GIST v0.7 ― S
“SAC” to “system verification”

S

- SAC

See: service assessment criteria.

- safeguard n.

See: security control.

- safety n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The property of a system being free from risk of causing harm to system entities and outside entities.

- SAID n.

See: security association identifier.

- salt n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A random value that is concatenated with a password before applying the one-way encryption function used to protect passwords that are stored in the database of an access control system. (See: initialization value.)

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 9796-2 (12/2001)

Random data produced by the signing entity during the generation of the message representative in Signature scheme 2.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A non-secret value that is used in a cryptographic process, usually to ensure that the results of computations for one instance cannot be reused by an attacker.

- SAML n.

See: Security Assertion Markup Language.

- SAML artifact n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A small, fixed-size, structured data object pointing to a typically larger,variably-sized SAML protocol message. SAML artifacts are designed to be embedded in URLs and conveyed in HTTP messages, such as HTTP response messages with “3xx Redirection” status codes, and subsequent HTTP GET messages. In this way, a service provider may indirectly, via a user agent, convey a SAML artifact to another provider, who may subsequently dereference the SAML artifact via a direct interaction with the supplying provider, and obtain the SAML protocol message. Various characteristics of the HTTP protocol and user agent implementations provided the impetus for concocting this approach. The HTTP Artifact binding section of [SAMLBind] defines both the SAML Artifact format and the SAML HTTP protocol binding incorporating it.

- SAML authentication assertion n.

See: authentication assertion.

- SAML authority n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

An abstract system entity in the SAML domain model that issues assertions. See also attribute authority, authentication authority, and policy decision point (PDP).

- SAML requester n.

See: requester.

- SAML responder n.

See: responder.

- sample n.

See: biometric sample.

- sandboxing n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

A method of isolating application modules into distinct fault domains enforced by software. The technique allows untrusted programs written in an unsafe language, such as C, to be executed safely within the single virtual address space of an application. Untrusted machine interpretable code modules are transformed so that all memory accesses are confined to code and data segments within their fault domain. Access to system resources can also be controlled through a unique identifier associated with each domain.

- sanitization n., - sanitize vb., - sanitizing n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

sanitizing

Removing sensitive information from a document to reduce its sensitivity.

RFC 2828 (2000)

sanitize

(I) Delete sensitive data from a file, a device, or a system; or modify data so as to be able to downgrade its classification level.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200; CNSSI-4009 Adapted

sanitization

Process to remove information from media such that information recovery is not possible. It includes removing all labels, markings, and activity logs.

- Sarbanes-Oxley n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which introduced changes to regulations that apply to financial practice and corporate governance for public companies. The Act introduced new rules that were intended “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws.”

- SASL n.

See: Simple Authentication and Security Layer.

- s-box n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 197

Non-linear substitution table used in several byte substitution transformations and in the key expansion routine to perform a one for one substitution of a byte value.

- SCA n.

See: subordinate certification authority.

- scanning n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

Sending packets or requests to another system to gain information to be used in a subsequent attack.

- scavenge vb., - scavenging n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

scavenge

To search, without authorization, through residual data to acquire sensitive information.

RFC 2828 (2000)

scavenging attack

See: (secondary definition under) threat consequence.

- scenario testing n.

BEM 2002

Testing a biometric system to measure its statistical properties (e.g. FAR and FRR) in an environment modelled to simulate a particular application. (Compare operational testing; technology testing.)

- scheme n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 15443-1 (11/2001)

Set of rules defining the environment, including criteria and methodology required to conduct an assessment.

- scoping guidance n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

Provides organizations with specific technology-related, infrastructure-related, public access-related, scalability-related, common security control-related, and risk-related considerations on the applicability and implementation of individual security controls in the control baseline.

FIPS 200

Specific factors related to technology, infrastructure, public access, scalability, common security controls, and risk that can be considered by organizations in the applicability and implementation of individual security controls in the security control baseline.

- score n., vb.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008) – A.2.12

Note: Use in the natural language sense.

But it doesn’t say what that is! Presumably not “twenty” … or “an act of buying illegal drugs”!

[NOAD] gives: (n.) “the number of points, goals, runs, etc., achieved in a game … a rating or grade, such as a mark achieved in a test …”; (vb.) “… decide on the scores to be awarded in (a game or competition) …”.

See: comparison score.

- scoring n.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008) – A.2.13

Act of developing comparison scores. Note: Use in the natural language sense.

- screening router n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A synonym for filtering router.

- SDE n.

See: Secure Data Exchange.

- SDNS n.

See: Secure Data Network System.

- seal n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) To use cryptography to provide data integrity service for a data object. (See: sign, wrap.)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this definition; instead, use language that is more specific with regard to the mechanism(s) used, such as sign when the mechanism is digital signature.

- secret adj. & n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) 1. adj. The condition of information being protected from being known by any system entities except those who are intended to know it. 2. n. An item of information that is protected thusly.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

Information that must be known only to authorised users and/or the TSF in order to enforce a specific SFP.

- secret key n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A synonym for symmetric key.

- secret-key cryptography n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A synonym for symmetric cryptography.

- secret-key encryption n.

See: symmetric encryption algorithm.

- secret seed n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

A secret value that used to initialize a pseudorandom number generator. The resulting value from the random number generator remains secret or private.

- sector alignment n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A technique for copy protection that determines whether a disk is an unauthorized copy by checking whether sectors are positioned properly from track to track.

- secure communication protocol n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

A communication protocol that provides the appropriate confidentiality, authentication and content integrity protection.

- Secure Data Exchange (SDE) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A local area network security protocol defined by the IEEE 802.10 standard.

- Secure Data Network System (SDNS) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) An NSA program that developed security protocols for electronic mail (Message Security Protocol), OSI layer 3 (SP3), OSI layer 4 (SP4), and key management (KMP).

- secure envelope (SENV) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 13888-1 (11/2001)

A set of data items which is constructed by an entity in such a way that any entity holding the secret key can verify their integrity and origin. For the purpose of generating evidence, the SENV is constructed and verified by a TTP with a secret key known only to the TTP.

- Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1) n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-22

The Secure Hash Algorithm defined in Federal Information Processing Standard 180-1.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

One of the most popular hashing algorithms, designed for use with the Digital Signature Standard by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) and the National Security Agency (NSA). SHA-1 produces a 160-bit hash.

- Secure Hash Standard (SHS) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) The U.S. Government standard [FP180] that specifies the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA-1), a cryptographic hash function that produces a 160-bit output (hash result) for input data of any length < 2**64 bits.

- Secure Hypertext Transfer Protocol (Secure-HTTP, S-HTTP) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A Internet protocol for providing client-server security services for HTTP communications. (See: https.)

(C) S-HTTP was originally specified by CommerceNet, a coalition of businesses interested in developing the Internet for commercial uses. Several message formats may be incorporated into S-HTTP clients and servers, particularly CMS and MOSS. S-HTTP supports choice of security policies, key management mechanisms, and cryptographic algorithms through option negotiation between parties for each transaction. S-HTTP supports both asymmetric and symmetric key operation modes. S-HTTP attempts to avoid presuming a particular trust model, but it attempts to facilitate multiply-rooted hierarchical trust and anticipates that principals may have many public key certificates.

- secure identity n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

The verifiable and exclusive right to use the identity information being presented by an individual to access a set of privileges.

- Secure/MIME (S/MIME) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions, an Internet protocol [R2633] to provide encryption and digital signatures for Internet mail messages.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-49

A set of specifications for securing electronic mail. Secure/ Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) is based upon the widely used MIME standard and describes a protocol for adding cryptographic security services through MIME encapsulation of digitally signed and encrypted objects. The basic security services offered by S/MIME are authentication, non-repudiation of origin, message integrity, and message privacy. Optional security services include signed receipts, security labels, secure mailing lists, and an extended method of identifying the signer’s certificate(s).

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A protocol for exchanging digitally signed and/or encrypted mail.

- Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) An Internet protocol (originally developed by Netscape Communications, Inc.) that uses connection-oriented end-to-end encryption to provide data confidentiality service and data integrity service for traffic between a client (often a web browser) and a server, and that can optionally provide peer entity authentication between the client and the server. (See: Transport Layer Security.)

(C) SSL is layered below HTTP and above a reliable transport protocol (TCP). SSL is independent of the application it encapsulates, and any higher level protocol can layer on top of SSL transparently. However, many Internet applications might be better served by IPsec.

(C) SSL has two layers: (a) SSL’s lower layer, the SSL Record Protocol, is layered on top of the transport protocol and encapsulates higher level protocols. One such encapsulated protocol is SSL Handshake Protocol. (b) SSL’s upper layer provides asymmetric cryptography for server authentication (verifying the server’s identity to the client) and optional client authentication (verifying the client’s identity to the server), and also enables them to negotiate a symmetric encryption algorithm and secret session key (to use for data confidentiality) before the application protocol transmits or receives data. A keyed hash provides data integrity service for encapsulated data.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-46

Secure Socket Layer and Transport Layer Security (SSL and TSL)

Secure Sockets Layer is a protocol developed by Netscape for transmitting private documents via the Internet. SSL works by using a public key to encrypt data that’s transferred over the SSL connection. Most web browsers support SSL, and many web sites use the protocol to obtain confidential user information, such as credit card numbers. By convention, URLs that require an SSL connection start with “https:” instead of “http:”. TLS is an Internet standard based on SSL version 3.0. There are only very minor differences between SSL and TLS.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

SSL is a protocol used to transmit information on the Internet in encrypted form. SSL also ensures that the transmitted information is only accessible by the server that was intended to receive the information.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

An authentication and security protocol widely implemented in browsers and web servers. SSL has been superseded by the newer Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol; TLS 1.0 is effectively SSL version 3.1.

- secure state n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A system condition in which no subject can access any object in an unauthorized manner. (See: (secondary definition under) Bell-LaPadula Model, clean system.)

- security n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) 1. Measures taken to protect a system. 2. The condition of a system that results from the establishment and maintenance of measures to protect the system. 3. The condition of system resources being free from unauthorized access and from unauthorized or accidental change, destruction, or loss.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 15443-1 (11/2001)

All aspects related to defining, achieving, and maintaining confidentiality, integrity, availability, accountability, authenticity, and reliability. Note: A product, system, or service is considered to be secure to the extent that its users can rely that it functions (or will function) in the intended way. This is usually considered in the context of an assessment of actual or perceived threats.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A collection of safeguards that ensure the confidentiality of information, protect the systems or networks used to process it, and control access to them. Security typically encompasses the concepts of secrecy, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. It is intended to ensure that a system resists potentially correlated attacks. [CyberTrust]

- security accreditation n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-37

The official management decision given by a senior agency official to authorize operation of an information system and to explicitly accept the risk to agency operations (including mission, functions, image, or reputation), agency assets, or individuals, based on the implementation of an agreed-upon set of security controls.

IAEG LIAF (2008)

A collection of safeguards that ensures the confidentiality of information, protects the integrity of information, ensures the availability of information, accounts for use of the system, and protects the system(s) and/or network(s) used to process the information.

- security architecture n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A plan and set of principles that describe (a) the security services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of its users, (b) the system elements required to implement the services, and (c) the performance levels required in the elements to deal with the threat environment. (See: (discussion under) security policy.)

(C) A security architecture is the result of applying the system engineering process. A complete system security architecture includes administrative security, communication security, computer security, emanations security, personnel security, and physical security (e.g., see: [R2179]). A complete security architecture needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental kinds of threats.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A plan and set of principles for an administrative domain and its security domains that describe the security services that a system is required to provide to meet the needs of its users, the system elements required to implement the services, and the performance levels required in the elements to deal with the threat environment. A complete security architecture for a system addresses administrative security, communication security, computer security, emanations security, personnel security, and physical security, and prescribes security policies for each. A complete security architecture needs to deal with both intentional, intelligent threats and accidental threats. A security architecture should explicitly evolve over time as an integral part of its administrative domain’s evolution. [RFC2828]

- security assertion n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

An assertion that is scrutinized in the context of a security architecture.

- Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

The set of specifications describing security assertions that are encoded in XML, profiles for attaching the assertions to various protocols and frameworks, the request/response protocol used to obtain the assertions, and bindings of this protocol to various transfer protocols (for example, SOAP and HTTP).

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A specification for encoding security assertions in the Extensible Markup Language (XML). An XML-based security specification developed by OASIS for exchanging authentication (and authorization) information between trusted entities over the Internet.

An XML framework for exchanging authentication and authorization information, developed by the OASIS Security Services Technical Committee (TC). SAML version 1.1 was approved as an OASIS Standard on 2 September 2003.

The stated goals of the SAML version 2 effort are:

Addressing issues and enhancement requests that have arisen from experience with real-world SAML implementations and with standards architectures that use SAML, such as the OASIS WSS and XACML work.
Adding support for features that were deferred from previous versions of SAML for schedule reasons, such as session support, the exchange of metadata to ensure more interoperable interactions, and collection of credentials.
Converging on a unified technology approach for identity federation by integrating the specifications contributed to the TC by the Liberty Alliance.

See: OASIS Security Services TC externalLink

- security association n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A relationship established between two or more entities to enable them to protect data they exchange. The relationship is used to negotiate characteristics of protection mechanisms, but does not include the mechanisms themselves. (See: association.)

(C) A security association describes how entities will use security services. The relationship is represented by a set of information that is shared between the entities and is agreed upon and considered a contract between them.

(O) IPsec usage: A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection created for security purposes and implemented with either AH or ESP (but not both). The security services offered by a security association depend on the protocol selected, the IPsec mode (transport or tunnel), the endpoints, and the election of optional services within the protocol. A security association is identified by a triple consisting of (a) a destination IP address, (b) a protocol (AH or ESP) identifier, and (c) a Security Parameter Index.

- security association identifier (SAID) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A data field in a security protocol (such as NLSP or SDE), used to identify the security association to which a protocol data unit is bound. The SAID value is usually used to select a key for decryption or authentication at the destination. (See: security parameters index.)

- security attribute n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

Information associated with subjects, users and/or objects that is used for the enforcement of the TSP.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 188

A security-related quality of an object. Security attributes may be represented as hierarchical levels, bits in a bit map, or numbers. Compartments, caveats, and release markings are examples of security attributes.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

security attributes

Condition of use of objects in the ID card including stored data and data processing functions, expressed as a data element containing one or more access rules.

- security audit n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

An independent review and examination of data processing system records and activities to test for adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established security policy and operational procedures, to detect breaches in security, and to recommend any indicated changes in control, security policy, and procedures.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An independent review and examination of a system’s records and activities to determine the adequacy of system controls, ensure compliance with established security policy and procedures, detect breaches in security services, and recommend any changes that are indicated for countermeasures. [I7498 Part 2, NCS01]

(C) The basic audit objective is to establish accountability for system entities that initiate or participate in security-relevant events and actions. Thus, means are needed to generate and record a security audit trail and to review and analyze the audit trail to discover and investigate attacks and security compromises.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32; CNSSI-4009

audit

Independent review and examination of records and activities to assess the adequacy of system controls, to ensure compliance with established policies and operational procedures, and to recommend necessary changes in controls, policies, or procedures

- security audit trail n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A chronological record of system activities that is sufficient to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of environments and activities surrounding or leading to an operation, procedure, or event in a security-relevant transaction from inception to final results. [NCS04] (See: security audit.)

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

audit trail

Data collected for the potential use in a security audit.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32

audit data

Chronological record of system activities to enable the reconstruction and examination of the sequence of events and changes in an event.

SP 800-47

audit trail

A record showing who has accessed an Information Technology (IT) system and what operations the user has performed during a given period.

- security authority n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15816: 2002

The entity accountable for the administration of a security policy within a security domain.

- security authorization n.

See: accreditation.

- security category n.

See: category.

- security class n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) A synonym for security level. For consistency, ISDs SHOULD use security level instead of security class.

- security classification n.

See: classification.

- security clearance n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

Permission granted to an individual to access data or information at or below a particular security level.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A determination that a person is eligible, under the standards of a specific security policy, for authorization to access sensitive information or other system resources. (See: clearance level.)

- security compromise n.

See: compromise.

- security context n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

With respect to an individual SAML protocol message, the message’s security context is the semantic union of the message’s security header blocks (if any) along with other security mechanisms that may be employed in the message’s delivery to a recipient. With respect to the latter, an examples are security mechanisms employed at lower network stack layers such as HTTP, TLS/SSL, IPSEC, etc.

With respect to a system entity, “Alice”, interacting with another system entity, “Bob”, a security context is nominally the semantic union of all employed security mechanisms across all network connections between Alice and Bob. Alice and Bob may each individually be, for example, a provider or a user agent. This notion of security context is similar to the notion of “security contexts” as employed in [RFC2743], and in the Distributed Computing Environment [DCE], for example.

- security control n.

NIST SP 800-53 seems rather schizophrenic here. It states that countermeasures, safeguards and security controls are synonymous but provides three distinct definitions. The last definition (below) suggests that security controls is a superset that includes both countermeasures and safeguards. It is with this point of view that all these definitions are grouped under this heading.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

countermeasure

An action, device, procedure, technique, or other measure that is designed to minimize vulnerability.

RFC 2828 (2000)

countermeasure

(I) An action, device, procedure, or technique that reduces a threat, a vulnerability, or an attack by eliminating or preventing it, by minimizing the harm it can cause, or by discovering and reporting it so that corrective action can be taken.

(C) In an Internet protocol, a countermeasure may take the form of a protocol feature, an element function, or a usage constraint.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC PDTR 13335-1 (11/2001)

safeguard

A practice, procedure or mechanism that reduces risk. Note that the term safeguard is normally considered to be synonymous with the term control.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200; CNSSI-4009

countermeasures

Actions, devices, procedures, techniques, or other measures that reduce the vulnerability of an information system. Synonymous with security controls and safeguards.

SP 800-53; CNSSI-4009 Adapted [???]

safeguards

Protective measures prescribed to meet the security requirements (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, and availability) specified for an information system. Safeguards may include security features, management constraints, personnel security, and security of physical structures, areas, and devices. Synonymous with security controls and countermeasures.

FIPS 200; CNSSI-4009 Adapted [???]

safeguards

SP 800-53; FIPS 200; FIPS 199

security controls

The management, operational, and technical controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) prescribed for an information system to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the system and its information.

- security control baseline n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200

The set of minimum security controls defined for a low-impact, moderate-impact, or high-impact information system.

- security control enhancements n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

Statements of security capability to:

build in additional, but related, functionality to a basic control; and/or
increase the strength of a basic control.

- security domain n.

See: domain.

- security element n.

See: element.

- security environment n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The set of external entities, procedures, and conditions that affect secure development, operation, and maintenance of a system.

- security event n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A occurrence in a system that is relevant to the security of the system. (See: security incident.)

(C) The term includes both events that are security incidents and those that are not. In a CA workstation, for example, a list of security events might include the following:

Performing a cryptographic operation, e.g., signing a digital certificate or CRL.
Performing a cryptographic card operation: creation, insertion, removal, or backup.
Performing a digital certificate lifecycle operation: rekey, renewal, revocation, or update.
Posting information to an X.500 Directory.
Receiving a key compromise notification.
Receiving an improper certification request.
Detecting an alarm condition reported by a cryptographic module.
Logging the operator in or out.
Failing a built-in hardware self-test or a software system integrity check.

- security fault analysis n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A security analysis, usually performed on hardware at a logic gate level, gate-by-gate, to determine the security properties of a device when a hardware fault is encountered.

- security filter n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

security filter

A trusted computer system that enforces a security policy on the data that pass through the system.

- Security Function (SF) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A part or parts of the TOE that have to be relied upon for enforcing a closely related subset of the rules from the TSP.

- Security Function Policy (SFP) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

The security policy enforced by an SF.

- security gateway n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A gateway that separates trusted (or relatively more trusted) hosts on the internal network side from untrusted (or less trusted) hosts on the external network side. (See: firewall and guard.)

(O) IPsec usage: “An intermediate system that implements IPsec protocols.” [R2401] Normally, AH or ESP is implemented to serve a set of internal hosts, providing security services for the hosts when they communicate with other, external hosts or gateways that also implement IPsec.

- security goal n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-27A

IT security goals, security goals

The five security goals are confidentiality, availability, integrity, accountability, and assurance.

SP 800-53; FIPS 200; FIPS 199

security objective

Confidentiality, integrity, or availability.

See: Security Matters ▶ Overview: The five elements.

- security ID n.

See: security identifier.

- security identifier (security ID, SID) n.

in Windows operating systems: “A unique number that identifies user, group, and computer accounts. Every account on your network is issued a unique SID when the account is first created. Internal processes in Windows 2000 refer to an account’s SID rather than the account’s user or group name. If you create an account, delete it, and then create an account with the same user name, the new account will not have the rights and permissions previously granted to the old account because the accounts have different SID numbers.” [MSFT]

See: userid.

- security impact analysis n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

The analysis conducted by an agency official, often during the continuous monitoring phase of the security certification and accreditation process, to determine the extent to which changes to the information system have affected the security posture of the system.

- security incident n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A security event that involves a security violation. (See: CERT, GRIP, security event, security intrusion, security violation.)

(C) In other words, a security-relevant system event in which the system’s security policy is disobeyed or otherwise breached.

(O) “Any adverse event which compromises some aspect of computer or network security.” [R2350]

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this “O” definition because (a) a security incident may occur without actually being harmful (i.e., adverse) and (b) this Glossary defines compromise more narrowly in relation to unauthorized access.

- security information object n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15816: 2002

An instance of an SIO class.

- security information object class n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15816: 2002

An information object class that has been tailored for security use.

- security intrusion n.

See: intrusion.

- security kernel n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) “The hardware, firmware, and software elements of a trusted computing base that implement the reference monitor concept. It must mediate all accesses, be protected from modification, and be verifiable as correct.” [NCS04] (See: reference monitor.)

- security label n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A marking that is bound to a system resource and that names or designates the security-relevant attributes of that resource. [I7498 Part 2, R1457]

(C) The recommended definition is usefully broad, but usually the term is understood more narrowly as a marking that represents the security level of an information object, i.e., a marking that indicates how sensitive an information object is. [NCS04]

(C) System security mechanisms interpret security labels according to applicable security policy to determine how to control access to the associated information, otherwise constrain its handling, and affix appropriate security markings to visible (printed and displayed) images thereof. [FP188]

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

Explicit or implicit marking of a data structure or output media associated with an information system representing the FIPS 199 security category, or distribution limitations or handling caveats of the information contained therein.

FIPS 188

A marking bound to a resource (which may be a data unit) that names or designates the security attributes of that resource.

- security level n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

The combination of a hierarchical security classification and a security category that represents the sensitivity of an object or the security clearance of an individual.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The combination of a hierarchical classification level and a set of non-hierarchical category designations that represents how sensitive information is. (See: (usage note under) classification level, dominate, lattice model.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 188

A hierarchical indicator of the degree of sensitivity to a certain threat. It implies, according to the security policy being enforced, a specific level of protection.

- security management infrastructure (SMI) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) System elements and activities that support security policy by monitoring and controlling security services and mechanisms, distributing security information, and reporting security events. The associated functions are as follows [I7498-4]:

Controlling (granting or restricting) access to system resources: This includes verifying authorizations and identities, controlling access to sensitive security data, and modifying access priorities and procedures in the event of attacks. (See: privilege management infrastructure.)
Retrieving (gathering) and archiving (storing) security information: This includes logging security events and analyzing the log, monitoring and profiling usage, and reporting security violations.
Managing and controlling the encryption process: This includes performing the functions of key management and reporting on key management problems. (See: public-key infrastructure.)

- security mechanism n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A process (or a device incorporating such a process) that can be used in a system to implement a security service that is provided by or within the system. (See: (discussion under) security policy.)

(C) Some examples of security mechanisms are authentication exchange, checksum, digital signature, encryption, and traffic padding.

- security model n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A schematic description of a set of entities and relationships by which a specified set of security services are provided by or within a system. (See: (discussion under) security policy.)

- security objective n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A statement of intent to counter identified threats and/or satisfy identified organisation security policies and assumptions.

See also: biometric capture device.

2. (in infrastructure protection)

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC DTR 15947 (10/2001)

sensor or monitor

A component/agent of an IDS, which collects event data from an IT system under observation.

- sensor aging n.

BEM 2002

The gradual degradation in performance of a sensor over time.

- separation of duties n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

Dividing responsibility for sensitive information so that an individual acting alone can compromise the security of only a limited portion of a data processing system.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The practice of dividing the steps in a system function among different individuals, so as to keep a single individual from subverting the process. (See: dual control, administrative security.)

- sequence number n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997, ISO/IEC 11770-1: 1996, ISO/IEC 11770-2: 1996, ISO/IEC 11770-3: 1999, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-3 (02/2001)

A time variant parameter whose value is taken from a specified sequence which is non-repeating within a certain time period.

- serial number n.

See: certificate serial number.

- Serpent n.

An AES finalist.

- server n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A system entity that provides a service in response to requests from other system entities called clients.

- service assessment criteria (SAC)

IAEG LIAF (2008)

A set of requirements levied upon specific organizational and other functions performed by electronic trust services and electronic trust service providers.

Services and service providers must comply with all applicable criteria to qualify for IAEG approval.

- service provider n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A role donned by a system entity where the system entity provides services to principals or other system entities.

- session n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A lasting interaction between system entities, often involving a principal, typified by the maintenance of some state of the interaction for the duration of the interaction.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005) makes the distinction between a simple session and a rich session but does not provide definitions for these terms.

- session authority n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A role donned by a system entity when it maintains state related to sessions. Identity providers often fulfill this role.

- session-hijack attack n.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

An attack in which the attacker is able to insert himself or herself between a claimant and a verifier subsequent to a successful authentication exchange between the latter two parties. The attacker is able to pose as a subscriber to the verifier or vice versa to control session data exchange.

- session key n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) In the context of symmetric encryption, a key that is temporary or is used for a relatively short period of time. (See: ephemeral key, key distribution center, master key.)

(C) Usually, a session key is used for a defined period of communication between two computers, such as for the duration of a single connection or transaction set, or the key is used in an application that protects relatively large amounts of data and, therefore, needs to be rekeyed frequently.

- session participant n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A role donned by a system entity when it participates in a session with at least a session authority.

- SET n.

See: SET Secure Electronic Transaction™.

- SET private extension n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) One of the private extensions defined by SET for X.509 certificates. Carries information about hashed root key, certificate type, merchant data, cardholder certificate requirements, encryption support for tunneling, or message support for payment instructions.

- SET qualifier n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) A certificate policy qualifier that provides information about the location and content of a SET certificate policy.

(C) In addition to the policies and qualifiers inherited from its own certificate, each CA in the SET certification hierarchy may add one qualifying statement to the root policy when the CA issues a certificate. The additional qualifier is a certificate policy for that CA. Each policy in a SET certificate may have these qualifiers:

A URL where a copy of the policy statement may be found.
An electronic mail address where a copy of the policy statement may be found.
A hash result of the policy statement, computed using the indicated algorithm.
A statement declaring any disclaimers associated with the issuing of the certificate.

- SET Secure Electronic Transaction™ or SET™ n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A protocol developed jointly by MasterCard International and Visa International and published as an open standard to provide confidentiality of transaction information, payment integrity, and authentication of transaction participants for payment card transactions over unsecured networks, such as the Internet. [SET1] (See: acquirer, brand, cardholder, dual signature, electronic commerce, issuer, merchant, payment gateway, third party.)

(C) This term and acronym are trademarks of Setc.. MasterCard and Visa announced the SET standard on 1 February 1996. On 19 December 1997, MasterCard and Visa formed SET Secure Electronic Transaction LLC (commonly referred to as Setc.) to implement the SET 1.0 specification. A memorandum of understanding adds American Express and JCB Credit Card Company as co-owners of Setc..

- SETCo n.

See: (secondary definition under) SET Secure Electronic Transaction.

- SHA-1

See: Secure Hash Algorithm.

- shared secret n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A synonym for keying material or cryptographic key.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A secret used in authentication that is known to the claimant and the verifier.

- shell site n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A synonym for cold site.

- S-HTTP n.

See: Secure HTTP.

- SID n.

See: security identifier.

- sign n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Create a digital signature for a data object.

- signatory

IAEG LIAF (2008)

A party that opts into and agrees to be bound by the IAEG Rules according to the specified procedures.

- signature n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 9796-2 (12/2001)

String of bits resulting from the signature process.

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000

The string of bits resulting from the signature process. Note: This string of bits may have internal structure specific to the signature mechanism. The signatures produced by the mechanisms specified in this part of ISO/IEC 9796 have two parts, of which only the second one depends on the signature key.

ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-2 (04/2001), ISO/IEC WD 15946-4 (10/2001)

The string of bits resulting from the signature process.

ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998

The string of bits resulting from the signature process. Note: This string of bits may have internal structure specific to the signature mechanism.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

A recognizable, distinguishing pattern associated with an attack, such as a binary string in a virus or a particular set of keystrokes used to gain unauthorized access to a system.

See also: digital signature, electronic signature.

- signature certificate n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A public-key certificate that contains a public key that is intended to be used for verifying digital signatures, rather than for encrypting data or performing other cryptographic functions.

(C) A v3 X.509 public-key certificate may have a keyUsage extension which indicates the purpose for which the certified public key is intended.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32

A public key certificate that contains a public key intended for verifying digital signatures rather than encrypting data or performing any other cryptographic functions.

- signature equation n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998

An equation defining the signature function.

- signature function n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998

A function in the signature process which is determined by the signature key and the domain parameters. A signature function takes the assignment and possibly the randomizer as inputs and gives the second part of the signature as output.

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000

- signature generation n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

Uses a digital signature algorithm and a private key to generate a digital signature on data.

- signature key n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000, ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-2 (04/2001), ISO/IEC WD 15946-4 (10/2001)

A secret data item specific to an entity and usable only by this entity in the signature process.

- signature process n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000, ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-2 (04/2001), ISO/IEC WD 15946-4 (10/2001)

A process which takes as inputs the message, the signature key and the domain parameters, and which gives as output the signature.

- signature system n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 11770-3: 1999, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-3 (02/2001)

A system based on asymmetric cryptographic techniques whose private transformation is used for signing and whose public transformation is used for verification.

- signature verification n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

Uses a digital signature algorithm and a public key to verify a digital signature.

- signed data n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 196

Data on which a digital signature is generated.

- signed message n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000, ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998

A set of data items consisting of the signature, the part of the message which cannot be recovered from the signature, and an optional text field.

ISO/IEC WD 15946-4 (10/2001)

A set of data items formed by the signature, the part of the message which cannot be recovered from the signature, and an optional text field.

- signer n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A human being or an organization entity that uses its private key to create a digital signature for a data object. [ABA]

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 13888-1 (11/2001)

The entity generating a digital signature.

- sign off vb.

See: log out.

- sign-off n.

See: logout.

- sign on vb.

See: log in.

- sign-on n.

See: login.

- SILS n.

See: Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security.

- SIM n.

See: Subscriber Identity Module.

- similarity score n.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008)

Comparison score that increases with similarity.

- simple authentication n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An authentication process that uses a password as the information needed to verify an identity claimed for an entity. (See: strong authentication.)

(O) “Authentication by means of simple password arrangements.” [X509]

- Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An Internet specification [R2222] for adding authentication service to connection-based protocols. To use SASL, a protocol includes a command for authenticating a user to a server and for optionally negotiating protection of subsequent protocol interactions. The command names a registered security mechanism. SASL mechanisms include Kerberos, GSSAPI, S/KEY, and others. Some protocols that use SASL are IMAP4 and POP3.

- Simple Key-management for Internet Protocols (SKIP) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A key distribution protocol that uses hybrid encryption to convey session keys that are used to encrypt data in IP packets. [R2356] (See: IKE, IPsec.)

(C) SKIP uses the Diffie-Hellman algorithm (or could use another key agreement algorithm) to generate a key-encrypting key for use between two entities. A session key is used with a symmetric algorithm to encrypt data in one or more IP packets that are to be sent from one of the entities to the other. The KEK is used with a symmetric algorithm to encrypt the session key, and the encrypted session key is placed in a SKIP header that is added to each IP packet that is encrypted with that session key.

- Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A TCP-based, application-layer, Internet Standard protocol [R0821] for moving electronic mail messages from one computer to another.

- Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A UDP-based, application-layer, Internet Standard protocol [R2570, R2574] for conveying management information between managers and agents.

(C) SNMP version 1 uses cleartext passwords for authentication and access control. (See: community string.) Version 2 adds cryptographic mechanisms based on DES and MD5. Version 3 provides enhanced, integrated support for security services, including data confidentiality, data integrity, data origin authentication, and message timeliness and limited replay protection.

- simple security property n.

See: (secondary definition under) Bell-LaPadula Model.

- simple session n.

See: session.

- SIN n.

See: single identification number.

- single-factor authentication n.

See: (secondary definition under) authentication.

- single-hop problem n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

The security risks resulting from an mobile software agent moving from its home platform to another platform.

- single identification number (SIN) n.

An identifier assigned by the state, used by the state to uniquely identify each of its citizens (and other subgroups of natural persons) and legal persons. Examples include:

CA: Social Insurance Number (SIN)
SI: Enotna matična številka občana (EMŠO) (Unique Master Citizen Number)
UK: National Insurance Number (NINO)
US: Social Security Number (SSN)

Mona could see the sun through a couple of rips in the black plastic they kept taped over the window. She hated the squat too much to stay there when she was awake or straight, and now she was both. She was 16 and SINless, Mona, and this older trick had told her once that that was a song, “Sixteen and SINless.” Meant that she hadn’t been assigned a SIN when she was born, a Single Identification Number, so she grown up on the outside of most official systems. She knew that it was supposed to be possible to get a SIN, if you didn’t have one, but it stood to reason you’d have to go to a building somewhere and talk to a suit, and that was a long way from Mona’s idea of a good time or even normal behavior.

― William Gibson, Mona Lisa Overdrive (Bantam 1988)

- single-level device n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A functional unit that can only process data of a single security level at a particular time. (See: multilevel device.)

- single sign-on (SSO) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A system that enables a user to access multiple computer platforms (usually a set of hosts on the same network) or application systems after being authenticated just one time. (See: Kerberos.)

(C) Typically, a user logs in just once, and then is transparently granted access to a variety of permitted resources with no further login being required until after the user logs out. Such a system has the advantages of being user friendly and enabling authentication to be managed consistently across an entire enterprise, and has the disadvantage of requiring all hosts and applications to trust the same authentication mechanism.

- site n.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

An informal term for an administrative domain in geographical or DNS name sense. It may refer to a particular geographical or topological portion of an administrative domain, or it may encompass multiple administrative domains, as may be the case at an ASP site.

- situation n.

See: security situation.

- S/Key n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A security mechanism that uses a cryptographic hash function to generate a sequence of 64-bit, one-time passwords for remote user login. [R1760]

(C) The client generates a one-time password by applying the MD4 cryptographic hash function multiple times to the user’s secret key. For each successive authentication of the user, the number of hash applications is reduced by one. (Thus, an intruder using wiretapping cannot compute a valid password from knowledge of one previously used.) The server verifies a password by hashing the currently presented password (or initialization value) one time and comparing the hash result with the previously presented password.

- skimming n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

The practice of obtaining information from a data storage device without the owner’s knowledge. Skimming is typically associated with magnetic stripe-based credit cards.

- SKIP n.

See: Simple Key-management for Internet Protocols.

- SKIPJACK n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A Type II block cipher [NIST] with a block size of 64 bits and a key size of 80 bits, that was developed by NSA and formerly classified at the U.S. Department of Defense “Secret” level. (See: CAPSTONE chip, CLIPPER chip, FORTEZZA, Key Exchange Algorithm.)

- slot n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) MISSI usage: One of the FORTEZZA PC card storage areas that are each able to hold an X.509 certificate and additional data that is associated with the certificate, such as the matching private key.

- smart card n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A credit-card sized device containing one or more integrated circuit chips, which perform the functions of a computer’s central processor, memory, and input/output interface. (See: PC card.)

(C) Sometimes this term is used rather strictly to mean a card that closely conforms to the dimensions and appearance of the kind of plastic credit card issued by banks and merchants. At other times, the term is used loosely to include cards that are larger than credit cards, especially cards that are thicker, such as PC cards.

(C) A smart token is a device that conforms to the definition of smart card except that rather than having standard credit card dimensions, the token is packaged in some other form, such as a dog tag or door key shape.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-48

A credit card with a built-in microprocessor and memory that is used for identification or financial transactions. When inserted into a reader, the card transfers data to and from a central computer. A smart card is more secure than a magnetic stripe card and can be programmed to self-destruct if the wrong password is entered too many times.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A device that includes an embedded integrated circuit that can be either a secure microcontroller or equivalent intelligence with internal memory or a memory chip alone. The card connects to a reader with direct physical contact or with a remote contactless radio frequency interface. With an embedded microcontroller, smart cards have the unique ability to store large amounts of data, carry out their own on-card functions (e.g., encryption and mutual authentication) and interact intelligently with a smart card reader. Smart card technology conforms to international standards (ISO/IEC 7816 and ISO/IEC 14443) and is available in a variety of form factors, including plastic cards, subscriber identity modules used in GSM mobile phones, and USB-based tokens.

See: contact smart card, contactless smart card, cryptographic smart card, dual-interface card, hybrid card, multi-application card.

- smart-card interface device (SC-IFD) n.

A formal name for a smart-card reader. (See: interface device.)

- smart-card reader n.

See: card reader, smart-card interface device.

- smart token n.

See: (secondary definition under) smart card.

- SMI n.

See: security management infrastructure.

- S/MIME

See: Secure/MIME.

- SMTP n.

See: Simple Mail Transfer Protocol.

- smurf n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Software that mounts a denial-of-service attack (smurfing) by exploiting IP broadcast addressing and ICMP ping packets to cause flooding. (See: flood ing, ICMP flood.)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in most dictionaries and could confuse international readers.

(C) A smurf program builds a network packet that appears to originate from another address, that of the victim, either a host or an IP router. The packet contains an ICMP ping message that is addressed to an IP broadcast address, i.e., to all IP addresses in a given network. The echo responses to the ping message return to the victim’s address. The goal of smurfing may be either to deny service at a particular host or to flood all or part of an IP network.

“Far, very far from here, in a little village full of mushroom-shaped houses live the Smurfs. The little characters are three apples high, have blue skin and are dressed in white trousers and a cap. Yet they are a happy, easy-going bunch - give or take one or two.” — The Smurfs' Official Site externalLink

- sniffer n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

Software that observes and records network traffic.

- sniffing n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of a term that is better established. (See: (usage note under) Green Book.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

The act of auditing or watching computer network traffic. Hackers may use sniffing programs to capture data that is being communicated on a network (e.g., usernames and passwords).

- SNMP n.

See: Simple Network Management Protocol.

- social engineering n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A euphemism for non-technical or low-technology means – such as lies, impersonation, tricks, bribes, blackmail, and threats – used to attack information systems. (See: masquerade attack.)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is vague; instead, use a term that is specific with regard to the means of attack.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

An attempt to trick someone into revealing information (e.g., a password) that can be used to attack systems or networks.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

The act of deceiving an individual into revealing sensitive information by associating with the individual to gain confidence and trust.

- SOCKS n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An Internet protocol [R1928] that provides a generalized proxy server that enables client-server applications – such as TELNET, FTP, and HTTP; running over either TCP or UDP – to use the services of a firewall.

(C) SOCKS is layered under the application layer and above the transport layer. When a client inside a firewall wishes to establish a connection to an object that is reachable only through the firewall, it uses TCP to connect to the SOCKS server, negotiates with the server for the authentication method to be used, authenticates with the chosen method, and then sends a relay request. The SOCKS server evaluates the request, typically based on source and destination addresses, and either establishes the appropriate connection or denies it.

- SOF n.

See: strength of function

- SOF-basic n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against casual breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a low attack potential.

- SOF-high n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against deliberately planned or organised breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a high attack potential.

- SOF-medium n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A level of the TOE strength of function where analysis shows that the function provides adequate protection against straightforward or intentional breach of TOE security by attackers possessing a moderate attack potential.

- soft TEMPEST n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) The use of software techniques to reduce the radio frequency information leakage from computer displays and keyboards. [Kuhn] (See: TEMPEST.)

- software n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Computer programs (which are stored in and executed by computer hardware) and associated data (which also is stored in the hardware) that may be dynamically written or modified during execution. (See: firmware, hardware.)

- software-based fault isolation n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

- software piracy n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

The unauthorized use, copying, or distribution of software products. Note: This is a revised version of the definition in ISO/IEC 2382-1:1993.

- software publisher certificate n.

No such heading in RFC 2828, although it is cross-referenced.

- SORA n.

See: SSO-PIN ORA.

- source authentication n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is ambiguous. If the intent is to authenticate the original creator or packager of data received, then say data origin authentication. If the intent is to authenticate the identity of the sender of data, then say peer entity authentication. (See: data origin authentication, peer entity authentication).

- source integrity n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The degree of confidence that can be placed in information based on the trustworthiness of its sources. (See: integrity.)

- SP3 n.

See: Security Protocol 3.

- SP4 n.

See: Security Protocol 4.

- spam vb. & n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) 1. vb.: To indiscriminately send unsolicited, unwanted, irrelevant, or inappropriate messages, especially commercial advertising in mass quantities. 2. n.: electronic junk mail. [R2635]

(D) This term SHOULD NOT be written in upper-case letters, because SPAM™ is a trademark of Hormel Foods Corporation. Hormel says, “We do not object to use of this slang term [spam] to describe [unsolicited commercial email (UCE)], although we do object to the use of our product image in association with that term. Also, if the term is to be used, it should be used in all lower-case letters to distinguish it from our trademark SPAM, which should be used with all uppercase letters.” [See: SPAM and the Internet externalLink

(C) In sufficient volume, spam can cause denial of service. (See: flooding.) According to the SPAM Web site, the term was adopted as a result of the Monty Python skit in which a group of Vikings sang a chorus of “SPAM, SPAM, SPAM…” in an increasing crescendo, drowning out other conversation. Hence, the analogy applied because UCE was drowning out normal discourse on the Internet.

- SPC n.

See: software publisher certificate.

- speaker-dependent adj.

iAfB-ICSA 1999

A term sometimes used by speaker verification vendors to emphasise the fact their technology is designed to distinguish among voices.

- speaker separation n.

iAfB-ICSA 1999

A speaker verification technology that separates overlapping voices from each other and other background noises.

- speaker verification n.

iAfB-ICSA 1999

A part physical, part behavioural biometric characteristic that analyses patterns in speech.

- specific SIO class n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15816: 2002

An SIO class in which the data types for all components are fully specified.

- specification n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A set of documentation that reflects agreements on products, practices, or operations produced by one or more organizations (or groups of cooperating entities), some for internal usage only, others for use by groups of people, groups of companies, or an entire industry.

- specified service

IAEG LIAF (2008)

The electronic trust service which, for the purposes of an IAEG assessment, is the subject of criteria set out in a particular SAC, or in an application for assessment, in a grant of an approval or other similar usage as may be found in various IAEG documentation.

- speech recognition n.

iAfB-ICSA 1999

This is not a biometric and should not be confused with speaker verification. Speech recognition involves recognising words as they are spoken and does not identify the speaker.

- SPI n.

See: security parameters index.

- spiral track n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A track with a spiral shape on a disk, as part of a method of copy protection.

- split key n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A cryptographic key that is divided into two or more separate data items that individually convey no knowledge of the whole key that results from combining the items. (See: dual control, split knowledge.)

- split knowledge n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A security technique in which two or more entities separately hold data items that individually convey no knowledge of the information that results from combining the items. (See: dual control, split key.)

(O) “A condition under which two or more entities separately have key components which individually convey no knowledge of the plaintext key which will be produced when the key components are combined in the cryptographic module.” [FP140]

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

A procedure whereby a cryptographic key is handled as multiple key components from the time that the key or the separate key components are generated until the key components are combined for use. Each key component provides no knowledge of the ultimate key. The key may be created and then split into the key components, or may be created as separate key components. The key components are output from the generating cryptographic module(s) to separate entities for individual handling, and subsequently input separately into the intended cryptographic module and combined to form the ultimate key. Note: A suitable combination function is not provided by simple concatenation; e.g., it is not acceptable to form an 80-bit key by concatenating two 40-bit key components.

FIPS 140-2

A process by which a cryptographic key is split into multiple key components, individually sharing no knowledge of the original key, that can be subsequently input into, or output from, a cryptographic module by separate entities and combined to recreate the original cryptographic key.

- sponsor n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15292: 2001

An entity (organisation, individual, etc.) responsible for the content of a register entry.

- spoof vb., - spoofing n., - spoofing attack n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

spoof

To take action intended to deceive a user, an observer (such as an eavesdropper) or a system resource.

RFC 2828 (2000)

spoofing attack

(I) A synonym for masquerade attack.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-48

spoofing

“IP spoofing” refers to sending a network packet that appears to come from a source other than its actual source.

FIPS 191

spoofing

Involves –

the ability to receive a message by masquerading as the legitimate receiving destination, or
masquerading as the sending machine and sending a message to a destination.

spoofing

(in biometrics) “the use of artifacts such as fake fingerprints to defeat biometric systems” [IBG email]

- spyware n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53 Rev 1

Software that is secretly or surreptitiously installed into an information system to gather information on individuals or organizations without their knowledge; a type of malicious code.

- SSH n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A protocol for secure remote login and other secure network services over an insecure network.

Transport layer protocol: Provides server authentication, confidentiality, and integrity. It may optionally also provide compression. The transport layer will typically be run over a TCP/IP connection, but might also be used on top of any other reliable data stream.
User authentication protocol: Authenticates the client-side user to the server. It runs over the transport layer protocol.
Connection protocol: Multiplexes the encrypted tunnel into several logical channels. It runs over the user authentication protocol.

- SSL n.

See: Secure Sockets Layer, Standard Security Label.

- SSO n.

See: single sign-on, system security officer.

- SSO PIN n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) MISSI usage: One of two personal identification numbers that control access to the functions and stored data of a FORTEZZA PC card. Knowledge of the SSO PIN enables the card user to perform the FORTEZZA functions intended for use by an end user and also the functions intended for use by a MISSI certification authority. (See: user PIN.)

- SSO-PIN ORA (SORA) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) MISSI usage: A MISSI organizational RA that operates in a mode in which the ORA performs all card management functions and, therefore, requires knowledge of the SSO PIN for an end user’s FORTEZZA PC card.

- standard n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 201

A published statement on a topic specifying characteristics, usually measurable, that must be satisfied or achieved in order to comply with the standard.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

Specifications produced by accredited associations, such as ANSI, ISO, SIA, ETSI or NIST. In the United States the use of standards is typically optional and multiple standards can be developed on the same subject. In some countries, the use of existing standards may be required by law and the development of multiple standards on the same subject may be restricted.

- Standards for Interoperable LAN/MAN Security (SILS) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) 1. The IEEE 802.10 standards committee. 2. A developing set of IEEE standards, which has eight parts: (a) Model, including security management, (b) Secure Data Exchange protocol, (c) Key Management, (d) [has been incorporated in (a)], (e) SDE Over Ethernet 2.0, (f) SDE Sublayer Management, (g) SDE Security Labels, and (h) SDE PICS Conformance. Parts b, e, f, g, and h are incorporated in IEEE Standard 802.10-1998.

- Standard Security Label n.

No such heading in RFC 2828, although it is cross-referenced.

- standard topography n.

See: mandatory topography.

- star property n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) (Written *-property.) See: confinement property under Bell-LaPadula Model.

- starting variable (SV) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO 8372: 1987

Variable derived from the initializing value and used in defining the starting point of the modes of operation. Note: The method of deriving the starting variable from the initializing value is not defined in this International Standard. It needs to be described in any application of the modes of operation.

ISO/IEC CD 10116 (12/2001)

Variable defining the starting point of the mode of operation. Note: The method of deriving the starting variable from the initializing value is not defined in this International Standard. It needs to be described in any application of the modes of operation.

- Star Trek attack n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

- state n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 197

Intermediate cipher result that can be pictured as a rectangular array of bytes.

- static biometric characteristic n.

A synonym for physiological biometric characteristic.

- static key n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

static keys

Static keys are relatively long-lived and are common to a number of executions of a given algorithm.

- static signature verification n.

iAfB-ICSA 1999

Verification of signature based only on the shape of the resulting signature (see: biometric characteristic).

- steganography n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Methods of hiding the existence of a message or other data. This is different than cryptography, which hides the meaning of a message but does not hide the message itself. (See: cryptology.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-72

The art and science of communicating in a way that hides the existence of the communication. For example, a child pornography image can be hidden inside another graphic image file, audio file, or other file format.

- storage channel n.

See: (secondary definition under) covert channel.

- stream cipher n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An encryption algorithm that breaks plaintext into a stream of successive bits (or characters) and encrypts the n-th plaintext bit with the n-th element of a parallel key stream, thus converting the plaintext bit stream into a ciphertext bit stream. [Schn] (See: block cipher.)

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 18033-1 (12/2001)

Symmetric encryption algorithm with the property that the encryption process involves combining the plaintext with a pseudorandom enciphering sequence one bit at a time. Each ciphertext bit is thus a function of both the corresponding plaintext bit and its position within the sequence of plaintext bits.

- Strength of Function (SOF) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

A qualification of a TOE security function expressing the minimum efforts assumed necessary to defeat its expected security behaviour by directly attacking its underlying security mechanisms.

- strong authentication n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An authentication process that uses cryptography – particularly public-key certificates – to verify the identity claimed for an entity. (See: X.509.)

(O) “Authentication by means of cryptographically derived credentials.” [X509]

An authentication process that uses cryptography is not necessarily “strong”. See: (discussion under) authentication.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

multi-factor authentication

The use of multiple techniques to authenticate an individual’s identity. This usually involves combining two or more of the following: something the individual has (e.g., a card or token); something the individual knows (e.g., a password or personal identification number); something the individual is (e.g., a fingerprint or other biometric measurement).

strong authentication

The use of two or more factors of authentication to prove an individual’s identity. Factors would include some combination of something you know (a password or personal identification number that only you know), something you have (a physical item or token in your possession) and something you are (a unique physical quality or behavior that differentiates you from all other individuals).

- subject n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

in computer security: An active entity that can access objects. Example: A process that involves execution of a program. Note: A subject may cause information to flow among objects or may change the state of the data processing system.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) in a computer system: A system entity that causes information to flow among objects or changes the system state; technically, a process-domain pair. (See: Bell-LaPadula Model.)

(I) of a certificate: The entity name that is bound to the data items in a digital certificate, and particularly a name that is bound to a key value in a public-key certificate.

OASIS XACML 2.0 (2005)

An actor whose attributes may be referenced by a predicate.

(1.1.2 Related terms) In the field of access control and authorization there are several closely related terms in common use. For purposes of precision and clarity, certain of these terms are not used in this specification. … Requestors and initiators are covered by the term subject.

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A principal in the context of a security domain. SAML assertions make declarations about subjects.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 15408-1: 1999

An entity within the TSC that causes operations to be performed.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 196

initiator

The entity that initiates an authentication exchange.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A person, system or object with associated attributes.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008) – A.2.14

Note 1: Use in the natural language sense.

Note 2: An individual undergoing a biometric process is typically referred to as a biometric subject, further qualified by the type of process. For example, biometric capture subject and biometric data subject. This helps clarify the different roles of individuals, such as attendants and biometric capture subjects.

IAEG LIAF (2008)

An entity that is able to use an electronic trust service subject to agreement with an associated subscriber.

A subject and a subscriber can be the same entity.

A very narrow definition of subject!

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

The person whose identity is bound in a particular credential.

- submission n.

IBG

The process whereby a user provides behavioral or physiological data in the form of biometric samples to a biometric system. A submission may require looking in the direction of a camera or placing a finger on a platen. Depending on the biometric system, a user may have to remove eyeglasses, remain still for a number of seconds, or recite a passphrase in order to provide a biometric sample. (See: biometrics.)

- subnetwork n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) An OSI term for a system of packet relays and connecting links that implement the lower three protocol layers of the OSIRM to provide a communication service that interconnects attached end systems. Usually the relays operate at OSI layer 3 and are all of the same type (e.g., all X.25 packet switches, or all interface units in an IEEE 802.3 LAN). (See: gateway, internet, router.)

- subordinate certification authority (SCA) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A CA whose public-key certificate is issued by another (superior) CA. (See: certification hierarchy.)

(O) MISSI usage: The fourth-highest (bottom) level of a MISSI certification hierarchy; a MISSI CA whose public-key certificate is signed by a MISSI CA rather than by a MISSI PCA. A MISSI SCA is the administrative authority for a subunit of an organization, established when it is desirable to organizationally distribute or decentralize the CA service. The term refers both to that authoritative office or role, and to the person who fills that office. A MISSI SCA registers end users and issues their certificates and may also register ORAs, but may not register other CAs. An SCA periodically issues a CRL.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32

In a hierarchical PKI, a certification authority whose certificate signature key is certified by another CA, and whose activities are constrained by that other CA.

- subordinate distinguished name n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An X.500 DN is subordinate to another X.500 DN if it begins with a set of attributes that is the same as the entire second DN except for the terminal attribute of the second DN (which is usually the name of a CA). For example, the DN {C=FOOLAND, O="Gov", OU="Treasurer", CN="DukePinchpenny"} is subordinate to the DN {C=FOOLAND, O="Gov", CN="KingFooCA"}.

- subscriber n.

IAEG LIAF (2008)

A party that has entered into an agreement to use an electronic trust service. A subscriber and a subject can be the same entity.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A party who receives a credential or token from a CSP and becomes a claimant in an authentication protocol.

- Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A SIM is the smart card that is included in GSM (Global System for Mobile Communications) mobile phones. SIMs are configured with information essential to authenticating a GSM mobile phone, thus allowing a phone to receive service whenever the phone is within coverage of a suitable network.

- substitution n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

Encryption that replaces bit strings or character strings with other bit strings or character strings. Note: The resulting ciphertext is called [a] substitution cipher.

- subsystem n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-18 Rev 1

A major subdivision or component of an information system consisting of information, information technology, and personnel that perform one or more specific functions.

- subversive biometric capture subject n.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008) – 3.4.2.3.1

Subversive user who is a biometric capture subject.

- subversive user n.

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008) – 3.4.2.3

User of a biometric system who attempts to subvert the correct and intended system policy.

Examples: Operator letting unsanctioned subject through, users initiating denial of service attack, administrators allowing unsanctioned function creep, subjects impersonating enrolled users.

- superencryption n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An encryption operation for which the plaintext input to be transformed is the ciphertext output of a previous encryption operation.

- superior certification authority n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32

In a hierarchical PKI, a certification authority who has certified the certificate signature key of another CA, and who constrains the activities of that CA.

- supersector n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

An oversized sector written on a disk, as part of a method of copy protection.

- supplementary character, - supplementary check character n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FCD 7064 (09/2000)

Check character which does not belong to the character set of the strings which are to be protected.

- survivability n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The ability of a system to remain in operation or existence despite adverse conditions, including both natural occurrences, accidental actions, and attacks on the system. (See: availability, reliability.)

- symmetric cryptographic technique, - symmetric cryptography n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

symmetric cryptography

Cryptography in which the same cryptographic key is used for encryption and decryption.

RFC 2828 (2000)

symmetric cryptography

(I) A branch of cryptography involving algorithms that use the same key for two different steps of the algorithm (such as encryption and decryption, or signature creation and signature verification). (See: asymmetric cryptography.)

(C) Symmetric cryptography has been used for thousands of years [Kahn]. A modern example of a symmetric encryption algorithm is the U.S. Government’s Data Encryption Algorithm. (See: DEA, DES.)

(C) Symmetric cryptography is sometimes called secret-key cryptography (versus public-key cryptography) because the entities that share the key, such as the originator and the recipient of a message, need to keep the key secret. For example, when Alice wants to ensure confidentiality for data she sends to Bob, she encrypts the data with a secret key, and Bob uses the same key to decrypt. Keeping the shared key secret entails both cost and risk when the key is distributed to both Alice and Bob. Thus, symmetric cryptography has a key management disadvantage compared to asymmetric cryptography.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997, ISO/IEC 11770-1: 1996

symmetric cryptographic technique

A cryptographic technique that uses the same secret key for both the originator’s and the recipient’s transformation. Without knowledge of the secret key, it is computationally infeasible to compute either the originator’s or the recipient’s transformation.

ISO/IEC WD 18033-1 (12/2001)

symmetric cryptographic technique

Cryptographic technique that uses the same secret key for both the encryption and the decryption transformation. Without knowledge of the secret key, it is computationally infeasible to compute either the originator’s or the recipient’s transformation.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 140-2 [CHECK!]

secret key (symmetric) cryptographic algorithm

A cryptographic algorithm that uses a single secret key for both encryption and decryption.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

symmetric cryptographic technique

A cryptographic technique using the same secret key for both the originator’s and the recipient’s operation. (Without the secret key, it is computationally infeasible to compute either operation.)

- symmetric encipherment algorithm n.

See: symmetric encryption algorithm

- symmetric encryption algorithm n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997

symmetric encipherment algorithm

An encipherment algorithm that uses the same secret key for both the originator’s and the recipient’s transformation.

ISO/IEC WD 18033-1 (12/2001)

Encryption algorithm that uses the same secret key for both the encryption and decryption processes. Note: A symmetric encryption algorithm is a symmetric cryptographic technique that is also an encryption algorithm.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-46

secret (symmetric) key encryption

This is the traditional method used for encryption. The same key is used for both encryption and decryption. Only the party or parties that exchange secret messages know the secret key. The biggest problem with symmetric key encryption is securely distributing the keys. Public key techniques are now often used to distribute the symmetric keys.

SP 800-49

Encryption algorithms using the same secret key for encryption and decryption.

- symmetric key n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

secret key

A cryptographic key that is intended for use by a limited number of correspondents for encryption and decryption.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A cryptographic key that is used in a symmetric cryptographic algorithm.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 11770-1: 1996, ISO/IEC WD 13888-1 (11/2001)

secret key

A key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques and usable only by a set of specified entities.

ISO/IEC 11770-3: 1999, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-3 (02/2001)

secret key

A key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques by a set of specified entities.

ISO/IEC WD 18033-1 (12/2001)

secret key

Key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques by a set of specified entities.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

secret key

A cryptographic key that is used with a secret key (symmetric) cryptographic algorithm, that is uniquely associated with one or more entities and is not be made public. The use of the term “secret” in this context does not imply a classification level, but rather implies the need to protect the key from disclosure.

FIPS 201

secret key

A cryptographic key that must be protected from unauthorized disclosure to protect data encrypted with the key.

FIPS 198

secret key

A cryptographic key that is uniquely associated with one or more entities. The use of the term “secret” in this context does not imply a classification level, but rather implies the need to protect the key from disclosure.

FIPS 140-2

secret key

A cryptographic key, used with a secret key cryptographic algorithm, that is uniquely associated with one or more entities and should not be made public.

SP 800-21 [2ndEd]

A single cryptographic key that is used with a secret (symmetric) key algorithm.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

secret key

A key used with symmetric cryptographic techniques by a set of specified entities.

symmetric keys

Keys that are used for symmetric (secret) key cryptography. In a symmetric cryptographic system, the same secret key is used to perform both the cryptographic operation and its inverse (for example to encrypt and decrypt, or to create a message authentication code and to verify the code).

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A cryptographic key that is used to perform both the cryptographic operation and its inverse, for example to encrypt and decrypt, or create a message authentication code and to verify the code.

- SYN flood n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A denial of service attack that sends a host more TCP SYN packets (request to synchronize sequence numbers, used when opening a connection) than the protocol implementation can handle. (See: flooding.)

- synchronous multimodal adj.

See (secondary definition under): multimodal.

- system n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008) – A.2.15

An organized scheme or method; a complex whole; a set of things working together as a mechanism or interconnected network.

Note: Definition source: Oxford dictionary.

See information system.

- system administrator n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-40 Ver 2

A person who manages the technical aspects of a system.

- system development life cycle (SDLC) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 15443-1 (11/2001)

system life cycle

The evolution with time of the system from conception through to disposal.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-34

The scope of activities associated with a system, encompassing the system’s initiation, development and acquisition, implementation, operation and maintenance, and ultimately its disposal that instigates another system initiation.

- system entity n.

See: entity.

- system high n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The highest security level supported by a system at a particular time or in a particular environment. (See: system high security mode.)

- system high security mode n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A mode of operation of an information system, wherein all users having access to the system possess a security clearance or authorization, but not necessarily a need-to-know, for all data handled by the system. (See: mode of operation.)

(C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is widely used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government.

- system integrity n.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

The quality of a data processing system fulfilling its operational purpose while both preventing unauthorized users from making modifications to or use of resources and preventing authorized users from making improper modifications to or improper use of resources.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) “The quality that a system has when it can perform its intended function in a unimpaired manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized manipulation.” [NCS04] (See: system integrity service.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-27A; CNSSI-4009 Adapted

The quality that a system has when it performs its intended function in an unimpaired manner, free from unauthorized manipulation of the system, whether intentional or accidental.

- system integrity service n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A security service that protects system resources in a verifiable manner against unauthorized or accidental change, loss, or destruction. (See: system integrity.)

- system interconnection n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-47

The direct connection of two or more IT systems for the purpose of sharing data and other information resources.

- system life cycle n.

See: system development life cycle.

- system low n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The lowest security level supported by a system at a particular time or in a particular environment. (See: system high.)

- system resource n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) Data contained in an information system; or a service provided by a system; or a system capability, such as processing power or communication bandwidth; or an item of system equipment (i.e., a system component – hardware, firmware, software, or documentation); or a facility that houses system operations and equipment.

- system security officer (SSO) n.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A person responsible for enforcement or administration of the security policy that applies to the system.

- system security plan n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200

Formal document that provides an overview of the security requirements for the information system and describes the security controls in place or planned for meeting those requirements.

- system software n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 140-2

The special software within the cryptographic boundary (e.g., operating system, compilers or utility programs) designed for a specific computer system or family of computer systems to facilitate the operation and maintenance of the computer system, and associated programs, and data.

- system-specific security control n.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

A security control for an information system that has not been designated as a common security control.

- system verification n.

See: (secondary definition under) verification.

The originals sources of these definitions may be protected by copyright. The definitions are republished here for review and commentary.
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