Northman's Fury

William Lind is one of the founding members of the fourth generation warfare theory, and while I have some disagreements with some of his social views, when it comes to warfare and strategy, he always provides excellent analysis and insight.

He’s written an essay on how the US can salvage a strategic victory in Iraq for the American Conservative magazine.  The strategy he outlines is chancy by his own admission and there is no guarantee of success, but it is one of the best laid-out and realistic plans I’ve seen in some time.

The first step is to throw out the maximalist objectives that include Iraq being a US and Israeli-friendly satellite allowing huge military bases and unlimited access to oil.  That’s just never going to happen.

After that, the game is using the “indirect approach”.  Everyone the US supports nowadays is automatically suspect and loses legitimacy, so the only way an effective government is going to emerge from the chaos of Iraq is in the form of forces who oppose the US.  For Lind, that means the effective strategic answer is to withdraw US forces and get out of those forces way.

The third piece of Lind’s strategy is to reach a form a rapprochement with Iran.  This would have been far easier and less costly to the US back in 2003 when there was still a Reformist President in Iran and the US military was still looked upon as a fearsome force to be reckoned with, but the basic framework for agreement between the two powers is still intact and attainable.  Again, this is an area where the US must stop pursuing maximalist objectives  Getting everything you want is rarely possible, but getting what you need usually is.

It is the second point where this strategy is the trickiest and over which the US has the least amount of control.  I think Lind overestimates al-Sadr’s importance and willingness to work across sectarian lines, but the recent formation of a alliance of major Sunni insurgent groups opposed to both the US and al Qaeda shows that the basic idea is sound, particularly given the groups apparent willingness to reach out to Shia groups, if not currently Sadr’s forces.

Still, this strategy requires the US abandon the current Iraqi government, or at least take them back into exile with them.  Not a very popular move to make and there is still the prospect of a major bloodbath following the US withdrawal.

Still, the recent US military war games seem to indicate that the mess following a US withdrawal may not be as bad as some have predicted, and if the US works behind the scenes with the proper objective of empowering the opposition groups to form a government, the worst excesses can be avoided.

Given that it is more a question of when rather than if the US leaves Iraq, it would be wise to try and find a way to make the defeat merely tactical rather than strategic. 

Unfortunately, I have little confidence in the current administration making the hard choices necessary to bring that about, and the situation may well progress too far down the wrong path for the next administration to make any difference.

Still, it is an idea worth considering.

U.S. Needs to Devise a Different 'Brand' to Win Over the Iraqi People, Study Advises

Maybe if they called themselves “The Fluffy Bunny Liberation Brigade”?

Seriously. It’s not the brand; it’s the job. The US military is trained to fight and kill enemies using the maximum amount of available firepower. All well and good when you’re fighting another military force trained to fight the same way; not so good when trying to mount a counterinsurgency campaign.

In an urban insurgency, for example, civilians can help identify enemy infiltrators and otherwise assist U.S. forces. They are less likely to help, the study says, when they become "collateral damage" in U.S. attacks, have their doors broken down or are shot at checkpoints because they do not speak English. Cultural connections -- seeking out the local head man when entering a neighborhood, looking someone in the eye when offering a friendly wave -- are key.

And they only had to spend $400,000 to be told that, proving once again that consultants are highly paid people who tell you what you already know.

One other point at the bottom of the article:

Adversaries are doing their own shaping on Iraq's urban battlefields. While intimidation, coercion and assassination might not make them beloved, such techniques effectively limit public outreach to U.S. forces, the Rand study notes. Enemy forces have also learned that "doing good works is a classic approach to winning friends and influencing people" and frequently provide basic services that the U.S. military is unable to match.

$12,000,000,000 a month, and the US can’t match a bunch of mostly self-financed insurgents in the provision of basic services. Compared to that, $400 grand for stating the obvious doesn’t seem like that bad a deal.

You know, until I saw this little story, I had completely forgotten that Bush had appointed a War Czar.

I remember now that several top generals refused the position, and I'm sure I made some snarky comment about finding a scapegoat when Gen. Lute accepted the position, but the guy has completely dropped off the radar since then.

Kind of makes you wonder just how important this "war czar" is in regards to the war effort.

While the bulk of the government’s - and the world’s - attention is focused on the insurgency-ridden south, Afghanistan’s northern provinces are becoming increasingly troubled.

Over the past few months, incidents of violence are becoming a regular occurrence in a region previously thought to be relatively stable. Commanders clashed violently in Faryab, leaving several dead, dozens injured, and necessitating the call-out of national troops. A protest in Jowzjan turned bloody, killing ten and wounding many more. A member of parliament was attacked in Samangan, and persistent rumours are circulating that weapons are being distributed in Sar-e-Pul.

“According to our information, some former commanders in Sar-e-Pul province have recommenced their activity,” said Colonel Mir Ali Nadem, who heads the DIAG (Disarmament of Illegal Armed Groups) programme in Sar-e-Pul. “Our intelligence shows that weapons have been distributed to some parties and individuals.”

Although these groups have not yet taken overt action against the government, added Nadem, the distribution of weapons is a serious threat to security. It also compromises the DIAG process, which, over the past two years, has managed to collect a mere 30,000 weapons. While no one has exact figures for how many guns, grenades and other types of military hardware existed in Afghanistan before the DIAG programme was launched in June 2005, the estimates run into the millions.

Illegal or “irresponsible” armed groups, as they are termed by officials, have left a dark legacy in the country. After the fall of the communist-backed Najibullah regime in 1992, the country disintegrated into armed camps belonging to various commanders who governed their fiefdoms with an iron hand. It was, in large part, revulsion at their despotic and corrupt rule that gave rise to the Taleban, who promised to rid the country of the “warlords” and bring some measure of security to the people.

This is not just disturbing in the sense that these groups pose a possible threat to the US-backed government, it is also an indicator that the people are increasingly likely to view that government as illegitimate and are focusing on building up power bases for the next round of a multi-sided civil war.

The other major concern I have seeing this news, is that many of the NATO countries involved in Afghanistan have purposely stayed in the north to avoid having to take part in combat operations. If the north becomes unstable and violent, the trends point to those governments pulling out entirely rather than offering increased support to the US, British, Canadian, and Dutch forces fighting in the south.

If that happens, then the nightmare scenario outlined by senior British generals becomes that much harder to avoid.