success. Add to that at least half a billion dollars in aid to the Ethiopian government.
Despite all the American aid and international cover, the Somalia invasion and occupation has turned into
a strategic sinkhole for Ethiopia, and is racheting up instability in the entire region.
The Ethiopian decision to invade Somalia in December 2006 altered the balance of power in the Horn of Africa.
. . .
Ethiopian forces, which had been facing Eritrea along their 1,000km border, but were otherwise confronting few security threats, are now engaged on three fronts.
The forces in Somalia are now bogged down and cannot withdraw, as Prime Minister Meles Zenawi recently acknowledged.
In addition to the conflict in Somalia they now also confront a growing rebellion in the Somali region of Ethiopia from the Ogaden National Liberation Front.
The third front is a possible reopening of the hostilities between Ethiopia and Eritrea, something the US also has
played an unhelpful hand in.
Add to all that the fact that all of the refugees streaming south into Kenya probably played a large part in straining tensions there past the breaking point recently.
All of this has of course placed considerable strain on the Ethiopian military. Regardless of how big and well-equipped an army might be, there are only a finite number of folks who will willingly put their lives on the line. Ethiopia not being nearly as wedded to human rights as any civilized nation, has went far beyond stop-loss to
fill out the ranks of cannon-fodder.
Ethiopian soldiers have forcibly drafted hundreds of civilians to fight separatist rebels in the desolate, predominantly Muslim Ogaden region in a shadowy military campaign supported by the Bush administration, according to more than a dozen refugees and former recruits who've fled to neighboring Kenya.
The untrained and ill-equipped draftees — including students, camel herders and tribal leaders who've never fired weapons in combat — are being thrown into pitched battles with ethnic Somali guerrillas and often suffer heavy casualties, the refugees and ex-recruits said.
Men who resist joining these civilian militias — known as "dabaqodhi," or "puppets" of the government — are beaten, locked up in military prisons or killed, the refugees said in interviews. When recruits perform poorly in combat, as they often do, they're abused and accused of aiding the rebels, refugees said.
And that is really only the tip of the iceberg. The
humanitarian disaster that is Somalia and the neighbouring Ogaden region is one of the most under-reported parts of this whole sad mess.
. . . Human Rights Watch says it has documented dozens of cases of severe abuse by Ethiopian troops in the Ogaden, including gang rapes, burned villages and what it calls “demonstration killings,” like hangings and beheadings, meant to terrorize the population.
. . .
Recent refugees said the military was trying to starve them out and the blockade had been like a noose on some parts of the region, cutting off food supplies.
In October, Save the Children U.K. surveyed more than 600 Ogadeni children and found that 21 percent were acutely malnourished, compared with United Nations surveys that found malnutrition rates of 19 percent in an area of Somalia and 13 percent in Darfur, Sudan. The United Nations considers 15 percent the emergency threshold.
Read over that last paragraph again. The food situation for children in the Ogaden region and parts of Somalia is worse than it is in Darfur. How is it we don’t hear more about this?
The Bush administration considers Ethiopia its No. 1 ally in combating terrorism in the Horn of Africa, and the American government provides it with roughly $500 million in annual aid.
Right. Silly me. Human rights only matter if you happen to be an enemy of the Bush administration. When you’re an ally, particularly a Christian-led ally fighting Muslims, you can safely ignore them.
It also means you can call for international aid without being laughed at, but the international community is, not too surprisingly, reluctant to send much in the way of aid or soldiers to bail out the beleaguered interim government and the Ethiopians. The result is the interim government taking actions that will likely
hasten its fall.
The trouble started when government soldiers went to the market and, at gunpoint, began to help themselves to sacks of grain last week.
Islamist insurgents poured into the streets to defend the merchants. The government troops took heavy casualties and retreated all the way back to the presidential palace, supposedly the most secure place in the city. It, too, came under fire.
. . .
To get clan support and — just as crucially — more militiamen, transitional leaders have cut deals with warlords like Mohammed Dheere, now Mogadishu’s mayor, and Abdi Qeybdid, now the police chief. These are the same men whom the C.I.A. paid in 2006 to fight the Islamists, a strategy that backfired because the population turned against them, mostly because of their legacy of terrorizing civilians.
A legacy they seem intent on continuing, and one the Islamists are exploiting.
In the rat-tat-tat of nightly machine-gun fire, people are beginning to hear the government’s death knell. Many residents have mixed feelings about this. They contend that the government has enabled warlords. They say, almost without exception, that things were better under the Islamists. But they fear what lies ahead.
“We’re getting addicted to anarchy,” said Dahabo Abdulleh, a fuel seller.
. . .
Hassan, the government soldier, said he had been in one of these warlord militias since he was 8. He cannot read or write. He has thin wrists, a delicate face, empty eyes and a wife and two children to feed, which is why he said he routinely robs people.
“We are losing,” he said.
He said many of his friends were defecting to the Islamists because that was the only way to survive.
The Islamists have briefly captured several towns in recent weeks, freeing prisoners, snatching weapons and then melting back into the bush. Gone are the beards and the checkered scarves they used to wear. Many, like a young man named Elmi, are clean-shaven and favor crisply pressed suits.
Elmi, who like Hassan said he could not reveal his last name, said business owners sold gold, real estate and sheep to raise money for the Islamists. Elmi said that he was part of the battle at the market on March 20 that began with the looting, and that the government lost three trucks, which was corroborated by government soldiers.
“We were there because we are everywhere,” Elmi said.
The Islamists now effectively control large swaths of territory where they can strike at will, and the government’s legitimacy continues to fade, along with the increasingly small area it controls.
Somehow I doubt that a single airstrike is going to have much of an effect on this dynamic.