GIST v0.7 ― M
“MAC” to “mutual suspicion”

M

- MAC n. 

See: mandatory access control, message authentication code, Message Authentication Code.

- MAC algorithm n.

See: message authentication code algorithm.

- MAC algorithm key n.

See: message authentication code algorithm key.

- machine readable travel document (MRTD) n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

ICAO establishes international standards for travel documents. An MRTD is an international travel document (e.g., a passport or visa) containing eye- and machine-readable data. ICAO Document 9303 is the international standard for MRTDs.

- maintenance hook n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A trapdoor in software that allows easy maintenance and development of additional features and that may allow entry into the program at unusual points or without the usual checks.

- macro virus n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

A virus that attaches itself to documents and uses the macro programming capabilities of the document’s application to execute and propagate.

- major application n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; OMB Circular A-130, App. III

An application that requires special attention to security due to the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information in the application. Note: All federal applications require some level of protection. Certain applications, because of the information in them, however, require special management oversight and should be treated as major. Adequate security for other applications should be provided by security of the systems in which they operate.

- major information system n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; OMB Circular A-130, App. III

An information system that requires special management attention because of its importance to an agency mission; its high development, operating, or maintenance costs; or its significant role in the administration of agency programs, finances, property, or other resources.

- malicious code, - malicious logic n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

malicious logic

A program implemented in hardware, firmware, or software, and whose purpose is to perform some unauthorized or harmful action. Examples: A logic bomb, a Trojan horse, a virus, a worm.

RFC 2828 (2000)

malicious logic

(I) Hardware, software, or firmware that is intentionally included or inserted in a system for a harmful purpose. (See: logic bomb, Trojan horse, virus, worm.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53 Rev 1; CNSSI-4009

malicious code

Software or firmware intended to perform an unauthorized process that will have adverse impact on the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of an information system. A virus, worm, Trojan horse, or other code-based entity that infects a host.

SP 800-83

malware

A program that is inserted into a system, usually covertly, with the intent of compromising the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of the victim’s data, applications, or operating system or of otherwise annoying or disrupting the victim.

- malicious subject n. 

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008)

Biometric data capture subject who intentionally makes a false claim to the biometric system.

- malware n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A contraction of malicious software. (See: malicious logic.)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term because it is not listed in most dictionaries and could confuse international readers.

- man-in-the-middle (MITM) adj.,- man-in-the-middle attack n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

man-in-the-middle

(I) A form of active wiretapping attack in which the attacker intercepts and selectively modifies communicated data in order to masquerade as one or more of the entities involved in a communication association. (See: hijack attack, piggyback attack.)

(C) For example, suppose Alice and Bob try to establish a session key by using the Diffie-Hellman algorithm without data origin authentication service. A man in the middle could (a) block direct communication between Alice and Bob and then (b) masquerade as Alice sending data to Bob, (c) masquerade as Bob sending data to Alice, (d) establish separate session keys with each of them, and (e) function as a clandestine proxy server between them in order to capture or modify sensitive information that Alice and Bob think they are sending only to each other.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

man-in-the-middle attack

An attack on an authentication protocol in which the attacker is positioned between the individual seeking authentication and the system verifying the authentication. In this attack, the attacker attempts to intercept and alter data traveling between the parties.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

man-in-the-middle attack

An attack on the authentication protocol run in which the attacker positions himself in between the claimant and verifier so that he can intercept and alter data traveling between them.

- management controls n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200

The security controls (i.e., safeguards or countermeasures) for an information system that focus on the management of risk and the management of information system security.

- mandate n.

modonis^IDM (2005)

Definition: A mandate (or proxy) is a revocable role or a set of revocable roles which refer(s) to one or more permissions granted by an identified entity to another identified entity to perform well-defined actions with legal consequences in the name and for the account of the former.

Mandates are a type of characteristic, and thus also an attribute. Mandates (or proxies) must be revocable. E.g., the power of attorney or a parent’s authority over its underage child.

- mandatory access control (MAC) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An access control service that enforces a security policy based on comparing (a) security labels (which indicate how sensitive or critical system resources are) with (b) security clearances (which indicate system entities are eligible to access certain resources). (See: discretionary access control, rule-based security policy.)

(C) This kind of access control is called mandatory because an entity that has clearance to access a resource may not, just by its own volition, enable another entity to access that resource.

(O) “A means of restricting access to objects based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the objects and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of subjects to access information of such sensitivity.” [DOD1]

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-44; CNSSI-4009 Adapted

A means of restricting access to system resources based on the sensitivity (as represented by a label) of the information contained in the system resource and the formal authorization (i.e., clearance) of users to access information of such sensitivity.

FIPS 191

Access controls (which) are driven by the results of a comparison between the user’s trust level or clearance and the sensitivity designation of the information.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

An access control technique that assigns a security level to all resources (e.g., information, parts of a building), assigns a clearance level to all potential users requiring access, and ensures that only users with the appropriate clearance level can access a requested resource.

- mandatory topography n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 201

The format and information required to be displayed on a PIV card. Also known as the standard topography.

- manipulation detection n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

manipulation detection, modification detection

A procedure that is used to detect whether data have been modified, either accidentally or intentionally.

- manipulation detection code n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

manipulation detection code, modification detection code, MDC (abbreviation)

A bit string that is a function of data to which it is attached to allow manipulation detection. Notes: The resulting message (data plus MDC) may then be encrypted in order to achieve secrecy or data authentication. The function used to generate the MDC must be public.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for checksum because the word manipulation implies protection against active attacks, which an ordinary checksum might not provide. Instead, if such protection is intended, use protected checksum or some particular type thereof, depending on which is meant. If such protection is not intended, use error detection code or some specific type of checksum that is not protected.

- manual key transport n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-57

A non-electronic means of transporting cryptographic keys by physically moving a device, document or person containing or possessing the key or a key component.

FIPS 140-2

A non-electronic means of transporting cryptographic keys.

- markup language n. 

OASIS SAML 2.0 (2005)

A set of XML elements and XML attributes to be applied to the structure of an XML document for a specific purpose. A markup language is typically defined by means of a set of XML schemas and accompanying documentation. For example, the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML) is defined by two schemas and a set of normative SAML specification text.

- MARS n. 

An AES finalist.

- mask generation function n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 9796-2 (12/2001)

Function which maps strings of bits to strings of bits of arbitrary specified length, satisfying the following property:

• it is computationally infeasible to predict, give one part of the output but not the input, another part of the output.

- masquerade n., masquerade attack n., masquerading n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

masquerade

The pretence by a entity to be a different entity in order to gain unauthorized access.

RFC 2828 (2000)

masquerade attack

(I) A type of attack in which one system entity illegitimately poses as (assumes the identity of) another entity. (See: spoofing attack.)

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997

masquerade

The pretence by an entity to be a different entity.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

masquerading

When an unauthorized agent claims the identity of another agent it is said to be masquerading.

- master key n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

No such heading in RFC 2828, although it is cross-referenced.

- match vb. & n., - matching n. 

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008)

match (n.)

Comparison decision that the probe biometric sample(s) and the biometric reference are from the same source.

Note that JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008) deprecates match (vb.) and matching (n.) as synonyms for compare (vb.), comparison (n.).

- matching score n. 

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008)

matching score (deprecated)

Note: This term is deprecated in favour of comparison score.

- matrix n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC CD 10118-3 (11/2001)

An 8 by 8 matrix in which each entry is a string of 8 bits in dedicated hash-function 7.

- MCA n. 

See: merchant certification authority.

- MCU n.

See: microcontroller.

- MD2 n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A cryptographic hash [R1319] that produces a 128-bit hash result, was designed by Ron Rivest, and is similar to MD4 and MD5 but slower. (See: message digest.)

- MD4 n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A cryptographic hash [R1320] that produces a 128-bit hash result and was designed by Ron Rivest. (See: message digest and SHA-1.)

- MD5 n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A cryptographic hash [R1321] that produces a 128-bit hash result and was designed by Ron Rivest to be an improved version of MD4.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

One of the most popular hashing algorithms, developed by Professor Ronald L. Rivest of MIT, which produces a 128-bit hash from any input.

- media n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 200

Physical devices or writing surfaces including but not limited to magnetic tapes, optical disks, magnetic disks, LSI memory chips, printouts (but not including display media) onto which information is recorded, stored, or printed within an information system.

- media sanitization n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-88

A general term referring to the actions taken to render data written on media unrecoverable by both ordinary and extraordinary means.

- memorandum of understanding/agreement (MOU/A) n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-47

A document established between two or more parties to define their respective responsibilities in accomplishing a particular goal or mission. In this guide, an MOU/A defines the responsibilities of two or more organizations in establishing, operating, and securing a system interconnection.

- memory card n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

Typically a smart card or any pocket-sized card with an embedded integrated circuit or circuits containing non-volatile memory storage components and perhaps some specific security logic.

- merchant n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) SET usage: “A seller of goods, services, and/or other information who accepts payment for these items electronically.” [SET2] A merchant may also provide electronic selling services and/or electronic delivery of items for sale. With SET, the merchant can offer its cardholders secure electronic interactions, but a merchant that accepts payment cards is required to have a relationship with an acquirer. [SET1, SET2]

- merchant certificate n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) SET usage: A public-key certificate issued to a merchant. Sometimes used to refer to a pair of such certificates where one is for digital signature use and the other is for encryption.

- merchant certification authority (MCA) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) SET usage: A CA that issues digital certificates to merchants and is operated on behalf of a payment card brand, an acquirer, or another party according to brand rules. Acquirers verify and approve requests for merchant certificates prior to issuance by the MCA. An MCA does not issue a CRL, but does distribute CRLs issued by root CAs, brand CAs, geopolitical CAs, and payment gateway CAs. [SET2]

- mesh PKI n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A non-hierarchical PKI architecture in which there are several trusted CAs rather than a single root. Each certificate user bases path validations on the public key of one of the trusted CAs, usually the one that issued that user’s own public-key certificate. Rather than having superior-to-subordinate relationships between CAs, the relationships are peer-to-peer, and CAs issue cross-certificates to each other. (See: hierarchical PKI, trust-file PKI.)

- message n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 9796-2 (12/2001)

String of bits of any length.

ISO/IEC 9796-3: 2000, ISO/IEC 14888-1: 1998,
ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-2 (04/2001), ISO/IEC WD 15946-4 (10/2001)

A string of bits of any length.

- message authentication n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

Verification that a message was sent by the purported originator to the intended recipient and that the message was not changed in transit.

- message authentication code n. 

Compare with Message Authentication Code.

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A bit string that is a function of both data (either plaintext or ciphertext) and a secret key, and that is attached to the data in order to allow data authentication. Note: The function used to generate the message authentication code is typically a one-way function.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use the uncapitalized form message authentication code, because this term mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. Instead, use checksum, error detection code, hash, keyed hash, Message Authentication Code, or protected checksum, depending on what is meant. (See: authentication code.)

(C) In the uncapitalized form, the word message is misleading because it implies that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited to electronic mail (see: Message Handling Systems), the word authentication is misleading because the mechanism primarily serves a data integrity function rather than an authentication function, and the word code is misleading because it implies that either encoding or encryption is involved or that the term refers to computer software.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9797-1: 1999, ISO/IEC WD 13888-1 (11/2001)

The string of bits which is the output of a MAC algorithm. Note: A MAC is sometimes called a cryptographic check value.

SC 27 SD 6 capitalizes this, but since the definition doesn’t refer to the ANSI standard (see the RFC 2828 (C) paragraph, above), it should be uncapitalized.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

FIPS 201

A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of the data.

FIPS 198

A cryptographic checksum that results from passing data through a message authentication algorithm.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A short piece of information used to support authentication of a message. A MAC algorithm accepts as input a secret key and an arbitrary-length message to be authenticated, and outputs a MAC (sometimes known as a tag or checksum). The MAC value protects both a message’s integrity as well as its authenticity, by allowing verifiers (who also possess the secret key) to detect any changes to the message content. MACs are computed and verified with the same key, unlike digital signatures.

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A cryptographic checksum on data that uses a symmetric key to detect both accidental and intentional modifications of the data.

- Message Authentication Code (MAC) n. 

Compare with message authentication code.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) "(The) Message Authentication Code” refers to an ANSI standard for a checksum that is computed with a keyed hash that is based on DES. [A9009] (Also known as the U.S. Government standard Data Authentication Code. [FP113])

(C) The ANSI standard MAC algorithm is equivalent to cipher block chaining with IV = 0.

- message authentication code algorithm (MAC algorithm) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9797-1: 1999

An algorithm for computing a function which maps strings of bits and a secret key to fixed-length strings of bits, satisfying the following two properties:

• for any key and any input string the function can be computed efficiently;
• for any fixed key, and given no prior knowledge of the key, it is computationally infeasible to compute the function value on any new input string, even given knowledge of the set of input strings and corresponding function values, where the value of the ith input string may have been chosen after observing the value of the first i-1 function values.

Notes: (1) A MAC algorithm is sometimes called a cryptographic check function. (2) Computational feasibility depends on the user’s specific security requirements and environment.

SC 27 SD 6 capitalizes the first three words, as it does for message authentication code, but since the definition doesn’t refer to the ANSI standard, it should be uncapitalized.

- message authentication code algorithm key (MAC algorithm key) n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9797-1: 1999

A key that controls the operation of a MAC algorithm.

SC 27 SD 6 capitalizes the first three words, but… see my comments on message authentication code algorithm, above.

- message digest n. 

See: hash result.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for hash result because it unnecessarily duplicates the meaning of the other, more general term and mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way. (See: cryptographic hash, Message Handling Systems.)

- Message Handling Systems n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A ITU-T/ISO system concept, which encompasses the notion of electronic mail but defines more comprehensive OSI systems and services that enable users to exchange messages on a store-and-forward basis. (The ISO equivalent is Message Oriented Text Interchange System.) (See: X.400.)

- message indicator n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use this term as a synonym for initialization value because it mixes concepts in a potentially misleading way.

- message integrity check n., - message integrity code n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(D) ISDs SHOULD NOT use these terms because they mix concepts in a potentially misleading way. (The word message is misleading because it suggests that the mechanism is particularly suitable for or limited to electronic mail. The word code is misleading because it suggests that either encoding or encryption is involved, or that the term refers to computer software.) Instead, use checksum, error detection code, hash, keyed hash, Message Authentication Code, or protected checksum, depending on what is meant.

- message representative n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 9796-2 (12/2001)

Bit string derived as a function of the message and which is combined with the private signature key to yield the signature.

See: digital signature.

- Message Security Protocol (MSP) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A secure message handling protocol [SDNS7] for use with X.400 and Internet mail protocols. Developed by NSA’s SDNS program and used in the U.S. Defense Message System.

- metadata n. 

JTC 1/SC 37 (2008)

Data about data or data elements, possibly including their data descriptions, and data about data ownership, access paths, access rights and data volatility.

Note: Definition source: ISO 2382 Part 17, term 17.06.05.

- metrics n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-55

Tools designed to facilitate decision-making and improve performance and accountability through collection, analysis, and reporting of relevant performance-related data.

- MHS n. 

See: Message Handling Systems.

- microcontroller (MCU) n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A highly integrated computer chip that contains all of the components comprising a controller. Typically this includes a CPU, RAM, some form of ROM, I/O ports, and timers. Unlike a general purpose computer used in IT, a microcontroller is designed to operate in a restricted environment.

- microprocessor card n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

Typically a smart card or any pocket-sized card with an embedded integrated circuit or circuits containing memory and microprocessor components.

- MIME n. 

See: Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions.

- MIME Object Security Services (MOSS) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An Internet protocol [R1848] that applies end-to-end encryption and digital signature to MIME message content, using symmetric cryptography for encryption and asymmetric cryptography for key distribution and signature. MOSS is based on features and specifications of PEM. (See: S/MIME.)

- min-entropy n. 

NIST SP 800-63-1 DRAFT (2008)

A measure of the difficulty that an attacker has to guess the most commonly chosen password used in a system. In this document, entropy is stated in bits. When a password has n-bits of min-entropy then an attacker requires as many trials to find a user with that password as is needed to guess an n-bit random quantity. The attacker is assumed to know the most commonly used password(s). See Appendix A.

- Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components (MISPC) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(N) A technical description to provide a basis for interoperation between PKI components from different vendors; consists primarily of a profile of certificate and CRL extensions and a set of transactions for PKI operation. [MISPC]

- minimum privilege n. 

See: least privilege.

- minor application n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

An application, other than a major application, that requires attention to security due to the risk and magnitude of harm resulting from the loss, misuse, or unauthorized access to or modification of the information in the application. Minor applications are typically included as part of a general support system.

- minutia n., - minutiae pl. 

iAfB-ICSA 1999

minutiae

Small details found in finger images such as ridge endings or bifurcations.

- misnamed files n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-72

A technique used to disguise a file’s content by changing the file’s name to something innocuous or altering its extension to a different type of file, forcing the examiner to identify the files by file signature versus file extension.

- MISPC n. 

See: Minimum Interoperability Specification for PKI Components.

- mission-critical adj. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-60

Any telecommunications or information system that is defined as a national security system (Federal Information Security Management Act of 2002 - FISMA) or processes any information the loss, misuse, disclosure, or unauthorized access to or modification of, would have a debilitating impact on the mission of an agency.

- MISSI user n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(O) MISSI usage: A system entity that is the subject of one or more MISSI X.509 public-key certificates issued under a MISSI certification hierarchy. (See: personality.)

(C) MISSI users include both end users and the authorities that issue certificates. A MISSI user is usually a person but may be a machine or other automated process. Some machines are required to operate non-stop. To avoid downtime needed to exchange the FORTEZZA cards of machine operators at shift changes, the machines may be issued their own cards, as if they were persons.

- mobile code n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; CNSSI-4009 Adapted

Software programs or parts of programs obtained from remote information systems, transmitted across a network, and executed on a local information system without explicit installation or execution by the recipient.

- mobile code technologies n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53

Software technologies that provide the mechanisms for the production and use of mobile code (e.g., Java, JavaScript, ActiveX, VBScript).

- mobile site n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-34

A self-contained, transportable shell custom-fitted with the specific IT equipment and telecommunications necessary to provide full recovery capabilities upon notice of a significant disruption.

- mobile software agent n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

Programs that are goal-directed and capable of suspending their execution on one platform and moving to another platform where they resume execution.

- mode , - mode of operation n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) encryption usage: A technique for enhancing the effect of a cryptographic algorithm or adapting the algorithm for an application, such as applying a block cipher to a sequence of data blocks or a data stream. (See: electronic codebook, cipher block chaining, cipher feedback, output feedback.)

(I) system operation usage: A type of security policy that states the range of classification levels of information that a system is permitted to handle and the range of clearances and authorizations of users who are permitted to access the system. (See: dedicated security mode, multilevel security mode, partitioned security mode, system high security mode.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-38C

mode of operation

An algorithm for the cryptographic transformation of data that features a symmetric key block cipher algorithm.

- model n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A detailed description or scaled representation of one component of a larger system that can be created, operated, and analyzed to predict actual operational characteristics of the final produced component.

- moderate-impact system n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-53; FIPS 200

An information system in which at least one security objective (i.e., confidentiality, integrity, or availability) is assigned a FIPS 199 potential impact value of moderate and no security objective is assigned a FIPS 199 potential impact value of high.

- modification detection n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A synonym for manipulation detection.

- modification detection code n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A synonym for manipulation detection code.

- modulus n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The defining constant in modular arithmetic, and usually a part of the public key in asymmetric cryptography that is based on modular arithmetic. (See: Diffie-Hellman, Rivest-Shamir-Adleman.)

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 10118-4: 1998

A parameter which is a positive integer and a product of two distinct prime numbers.

ISO/IEC FCD 7064 (09/2000)

Integer used as a divisor of an integer dividend in order to obtain an integer remainder.

- monitor n.

See: monitoring authority, sensor.

- monitoring authority n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC WD 13888-1 (11/2001)

A trusted third party monitoring the actions and events and is trusted to provide evidence about what was monitored.

- Morris Worm n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A worm program written by Robert T. Morris, Jr. that flooded the ARPANET in November, 1988, causing problems for thousands of hosts. (See: worm.)

- MOSS n. 

See: MIME Object Security Services.

- motivated impostor n. 

JTC 1/SC 37 (2006⇒2008)

Biometric impostor who acts in a prepared manner through use of artifacts, knowledge or cunning.

- MSP n. 

See: Message Security Protocol.

- multi-application card n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A smart card that runs multiple applications – for example, physical access, logical access, data storage and electronic purse – using a single card.

- multi-factor authentication n.

See strong authentication.

- multi-factor reader n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A smart card reader that includes a PIN pad, biometric reader, or both to allow multi-factor authentication.

- multi-hop problem n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-19

The security risks resulting from a mobile software agent visiting several platforms.

- multi-technology card n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

An ID card that has two or more ID technologies that are independent and that don’t interact or interfere with one another. An example is a card that contains a smart card chip and a magnetic stripe.

- multi-technology reader n.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

A card reader/writer that can accommodate more than one card technology in the same reader (e.g., both ISO/IEC 14443 and ISO/IEC 15693 contactless smart card technologies or both 13.56 MHz and 125 kHz contactless technologies).

- multilevel device n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

A functional unit that can simultaneously process data of two or more security levels without risking to compromise computer security. (See: single-level device.)

- multilevel secure (MLS) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A class of system that has system resources (particularly stored information) at more than one security level (i.e., has different types of sensitive resources) and that permits concurrent access by users who differ in security clearance and need-to-know, but is able to prevent each user from accessing resources for which the user lacks authorization.

- multilevel security mode n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) A mode of operation of an information system, that allows two or more classification levels of information to be processed concurrently within the same system when not all users have a clearance or formal access authorization for all data handled by the system.

(C) This mode is defined formally in U.S. Department of Defense policy regarding system accreditation [DOD2], but the term is also used outside the Defense Department and outside the Government.

- multimodal adj. 

iAfB-ICSA 1999

multiple biometric

A biometric system that includes more than one biometric system or biometric technology.

BEM 2002

multimodal biometric

A biometric device [sic… likely should be a biometric system] which uses information from different biometrics - e.g. fingerprint and hand shape; or fingerprints from two separate fingers. All statistical analysis of multimodal systems should consider how the modes are combined in the comparison process.

IBG

A biometric system that utilizes more than one core technology for user authentication is referred to as multimodal (in contrast to monomodal). Many vendors suggest that multimodal systems can offer more security for the enterprise and convenience for the end user. There are three types of multimodality in the biometric world:

Either/or multimodal systems offer multiple biometric technologies, but only require verification through a single technology. For example, an authentication infrastructure might support facial, voice, and fingerprint at each desktop and allow users to verify through any of these methods. A number of vendors have developed enabling middleware that allows for authentication by means of various biometrics. The benefit of this system is that biometrics, instead of passwords, can be used as a fallback. To have access to either/or multimodality, a user must enroll in each technology. To use finger, face, and voice, for example, one must become familiar with three devices and three submission processes. As a key performance indicator in biometrics is ease-of-use, requiring familiarity with multiple processes can be problematic.

Asynchronous multimodal systems require that a user verify through more than one biometric in sequence. Asynchronous multimodal solutions are comprised of one, two, or three distinct authentication processes. A typical user interaction will consist of a verification on finger scan, then face if finger is successful. The advantage of added security – it is highly unlikely that a user will break two systems – is offset by a reduction in convenience. In addition to the time required to execute these separate submissions correctly (such verification can require 10 seconds of submission) the user must learn multiple biometric processes, as in either/or systems. This can be a challenge for both physical and logical access scenarios.

Synchronous multimodal systems use multiple biometric technologies in a single authentication process. For example, biometric systems exist which use face and voice simultaneously, reducing the likelihood of fraud and reducing the time needed to verify. Systems that offer synchronous multimodality can be difficult to learn, as one must interact with multiple technologies simultaneously.

A great deal of thought has gone into whether multiple biometrics are more or less accurate than a single biometric. This debate must also take into account the fact that the process flow of enrollment and verification are as relevant to real-world performance as the underlying statistical bases for performance. It is rare that multiple biometric technologies will be used at a single authentication point (i.e. a door, a desktop) within an enterprise. It is likely, however, that various technologies will be deployed in suitable environments – voice for telephony-based verification, finger for PC-oriented verification, etc.

- multiple biometric n. 

See: multimodal.

- multiple component incident n. 

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-61

A single incident that encompasses two or more incidents.

- Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) n. 

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) An Internet protocol [R2045] that enhances the basic format of Internet electronic mail messages [R0822] to be able to use character sets other than US-ASCII for textual headers and text content, and to carry non-textual and multi-part content. (See: S/MIME.)

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-41

An extensible mechanism for email. A variety of MIME types exist for sending content such as audio using the Simple Mail Transfer Protocol (SMTP) protocol.

- mutual authentication n., - mutual entity authentication n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC 9798-1: 1997

mutual authentication

Entity authentication which provides both entities with assurance of each other’s identity.

ISO/IEC 11770-3: 1999, ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-3 (02/2001)

mutual entity authentication

Entity authentication which provides both entities with assurance of each other’s identity.

NIST IR 7298 (2006)

SP 800-32

Occurs when parties at both ends of a communication activity authenticate each other.

SCA ISCTAG (2007)

For applications requiring secure access, the process that is used for the smart card-based device to verify that the reader is authentic and to prove its own authenticity to the reader before starting a secure transaction.

- mutual forward secrecy n.

SC 27 SD 6 (2002)

ISO/IEC FDIS 15946-3 (02/2001)

The property that knowledge of both A’s and B’s long-term private keys subsequent to a key agreement operation does not enable the opponent to recompute previously derived keys.

- mutual suspicion n. 

ISO/IEC 2382-8:1998

The relationship between interacting entities in which neither entity relies upon the other entity to function correctly or securely with respect to some property.

RFC 2828 (2000)

(I) The state that exists between two interacting system entities in which neither entity can trust the other to function correctly with regard to some security requirement.