How it's done
In the latest of William Lind’s ongoing On War series at the DNI site, he takes a look at Martin van Creveld’s latest book, and in particular, Chapter Six’s summary of how the British were able to prevail in Northern Ireland.
First, unlike President Bush in 2001, the British did not declare war, which would have removed a whole series of legal constraints and put the entire conflict on a new footing. Instead, from beginning to end the problem was treated as a criminal one…
Note that, in contrast to what we hear from the Bush administration and the U.S. military, van Creveld sees the removal of restrictions on what troops can do as a disadvantage. He understands that in Fourth Generation war, the counter-intuitive is often correct.
Second, much of the day-to-day work was left to the RUC (Royal Ulster Constabulary). Its members, having been locally recruited and assigned lengthy stays at their posts, knew the area better than anyone else. Accordingly, they were often able to discriminate among the various factions inside the IRA as well as between terrorists and others…
For the most part, this isn’t even a possibility any more in Iraq, and the same is often true in Afghanistan. The local police forces in both countries are corrupt, underpaid, under-equipped, and either sectarian (in Iraq), or tribal (in Afghanistan). The local military is usually better on the first part, but worse in the second. For the most part, the US doesn’t trust the local forces and has stopped training them for fear that they are training their opponents, which is too often the case.
Third, never again (after Bloody Sunday, January 30, 1972, when British troops fired into a crowd and killed thirteen people) did British troops fire indiscriminately into marching or rioting crowds
Even today, Bloody Sunday is an incident that lives in infamy. The anger it caused is a large part of why the “troubles” continued for as long as they did. The British recognized this and did what they could to de-escalate the situation.
It’s an incident almost identical to this that started the bad feelings in Fallujah, and the situation simply grew continually worse. Add to that other reports of US troops firing indiscriminately into passers-by after sniper attacks or roadside bombings.
Fourth, and in marked contrast with most other counterinsurgents from the Germans in Yugoslavia to the Americans in Vietnam and elsewhere, not once in the entire struggle did the army bring in heavy weapons such as tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery, or aircraft to repulse attacks and inflict retaliation…
Even the Germans rarely used heavy weapons. This point also has some relevance to Canadians, buying a bunch of newer tanks to replace the aging fleet of Leopards we sent to Afghanistan.
We’ve suffered a number of casualties from badly aimed US air support, how much more so the Afghan people?
Fifth, never once did the British inflict collective punishment such as curfews, the cutting off of electricity and water, demolishing houses, destroying entire neighborhoods. . . As far as humanly possible, the police and the army posed as the protectors of the population, not its tormentors. In this way they were able to prevent the uprising from spreading.
They probably didn’t build many walls either.
Sixth and most important of all, by and large both the RUC and the army stayed within the framework of the law. . .From (1972) on, the British refrained from arbitrary imprisonment, torture, and illegal killings…
The most important insight of all, though, (came) over dinner in Geneva in 1995. My partner on that occasion was a British colonel, regiment of paratroopers, who had done several tours of duty in Northern Ireland. What he said can be summed up as follows…
the struggle in Northern Ireland had cost the United Kingdom three thousand casualties in dead alone. Of the three thousand, about seventeen hundred were civilians….of the remaining, a thousand were British soldiers. No more than three hundred were terrorists, a ratio of three to one. Speaking very softly, he said: And that is why we are still there.(Emphasis mine)
In a nutshell, the reason the occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan are doomed can be summed up in two words, “Force Protection”. How often have you heard stories of troops firing on vehicles at checkpoints because they failed to stop on time and the troops felt threatened? The idea is to protect the troops from suicide bombers, and it’s hard to argue that this is a bad thing. Sometimes they’re right and stop suicide bombers. Other times they are tragically wrong and slaughter innocent civilians.
The message is that our troops’ lives are far more important than the civilians that they are supposedly there to protect. Look at the casualty figures in N. Ireland again. The reason the British suffered greater losses than the terrorists, is because they ignored “force protection” and put civilian life above their own. Part of the fifth point above, they were there as protectors, not tormentors. Shooting up innocent civilians turns their families against the occupiers and to the terrorists. Not shooting them up means some real terrorists get through and you suffer greater casualties.
The reason the latter case works, is because taking the casualties yourself and not inflicting them on the civilian population means the terrorists have far more difficulty increasing their support and numbers. With limited support and numbers, they can be dealt with. “Force Protection” means fewer casualties for you in the short term at the cost of creating more enemies and suffering far more casualties long term and ultimately, leads to defeat.

